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? • 25, fn .  15, l in e  16, should  read* 'few York Times [ h e r e a f te r  
NY£], Mar. 3, 1957, VI, 67 .
P . 26, fn* 36, l i n e  4> should  read* &YT, a r .  12, 1956, P* 1-9*
p . 80 , fn .  70, l in e  3, shou ld  read* Bee a lso  cases re p o rte d  in
VII CLD 26-28 (1961)* VTI CUD 58-60, 94-96 , 121-22 (1962)5
v ii i  cu) 55-57 (1962).
P. 84, fn . 83 , should reads SPfT, O ct. 18, i 960, p . 47? Ian . 29,
1961, p .  64.
P . 112, f n .  51, should  read* As reco rded  on The '»arch on Washlryrton 
A u tis t  28th  1963» We S h a ll Overcome (Haw York* C ouncil 
f o r  United C iv il  R igh ts  L eadersh ip , 1963)* a u th o rise d  rec o rd in g
P . 114, f n .  53s should read* The -usrch on W ashington. August 28th 
1963* >«e S h a ll Overcome* op.  c i t .
P . 221, f n .  4 2 , should read* G. B e ll and Sons
P . 240, f n .  35» should  read* F ebruary , I 96I ,
P. 243, f n .  49» l in e  1, should read* p u b lish ed  by The Times, Thu 
uc 1 ear Dilemaa
P. 310, f n .  122, should  read* Free Speech? The Arrowsmith Case
P . 324» fn .  155» should  read* M ichael Foot
U sing th e  model o f  a n o rm -o rie n te d  movement s e t  up by N e ll 
S m elser in  h i s  ’Theory o f  C o llec tive  Behavior,  I  have t r a c e d  th e  
sequence o f  e v e n ts  o f  th r e e  p o l i t i c a l  movements: (1) th e  c i v i l  
r i g h t s  movement in  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s ,  1945-64; (2) th e  n u c le a r
d isarm am ent movement in  G rea t B r i t a i n ,  1957-64; (3) s e le c te d  a s p e c ts  
o f  th e  t r a d e  un ion  movement in  A u s t r a l i a ,  1916-64, w ith  p a r t i c u l a r  
em phasis on th e  p e r io d  1937-50. In  a d d i t io n  to  b e in g  movements w hich 
a t te m p t to  m odify o r  c r e a te  norms in  th e  name o f  a  g e n e ra liz e d  b e l i e f  
(u s in g  S m e lse r 's  te rm in o lo g y ) , th e s e  movements c o n ta in  groups and 
in d iv id u a ls  who use  u n c o n v e n tio n a l, and o c c a s io n a l ly  i l l e g a l ,  t a c t i c s  
to  make known t h e i r  demands to  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Through th e  use o f  
v a r io u s  form s o f  n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n ,  th e  movements seek  to  
p e rsu ad e  governm en tal a u t h o r i t i e s  to  p ass  new o r  e n fo rc e  e x i s t in g  
l e g i s l a t i o n ,  i n s t i t u t e  new p o l i c i e s  in  th e  dom estic  o r  fo re ig n  sp h e re , 
o r  p r o te c t  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  c e r t a in  groups w ith in  th e  s o c ie ty .
In  o rd e r  to  e v a lu a te  th e  su c c e s se s  and f a i l u r e s  o f  th e  th re e  
movements, I  have a p p lie d  S m e lse r 's  s i x  d e te rm in a n ts  o f  c o l l e c t iv e  
b e h a v io u r  to  each  o f  th e  movements in  tu r n :  (1) s t r u c t u r a l  co n d u c iv en ess ; 
(2) s t r u c t u r a l  s t r a i n ;  (3) th e  grow th o f  a g e n e ra liz e d  b e l i e f ;  (4) th e  
r o le  o f  p r e c i p i t a t i n g  f a c t o r s ;  (5 ) m o b i l iz a t io n  o f  th e  p a r t i c ip a n t s  f o r  
a c t io n ;  and (6) s o c i a l  c o n t r o l .  In  so  d o in g , I  have sou g h t answ ers 
to  th e  q u e s tio n s  o f  why th e  movements a r i s e  w here th e y  do , when they  
do, and in  th e  way t h a t  th e y  do . F in a l ly ,  I  have so u g h t to  a s s e s s  th e  
rea so n s  c o n t r ib u t in g  to  th e  su c c e s se s  and f a i l u r e s  o f  th e  r e s p e c t iv e
movements.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
E x p erien ce  and o b s e rv a tio n  r e v e a l  th a t  p eo p le  a re  c o n d itio n e d  
by u sa g e , custom , c o n v en tio n  and law -  th e  s o c i a l  r e g u la to r s  o f a 
p e r s o n 's  b e h a v io u r . P eop le  do w hat i s  f a m i l i a r ,  w hat i s  u s u a l ,  and 
what i s  r o u t in e .  They have c e r t a in  id e a s  a s  to  w hat i s  p ro p e r :  th ey  
may a c t  a c c o rd in g  to  co n v en tio n  o u t o f  f e a r  o f  d is a p p ro v a l  o r  s o c ia l  
o s tra c ism ; o r  ac c o rd in g  to  law  o u t o f  f e a r  o f  punishm ent o r  l e g a l  
c o e rc io n .
T r a d i t io n  and th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  way o f  do ing  th in g s  a re  such  s tro n g
components o f  conduct t h a t  d e v ia t io n  from  th e  u s u a l ,  norm al o r  ty p i c a l
\
way o f  a c t in g  i s  very  r a r e .  C onform ity  and r e g u la r i t y  need  n o t be 
demanded o f  peop le  by th r e a te n in g  l e g a l  p u n ishm en t. The judgem ent o f  
co n tem p o raries  o r  o f  p o s t e r i t y  may be a  s t r o n g e r  d e t e r r e n t  to  d e v ia t io n  
than  th e  judgem ent o f  a  c o u r t .  As V eber p o in ts  o u t ,  when a c t io n  reg u ­
l a r l y  r e c u r s ,  i t  becomes imbued w ith  a  s e n se  o f  "o u g h tn ess"  and p eo p le  
become o r ie n te d  to  i t s  r e c u r r e n c e .  Even w ith  r e s p e c t  to  law s: "The 
broad  mass o f  th e  p a r t i c ip a n t s  a c t  in  a  way co rre sp o n d in g  to  l e g a l  
norm s, n o t  o u t o f  o b ed ien ce  re g a rd e d  as  a  l e g a l  o b l ig a t io n ,  b u t e i t h e r  
because th e  env ironm ent approves o f  th e  conduct and d isa p p ro v e s  o f  i t s  
o p p o s ite ,  o r  m erely  as a r e s u l t  o f  u n r e f l e c t l v e  h a b i tu a t io n  to  th e  
r e g u la r i ty  o f  l i f e  t h a t  has eng raved  i t s e l f  as  a  cu s to m .”^
1 Max W eber, On Leu in  Economy and S o c ie ty ,  Max R h e in s te in ,  e d . , 
t r a n s .  by Edward S h l ls  (C am bridge: H arvard  U n iv e rs ity  P re s s ,
1954), p .1 2 .
-  2 -
Why people ab ide  by usage, custom , convention and law i s  a p a r t  
o f  the  s u b je c t m a tte r o f psychology; th a t  people u su a lly  abide by these  
re g u la to rs  o f  conduct i s  a s t a r t i n g  p o in t o f the  s o c ia l  s c ie n c e s . 
Innovation  and d e v ia t io n , by d e f in i t io n ,  a re  excep tio n s  to  the  ru le s  
o f  behav iou r. As ex ce p tio n s , they s tan d  o u t as demanding e x p lan a tio n . 
P o l i t i c a l  d e v ia t io n , no le s s  than o th e r  k in d s , must be ex p la in ed  by 
re fe re n c e  to  the  s tan d a rd s  th a t  a re  regarded  as "normal" a t  the  re le v a n t 
tim e.
Even where people c a s t  in  th e  ro le  o f p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i s t s  t ry  to  
b rin g  about p o l i t i c a l  changes in  th e  s o c ie ty ,  they u su a lly  follow  
methods o f a c tio n  which a re  them selves re g u la te d  by ap p ro p ria te  o r ,  
a t  any r a te ,  ty p ic a l  ru le s  o f conduct. This th e s is  i s  concerned w ith  
th re e  p o l i t i c a l  movements which e x h ib i t  c e r ta in  d i s t i n c t  p a t te rn s  of 
behaviour n o t u su a lly  found in  o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  movements; th a t  i s ,  they 
in d ic a te  d e v ia tio n s  from the  conventions and the laws o f the  s o c ie t ie s  
in  which they o p e ra te . The th re e  a re :  (1) th e  c i v i l  r ig h ts  movement 
in  the  United S ta te s ,  1954-64; (2) the  n u c le a r  disarmament movement in  
Great B r i ta in ,  1957-64; (3) a s e c t io n  o f the  tra d e  union movement in  
A u s tra lia , 1917-64, w ith  p a r t i c u la r  emphasis on the  p e rio d  1937-50. 
While th ese  th re e  movements have c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  in  common w ith  o th e r  
p o l i t i c a l  movements, they a re  d is tin g u is h e d  by th e i r  in c lu s io n  of 
groups and In d iv id u a ls  who u t i l i s e  unconven tional o r  i l l e g a l  t a c t i c s ,  
such as the  p ra c t ic e  o f c i v i l  d iso b ed ien ce , as a  re g u la r  p a r t  of t h e i r  
a c t i v i t i e s .
I  propose to  examine th e se  th re e  p o l i t i c a l  movements as forms o f 
c o lle c t iv e  b eh av io u r, by ex p la in in g  what k ind  o f  c o l le c t iv e  behaviour
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they a r e ,  why they occur where they do, when they do, and in  th e  way
th a t  th ey  do. For purposes o f a n a ly s is ,  I  s h a l l  use a m o d if ica tio n  of
2the  scheme advanced by Sm elser in  h is  Theory o f  C o llec tive  Behaviour.
Sm elser*s work i s  a sy s te m a tic  a ttem p t to  account fo r  v a rio u s  kinds 
o f c o l le c t iv e  beh av io u r. He d e fin e s  c o l le c t iv e  behaviour as "mobiliza­
tion  on the basis  o f  a b e l i e f  which redefines aooial a c tio n . " 2 3 He regards 
th is  as a te c h n ic a l d e f in i t io n  which leav es  ou t o f account types o f 
behav iour such as cerem onial b eh av io u r, th e  au d ien ce , p u b lic  o p in io n , 
propaganda, crime and in d iv id u a l dev iance (hobolsm, a d d ic t io n , alcohol** 
ism ). C u ttin g  through h is  P arson ian  ja rg o n , one can l i s t  th e  c h a ra c te r ­
i s t i c s  of such behav iour: (1) i t  i s  purposive behav iour; (2) i t  i s  
behav iour in v o lv in g  an a ttem p t to  change a p a r t  o f the environm ent;
(3) I t  i s  behav iour a ttem p tin g  to  e f f e c t  change on the  b a s is  o f some
b e l i e f  (g e n e ra lise d  b e l ie f )  which th e  a c t i v i s t s  o r p a r t ic ip a n ts  in  the
behaviour hold  to  be t r u e .  Sm elser makes two o th e r p o in ts  in  d e f in in g  
c o l le c t iv e  beh av io u r. F i r s t ,  th a t  c o l le c t iv e  behaviour i s  u n in s t i tu t io n ­
a l iz e d ;  th a t  i s ,  i t  i s  n e i th e r  e s ta b lis h e d  n o r compulsory behav iour b u t 
r a th e r  behav iour th a t  i s  o u ts id e  o f ,  a lthough  re la te d  to ,  the  i n s t i t u ­
t io n a l  o rd e rs  o f the  s o c ie ty .  Second th a t  th e  b e l ie f s  on which 
c o l le c t iv e  behav iour i s  based a re  assessm en ts o f c e r ta in  co n d itio n s
4
which e i t h e r  do e x i s t  o r which a re  thought to  e x i s t  now o r in  th e  fu tu re .
2
N eil J .  Sm elser, Theory o f  C o llec tive  Behaviour (London: Rout ledge 
& kCegan P a u l, 1962).
3 I b id .y p .8 .  I t a l i c s  in  the  o r ig in a l .
A I b id . ,  pp. 4 -9 , 71-78.
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Sraelser in trod u ces both a c l a s s i f i c a t io n  system  and an explana­
tory model in to  h is  a n a ly s is  of c o l le c t iv e  behaviour. He adopts a 
Farsonian typology o f s o c ia l  a c tio n  in  order to  show th a t s p e c i f i c  
kinds o f c o l le c t iv e  behaviour r e la te  to  s p e c i f i c  components o f s o c ia l  
a c t io n . He argues that c o l le c t iv e  behaviour i s  formed or brought in to  
being as a r e s u lt  o f  c e r ta in  s itu a t io n s  o f  s t r a in .  He su g g ests  th at  
th ere are four re lev a n t p arts  o f the s o c ia l  environment which c o l l e c t iv e  
behaviour may be attem pting to change. These he c i t e s  a s:
(1) v a lu e s , or the le g it im a te  ends o f  the s o c ie ty ;
(2) norms, or the r u le s  or regu la tory  p r in c ip le s  by
which the v a lu es  are r e a liz e d ;
(3) m o b iliza tio n  o f m o tiv a tio n s , or the agents or
s tr u c tu r e s  which r e a l iz e  the norms;
(4) f a c i l i t i e s ,  or in form ation , s k i l l s ,  to o ls  or
oth er  means used by agents or s tr u c tu r e s . 5
He then c l a s s i f i e s  c o l l e c t iv e  behaviour as i t  r e la t e s  to  or i s  o r ien te d  
towards th ese  four components o f  s o c ia l  a c tio n :
(1) the v a lu e -o r ie n te d  movement, or c o l le c t iv e  behaviour  
m obilized  on the b a s is  o f a g en era lized  b e l i e f  ( in  t h is  
case a v a lu e -o r ie n te d  b e l i e f )  which attem pts to  a l t e r  
the v a lu es  o f th e  s o c ie ty ;^
(2) the nonm -oriented movement, or c o l le c t iv e  behaviour  
m obilized  on th e b a s is  o f a g en era lized  b e l i e f  ( in  t h is  
case  a norm -oriented b e l i e f )  which attem pts to  a l t e r  the  
norms o f  the s o c ie t y ; * 67
Ib id .,  pp. 23-46 .
6 Ib id .,  pp. 313-81.
7 Ib id .,  pp. 270-312.
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(3) the hostile outburst, or collective behaviour mobilized 
on the basis of a generalized belief (in this case a 
hostile belief) which attempts to act against agentsg
in the society;
(4) the craze or panic, or collective behaviour mobilized
on the basis of generalized beliefs (in this case either
wish fulfilment or hysteria) which attempt to redefine
certain facilities (information, knowledge, skills) in 
9the society.
Smelser then moves from this classification system to an explana­
tory model which will use this system. He argues that any given kind 
of collective behaviour is determined, in the sense of being influenced 
or conditioned, by six factors: (1) structural conduciveness; (2) struc­
tural strain; (3) growth and spread of a generalized belief; (4) pre­
cipitating factors; (5) mobilization of participants for action;
(6) operation of social control. ^  These factors or determinants 
are applicable to each major type of collective behaviour. By analogy 
with the concept "value-added" in economics, Smelser explains that each 
determinant is a necessary condition for the next factor to operate as 
a determinant. In his theory, the determinants must combine in a definite 
analytical, although not temporal, pattern to produce a specific and
Ibid., pp. 222-69,
9 Ibid., PP* 131-221.
10 Ibid., pp. 15-18.
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distinct kind of collective behaviour*^ He argues that "value-added”
posits "a definite sequence for the activation of determinants but does
not posit a definite sequence for the empirical establishment of events 
12and situations."
In general, the six determinants indicate the conditions by which 
any form of collective behaviour will be shaped. Structural conducive­
ness indicates the structures in the society which permit, encourage, or 
discourage a given kind of collective behaviour. Structural strain 
indicates the conflicts, ambiguities, real or anticipated deprivations, 
and discrepancies in the society which elicit a given kind of collective 
behaviour. The growth and spread of a generalized belief indicates the 
making of the situation of strain or the conflict meaningful to the 
potential activists of a given kind of collective behaviour by identifying 
and explaining the strain and outlining appropriate responses. Precipita­
ting factors indicate the specific events which initiate a given kind of 
collective behaviour. Mobilization of the participants for action indicates 
the ways in which the affected activists act in a given kind of collective 
behaviour. The operation of social control indicates the counter-determinal
Ibid., pp. 12-20. Smelser argues that the "value-added"process 
differs from the "natural history" approach used by various 
writers to discuss episodes of collective behaviour. He says 
that "natural history" fails to take into account dormant but 
existing determinants, while "value-added" can allow for the 
occurrence or existence of an event, on the one hand, and its 
activation as a determinant on the other. This distinction between 
the two approaches appears to me to be based on Smelser’s misreading 
of certain authors. The methodology used by Crane Brinton, to cite 
an example of Smelser*s of a writer using "natural history", does 
not differ in any major sense from Smelser’s adaptation of "value- 
added". See Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution3 rev. ed.
(New York: Vintage Books, 1957), pp. 3-27.
12 Smelser, op• cit,9 p. 20
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w hich p r e v e n t ,  i n t e r r u p t ,  d e f l e c t ,  i n h i b i t  o r  o th e rw ise  a f f e c t  th e  
p re v io u s  f iv e  d e te rm in a n ts  o f  a g iv en  k in d  o f  c o l l e c t iv e  behaviour*
S m e lse r’ s work p ro v id e s  a c o n c e p tu a l model w hich d e s c r ib e s
s im p le r  and more a c c u ra te ly  a n a ly z a b le  forms o f  c o l l e c t iv e  b eh av io u r
th an  o ccu r in  th e  r e a l  w orld* I t  i s  l e s s  a  f u l l - s c a l e  th e o ry  th an  a
com parison o f  d i f f e r e n t  forms o f  c o l l e c t iv e  behav iour*  In  f a c t ,  th e
work sh o u ld  have been more a c c u ra te ly  t i t l e d  Idea l Types o f  C o llec tive
Behaviour• For l i k e  W eber’s " id e a l  ty p e s " ,  S m else r’s forms o f  c o l l e c t iv e
b eh av io u r " a re  used  as c o n c e p tu a l in s tru m e n ts  f o r  comparison w ith  and
13th e  measurement o f r e a l i t y * "  I d e a l  ty p e s  d e s c r ib e ,  b u t they  a r e  n o t 
e m p ir ic a l  d e s c r ip t io n s *  One need  n o t f e a r  do ing  v io le n c e  to  r e a l i t y  i f  
one re g a rd s  S m else r’ s work as  p ro v id in g  a  s e t  o f  id e a l  ty p es  w ith  which 
one can compare e m p ir ic a l  cases*  ^
A ccord ing  to  S m e lse r’ s system  o f  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  th e  th r e e  p o l i t i c a l  
movements c i te d  in  t h i s  th e s i s  approx im ate  most c lo s e ly  to  n o rm -o rie n te d  
movements; f o r ,  in  th e  m ain , they  a re  a tte m p ts  to  a l t e r  r u le s  o r  p o l i c i e s  
of th e  s o c ie ty  in  th e  name o f c e r t a in  g e n e ra liz e d  b e l i e f s . ^ “*
Max W eber, On the Methodology o f  the S ocia l Sciences, Edward A, S h i ls  
and Henry A* F in c h , e d s . and tra n s*  (G lencoe : F ree  P r e s s ,  1 9 49 ), p*97* 
I t a l i c s  in  th e  o r i g i n a l .
S m e lse r 's  id e a l  ty p e s  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  b e h a v io u r can be used  even by 
th o se  who f in d  S m e lse r 's  sy stem  o f c l a s s i f y i n g  components o f s o c ia l  
a c t io n  cumbersome and tu rg id *  They s ta n d  up as in s tru m e n ts  fo r  
com paring and m easuring  r e a l i t y  even when th ey  a re  c o n s id e re d  in d e ­
p e n d e n tly  o f t h e i r  P a rso n ia n  fo re b e a rs*  A f te r  d o u b tin g  th e  w orth  o f  
a work which used  such  fo rm id ab le  ja rg o n ,  I  was r e l ie v e d  and p le a se d  
to  f in d  th a t  S m else r’ s models o f  b e h a v io u r  w ere used  by George Rudd, 
an h i s t o r i a n  whose work I  re sp e c t*  See George Rudd, The Crowd in  
H istory: A Study o f  Popular Disturbances in  France and England, 17SO-  
1848 (New Y ork: John W iley & S ons, 1964).
S m else r, op c i t , ,  p .2 7 0 .
The relation between the components of social action and the 
movements discussed would approximate the following table:
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Components of 
Social Action
Civil Rights i
Movement
luclear Disarmament 
Movement
Trade Union 
Movement
Value Democratic Democratic Democratic
Capitalism Capitalism Capitalism
Norm Access to public 
Ac commoda tion
Weapons testing Trade with 
Japan
Mobilization Congress of Committee of 100 Waterside Workers * 
Federationof motivation Racial Equality
Facilities Knowledge of Knowledge of Knowledge ofJapanese
AggressionNegro Discontent Radio-activity
The six determinants of a norm-oriented movement indicate the ideal 
conditions under which activists will develop and act on a norm-oriented 
belief:
(1) Structural conduciveness for a norm-oriented movement involves 
the possibility of altering the norms without fundamentally altering the 
values of the society. Certain channels for expressing dissatisfaction 
must remain open so that the activists are able to continue with norm- 
oriented activity and are not forced into activity which attempts to alter 
the values of the society or which results in expressions of hostility."^
(2) Strains or conflicts mist exist which create demands to change 
the social environment,^
(3) Beliefs as to what is wrong with a regulation or policy and how 
the wrong is to be corrected may be built up through a variety of ways:
16 Ibid.,pp. 278-87.
17 Ibid», pp. 287-92
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l i t e r a t u r e ;  m a n ife s to s ;  th e  mind o f an in d iv id u a l ;  im p o r ta t io n  from one
18c u l t u r a l  s e t t i n g  in to  a n o th e r .
(4 ) P r e c ip i t a t i n g  f a c to r s  o r  s p e c i f i c  e v e n ts  sudden ly  sym bolize one
o f  th e  c o n d itio n s  o f  s t r a i n .  They fo cu s th e  b e l i e f ,  c r e a te  a  sen se  o f
19u rg e n c y , and h a s te n  th e  m o b i l iz a tio n  f o r  a c t io n .
(5 ) M o b iliz a tio n  o f  th e  movement f o r  a c t io n  i s  h e a v ily  dependent 
upon th e  r o le  w hich th e  le a d e r s h ip  p la y s  and i t s  ch o ice  o f  s t r a t e g y  and 
t a c t i c s .  In  g e n e ra l ,  th e  movement goes th rough  a slow  b eg in n in g  p h ase , 
w hich i s  fo llo w ed  by a  p e r io d  o f  e n t h u s i a s t i c  m o b i l iz a t io n ,  a f t e r  w hich 
th e  movement s e t t l e s  in to  an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  and o rg a n iz e d  p a t t e r n  o f 
b e h a v io u r .2^
(6) G enera l encouragem ent from  th e  a g e n c ie s  o f s o c i a l  c o n t ro l  w i l l
a c t  as a b o o s t to  th e  n o rm -o rie n te d  movement; g e n e ra l d iscou ragem en t w i l l
e i t h e r  send  th e  movement in to  d e c l in e  o r  i n t o  o th e r  th an  n o rm -o rie n te d
forms o f a c t i v i t y .  Encouragem ent Blight in c lu d e  p e rm it t in g  th e  le g i t im a te
e x p re s s io n  o f  g rie v a n c e s  o r  th e  h e a r in g  o f  c o m p la in ts . D iscouragem ent
m ight in c lu d e  r e f u s in g  to  re c o g n iz e  th e  movement ( r e f u s a l  to  n e g o t i a t e ,
r e f u s a l  to  m eet l e a d e r s h ip ) ,  v a c i l l a t i o n  in  th e  fa c e  o f  p r e s s u r e ,  c lo s in g
o f f  a l l  avenues o f a g i t a t i o n ,  ta k in g  s i d e s ,  o r  open ly  en co u rag in g  some
21o th e r  k in d  of c o l l e c t iv e  o u tb u r s t .
To r e tu r n  to  th e  o b je c t iv e  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  s t r u c t u r a l  conduciveness 
and s t r u c t u r a l  s t r a i n  a re  p a r t i c u l a r l y  im p o r ta n t in  e x p la in in g  why th e
18 I b id . ,  pp . 292-94 .
19 I b id . ,  pp . 294-96 .
20 I b id . ,  pp . 296-306. 
21 I b id . ,  pp . 306-10 .
-  10 -
c ite d  p o l i t i c a l  movements occur where they do; the growth o f a g en era lized  
b e l i e f  and the r o le  o f p r e c ip ita t in g  fa c to r s  are p a r t ic u la r ly  important 
in  ex p la in in g  way they occur wueu they do; m o b iliza tio n  o f the p a r t ic ip a n ts  
fo r  a c t io n  and the op eration  o f  s o c ia l  co n tr o l are p a r t ic u la r ly  im portant 
in  ex p la in in g  why they occur in  the way tuat they do,
D e f in it io n  o f Concepts
I t  i s  now n ecessary  to  d e fin e  in  a prelim inary way some o f  the 
lea d in g  concepts used in  th is  t h e s i s ,  v iz « ,  the iu ea  o f  a ‘'movement*’, 
and some o f the methods e s p e c ia l ly  c h a r a c te r is t ic  of the p o l i t i c a l  
movements stu d ied  in  the th e s is  -  d ir e c t  a c tio n  and i t s  suo-form a, " c iv i l  
d isobed ience"  and " p o l i t ic a l  strike**«
Movement* The Oxford E nglish D ic tion ary  d e f in e s  a movement a s : **A 
course or s e r ie s  o f  a c t io n s  and endeavours on the part o f  a body o f
p erso n s, moving or tending so re  or l e s s  con tin u ou sly  toward some s p e c ia l
22end."“ This d e f in it io n  i s  com patib le w ith  th e  d e sc r ip tio n  o f  movements
23 24giveu by Certh and H i l l s  and h e b e r le . These w r ite r s  empnasize th at  
movements must be In te n t upon changing in s t i t u t io n s ;  th a t th ere must be 
a turnover o f  membership w ith ou t the movement lo s in g  i t s  id e n t i ty ;  th a t  
a movement may con ta in  organ ized  groups aa w e ll  as in d iv id u a ls ;  that the  
membership must be aware o f  i t s  common I n te r e s t s  or p r in c ip le s ,  h eb erle  
s t r e s s e s  th e l a s t  p o in t:
^  Oxford English D ic tion ary  tYl (1 9 3 3 ), 729.
23 Hens G erth  end C. W right M ills ,  Character and S o c ia l S tru c tu re :
The Psychology o f  S o c ia l I n s t i tu t io n *  (London: Koutledge 4 
Kegan P au l, 1934).
24 Rudolph H e b e r le , S o c ia l Movements: An In tro d u c tio n  to  P o l i t i c a l  
S ocio logy  (New York: A pp leton -C entury-C rofts, 1951 ).
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. . .m e r e  s i m i l a r i t y  o f  se n tim e n ts  o c c u rr in g  in d e p en d en tly  
among a la r g e  number o f p eo p le  does n o t  c o n s t i tu te  a 
movement, n o r  does mere im i ta t iv e  mass a c t io n .  A sen se  
o f group id e n t i t y  and s o l i d a r i t y  i s  r e q u ir e d ,  f o r  on ly  
when th e  a c t in g  in d iv id u a ls  have become aw are o f  th e  f a c t  
t h a t  they  have s e n tim e n ts  and g o a ls  in  common -  when they  
th in k  o f  them selves as b e in g  u n i te d  w ith  each  o th e r  in  
a c t io n  th rough  th e se  se n tim e n ts  and f o r  th e s e  g o a ls  -  do 
we acknow ledge th e  e x is te n c e  o f a  s o c i a l  movement. 25
I  d e f in e  p o li t ic a l  movements as movements w hich a tte m p t to  
in f lu e n c e  th e  power o f th e  s t a t e .
Direct Action• H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  th e  te rm  " d i r e c t  a c t io n "  has
r e f e r r e d  p r im a r i ly  to  methods o f  th e  la b o r  movement w hich do n o t r e ly
upon e i t h e r  governm ental p r o te c t io n  o r  p a r lia m e n ta ry  p ro c e d u re , such
as a r b i t r a t i o n  o r  p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n  th rough  a  la b o r  p a r ty .  As a  concep t
c e n t r a l  to  th e  th e o ry  o f  s y n d ic a l is m , " d i r e c t  a c t io n "  was reg a rd ed  as
th e  w o rk e rs ' c h ie f  weapon in  th e  c l a s s  s t r u g g le  a g a in s t  b o th  em ployers
and th e  governm ent. A g a in s t th e  fo rm er, w orkers co u ld  u se  th e  s t r i k e ,
th e  b o y c o t t ,  and sa b o ta g e ; a g a in s t  th e  l a t t e r ,  a g i t a t i o n ,  d e m o n s tra tio n s ,
r e f u s a l  to  jo i n  th e  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s ,  and o th e r  forms o f  mass p r e s s u r e .
D ire c t  a c t io n  need  n o t  e n t a i l  v io le n c e ,  a lth o u g h  som etim es i t  w i l l  assume
v io l e n t  fo rm s; o f t e n ,  how ever, syndicalist i n t e l l e c t u a l s  have made a t u l t  
26o f  v io le n c e " .  A French s y n d i c a l i s t  w r i t e r  s a y s ,  " D ire c t  A ction  i s  
opposed to  th e  i n d i r e c t  and le g a l iz e d  a c t io n  o f dem ocracy, o f  P a r lia m e n t 
and o f p a r t i e s .  I t  means t h a t  in s te a d  o f d e le g a t in g  to  o th e rs  th e  fu n c tio n  
o f a c t io n  ( fo llo w in g  th e  h a b i t  o f  dem ocracy) th e  w orking c la s s  i s
25 I b i d . ,  p . 7 .
26 Q uoting V al R. Lorw in, The French Labor Movement (Cam bridge: 
H arvard  U n iv e rs i ty  P r e s s ,  1 9 5 4 ), p . 33.
Q uoting  H ubert L a g a rd e l le ,  in  P au l F re d e r ic k  B r is se n d e n ,
The I»W.W.: A Study o f  American Syndicalism  (New Y ork: Columbia 
U n iv e r s i ty ,  1 9 19 ), p p . 276-77 .
27
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27d e te rm in e d  to  work f o r  i t s e l f ” .
W hile th e  co n cep t o f d i r e c t  a c t io n  has been more i n f l u e n t i a l  in
i n d u s t r i a l  la b o r  movements than  e lse w h e re , some o f  i t s  r e l a t e d  id e a s ,
28such  as th e  g e n e ra l s t r i k e  and th e  co n sc io u s m in o r ity ,  have in f lu e n c e d
com munist and a n a r c h is t  th in k in g .  In  a d d i t io n ,  i t  has " c o n tr ib u te d  to
29p r e s e n t  day c r i t i c i s m  o f s o v e re ig n ty  and o f  th e  d em o cra tic  s t a t e " .
D ire c t  a c t io n  has come to  mean: (1) a te c h n iq u e  o f  a c t io n  d i r e c t l y
in v o lv in g  th e  p a r t i c ip a n t s  in  p r o t e s t ;  o r  (2) s i t u a t i o n s  w here such  a
te c h n iq u e  i s  u se d . One w r i t e r  speaks o f  i t  as " a c t io n  engaged in
d i r e c t l y  by th e  p o p u lace  r a th e r  th an  th rough  p o l i t i c a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,
30m i l i t a r y  fo rm atio n s  o r  o th e r  ’ i n d i r e c t '  m eans". A nother w r i t e r  h as  a
more e x te n s iv e  d e f i n i t i o n :  "a  th e o ry  and p r a c t i c e  o f  p o l i t i c s  t h a t
e n v isa g e s  th e  a c t iv e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of th e  overw helm ing m a jo r i ty  in  th e
making and im plem enting  o f  p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s io n s " .  A nother c o n t r a s t s
i t  w ith  o th e r  i n d i r e c t  p ro c e s s e s ,  such as e d u c a tio n a l  o r  e l e c t o r a l  means
32o r  c o n v e n tio n a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p ro c e d u re s . The t a c t i c s  o f  d i r e c t  a c t io n ,  
as  so  d e f in e d  may in c lu d e  v io l e n t  o n e s , b u t  c u r r e n t  u sage  e q u a te s  d i r e c t  
a c t io n  t a c t i c s  w ith  n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n  t a c t i c s .
See Georges S o r e l ,  R e fle c tio n s  on V iolence ,  t r a n s .  by T .E . Hulme 
and J .  R oth , in t r o .b y  Edward A. S h i ls  (New Y ork: C o l l ie r  B ooks, 1961).
Lewis L. Lorw in, " D ire c t  A c tio n " , Encyclopedia o f  the S o c ia l Sciences ,  
V (1 9 3 1 ), 158. See a ls o  th e  same a u th o r 's  work u n d er th e  name o f  
L ouis L ev in e , The Labor Movement in  France: A Study in  Revolutionary  
Syndicalism  (New Y ork: Columbia U n iv e r s i ty ,  1912).
W illiam  R obert M i l le r ,  nonviolence: A C hristian  In te rp re ta tio n  
(New Y ork: A sso c ia tio n  P r e s s ,  1 9 6 4 ), p .  54 .
P e te r  Cadogan,"The P o l i t i c s  o f  D ire c t io n  A ctio n "  Anarchy,  N o .13 
(M arch, 1 9 6 2 ), p . 68.
Gene S h a rp , " D e f in i t io n s  o f  a Few Key Terms", in  C iv ilia n  Defense 
(London: Peace News, 1964 ), p p . 65 -6 6 . See A lso Gene S h a rp , "F ac in g  
T o ta l i ta r ia n is m  w ith o u t W ar" ,in  Ted Dunn, e d . A lte rn a tiv e s  to  War 
and Violence  -  A Search (London: James C la rk e  & C o ., 1 9 6 3 ), p p . 135-48.
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April Carter includes three categories of action under the term
"direct action": (1) economic action, such as strikes, boycotts, or
picketing; (2) civil disobedience and physical intervention, such as
acts of trespass or sit-ins; (3) non-cooperation with the state, such
as revenue refusal, conscientious objection, disobedience of govern-
33mental decrees, or a general strike. I would add to these three
categories of direct action, two others which Carter refers to as
components of non-violent, but not direct, action - constitutional action
and propaganda, such as deputations and public meetings, and symbolic
action, such as marches and fasts. ^
Where direct action is non-violent, that is, non-violent direct
action, the term is interchangeable with non-violent action• I prefer
to include "direct" in the term to emphasize the "directness" of the
operation, for this appears to be essential to a full understanding
of the term. Following Sharp, non-violent action, or non-violent direct
action, is a generic term used to Include such phenomena as non-violent
33resistance (Satyagraha) and passive resistance. Protests without 
recourse to violence may be made by either acts of commission (e.g., 
Negroes entering white section of a bus terminal) or acts of omission 
(e.g., refusals to load ships bound for the Netherlands East Indies).
In addition to possible differences in specific techniques of non-violent 
direct action, there are also variation? in the motives for its use, the
April Carter, Direct Action (London: Peace News, n.d.), p. 34.
These categories are not mutually exclusive. Conscientious objection 
is not necessarily illegal and should not ordinarily be classed as 
"action against the state”.
34 Ibid. See Appendix A.
35 Sharp, "Definitions of a Few Key Terms", op. cit., p. 65.
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attitude bald toward the opponent, the objectives to be gained, and the
36relation of noo-violent action to other techniques of action*
historically, the different kinds of non-violent direct action have
had distinct meanings* In Gandhien thought, a distinction is nade between
non-violent resistance and passive resistance, the ferner being what was
practised by the Indians in South Africa at the beginning of the twentieth
century and the latter what wes practised by the suffragettes In Great
Britain at roughly the save tine*
"hon-vlolent resistance'5 or "satyagrahe” is defined by Gandhi as
37"soul force pure and simple", or "the force which Is boro of Truth and
33
Love or non-violence*M Its essential elenent is its refusal to sanction 
cooperation with what la regarded as evil* This refusal, as well as 
touching the heart of the opponent, nay act on hin coercively, but if so, 
the non-violent realster, according to Gandhi, should do what ha can to 
reduce the elenent of coercion* He nay even renounce concessions which 
have been nade to hin if he believes that they represent the fruits of 
coercion* Mon-violent resistance la not a tactic, but a way of llfes 
"Son-violence la a universal law acting under all circus»tances* Disregard 
of It is the surest way to destruction"* It is the continual pursuit of 
truth by non-violent naans* It is undertaken for the good of society* It 
has regard for both ends and aieana* It must cone fron the heart as veil
36 Ibid., p. 66.
37 M*£* Gandhi, Satyagraha in South Africa, trass* by Valji Govindji 
Desei, rev* ed* (Ahmedabad: NavajIvan Publishing House, 1930), p. 113*
Ibid*, p. 109.
H*£*Gandhi, Harijan, July 15, 1939, quoted in Gopinath Dhawan,
The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, rev* ed* (Ahnedabad: 
havajivan Publishing Mouse, 1951), p, 40,
39
as from the brain: "Non-violence to be a creed has to be all-pervasive,
I cannot be non-violent about one activity of mine and violent about
40others. That would be a policy, not a life-force".
"Passive resistance", on the other hand, is not a way of life but
a tactical weapon. Passive resistance might appear to bring about results
similar to those of non-violent resistance, but it does so, argues Gandhi,
without the use of "soul force", without the weapon of love, and without
the total and future rejection of violence. **
In current usage, the terms "non-violent resistance" and "passive
resistance" appear to be used interchangeably, with non-violent resistance
being the more commonly used of the two. Martin Luther King refers to
non-violence as being adoptable as both a technique and a way of life and
most contemporary writers would agree with this duality. King says that
while "nonviolence in the truest sense is not a strategy that one uses
simply because it is expedient at the moment.... the willingness to use
_ 42nonviolence as a technique is a step forward • Unlike Gandhi, who often
43spoke with contempt of those who used passive resistance, King recognises 
that its tactical practitioners may, in the future, become converted to
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M.K. Gandhi, Bari Jan, Oct. 12, 1935, quoted in M.K. Gandhi, Non-Violence 
in Peace and War, Vol.X, 3rd ed. (Ahmedabad: NavajIvan Publishing House, 
1948) p.110.
Gandhi, Satyagraha in South Africa, op. cit., pp. 111-15.
Martin Luther King, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story 
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1960), p. 71.
On at least several occasions, however, Gandhi said, "It did not 
matter if non-violence was accepted as a policy provided such acceptance 
was sincere and honest". M.K. Gandhi, Prayer Speech, Feb. 5, 1947, 
quoted in Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, Vol.X (AhmedabadiNav- 
ajivan Publishing House, 1956), p.534.
I am grateful to Kenneth Rivett for bringing this to my attention.
See also M.K. Gandhi, Young India, April 10, 1930, quoted in Gene Sharp;
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n o n -v io le n c e  as a way o f  l i f e .  He seems n o t to  o b je c t  to  c o e rc io n  as su ch .
C iv il  disobedience• The te rm  " c i v i l  d iso b e d ie n c e ” was f i r s t  used  by
Thoreau to  e x p la in  h i s  r e f u s a l  to  pay h is  p o l l  ta x  to  a  governm ent w hich he
44c o n s id e re d  to  be engaged in  an u n ju s t  w ar. When u n ju s t  laws o r  an u n ju s t  
system  e x i s t ,  th e  c i t i z e n  has th r e e  ch o ic e s  open to  h im : he can obey th e
la w s; he can t r y  to  change th e  la w s , w h ile  obeying  them u n t i l  he has suc­
ceeded ; he can b reak  th e  law s im m ed ia te ly . At th e  p o in t  a t  w hich th e  
government no lo n g e r  a c te d  j u s t l y ,  th e  m oral man, Thoreau a rg u ed , had to  
r e fu s e  to  c o o p e ra te  w ith  i t .  One way to  do t h i s  was to  b reak  th e  ta x  laws
and be p re p a re d  to  go to  j a i l  fo r  a cause t h a t  i s  m o ra lly  r i g h t .
45For G andhi, th e  "b reach  o f  unm oral s t a t u to r y  e n a c tm e n ts " , was a n o th e r
s te p  in  a s a ty a g ra h a  cam paign. He o f te n  used  th e  te rm  " c i v i l  r e s i s ta n c e "
f o r  " c i v i l  d iso b e d ie n c e " , b u t  in  b o th  cases  he em phasized t h a t  " c i v i l "
46 47meant n o n -v io le n t  o r  c i v i l i z e d ,  as w e ll as p u b l i c .  As th e  most d r a s t i c
form o f  n o n -c o o p e ra tio n , i t  had to  be used  w ith  ex trem e c a r e ;  w hereas o th e r  
forms o f n o n -c o o p e ra tio n  cou ld  be p r a c t i s e d  s a f e ly  by th e  m asses , c i v i l
43(C td)
Gandhi Wields the Weapon o f  Moral Power: Three Case S tud ies  
(Ahmedabad: N avajivan  P u b lis h in g  H ouse, 1 9 6 0 ), p . 93 .
44Henry David T horeau , "On th e  Duty o f C iv i l  D isob ed ien ce"  in  Henry David 
T horeau, Walden (New Y ork: New American L ib ra ry ,  19 4 2 ), pp . 222-40 .
45 G handi, Young In d ia 9 V o l . I ,  p . 22 , quo ted  in  Dhawan, op• c i t % 9 p .2 6 7 .
46 M.K. G handi, Non-Violence in  Peace and War9 V o l . I I  (Ahmedabad:
N avajivan  P u b lis h in g  H ouse, 1949 ), p .2 5 .
47 Gandhi, Harijan9 A pr. 1 , 1939, quo ted  in  Dhawan, op• c i t , 9 p .2 6 9 .
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disobedience, presupposing as it did a usual obedience to the laws,
could be practised “only as a last resort and by a select few in the
48first instance at any rate." It could oe directed against particular 
unjust laws or against general laws of the unjust state; it could be 
undertaken by groups or by individuals; it could be offensive or defensive, 
With respect to the latter distinction, Ghandi said:
Aggressive, assertive or offensive civil disobedience 
is non-violent, wilful disobedience of laws of the state 
whose breach does not involve moral turpitude and is 
undertaken as a symbol of revolt against the State [e.g., 
refusing to pay taxes] ....Defensive civil disobedience, 
on the other hand, is involuntary or reluctant non-violent 
disobedience of such laws as are in themselves bad and 
pbedience to which would be inconsistent with one's self 
respect or human dignity [e.g., picketing in violation of 
orders prohibiting same]....
Civil disobedience can be defined as non-violent direct action taken 
in open defiance of a positive law for the express purpose of opposing 
governmental policy. It is a protest against laws, policies or decisions 
of the government in order to frustrate or change the laws or policies.
The individual or group may violate a law by a positive act of commission, 
such as trespassing on private property, or by a negative act of omission, 
such as refusing to pay income taxes to support a war economy.
Civil disobedience may include forms of non-cooperation, such as 
refusal to comply with a policeman's orders to leave certain premises, 
but not all forms of non-cooperation violate a law, such as certain in­
stances of black bans on particular ships. Civil disobedience is a type 
of non-violent direct action, since the latter may include categories of 
action which do not involve law-breaking. Sometimes forms of non-violent
48Gandhi, Young India, Vol.I, p. 223, quoted in Dhawan, op oit.3 p. 267. 
49Gandhi, Young India3 Vol.I, p. 983, quoted in Dhawan, op. o£t.,p. 273.
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direct action which were not launched as acts of civil disobedience may 
become such. Should a positive law be invoked by the authorities which 
the activists had thought would not be, the act becomes one of civil 
disobedience if the activists decide to continue with their protest at 
the price of breaking the law; for example, if the police invoked an 
anti-parade ordinance after a peaceful march had been undertaken, an act 
of civil disobedience would occur once it was decided to continue the 
march. The situation may be complicated within a federal system of govern­
ment, where an act could be one of civil disobedience to local laws but 
not to the federal laws.
The law which is broken may be the actual object of dissent or 
symbolic of the object of dissent; in the latter instance, although the 
law which is broken is not itself regarded as oppressive, it is symbolic 
of the political situation which is so regarded. Civil disobedience is 
usually used when other remedies of protest do not exist or have been 
exhausted. It is used when the activists believe that legal devices for 
a redress of grievances have failed; orderly changes of laws or govern­
mental personnel have proved ineffective; the urgency of the situation 
makes it impractical to resort to more conventional methods. It may be 
used when the activists, as well as perhaps rejecting other methods on 
moral grounds, do not command any stores of armed weapons. It is used to 
create a conflict situation, so as to force the opposition into a 
confrontation.
When the conscious decision is made publicly to break a law as an 
act of protest, whatever moral, legal or rational reasons the person has 
for obeying laws yield to stronger reasons for not obeying a particular 
law. The reasons for disobeying may be similarly varied - religious
loyalty, social conscience, belief that a measure is constitutional,
belief that it infringes natural rights, political expediency. In each
instance, however, there is an obedience to an obligation regarded as
higher than the obligation to keep the law from being transgressed. For
the practioners of civil disobedience, the legal order may not be the
ultimate order, nor civic virtues the highest virtues.
Present theories of civil disobedience usually state that it is the
"people" who decide when law br aklng is justified and when it is not.
This is quite different from what Neumann calls ancient or functional
theories of civil disobedience, in which resistance was justified if the
ruler no longer fulfilled his proper role, and medieval or natural law
theories, in which resistance was justified if the ruler did not obey
certain natural law precepts* Now. Neumann points out, the individual or
a judiciary of the people must decide upon the validity of an act of
50civil disobedience.
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Franz Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian States Essays 
in Political and Legal Theory (Glencoe* Free Press, 1957). p. 153*
On the problems arising in connection with civil disobedience, see*
Roger N. Baldwin, "On the Justifiable Grounds of Disobedience to the 
Law", in R.M. Maclver, ed., Conflict of Loyalties (New Yorks Harper 
& Bros., 1952), pp* 37-44; Hugo A. Bedau, "On Civil Disobedience",
Journal of Philosophy, LVIII (Oct. 12, I96I), 653-65; Stuart M. Brown, Jr., 
"Civil Disobedience", Journal of Philosophy, LVIII (Oct. 26, 1961),
669-Sl; John R. Carnes, "*Why Should I Obey the Law?’", Ethics LXXI 
(October, i960), 14-26; Howard E. Dean, "Democracy, Loyalty, Disobediences 
A Query", Western Political Quarterly, VIII (December, 195>)> 601-11;
Thomas Hill Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation 
(Londons Longmans, Green and Co., 1921); Margaret Macdonald, "The Language 
of Political Theory", in Antony Flew, ed., Essays on Logic and Language 
(Oxfords Basil Blackwell, 195l)> PP* 167-665 Max A. Shepard, "Law and 
Obedience", American Political Science RRview. XXXIII (October, 1939)» 
763-810; David Spitz, "Democracy and the Problem of Civil Disobedience", 
American Political Science Review, XLVIII (June 1954)» 386-403;
Richard Wasserstrom, "Disobeying the Law", Journal of Philosophy,
LVIII (Oct. 12, 1961), 641-53*
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Political Strike, This is a form of non-violent direct action 
which may also be a fort» of civil disobedience* It is a concerted work 
stoppage which is not concerned with making ordinary demands on employers 
for the changing or sustaining of conditions of employment, but is 
essentially concerned with making demands on governmental authorities 
for altering and redirecting policy in the political or industrial sphere.
It may be characterized by its lack of any obvious industrial demands, 
while seeking to change or affect political events;;or It may have indus­
trial demands which can only be achieved by the government's alteration 
of an aspect of the political system. One writer argues that if the ends 
of the strike are industrial in nature, then the strike cannot be con­
sidered to be political; but he admits that classification in some cases 
may become a matter of controversy.*^
In any case, tactics and aims, not duration and intensity, distinguish 
political from other strikes. Workers may attempt to do various things: 
to obstruct the operation of a legislative act; to press for the removal 
of a law which they find objectionable; to demand the repeal of legislation
t
which they consider to be repressive; to call for the reconsideration of 
some aspect of the fovermrent's policy. In calling strikes for such reasons
Edvard I. Sykes, Strike Leas in Australia (Sydney: Lav Book Co., 1960), 
pp. 35-36. N.B. his argument that the 1949 coal strike could be thought 
of in either industrial or political terms. On similar views of the 
1926 General Strike in Great Britain, see H.G. Banbury, "Industrial 
Relations in Crime and Tort", in George W. Keeton and Georg Schvartzen- 
berger, eds. Current Legal Problems 1948 (London: Stevens & Sons, 1948), 
pp. 126-39. For further reading on political strikes, see V.L. Allen, 
Trade Unions and the Government (London: Longmans, 1960), E.T. Biller, 
The Strike: A Study in Collective Action (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1924); Arthur M. Ross and Paul T. Hartman, Changing patterns of 
Industrial Conflict (New York: John Wiley & Sona, I960).
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the trade unions are not applying economic pressure on an employer 
but political pressure on the government. They are demonstrating for 
a cause; it is not merely that they are giving publicity to a cause 
but rather that they are serving notice that they want their demands, 
in respect to that cause, complied with.
The political withdrawal of labour may take the form of either strike 
action (the direct downing of tools) or boycott (the refusal to handle or 
to produce certain goods or to operate certain services). It may be 
accompanied by other forms of direct action, such as mass meetings, marches 
or picketing; it may also be supplemented by applying direct pressure on 
political parties and by making direct appeals to public opinion. The 
tactics used to frustrate or change a law, a policy, or a decision of 
the government are geared to inconveniencing the government either directly 
or indirectly by inconveniencing a section of the community which may in 
turn complain to the government.
CHAPTER I I
THE C IV IL  RIGHTS MOVEMENT ( D INTRODUCTION
The c iv il rights movement operated in a country which has a value 
system of democratic capitalism^ based on certain ideals, customs and 
institu tions toward which the majority of citizens have an affective 
regard* Po litical representation, majority ru le, elections, govern­
mental responsibility to the electorate , and an economy where the means 
of production, d istribution and exchange are in large measure privately 
owned and operated -  these are the fundamental and sacred components of 
that value system* These values are for most people sacrosanct, much
like the myths which MacXver ca lls  the "value-impregnated beliefs and
_ 2notions that man hold, that they live by or live for^*
The c iv il rights movement operated in a country which also has formal 
and informal rules which determine how the system is  to be run; there are 
rules pertaining to elections, to citizenship righ ts, and to the decislon-
Aron cites the tra its  which characterise democracy I "the choice of 
governors and the exercise of authority in conformity with a 
constitution; free competition among parties and individuals 
in election to office; and respect for personal, in te llectual 
and public freedoms on the part of the temporary winners in such 
competition"• Raymond Aron, "The Situation of Damocracyl
Western P o litica l Institu tions In ths Twentieth Century", Daedalus,
XC (Spring, 1961), 353* Cola defines capitalism as "an economic
system in which the greater proportion of economic l i f e ,  particularly 
ownership of and investment in production goods, le carried on under 
private (i*e* non-governmental) auspices through the process of 
economic competition (q*v*) end the avowed Incentive of profit"*
G*D*H* Cole, "Capitalism", in Julius Gould and William L* Kolb, ads*,
A Dictionary o f  the Social Sciences (London; Tavistock Publications,
196A), p*70* Cola allows for economies in which there la  a degree of 
s ta te  Intervention, e*g*, welfare capitalism, protected capitalism*
2 BL*M* Maclver, The Vob o f  Government (Hew York; Macmillan Go*, 1947), p*4*
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making p ro c e s s e s , as w e ll as law s, such as those p e r ta in in g  to  freedom 
of a s s o c ia t io n ,  and customs which make i t  p o s s ib le  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  move­
ments to  fu n c tio n . There a re  in s t i tu t io n a l i z e d  s t ru c tu re s  through which 
demands f o r  a l t e r in g ,  m odifying, o r changing form al o r in fo rm al ru le s  
a re  made, as w e ll as channels fo r  in f lu e n c in g  the  a p p lic a tio n  of ru le s  
and re g u la t io n s .  G rievances a re  a r t i c u la te d  and demands a re  enu n cia ted
and d issem ina ted  both  fo rm ally  and in fo rm a lly  by p o l i t i c a l  groups (such
3 4as p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and p re ssu re  groups ) and in d iv id u a ls  to  a u th o r i t ie s  
who a re  capab le  o f  a d ju d ic a tin g  among th e  c o n f l ic t in g  demands made upon 
them by th e  v a rio u s  groups w ith in  the  s o c ie ty .^
3
'[T]he a rticu la te  organization o f  so c ie ty 3 4*9s active  p o l i t ic a l  agents,  
those who are concerned with the control o f  governmental power and 
who compete fo r  popular support with another group or groups holding 
divergent views• " Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of 
P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s " ,  in  Sigmund Neumann, e d . ,  Modem P o litic a l P arties: 
Approaches to Comparative P o litic s  (C hicago: U n iv e rs ity  o f Chicago 
P re s s , 1956), p .396 . I t a l i c s  in  the  o r ig in a l .
4
Organized groups, drawn o r  r e c ru i te d  from la rg e r  groups o r c la s s e s ,
which c o l le c t iv e ly  pursue common p o l i t i c a l  o b je c tiv e s  w ith o u t them selves 
try in g  to  become th e  government. They o p e ra te  in  a c u l tu r a l  s e t t in g
w ith  a p a r t i c u la r  va lue  system  and s p e c i f ic  ru le s  o f o p e ra tio n ; they 
have a  fo rm ally  s t ru c tu re d  le a d e rsh ip  and membership, a common s e t  of 
i n t e r e s t s ,  methods o f p re s s u re , and p o l i t i c a l  o b je c t iv e s ;  they t ry  to  
in f lu e n c e  th e  p o l ic ie s  and d e c is io n s  o f p u b lic  b o d ie s , be they  e x e c u tiv e , 
l e g i s l a t i v e * ju d ic ia l  o r  a d m in is tra tiv e  b o d ie s , in  the  manner they  considei 
to  be most e f f e c t iv e ;  th a t  i s ,  e i th e r  by d i r e c t  p re ssu re  on th e  a u th o r i­
t i e s  o r  on p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  o r  by an appeal to  p u b lic  o p in io n . Some 
u se fu l works on p re s su re  groups in c lu d e : S tu a r t  Chase, Democracy Under 
Pressure: Special In teres ts  v s . the Public Welfare (New York: Tw entieth 
Century Fund, 1945); Louis C oleridge Kesselman, The Social P o litic s  o f  
FEPC: A Study in  Reform Pressure Movements (Chapel H i l l :  U n iv e rs ity  o f 
North C aro lin a  P re s s ,  1948); L e s te r  W. M ilb ra th , The Washington Lobbyists
(Chicago: Eland McNally & Company, 1963); Harmon Z e ig le r , In tere s t Groups 
in  American Society  (Englewood C l i f f s :  P re n tic e -H a ll ,  1964).
This fo llow s Almond's fo rm u la tio n  where he d is tin g u is h e s  between the  
in te re s t  a rticu la tion  fu n c tio n , such as th a t  o f i n t e r e s t  groups, and 
the aggregative function3 such as th a t  of p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  in  power. 
G abrie l A. Almond, " In tro d u c tio n : A F u n c tio n a l Approach to  Comparative 
P o l i t i c s " ,  in  G abrie l A. Almond and James S. Coleman, ed s. The P o litic s  
o f Developing Areas (P r in c e to n : P rin ce to n  U n iv e rs ity  P re s s , 1960)^ p .1 6 .
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But th e  c i v i l  r ig h t s  movement a ls o  o p e ra te d  in  a c o u n try  o f i n t e r ­
r a c i a l  te n s io n ,  b e s e t  by w hat lfy rd a l c a l l s  th e  "Am erican Dilemma".**
This dilemma i s  th e  c o n f l i c t  betw een :
th e  v a lu a t io n s  p re se rv e d  on th e  g e n e ra l p la n e  w hich 
we s h a l l  c a l l  th e  "Am erican C reed " , w here th e  American 
th in k s ,  t a l k s ,  and a c t s  u n d er th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  h ig h  
n a t io n a l  and C h r is t i a n  p r e c e p ts ,  a n d ..«  th e  v a lu a t io n s  
on s p e c i f i c  p la n e s  o f  in d iv id u a l  and group l i v i n g ,  
w here p e rs o n a l  and lo c a l  i n t e r e s t s ;  econom ic, s o c i a l ,  
and s e x u a l j e a l o u s i e s ;  c o n s id e ra t io n s  o f  community 
p r e s t i g e  and c o n fo rm ity ; group p re ju d ic e  a g a in s t  
p a r t i c u l a r  p e rso n s  o r  ty p e s  o f  p e o p le ; and a l l  s o r t s  
o f  m isc e lla n e o u s  w a n ts , im p u lse s , and h a b i t s  dom inate  
h i s  o u t lo o k .7
T his dilemma and i t s  accom panying te n s io n s  w ere e x a c e rb a te d  in  1954 when 
th e  Supreme C ourt fo rm a lly  d e c la re d  f o r  th e  in t e g r a t i o n  o f  p u b l ic  educa­
t i o n a l  sy stem s.
I t  i s  n o t  p o s s ib le  to  d a te  th e  In c e p t io n  o f  c i v i l  r i g h t s  p r o t e s t  
w ith  acc u racy ; any p r e c i s e  d a te  i s  a r b i t r a r y .  To say  th a t  a c t i v i s t s  in  
th e  c i v i l  r i g h t s  movement began to  make c e r t a in  demands on th e  s t a t e  and 
f e d e r a l  governm ents a f t e r  th e  C ourt announced t h a t  s t a t e  law s r e q u i r in g  
s e g re g a t io n  in  th e  p u b l ic  s c h o o ls  w ere u n c o n s t i tu t i o n a l ,  i s  n o t  to  im ply 
t h a t  u n t i l  th en  Negroes and t h e i r  s u p p o r te r s  w ere s a t i s f i e d  w ith  th e  
N eg roes ' s t a t u s  in  th e  s o c ie ty .  Nor sh o u ld  i t  be ta k e n  to  mean th a t  
u n t i l  then  such  p eo p le  had r e f r a in e d  from  u s in g  law s u i t s ,  th e  b a l l o t ,  
o r  th e  p re s s u re s  o f  p o l i t i c s  and econom ics i n  t h e i r  own b e h a l f .  T hroughout 
Negro h i s t o r y ,  new in s ta n c e s  o f  p r o t e s t  had re p e a te d ly  been  se e n  as th e
Gunnar M yrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modem 
Democracy (New Y ork: h a rp e r  & B ro th e r s ,  1944).
I b id . ,  p . l x x i .7
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8 9a lg a  o f th e  "New N egro", be they s la v e  r e v o l t s ,  p la n ta t io n  r e b e l l io n s ,
a id  to  runaway s l a v e s , p r o t e s t  co n v en tions,*^  the  form ation of Negro
12 13o rg a n iz a tio n s  to  f ig h t  fo r  c i v i l  r i g h t s ,  b lack  n a t io n a l i s t  movements,
14o r  mass p r o te s t  marches« The tu rn  o f th e  cen tu ry  even w itnessed  a
Herbert A ptheker, American Negro Slave R evolts  (New York: Columbia 
U n iv e rs ity  P r e s s , 1943)•
Q
I b id .I  see  a lso  S tan ley  M. E lk in a , S lavery: A Problem in  American 
I n s t i tu t io n a l  and I n te l le c tu a l  L i fe  (Chicago: U n iv e rs ity  o f Chicago 
P r e s s ,  1959).
Howard H. B e l l ,  "E xpressions o f Negro M ilitancy  in  th e  N orth , 1840- 
1860 " Jo u rn a l o f  Negro H isto ry , XLV (Jan u a ry , 1960), 11-20.
11 Ib id .
12 E. F ran k lin  F r a z ie r ,  The Negro in  the United S ta te s ,  re v , ad .
(New York: Macmillan C o ., 1957), p p .520-63; Wilson Record, Race 
and Radicalism : The NAACP and the Cormuniet Party in  C o n flic t 
( I th a c a :  C o rn e ll U n iv e rs ity  P r e s s ,  1964).
1 % Edmund Cronon, Black Moses: The S to ry  o f  Marcus Garvey and the  
U niversal Negro Improvement A ssocia tion  (M adison: U n iv e rs ity  o f 
W isconsin P re s s ,  1955); E.U. Essien-Udom, Black Nationalism:
A Search fo r  an Id e n t i ty  in  America (C hicago: U n iv e rs ity  of 
Chicago P re s s , 1962), C. E r ic  L in co ln , Black Muslims in  America 
(B oston: Beacon P re s s , 1961); Wilson Record, "E x trem ist Movements 
among American N egroes", Phylon, XVII ( F i r s t  Q u a rte r , 1956),
17-23; I r a  De A. R eid , "Negro Movements and M essiahs: 1900-1949", 
Phylon,  X (F ourth  Q u a rte r , 1949), 362-69.
h e rb e t G a rf in k e l, When Negroes March: The March on Washington 
Movement in  the O rganisational P o l i t ic s  fo r  FEPC (G lencoe:
Free P re s s ,  1959).
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s h o r t - l iv e d  boyco tt o£ s t r e e t  ca rs  in  the  S o u th .^  Throughout American 
h is to r y ,  a f ig h t  had been waged by Negroes and th e i r  su p p o rte rs  a g a in s t  
w hite  suprem acy, bu t a f t e r  the  Second World War, c e r ta in  e x te rn a l  and 
in te r n a l  f a c to r s  coalesced  which made th e  Negroes le a s  co n ten t w ith  sm all 
gains in  th e  s tru g g le  fo r  equal r ig h ts  and which made fu tu re  f ig h ts  more 
l ik e ly  to  succeed .
The Second World War was the  second in te r n a t io n a l  s tru g g le  in  which
Negroes had p a r t ic ip a te d  to  "make the  w orld s a fe  fo r  democracyn • I t  was
fought a g a in s t  a theory o f th e  m aster ra c e  and r a c i a l  su fg rio r lty  which
the  mass o f Americans had found ab h o rre n t. The Japanese , p a ra d o x ic a lly ,
had d e a l t  a blow to  the  myth o f w hite  supremacy and th e  emerging co loured
n a tio n s  began to  pu t th e  bones o f th e  myth to  r e s t .  A Negro w r i te r
re c a l le d  how, a f t e r  the War, she no longer f e l t  h e r s e lf  a  member o f an
American m in o rity  bu t of a w orld m a jo rity : "As a f a i r l y  s e lf -c o n sc io u s
Negro, I  began to  f e e l  th is  k in s h ip , th e  f e e l in g  from th e  p a s t  summed up
in  ' a r e n ' t  we a l l  m ise rab le? ' p ass in g  to  a new and h ap p ie r f e e l in g :  'A r e n 't
16
we a l l  moving a h e a d ! T h e  hope th a t  th e  w attlm e propaganda would become 
peacetim e r e a l i t y  was r e a l iz e d  only p a r t i a l l y .  Armed fo rce s  u n i ts  were
August M eier, "B oycotts o f Segregated  S tr e e t  C ars, 1894-1006",
Phylon,  XVIII (T hird  Q u a rte r , 1957), ,296-97; Alan F. W estin ,
"R id e -In " , American Heritage ,X III (A ugust, 1962), _  57-64.
The term  "New Negro" was f i r s t  used by the  Negro h i s to r ia n  A lain  
locke in  speaking  o f the  Negro R enaissance in  the  a r t s  in  the  
1 9 2 0 's ; see  M argaret J u s t  B u tch er, The Negro in  American Culture: 
Based on M aterial l e f t  by A lain Locke (New York: New American 
L ib ra ry , 1957), pp. 132-88. The term  came in to  prominence ag a in  
a t  the  tim e o f  th e  Montgomery bus b o y c o tt ,  a lthough  used in  e a r l i e r  
in s ta n c e s ;  see  e . g . ,  Ü.C. B re a r le y , "The N egro 's New B e llig e re n c y ” , 
Phylon ,V (Fourth  Q u a rte r , 1944), p p .339-45. One Negro g rinned  qhen 
asked to  comment on the  term : "New Negro? I t ' s  j u s t  us o ld  N egroes, 
the same o ld  fo lk s . I t ' s  n o t th e  'new Negro' -  i t ' s  th e  'new t im e s '.  
Only we know i t ,  t h a t 's  a l l ,  and th e  w h ite  fo lk s  h a v e n 't  caught on 
to  i t  y e t ."  Quoted in  George B a r r e t t ,  "Jim  Crow, H e 's  Real T ire d " , 
NYT, Mar. 3, 1957. VI, 67.
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integrated during the Korean War, laproving the situation of the Negro, 
but just slightly« Although by 1954, coloured people in Asia and Africa 
were cooing into their own, Negroes in Aaerlca still had to face voting 
violations, nob action, ghettoisatioa and job discrimination based on 
colour prejudice«
In the 1950's newly emergent African states convincedaany doubters
among the Negroes that black akin could ha a race's pride and not a race's
shackle« For the first time on any major scale in the experience of 
17American Negroes, black men were reapected, listened to, and courted.
Negroes could says "Those Africans standing up there in the UN, they
make ms proud**; "If black people anywhere in the world make a significant
impact and thereby win respect and status, I share in some of it**; "The
average Negro sees that the whole world is forced to recognise and readjust
its attitudes toward the colored world; the rising black man is the theme
18of his thinking« ••«**.
Race prejudice after 1945 was no longer e private, domestic matter, 
as repeated interchanges in the halls of the United Kations bore witness« 
Hany people were prepared to Interpret the Negroes' struggle as part of the 
coloured people's struggle against colonialism and as a part of the Cold War
16 Quoting Lorraine Hans berry, in Harold &• Isaacs, The Hew World of Negro 
Americans (London: Phoenix House, 1964}, p.283.
A/' Almost twenty years earlier, Hails Selaissie, at the time of the Ethio­
pian War, appeared "as the symbolic defender not only of his country but 
of Negro self-respect everywhere"« Isaacs, op.oit«, p«150. See also 
remarks of a Negro informant, in John Pollard, Caste and Close in a 
Southern Town, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper 6 Brothers, 1949), pp« 214-15«
Quoting s sample of views of American Negroes, in Isaacs, op« cit*,
pp.291-93«
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and American competition for the undivided loyalties of the coloured 
people of the world« Myrdal had warned even before the Second World 
War was over that America was "free to ehooee whether the Negro shall 
remain her liability or become her opportunity n. With two-thirds 
of the world coloured, the American government had to be sensitive to 
its own colour problem when it tried to sell the American Creed abroad«
Diplomats sent to the United States by the new African states 
often had to face the indignities suffered by American Negroes: failure 
to be served in restaurants; difficulties in securing housing; crude 
and obscene shouts from the sidelines. Diplomatic embarrassments called 
for apologies for racial incidents from state officials, heads of federal 
departments and presidents themselves, many of whom would have hesitated 
to apologize to American Negroes had the latter been the victims« Such 
incidents served to magnify national problems of colour to the outside 
world«
By 1954t the domestic status of the American Negro had changed«
Migration to the North, urbanization, unionization, and increased
educational and job opportunities had battered the life of the average
Negro, bringing him closer to the ethos embodied in the American Dream
20and the rags-to-riches myth. Migration to the North and West, caused 
bychanges in southern agriculture and by northern demands for unskilled 
labour in Industry, brought with it a greater degree of political influence 
for Negroes In northern and national circles, particularly in trade unions; 
but such influence was still very low. The move to the cities, both in the
19 Myrdal, op.ait«, p« 1022« Italics in the original
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N orth and in  th e  S o u th , had s i g n i f i c a n t  im p l ic a t io n s :  i t  in c re a s e d  th e
number o f  N egroes a b le  and w i l l in g  to  use th e  b a l l o t ;  i t  d iv e r s i f i e d
Negro o c c u p a tio n a l p a t t e r n s ;  i t  in c re a s e d  th e  e a rn in g  power o f  many N egroes;
i t  made b e t t e r  system s o f e d u c a tio n  a v a i la b le  to  more N egroes*
W ith th e  in c re a s e  in  o c c u p a tio n a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in  th e  Negro
p o p u la t io n ,  a s iz e a b le  m id d le -c la s s  began to  emerge w hich conform ed more
to  th e  w h ite  m id d le -c la s s  in  a t t i t u d e s ,  v a lu e s ,  s ta n d a rd s  o f  l i v i n g ,  and
21a s p i r a t io n s  th an  d id  th e  r e s p e c t iv e  w h ite  and b la c k  lo w e r-c la s se s*  
U naccepted by w h ite  m id d le -c la s s  s o c ie ty  and d e tach ed  from  Negro lo w er-  
c la s s  s o c i e t y ,  th e  "B lack  B o u rg e o is ie "  so u g h t to  b reak  o u t o f  i t s  s o c ia l  
lim bo and become p a r t  o f th e  w h ite  American so c ie ty *  I t  i s  p ro b ab ly  t h i s  
c la s s  w hich M artin  L u th e r K ing had in  mind when he su g g e s te d  t h a t  as th e  
N egro’ s s ta n d a rd  o f  l i v in g  in c re a s e d ,  he took  a  new lo o k  a t  h im s e lf ,  
found new s e l f - r e s p e c t  and a  new sen se  o f  d ig n i ty :  "And so  th e  te n s io n  
w hich we a re  w itn e s s in g  in  ra c e  r e l a t i o n s  today  can be e x p la in e d , in  
p a r t ,  by th e  r e v o lu t io n a ry  change in  th e  N egro’s  e v a lu a t io n  o f  h im s e lf ,
By 1960, N eg ro es , who form ed 10*6Z o f  th e  p o p u la t io n ,  w ere 732 
u rban  and 27% r u r a l .  60Z w ere l i v in g  in  th e  S o u th , 34% in  th e  
N o rth , 6% in  th e  West* By 1960, p o s s ib ly  5Z w ere I l l i t e r a t e  
as compared w ith  11% in  1947* S in ce  World War I ,  N egroes had 
in c r e a s in g ly  e n te re d  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  h ig h e r  e d u c a tio n ;  p ro p o r­
t i o n a te ly  few er N egroes th a n  w h ite s  w ere go ing  to  f o l l e g e ,  b u t 
from  1947-61 , th e  number o f  n o n -w h ite s  in  c o l le g e  ro s e  a t  a 
f a s t e r  r a t e  th a n  th e  number o f  w h ite s*  The p ro p o r tio n  o f Negro 
m ales in  u n s k i l l e d  o r  s e r v ic e  jo b s ,  in c lu d in g  farm  la b o u r ,  was 
reduced  to  40% by 1960; o f  Negro women, to  l e s s  th a n  60%. The 
number o f  Negro s k i l l e d  and s e m i- s k i l le d  w orkers doub led  betw een 
1947-61 ; b u t p r o p o r t io n a te ly  few er n o n -w h ite s  e n te re d  p r o f e s s io n a l ,  
m a n a g e r ia l ,  o r  o th e r  w h ite  c o l l a r ,  o r  s k i l l e d  g ro u p s . See Marion 
H ayes, "A C entury  o f Change: N egroes in  th e  U .S. Economy, 1860-1960", 
Monthly Labor Review,  LXXXV (Decem ber, 1 9 6 2 ), 1359-65 . See a ls o  
U n ited  S ta te s  Commission on C iv i l  R ig h ts ,  1961 Report: Employment 
(W ashington: U.S* Government P r in t i n g  O f f ic e ,  1961)*
For a d is c u s s io n  o f th e  Negro m idd le  c l a s s ,  s e e  E* F ra n k lin  F r a z ie r ,  
Black Bourgeoisie (G lencoe : F ree  P r e s s ,  1956).
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and h is  d e te rm in a tio n  to  s t r u g g le  and s a c r i f i c e  u n t i l  th e  w a lls  o f
s e g re g a t io n  have f i n a l l y  been  c ru sh ed  by th e  b a t t e r in g  rams o f su rg in g
22
j u s t i c e . ”
A g a in s t t h i s  p ic tu r e  o f  th e  im provement in  th e  N eg roes ' economic 
p o s i t i o n ,  s to o d  o th e r  f a c t o r s :  d u r in g  th e  1 9 5 0 's ,  Negro f a m il ie s  ea rn e d  
t h r e e - f i f t h s  l e s s  th a n  w h ite  f a m i l i e s ;  N egroes w ere d is p ro p o r t io n a te ly  
c o n c e n tra te d  in  u n s k i l l e d  and s e m i- s k i l le d  jo b s ;  N egroes w ere d is p ro p o r­
t i o n a te ly  unem ployed; N egroes w ere d is c r im in a te d  a g a in s t  in  jo b s  b o th  in
23th e  N orth and in  th e  S ou th . Even though im provem ents came, a  Negro in
American s o c ie ty  was s t i l l  a t  a d is a d v a n ta g e .
The d isa d v a n ta g e s  o f  b e in g  a  Negro d id  n o t  ap p ea r su d d en ly ; they  had
been below  th e  s u r f a c e  f o r  y e a r s ,  b u t most w h ite s  had been b l in d  to  them
and most N egroes had n o t been a b le  o r  w i l l in g  to  a t ta c k  them w ith  v ig o u r .
A g ita t io n  by N egroes, by r a d ic a l s  and l i b e r a l s  o f b o th  r a c e s ,  and by
c i v i l  r i g h t s  o rg a n iz a t io n s  had marked th e  scene  f o r  many y e a r s .  But
a g i t a t i o n  was g iven  a  b o o s t by th e  Supreme C ourt in  th e  1954 sc h o o l
24d e s e g re g a t io n  d e c is io n ;  b e f o r e ,  c i v i l  r i g h t s  a c t i v i s t s  b e l ie v e d  them­
s e lv e s  m o ra lly  r i g h t ,  and in  1954 th e  Supreme C ourt s a id  t h a t  th ey  w ere 
l e g a l ly  r i g h t  as w e l l .  The d e c is io n  r e c e iv e d  w id esp read  p u b l i c i t y ,  
d is c u s s io n  and p r a i s e .  I t s  m essage was fo re v e r  im p ressed  upon th e  minds 
and th e  o u tlo o k  o f  th e  N eg roes. I t  n u l l i f i e d  some o f  th e  l e g a l  norms o f 
an a re a  w hich c o n ta in e d  more th a n  f i f t y  m i l l io n  p e o p le . The C o u rt, so
22P a r t  o f  an ad d re ss  d e l iv e r e d  a t  th e  F i r s t  Annual I n s t i t u t e  on Non- 
V io len ce  and S o c ia l  Change, Montgomery, Alabam a, December, 1956, 
re p o r te d  in  M artin  L u th e r K ing , J r . , "F ac in g  th e  C hallenge  o f  a  New 
Age” , Phylon,  X V III, ( F i r s t  Q u a r te r ,  1 9 57 ), 27.
23U n ited  S ta te s  D epartm ent o f  L abor, S p ec ia l Labor Foree R eport, No.53, 
Economic S ta tu s o f  Nonwhite Workers, 1955-62 (W ashington: Bureau o f 
Labor S t a t i s t i c s ,  1963).
24 Brown v .  Board o f  Education, 347 U .S . 483 (1 9 5 4 ). ______________ — -
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f a r  a s  th e  c i v i l  r ig h t s  movement was co n ce rn ed , had h i t  a f i n a l  f a t a l
25blow t o  le g a l  s e g re g a t io n .
However, th e  Supreme C o u r t 's  d e c is io n  h e lp ed  to  c r e a te  a  new c l im a te  
o f  o p in io n  in  th e  c i v i l  r i g h t s  movement, n o t so  much because  o f  w hat i t  
s a i d ,  b u t  because  o f  th e  f a i l u r e  o f  th e  s t a t e  governm ents to  im plem ent 
i t  b o th  in  l e t t e r  and in  s p i r i t .  The d e c is io n  c re a te d  disharm ony betw een 
l e g a l i t y  and a c t u a l i t y ;  f o r  w h ile  th e  Court had com m itted th e  co u n try  
to  a new p o s i t io n  on th e  ra c e  q u e s t io n ,  r e s i s t a n c e ,  compromise and 
m o d e ra tio n  in  th e  S o u th , w here th e  d e c is io n  was a p p l ic a b le ,  l e f t  th e  
Negro w ith  l i t t l e  to  show f o r  i t .  G rudging a c c e p ta n c e , s tu d ie d  i n d i f ­
f e r e n c e ,  and le g a l  c ircu m v en tio n  w ere th e  re sp o n ses  to  th e  d e c is io n .
When l e g a l  e f f o r t s  to  p re s e rv e  s e g re g a t io n  f a i l e d ,  s t a t e s  a tte m p te d  to  , 
g u a ra n te e  de fa c to  s e g re g a t io n  by b u i ld in g  more Negro s c h o o ls ,  by e s t ­
a b l i s h in g  p r iv a te  sch o o l sy s te m s , by p ro p o s in g  d e la y in g  t a c t i c s  w h ich , 
in  e f f e c t ,  co n cea led  s e g r e g a t io n ,  and by s h i f t i n g  th e  burden  o f t r a n s ­
f e r r i n g  sc h o o ls  to  th e  in d iv id u a l  sch o o l c h i ld .  To th e se  o f f i c i a l  
re sp o n se s  w ere added th e  u n o f f i c i a l  re sp o n se s  o f econom ic and p h y s ic a l  
r e p r i s a l s  and s o c ia l  o s tra c is m  d i r e c te d  a g a in s t  w h ite s  and N egroes who 
were p re p a re d  to  ab id e  by th e  C ourt d e c i s io n .  R e s is ta n c e  in s u re d  t h a t  
by th e  1960 sc h o o l y e a r ,  on ly  27 .3  p e r  c e n t ,  o f th e  b i r a c i a l  s c h o o l 
d i s t r i c t s  in  th e  South had begun to  i n t e g r a t e ,  and even h e re ,  l e s s  th a n  
10 p e r  c e n t o f  th e  Negro c h i ld r e n  in  th e  a re a  were in  in te g r a te d  
s i t u a t i o n s .  The I n te g r a te d  s i t u a t i o n s  w ere , m oreover, in  th e  u rban
For a d is c u s s io n  o f  su b se q u en t c o u r t  d e c is io n s  in  f i e l d s  o th e r  
th a n  e d u c a tio n  w hich w ere fa v o u ra b le  to  N egroes, se e  Jack  G reen b erg , 
Race Relations and American Lam (New Y ork: Columbia U n iv e rs i ty  P r e s s ,  
1959 ).
25
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centres o£ border states; "hard-core" states, by delaying contrivances
and official and unofficial intimidation and harassment, rejected cost-
26pliance with the Court’s decision.
The civil rights movement was launched In Its active phase when the 
arrest of a middle-aged Negro seamstress in December 1955 for refusing 
to vacate her seat for a white bus passenger sparked off economic repri­
sals by the Negroes of fontgomery, Alabama, Almost all of the city’s 
fifty thousand Negroes agreed to the action suggested oy Negro civic 
and ministerial leaders - that they walk, Join dar pools, or stay at 
home rather than ride the buses. In protesting against the humiliating 
second-class treatment meted out to one of their race, they intended to 
"make it clear to the white folks that we will not accept this type of 
treatment any longer". After the failure of negotiations with city 
authorities to resolve their differences, they settled into the first 
successful, large-scale application of non-violent direct action to an 
American situation.
Given the strain within the society and the growth of the generalised 
belief of equal rights for Negroes, Montgomery’s boycott may have been 
unexpected but It was not altogether unlikely. The spark of initiation, 
be it lighted spontaneously or by premeditation, had fad on past grie­
vances and past demands, Early la 1955, a high school student in Mont­
gomery had registered a protest similar to that of the Negro seamstress,
United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1961 Report: education 
(Washington: U,S, Government Printing Gffica, 1961), p,39.
See also "Declaration of Ninaty-SIx Southern Congressmen on 
Integration", Mar, 11, 1956, reported In Sew Iork Time* (hereafter 
NYT), Mar.U, 1956, p.19.
27 Quoting E.D, Nixon, who spearheaded the boycott idea, in King, 
Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story, op.cit., p. 35.
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when ehe a lso  re fu sed  to  move to  the  back o f a c i ty  bus. The a r r e s t  
had s im i la r ly  aroused Montgomery's Negro community» b u t p ro p o sa ls  made 
a t  th e  time fo r  a b o y co tt d id  n o t develop . B i r a d a l  ta lk s  w ith  th e  
C ity  Commission fa ile d »  as Negro demands fo r  a s ta tem en t o f s e a tin g
p o lic y  and more courteous trea tm en t from bus d r iv e rs  were tu rned  down.
When asked why the  b o y co tt a ro se  in  Montgomery in  December» 1955» 
M artin L uther King o ffe re d  some p o s s ib le  e x p la n a tio n s : th e  hope engen­
dered  by the  1954 Supreme Court d e c is io n ; the  long  h is to ry  o f I n ju s t ic e
on Montgomery's bu ses; the  p e o p le 's  w eariness of o p p re ss io n ; th e  appearance
30o f a  new Negro le a d e rsh ip  to  r e v i t a l i s e  th e  d iv id ed  community. O ther
le a d e rs  o f the  b o y co tt sim ply s a id :  " th e  straw  which broke th e  cam el's  
31back” . Having seen  th e  f u t i l i t y  o f n e g o tia tio n s  in  e a r l i e r  in s tan ces»  
the le a d e rs  th i s  tim e suggested  the  use o f  d i r e c t  a c tio n  to  supplem ent 
t h e i r  ta lk s .
From i t s  In c e p tio n  the  b o y co tt had a m id d le -c la ss  r e l ig io u s  to n e .
The Montgomery Improvement A sso c ia tio n  (MIA)» th e  ad hoe o rg a n is a tio n
28
29
O ft
HIT, Mar. 19» 1955, p .3 6 .
29 King, S tr id e  Toward Freedom: The Montgomery S to ry , op• o i t *, p.3 3.
30 I b i d . ,  p .5 3 .
33 Edgar N. F rench , "B eginnings o f a New Age", ln  G ienford E. M itch e ll 
and W illiam  H. Peace , I I I ,  e d s . ,  The Angry Black South (New York:
C orin th  Books, 1962), p .4 6 . See a lso  Nixon, in  K ing, S tr id e  Toward 
Freedom: The Montgomery S to ry , op . o i t* ,  p .3 5 . King s t r e s s e d ,  as 
w e ll ,  th e  d iv in e  dim ensions a t  work in  the use o f  th e  b o y c o tt: " I t  
seems as though God had decided  to  use Montgomery as th e  prov ing  
ground fo r  th e  s tru g g le  and trium ph o f freedom and ju s t i c e  in  America” . 
Ib id * , p .5 4 . For remarks on the  accum ulation o f In c id e n ts  which le d  to  
the b o y c o tt, see  P res to n  F a lle n , "The Montgomery Bus P ro te s t  as a  S o c ia l 
Movement” , in  J i t s u l c h l  Masuoka and P reston  V a lien , ed s . Race R ela tion e  
P roblem  and Theory: Essays in  Honor o f Robert E. Park ^ Chapel H i l l :  
U n iv ers ity  of North C aro lin a  P re s s ,  1961), pp .114-16.
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whihh d ire c te d  the  b o y c o tt ,  c o n s is te d  o f m in is te r s ,  te a c h e rs , businessmen
and lawyers« The c a rs  used to  re p la ce  the  buses were d riv en  by the  middle*
c la s s ;  the le a d e rs h ip  o p e ra ted  p rim a rily  through church p u lp i t s ,  the
t a c t i c s  and o b je c t iv e s  o f th e  b o y co tt were d issem ina ted  through mass
m eetings, h ig h ly  r e l ig io u s  in  c h a ra c te r ,  which were h e ld  in  Negro churches.
The chance appointm ent o f M artin  L uther King, a n e w ly -a rriv ed , young
B a p tis t  m in is te r  who had n o t had an o p p o rtu n ity  to  make enemies w ith in
32the  d iv id ed  Negro community, b rought fo r th  a le a d e r  who had made an
33" in t e l l e c tu a l  p ilg rim ag e  to  nonviolence*1« As th e  c h ild  v ic tim  of 
so u th ern  p re ju d ic e , he had come to  reg a rd  r a c i a l  i n ju s t i c e  and economic 
in ju s t i c e  as two s id e s  o f th e  sane coin« As a th e o lo g ic a l s tu d e n t ,  he 
had been exposed to  T h o reau 's  "Essay on C iv il  D isobedience" and the  
author* s code o f re fu s in g  to  cooperate  w ith  an e v i l  system ; to  Kauschen­
busch *s C h r is tia n ity  and the S o c ia l C ris is  w ith  i t s  emphasis on the  s o c ia l  
as w e ll as on the r e l ig io u s  g o sp e l; to  th e  p ac if ism  o f A.J« M uste; to  the  
g lo r i f i c a t io n  of power expounded by N ie tasch e ; to  th e  d i a l e c t i c  o f  H egel; 
and to  the  s o c ia l  e th ic s  o f Reinhold N iebuhr. He had come in to  c o n tac t 
w ith  the  works o f Marx and Lenin; and w hile  he had r e je c te d  what he 
considered  to  be th e  Communists' m a te r i a l i s t i c  concep tion  o f h i s to r y ,  
th e i r  e th ic a l  r e la t iv is m , and th e i r  p o l i t i c a l  to ta l i t a r ia n i s m ,  he had 
been challenged  by t h e i r  concern w ith  problems o f  s o c ia l  j u s t i c e .
But the  d e c is iv e  in f lu e n c e  came from Gandhi, who appeared to  b lend  
the  power o f love w ith  a  concern fo r  s o c ia l  reform  in  h is  emphasis on
32 King, S tr id e  Toward Freedom: The Montgomery S to ry ,  op• a i t , ,  p p .45-46.
33 I b id . ,  p . H .
-  34 -
nonviolence. King became convinced that non-violent resistance was the 
soundest and most powerful weapon that an oppressed people could use in 
their fight for justice. When he was called upon to lead the Montgomery 
bus boycott only two years after he had finished his formal training, he 
was in a position to put his intellectual tenets to the practical test.
King led the boycott in the spirit of a withdrawal of cooperation 
from an evil system. He laid down the code which he asked the membership 
to adopt:
We will take direct action against injustice without 
waiting for other agencies to act. We will not obey 
unjust laws or submit to unjust practices. We will 
do this peacefully, openly, cheerfully because our ala 
is to persuade. We adopt the means of nonviolence 
because our end is a community at peace with itself«.
We will try to persuade with our words, but if our 
words fail, we will try to persuade with our acts.
We will always be willing to talk and seek fair com­
promise, but we are ready to suffer when necessary 
and even risk our lives to witness to the truth as 
we see it.-^
If ministeie and professional people composed the bulk of the
organising staff and provided the core of drivers of alternative
transportation, all classes within the fttagro community provided the
walkers. The boycott. King sale, cut across class lines: "Men and
women who had been separated from each other by false standards of
class were now singing and praying together in a common struggle for
«35freedom and human dignity.
Ibid.j p,176
35 Ibid•, p. 68.
On th e  s id e  o f  d i r e c t  a c t io n ,  th e  MIA had th e  problem s o f  runn ing
a b o y c o tt  and o f c o u n te r in g  th e  m anoeuvres o f  th e  c i t y  a u t h o r i t i e s .  I t
had to  s e t  up and p ro v id e  a l t e r n a t i v e  means o f  t r a n s p o r ta t io n ,  f in a n c e
c a r  p o o l o p e ra t io n s ,  and keep up th e  m orale o f  i t s  s u p p o r te r s .  When
36th e  A s s o c ia t io n 's  l im ite d  demands w ere tu rn e d  down, i t  b roadened  i t s
o b je c t iv e s  in to  an a t t a c k ,  th ro u g h  th e  f e d e r a l  c o u r t s ,  on bus s e g re g a t io n
i t s e l f .  I t  c o n s id e re d  th a t  i t  had been fo rc e d  in to  t h i s  g e n e ra l a t t a c k
by th e  in t r a n s ig e n c e  o f  th e  w h ite  community and o f  th e  c i t y  o f f i c i a l s ,
who re fu s e d  n e g o t ia t io n  w h ile  su p p o r tin g  in t im id a t io n .  D uring th e  y e a r
o f  th e  b o y c o t t ,  when no f e d e r a l  c o u r t  had spoken , th e  N egroes o f  Montgomery
had to  fa c e  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s 'r e s p o n s e :  n u isa n c e  a r r e s t s  o f p r o t e s t  le a d e rs
f o r  m inor t r a f f i c  v io l a t i o n s ;  th e  q u e s tio n in g  and in t im id a t io n  o f  c a r  p o o l
d r iv e r s  and o th e r  b o y c o tt a c t i v i s t s ;  th e  a r r e s t  and c o n v ic tio n  o f  115
p a r t i c ip a n t s  under a 1921 s t a t e  s t a t u t e ,  o r i g i n a l l y  in te n d e d  to  d e a l w ith  
37la b o u r  d is p u te s .
On th e  l e g a l  s id e ,  i t  was n o t u n t i l  June 1956 t h a t  a f e d e r a l  c o u rt 
ru le d  t h a t  bus s e g re g a t io n  was in  v io l a t i o n  o f th e  due p ro c e s s  and eq u a l 
p r o te c t io n  c la u se s  of th e  C o n s t i tu t io n ,  and n o t u n t i l  December th a t  th e  
r u l in g  was made a p p lic a b le  to  Montgomery. Demands th a t  had been made
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I n i t i a l l y  th e  demands w ere f o r :  a  " f i r s t - c o m e ,  f i r s t - s e r v e d "  r u le  
under w hich Negroes would c o n tin u e  to  b oard  a t  th e  r e a r  and w h ite s  
a t  th e  f r o n t ,  b u t once th e  s e a t in g  was e s ta b l i s h e d  i t  would rem ain 
f ix e d ;  g r e a te r  co u rte sy  on th e  p a r t  o f th e  bus d r iv e r s ;  th e  h i r in g  
o f Negro d r iv e r s  fo r  ro u te s  s e rv in g  p red o m in an tly  Negro a r e a s .  I b i d , ,  p .5 2 .
37 NYT, F e b .2 , 1956, p . l ;  Mar. 23 , 1956, p . l .
38 Browder v . Gayle,  142 F . Sup^^o707 (1 9 5 6 ); u p h e ld  by th e  Supreme C ourt 
in  Gayle v • Browder, 352 U .S .^ (1 9 5 6 ). For o th e r  Supreme C ourt case s  on 
bus s e g re g a t io n ,  see  Flemming v . South C arolina E le c t r ic i t y  and Gas Co. ,
351 Ü .S . 901 (1956); f o r  e f f o r t s  o f  th e  c i t y  o f Montgomery to  circum ven t 
th e  Supreme Court d e c i s io n s ,  see  Montgomery v • Montgomery C ity  L ines,  
r e p o r te d  in  I  Race R ela tio n s Law R eporter  [ h e r e a f t e r  RRLR] 534 -4 6 (1 9 5 6 ); I I  
RRLR 121-23 (1957).
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on th e  c i ty  w ere , in  e f f e c t ,  ag reed  to  by th e  f e d e r a l  governm ent, and 
th e  e x p e rie n c e  o f  Montgomery made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  s t r o n g  ar«i . o f  th e  
f e d e r a l  law cou ld  be used  by c i v i l  r i g h t s  a c t i v i s t s  to  b reak  th e  yoke 
o f  u n c o n s t i tu t io n a l  s t a t e  law s.
Both th e  c o u r ts  and th e  s t r e e t s  gave th e  N egroes cause  to  keep th e
b o y c o tt  go ing  -  th e  l e g a l  v i c t o r i e s  c o n t r ib u t in g  to  a new sen se  o f hope
and th e  method o f  n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n  a c t in g  as a co h es iv e  e lem en t
in  th e  d iv id e d  community. The method tu rn e d  o u t to  be a form  o f p r o t e s t
in  w hich a l l  c l a s s e s  cou ld  p a r t i c i p a t e .  I t  re q u ire d  n e i th e r  c o l le g e
d eg rees  n o r t r a d e  t r a i n in g  and was a v a i la b le  to  b o th  th e  h ig h e s t  and
th e  lo w e s t income e a r n e r s .  I t s  a cc ep tan c e  need n o t have been b ased  on
any p h i lo s o p h ic a l  p re c e p ts  o r any know ledge o f  G andhi. D uring th e  b o y c o t t ,
hym n-sing ing  N egroes packed church  h a l l s  in  Montgomery tw ice  a week,
vowed to  c o n tin u e  t h e i r  p r o t e s t  a g a in s t  o p p re s s io n , and renewed t h e i r
d e d ic a tio n  to  n o n -v io le n t  r e s i s t a n c e .  King reco g n ized  th a t  m ost o f th e
p a r t i c ip a n t s  " d id  n o t b e l ie v e  in  n o n -v io le n c e  as a  p h ilo so p h y  o f l i f e ,  b u t
becau se  o f t h e i r  c o n fid e n ce  in  t h e i r  le a d e r s  and b ecause  n o n -v io le n c e
was p re s e n te d  to  them as a s im ple  e x p re s s io n  o f C h r i s t i a n i ty  in  a c t io n ,
39th ey  w ere w i l l in g  to  use  i t  as a te c h n iq u e " .
To r e l i g io u s  p eo p le  l i k e  th e  Montgomery N egroes, i t  was im p o rta n t 
to  be to ld  by t h e i r  m in is te r s  t h a t  th ey  w ere p la y in g  th e  r o le  o f  G od's 
c h i ld r e n ;  th e  su ccess  o f  t h e i r  method would p rove  th e y  w ere a p p ly in g  i t  
c o r r e c t ly .
The b o y c o tt  foreshadow ed tr e n d s  w hich o th e r  n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  
a c t io n  p r o te s t s  s p e l le d  o u t in  f u l l .  I t  showed th a t  l e g a l  b a t t l e s  ta k e
King
S tr id e  Toward Freedom: The Montgomery S to ry ,  op . c i t . ß p p .70-71
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time and money and that protests need measures of direct action to
make an immediate impression on the people concerned - both the active
participants and the audience watching them. By moving the fight for
their rights into the streets, the Negroes were able to air their
grievances to tne world outside Montgomery. With the colour question
one of international concern, the city became an international incident 
40which the domestic and foreign press, and radio and television were 
prepared to cover. The sight of thousands of Negroes - old women weighed 
down with their parcels, young children bundled up against the cold, 
teenagers in animated conversation - quietly and with dignity trudging 
the streets or waiting at a central depot to be picked up by one of the 
emergency cars pricked the conscience of many who saw or read about them. 
The occasional outburst of violence directed against some of the parti­
cipants and the bombing of King’s home was good copy for the mass media 
and ensured for the Negroes the publicity which they needed.
The boycott also pointed up the new role which the white Christian 
church was coming to play. Financial, moral and symbolic support came 
not only from national civil rights and civil liberties groups which had 
been combatting racial discrimination for decades but also from the 
national bodies of some of the Christian churches. From past silence, 
these now showed a willingness to take a more forthright stand on the 
civil rights question.
The boycott also revealed the dollar and cents pressure for settlement
40 The southern press, however, when it did mention the boycott, 
chided the Negroes for taking matters into their own hands; but 
most often it pursued a policy of silence on events in Montgomery, 
perhaps in the hope that the new tactics might then disappear.
On newspaper views of the coverage of integration incidents, see 
report of convention of American Society of Newspaper Editors,Art, Apr. 20, 1956, p. 11; Apr. 21. 1956. p. 8. _____________________
-  38 -
of th e  d is p u te  from  b u s in e s s e s  w hich w ere lo s in g  money from  suspended
Negro t r a d e ,  from  th e  bus l i n e s  w hich l o s t  $750,000 f o r  th e  y e a r ,  and
from in d u s t r i e s  w hich co u ld  n o t a t t r a c t  new monies to  a re a s  where th e re
41
was r a c i a l  te n s io n .
On th e  n e g a t iv e  s i d e ,  th e  b o y c o tt  r e s u l t e d  in  an e f f o r t  o f so u th e rn
congressm en to  sm ear th e  p r o t e s t  as a  Communist p l o t ,  th e  work o f ’’o u ts id e
42
a g i t a t o r s ” who had come to  th e  c i ty  to  s t i r  up th e  c o n te n te d  N egroes.
But even  in  a decade o f  f e a r ,  c h a ra c te r iz e d  as an age o f  "McCarthyism ,
few p e rso n s  in  th e  f e d e r a l  governm ent appeared  to  ta k e  th e se  a l le g a t io n s
s e r io u s ly .  The f e d e r a l  governm ent was ambiguous in  i t s  a t t i t u d e  to  th e
b o y c o t t .  P r e s id e n t  E isenhow er assumed a  s ta n d  o f  c r y p t i c  n e u t r a l i t y  and
re fu s e d  to  e v a lu a te  th e  b o y c o tt  p u b l i c ly .  He r e i t e r a t e d  one o f  h is
f a v o u r i t e  them es -  t h a t  on ly  tim e and e d u c a tio n  co u ld  b r in g  abo u t th e
s p i r i t u a l  change needed  to  end th e  prob lem  o f r a c i a l  d is c r im in a t io n :
i. 43
" I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  th rough  law and fo rc e  to  change a m an 's h e a r t  .
However, some o f  th e  a d m in is tr a to r s  around th e  p r e s id e n t  w ere aware o f 
th e  s ig n i f i c a n c e  o f  e v e n ts  in  hontgom ery and used  them to  p rod  Congress 
in t o  a c t io n  on th e  p r e s i d e n t 's  p ro p o sa ls  to  c r e a te  a c i v i l  r ig h t s
com m ission. 44
The b o y c o tt  foreshadow ed a s o l i d a r i t y  and r e s o lv e  among so u th e rn  
N egroes t h a t  few w h ite s  had th o u g h t p o s s ib le .  I t  showed t h a t  t i e s  of
I b id .,  F e b .28 , 1956; p .2 2 ;  N ov.18, 1956, p .1 0 2 ; J a n .14 , 1957, p .1 4 .
S ee , e . g . ,  F o r r e s te r ,  Congressional Record [H e re a f te r  CR], 102: 
J2Q8 (F eb . 23 , 1956); se e  a ls o  d e b a te ,  CR, 102. 3215 59 ( • >
1956).
43 NIT, S e p t. 6 , 1956, p .1 0 .
44 I b id .,  Feb. 2 6 , 1956, p .5 2 .
I
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c o lo u r  cou ld  c u t  a c ro s s  c la s s  l i n e s .  But above a l l ,  th e  b o y c o tt  
showed th e  deep re sen tm en t w hich N egroes f e l t  a t  b e in g  re g a rd e d  as  
second  c la s s  c i t i z e n s .  The w i l l  to  p r o t e s t  was th e re  ready  to  be 
c a l l e d  upon; and ev id en ced  by f i f t y  thousand  p e rso n s  r e fu s in g  to  r id e  
bu ses  f o r  one y e a r  -  f o r  mass p r o te s t s  canno t emerge o u t o f  c o n te n te d n e ss .
The b o y c o tt a ls o  foreshadow ed th e  problem  o f p e a c e fu l i n t e g r a t i o n  
once th e  f e d e r a l  c o u r ts  had d ec id ed  q u e s tio n s  o f  c i v i l  r i g h t s .  F ive  
weeks o f s p o ra d ic  in c id e n ts  o f  v io le n c e  a g a in s t  N egroes fo llo w ed  th e  
en d in g  of th e  b o y c o t t ;  i t  was n o t  u n t i l  one y e a r  l a t e r  t h a t  a c o n s is ­
t e n t  p a t t e r n  o f bus i n t e g r a t i o n  had been  e s ta b l i s h e d .  But i f  th e  b o y c o tt  
l e f t  t r a c e s  o f  b i t t e r n e s s  and some h a rd e n in g  o f  th e  l i n e s  o f  r e s i s t a n c e  
among th e  w h ite s ,  i t  showed th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  s o c i a l  change w ith o u t 
m ajo r o u tb re a k s  o f v io le n c e .
The Montgomery bus b o y c o tt  gave more th a n  m oral su s te n a n c e  to  th e  
c i v i l  r ig h t s  movement; i t  a ls o  e s ta b l i s h e d  a  p a t t e r n  o f p r o t e s t .  The 
c h o ic e  o f  methods o f p r e s e n t in g  dem ands, as w e ll  as th e  c h o ic e  o f ch an n e ls  
th ro u g h  w hich they  w i l l  be p re s e n te d ,  a re  n o t lucky  g u esses  w hich th e  
le a d e r s h ip  makes. T r a d i t io n ,  th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f some ch an n e ls  and th e  
i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y  o f o th e r s ,  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  c u r t a i l i n g  l e a d e r s h ip ,  o f  
r e p r e s s in g  some m ethods, and so o n , e n te r  in to  th e  c h o ic e .
Montgomery was i l l u s t r a t i v e  o f  an o p e ra t io n  o c c u rr in g  s im u lta n e o u s ly  
on two l e v e l s ,  one o f  d i r e c t  a c t io n  and a n o th e r  o f le g a lis m . Montgomery 
se rv e d  n o t ic e  t h a t  l i t i g a t i o n  a lo n e  was n o t  a  m ean ing fu l p ro c e s s  in  th e  
s t r u g g le  f o r  e q u a l r i g h t s .  The N egroes o f  th e  c i t y  made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  
th ey  would use  t h e i r  b o d ie s  to  demand r i g h t s  w hich th ey  b e l ie v e d  to  be 
t h e i r s  to  e n jo y . The r i t u a l  o f  p r o t e s t  h e lp e d  n o t o n ly  to  keep th e
m o v em en t to g e th e r  bu t a lso  helped  to  demonst r e t e  th e  massed s tre n g th  
of th e  movement« ^
Follow ing upon Montgomery« a  Negro le a d e rsh ip  began to  emerge In
the South le s s  dependent than b e fo re  upon the  t r a d i t io n a l  c i v i l  r ig h t s
o rg a n isa tio n s«  Some were young m in is te rs«  many in  t h e i r  tw en ties«
s e c u la r  in  outlook« and p reach e rs  o f both th e  s o c ia l  and th e  r e l ig io u s
gospel« While th e  church had always been among th e  most im p o rtan t Negro 
46in s t i tu t io n s «  c o n tro lle d  by th e  Negroes them selves« i t  now assumed more 
In f lu e n c e  on s e c u la r  m a tte rs« T h e  Negro m in is te r  could no lo n g e r be i n t e r ­
e s te d  s o le ly  in  * g e t t in ' the  Negro in  heaven*; he had to  be in te r e s te d  
in  ’ advancing the Race***« In  1957« th e  Southern  C h ris tia n  L eadersh ip  
Conference ( o r ig in a l ly  c a l le d  th e  Southern Negro Leaders Conference on 
N onvio lent In te g ra tio n «  then  changed to  SCLC) was organised« w ith  King 
as i t s  f i r s t  p re s id en t«  to  co n sid e r ways o f u s in g  n o n -v io le n t d i r e c t  
a c tio n  to  d eseg regate  th e  so u th ern  s o c ia l  s tru c tu re «  Composed la rg e ly  of 
so u th ern  m in is te rs«  SCLC co n ta in ed  many tra in e d  d is c ip le s  o f non -v io lence«
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Eobsbawm makes th e  p o in t th a t  modern s o c ia l  movements a re  la c k in g  
in  c o n triv e d  r i t u a l s  and th a t  co n ten t r a th e r  than form a c ts  as the  
cohesive  element« however, he c o n tin u e s , form p lay s  a f a r  more 
im p o rtan t ro le  In  p r im itiv e  s o c ia l  movements. I t  would seem th a t  
Negro communities in  the  S ou th , th e  l e a s t  modern s e c t io n  in  the  
U nited S ta te s ,  go in  fo r  r i t u a l  more than  do n o rth e rn  communities« 
S im ila r ly ,  r u r a l  communities go in  fo r  more r i t u a l  than do urban 
communitlea« See E«J« Hobsbawm, P rim itive  Rebele: S tu d ies  in  Archaic  
Form o f  S o c ia l Movement in  the 19th  and 20th Centuries  (M anchesters 
M anchester U n iv e rs ity  P re s s ,  1959), pp«150-74.
46
The Negro church had been th e  most s ig n i f ic a n t  in  t e r - r a c i a l  m eeting 
p la c e  as s  r e s u l t  o f o th e r  b u ild in g s  in  th e  South be in g  seg reg a te d  
by law« Since in  the  South th e  Negro cou ld  n o t p a r t i c ip a te  in  
in te g ra te d  forms o f community l i f e ,  th e  church became a  f a r  more 
im p o rtan t i n s t i t u t i o n  than in  d i f f a r e n t  c ircum stances o f th e  North« 
The r o le  o f th e  Negro church , as a re fu g e  in  a  h o s t i l e  w h ite  la n d , 
i s  b r i l l i a n t l y  s e t  o u t in  £« F ran k lin  F r a s ie r ,  The Negro Church in  
America (L iv erp o o l: L iverpool U n iv e rs ity  P r e s s ,  1964)«
47 F r a s ie r ,  The Negro in  the United S ta te s 9 op, a i t , ,  p«549«
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In c lu d in g  some who had  worked in  I n d ia .^8
Complementing th e  new le a d e r s h ip  in  th e  S o u th , th e  n a tu re  o f  th e
d is s e n t  and th e  q u a l i ty  o f  th e  d i s s e n te r s  changed. A f te r  th e  f a i l u r e
o f th e  Supreme C o u r t 's  d e c is io n  to  be im plem ented , th e r e  was l e s s  r e l i a n c e
upon l e g a l  b a t t l e s  and more upon a c t io n  in  th e  s t r e e t s .  The o ld e s t  and
l a r g e s t  o f  th e  c i v i l  r i g h t s  o r g a n iz a t io n s ,  th e  N a tio n a l A sso c ia tio n  fo r
-  49
th e  Advancement o f  C oloured  P eo p le  (NAACP), had r e l i e d  p r im a r i ly  upon 
th re e  m ethods: l e g a l  approach  th ro u g h  th e  c o u r t s ;  lo b b y in g  o f  l e g i s l a ­
tu r e s , ' and e d u c a tio n  o f  th e  g e n e ra l p u b l ic  on th e  I n e q u i t ie s  o f  Negro 
l i f e .  D ram atic e p is o d e s ,  s t a r t i n g  w ith  th e  Montgomery bus b o y c o t t ,  
in d ic a te d  t h a t  Negro u n re s t  was m a n ife s t in g  i t s e l f  th rough  ch an n e ls  o th e r  
th an  th o se  used  by th e  NAACP, In  1956, Negro s tu d e n ts  a t  a  South  C a ro lin a  
c o l le g e  b o y c o tte d  c la s s e s  in  p r o t e s t  a g a in s t  a  s t a t e  r e s o lu t io n  c a l l in g  
f o r  an in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  NAACP a c t i v i t y  on campus."*^ Bus b o y c o tts  w ere
48
N at H e n to f f , "A P e a c e fu l Army", Commonweal,  LXXII (Ju n e , 10 , 1 9 60 ), 
; 275-78 .
49
Founded in  1909 and i n i t i a l l y  su p p o r te d  by th e  Negro " ta l e n te d  
te n th "  and m id d le -c la s s  w h ite  l i b e r a l s ,  th e  NAACP had n e v e r  
been a mass o rg a n iz a t io n .  In  i t s  main form  o f  a c t i v i t i e s ,  i t  
r e f l e c t e d  th e  co m position  o f  i t s  p red o m in an tly  m id d le -c la s s  
Negro membership o f  400 ,000 . I t s  g o a l was " to  end r a c i a l  s e g re ­
g a tio n  in  a l l  p u b l ic  a s p e c ts  o f  American l i f e " .  See N a tio n a l 
A sso c ia tio n  f o r  th e  Advancement o f  Colo re d  P e o p le , T kie  i s  the  
NAACP (New Y ork: NAACP, 1 9 62 ). See a ls o  L angston  H ughes, F igh t 
f o r  Freedom: The S to ry  o f  the NAACP (New Y ork: W.W. N orton  and 
C o ., 1962).
50 NYT, Apr. 10 , 1956, p .2 0
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conducted  in  some c i t i e s  in  F lo r id a ,  Alabama, G eo rg ia , and T e n n e s s e e .^
I n t e r - r a c i a l  co n fe ren c es  w ere h e ld ,  in  v io l a t i o n  o f  law s fo rb id d in g  w h ite s
52and N egroes to  m ingle in  p u b l ic  p la c e s .  Race r e l a t i o n s  i n s t i t u t e s
53sp o n so red  sem in ars  on th e  use  o f  n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n .  In  1957,
thousands o f  c i v i l  r ig h t s  a c t i v i s t s  from  t h i r t y  s t a t e s  met in  W ashington ,
D .C ., f o r  a P ra y e r  P ilg r im a g e  f o r  Freedom in  o b serv an ce  o f th e  t h i r d
a n n iv e rs a ry  o f  th e  Supreme C o u rt’ s d e c is io n  o u tla w in g  s e g re g a t io n  in
54th e  p u b l ic  s c h o o ls .  In  1958 and 1959 , te n  thousand  and t h i r t y  thousand  
p e o p le ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  massed in  W ashing ton , D .C ., from  a l l  o v e r  th e  co u n try  
on Youth Marches f o r  I n te g r a te d  S choo ls  to  demand more v ig o ro u s  a c t io n  
from  th e  f e d e r a l  governm en t.33 In  T uskeegee, Alabama, Negro r e s id e n ts  
b o y c o tte d  c i t y  m erchants in  p r o t e s t  o v e r  th e  e f f o r t s  o f  th e  s t a t e  l e g i s ­
l a t u r e ,  w hich fe a re d  th e  p o t e n t i a l  Negro v o tin g  s t r e n g t h ,  to  gerrym ander 
Negro v o te r s  o u t o f th e  c i t y  l i m i t s ;  t h i s  was a n o th e r  in s ta n c e  o f  su p p le ­
m enting l e g a l  a c t io n  by d i r e c t  a c t i o n . ^
I b i d May 2 9 , 1956, p .5 6 ;  June 1 ,  1956, p .2 4 ;  J u ly  3 ,  1956, p .2 5 ;
Aug. 3 ,  1956, p .9 ;  O ct. 9 , 1956, p .4 4 ;  Dec. 2 4 , 1956, p .6 ;  D ec.27 ,
1956, p . l ;  Dec. 28 , 1956, p . l ;  Jan  2 , 1957, p . l ;  Jan  10« 1957, p .2 4 ;
Mar. 5 , 1957, p .2 1 ;  June 22 , 1957, p .1 4 ;  J a n .6 , 1958, p .2 6 ; Mar. 1 8 , 
1958, p .2 1 ;  A pr. 1 1 , 1958, p . 17; June 2 8 , 1958, p .2 0 ;  Dec. 10 , 1958, 
p .2 ;  Mar. 27 , 1959, p .4 7 ;  N ov.24, 1959, p .1 8 .
52 S ee , e . g . ,  th e  annual co n fe ren c e  o f  th e  Alabama C ouncil on Human 
R e la t io n s ,  i b i d . ,  Feb. 12 , 1956, p .8 6 .
53 I b id . ,  Dec. 3 , 1956, p .2 5 .
54 I b id . ,  May 18 , 1957, p . l .  P o l ic e  e s t im a te s  p u t th e  numbers a t  f i f t e e n  
th o u san d , w h ile  th e  p ilg r im a g e  le a d e r s  s e t  them a t  tw en tyseven  th o u san d .
55 Ib id . ,  O ct. 2 6 , 1958, p .7 6 ;  A pr. 1 9 , 1959, p .6 4 .
Gorrrillion v. L ig h tfo o ts 364 U .S. 339 (1 9 6 0 ); See a ls o  B ernard  T ap e r, 
Gomillian versus L ig h tfo u t  (New Y ork: McGraw H i l l ,  1962).
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The c i v i l  r ig h ts  movement p re fe rre d  n o n -v io len t d i r e c t  a c tio n  
to  the  co n v en tio n a l p re s su re  group methods o f such o rg a n iz a tio n s  as 
the  NAACP as w e ll as to  methods of de fen siv e  v io len ce  which were 
be in g  su g g ested  by some people a t  the t i m e .^  The movement was 
o p t im is t ic  about th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f i t s  demands b rin g in g  about c e r ta in  
p o l i t i c a l  changes. For in  a d d itio n  to  h igh  reg a rd  fo r  th e  fe d e ra l  
ju d ic ia r y , the  c i v i l  r ig h t s  movement recognized  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e , how­
ev e r s m a ll ,  o f the C iv il  R ights Act of 1957, which was the  f i r s t  p iece  
o f c i v i l  r ig h ts  l e g i s la t io n  passed  s in ce  th e  R econstruc tion  p e r io d . 
A fte r  e x te n s iv e  w a terin g  down of the Eisenhower A d m in is tra tio n 's  
o r ig in a l  p ro p o sa ls , and a f t e r  leng thy  debate  in  th e  S en a te , an a c t  
emerged r e s t r i c t e d  to :  (1) p ro te c tio n  of Negro v o tin g  r ig h ts  by in ju n c ­
t io n  in  th e  fe d e ra l  c o u rts  a t  the  req u est o f an in d iv id u a l o r  th e  
Department of J u s t ic e ;  (2) p ro v is io n  fo r  a  C iv il  R ights Commission
to  In v e s t ig a te  problems in  th i s  f i e ld ;  and (3) p ro v is io n  fo r  a  new
58C iv i l  R igh ts D iv ision  in  the  Department o f J u s t i c e .  While th e  Act 
d isap p o in ted  many persons in  th e  c i v i l  r ig h t s  movement, i t  d id  se rv e  
n o tic e  th a t  c i v i l  r ig h ts  were su b je c ts  fo r  l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t io n .  Though 
i t  o f fe re d  l i t t l e  in  the  way o f  m eaningful change f o r  th e  m a jo rity  of 
American N egroes, th e  a c t  d id  in d ic a te  th a t  where th e re  was sup p o rt
57
The b e s t  s ta tem en t o f views on d e fen siv e  v io len ce  a re  found in  
Robert F. W illiam s, Negroes with Guns, Marc S c h le i f e r ,e d . , (New 
York: Marzani&Munsell, 1962). W illiam s, as p re s id e n t o f the 
Monroe, North C a ro lin a , NAACP, had spoken o f th e  use o f  v io le n c e  
in  1959, only to  be d ism issed  from h is  p o s t by the  n a t io n a l  
h ead q u arte rs  o f  th e  A sso c ia tio n .
58 C iv il R ights Act of I f  57, 71 S ta t .  634. See in  th is  connection  
J.W. Anderson, Eisenhower, Brownell, and the Congress: The 
Tangled Origins o f  the C iv il Nights B i l l  o f  1956-1957 
U niv ers ity  o f Alabama P re s s , 1964.
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for civil rights legislation, it was bi-partisan.
However, because both major political parties contained sections
which opposed the demands of the civil rights movement, the movement saw
neither of the parties as its particular champion, Eisenhower, a
Republican president, never appeared to be enthusiastic about the question
of civil rights, as his role in the legislative battles on the 1957 Civil
Rights Act indicated. In addition, his handling of the Little Rock, crisis
contributed to Negro discontent with the Republican. Party, When seven
children courageously attempted to attend a formerly all-white high
school in Little Rock, Arkansas, they were threatened by mob violence.
When it became clear that the state and local authorities were unwilling
to safeguard the students* federal rights, as defined by the courts,
59Eisenhower ordered federal troops to the city. But his half-hearted and 
dilatory handling of the situation disheartened many Negroes, who then 
began to argue that the civil rights movement should not depend on support 
from political parties. While there was support among Negroes for 
northern Democrats, there was none for those in the South who had been 
actively denying the right to vote to the Negro ever since southern 
Democrats returned to positions of power after the Civil War, Chi the 
Republican side, southern Republicans did not offer Negroes a meaningful 
alternative to the Democratic incumbents; while northern Republicans
As had been the case whenever integration efforts met with 
violence (see, e,g«, the Atherlne Lucy case, NTT, Feb,5, 1956, 
p.60, and the integration of schools in Cllntoo, Tennessee, 
i b i d Aug, 31, 1956, p.36), the events at Little Rock were 
played out on the international scene to the detriment of 
American prestige. See Virgil T, Blossom, It Has Happened Here 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959); Brooks Hays, A Southern 
Moderate Speaks (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1959),
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w ere u s u a l ly  p i t t e d  a g a in s t  Democrats a b le  to  make a h ig h e r  b id  fo r  
60th e  Negro v o te .
In  r e s o r t in g  to  th e  new t a c t i c s  o f n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n ,  th e  
c i v i l  r i g h t s  movement rem ained f a i t h f u l  to  th e  American Dream; w here i t  
f e l l  o u t was w ith  e a r l i e r  e f f o r t s  to  r e a l i z e  th e  Dream. The c o n v e n tio n a l 
and l e g a l  methods o f  a g i t a t i n g  f o r  change had n o t w orked , so th e  movement 
d ec id ed  to  t r y  som eth ing  e l s e .  Lacking money and w ith  l i t t l e  a cc ess  to  
th e  c o r r id o r s  o f  pow er, th e  c i v i l  r ig h t s  movement c a l le d  upon i t s  
r i c h e s t  re so u rc e  -  i t s  n u m e rica l s t r e n g th ,
See V.O, Key, Southern P o li t ic s  in  S ta te  and Nation (New Y ork:
A lfre d  K nopf, 1 9 5 0 ), pp . 2 86 -91 , 619-45 .
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CHAPTER III
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2)t FROH GREENSBORO TO ALBANY
Introduction
Personal discontent, in order to grow into social unrest, must be 
widespread; accidents and chance occurrences affect movements by acceler­
ating general tendencies which are present already. Although four years 
were to elapse between the boycott in Montgomery and the start of the 
sit-ins, Montgomery had announced widespread discontent with the injus­
tices of Negro life in the United States. The sit-ins, for their part, 
made clear the urgency of the situation.
This phase of the civil rights movement had specific, limited 
objectives. The activists were demanding rights of equal access to 
places of public accommodation, such as hotels, eating establishments, 
gasoline stations, theatres and sports arenas, which they alleged southern 
law or southern custom had denied them solely because of their race.
The protests in Montgomery had concerned the right of Integrated 
seating arrangements on city buses. The sit-ins similarly were concerned 
with seating arrangements, first at lunch counters, then in other public 
places. As a specific campaign, the sit-ins lasted from February 1960 to 
May 1961; as a tactic, sit-ins were used in their original and in modified 
form through the period when this study doses.
Following upon the sit-ins came the Freedom Rides, with the objective 
of Integrating seating arrangements on interstate transportation and in
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interstate terminal facilities. Demonstrations in Albany, Georgia, 
highlighted, in one geographical setting, the various methods used to 
demand equal access to public accommodation.
Another essential characteristic of this phase was the transition 
from spontaneity to organization. The sit-ins turned spontaneous 
rebellion into a planned, deliberate movement of massive proportions. 
Spontaneity is most effective when it ignites similar situations and 
becomes organized into an effective bargaining unit. The first group 
of demonstrators had no idea that their act would spark off a mass 
movement; but the conditions which incensed them, incensed others as 
well. After the sit-ins, further direct action demonstrations were 
planned and directed by organizations which either had existed before 
1960 or were established to meet the needs of the new kind of demonstrations.
The demonstrations during this phase showed the dual approach which 
activists had toward the use of non-violent direct action. For a majority 
of the leadership, but for a minority of the membership, non-violence was 
a philosophical discipline; for the majority of members it was a technique 
adopted as an expedient. As one weapon among many, non-violence could be 
abandoned when it failed to bring favourable results. Its failure in 
Albany posed this very problem.
In this chapter, I shall trace the main events of the sit-ins, the 
Freedom Rides, and the demonstrations in Albany. When analysing the move­
ment, I shall follow Smel8er and bear in mind four aspects of the mobili­
zation of the participants for action: (1) the temporal phases of the 
movement; (2) the aims and motives of leadership and membership; (3) the
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success or failure of specific tactics; (4) the overall success or 
failure of the movement. At the same time, I shall examine the reaction 
to the movement, with particular emphasis on the specific behaviour and 
general encouragement or discouragement by the authorities.
Temporal Phases
Sit-ins,- It is helpful to think of the period 1960-64 as a subsection 
of the civil rights movement to which Smelser's six determinants of 
collective behaviour can be applied. Three of the factors - structural 
conduciveness, strain, and the growth of a generalized belief - remain 
substantively what they were for the analysis of the Montgomery bus 
boycott. In the case of the sit-ins, a fourth factor, the precipitating 
factor, occurred in February 1960, when four Negro college students in 
Greensboro, North Carolina, were refused restaurant service at a variety 
store which did not serve Negroes, Instead of taking their trade elsewhere, 
to a store outside the downtown shopping area where Negroes could be 
served, they decided to remain seated until they were waited on.^ Relay 
groups of similarly well-dressed and well-behaved students from the same 
college waited their turn to sit quietly at the all-white lunch counter 
until the store would agree to change its policy to serving everyone 
regardless of colour.
The demonstrations spread to another of the city’s variety stores; 
within a week of the initial protests, which had received a fair amount 
of publicity on radio, television, and in the press, similar demonstrations
NYT, Feb. 3, 1960, p.22.
1
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were be in g  h e ld  in  two o th e r  c i t i e s  in  Korth C aro lin a . Every day , new
c i t i e s  in  the  s t a t e  became th e  scene o f lunch coun ter s i t - i n s ;  w ith in  two
w eeks, dem onstrations had sp read  to  two o th e r  so u thern  s t a t e s .  Sympathy
d em o n stra tions were in tro d u ced  in  th e  llo rth  a t  v a r ie ty  s to re s  which had
so u th e rn  chain  o u t l e t s .  As th e  movement sp re ad , no s t a t e  cou ld  ex p ec t
to  rem ain immune. By March, s i t - i n s  were o c cu rrin g  in  a t  l e a s t  t h i r t y -
e ig h t  c i t i e s  in  a t  l e a s t  seven so u thern  s t a t e s ,  as w e ll as in  a t  l e a s t
s i x  n o rth e rn  s t a t e s .  By September 1961, every so u thern  and b o rd e r s t a t e
2had been h i t  by over seven ty  thousand a c t iv e  p a r t i c ip a n ts .
The a c t i v i s t s ,  p rim a rily  so u th ern  Negro s tu d e n ts ,  would occupy s e a ts  
a t  lunch c o u n te rs , s i t  q u ie t ly ,  and re fu se  to  leav e  u n t i l  they  w ere se rv ed , 
th e  co u n ter was c lo se d , they  were a r r e s t e d ,  o r  a fix ed  p e rio d  o f tim e had 
e la p se d  fo r  them to  have made th e i r  p o in t .  As the  movement p ro g re s se d , 
th e  s i t - i n s  were accompanied by b o y c o tts , p ic k e t in g s ,  p a ra d e s , and m arches; 
some a c t i v i s t s  a ls o  added the re finem en t of going to  j a i l  r a th e r  than  pay 
c o u rt a sse ssed  f in e s .
The s i t - i n s  met w ith  mixed re sp o n se s , in c lu d in g  some o u tb reak s  of 
h o s t i l i t y .  The o f f i c i a l  re p ly  o f c i ty  and s t a t e  a u th o r i t ie s  v a r ie d  to  
in c lu d e  doing n o th in g , examining th e  d em o n stra to rs ' g r ie v a n c e s , o r  a r r e s t in g  
th e  s i t - i n  p a r t i c ip a n t s .  When a r r e s t s  were made, as they were in  th e  cases 
o f f iv e  p e r cen t o f the  p a r t i c ip a n t s ,  s t a t e  c o u rts  u su a lly  found th e  
d efendan ts  g u i l ty .  But from th e  f i r s t  o f a s e r ie s  o f  d e c is io n s  handed 
down in  1961, the  U nited S ta te s  Supreme Court spoke o u t in  fav o u r o f the 
d em o n stra to rs .
Based cm f ig u re s  In  a s p e c ia l  re p o r t  o f th e  Southern R egional C ouncil,
The Student P ro test Movement: A Recapitulation  (A tla n ta : Southern
R egional C ouncil, 1961).
2
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According to  p ro g ress  re p o r ts  is su e d  by v a r ie ty  s to r e s ,  by October 
1960, 112 so u th ern  and b o rd e r communities had in te g ra te d  lunch c o u n te rs ,
3
which number had r is e n  to  125 by Jan u a ry , 1961« By September9 1961,
th e  Southern Regional Council l i s t e d  103 key c i t i e s  which had in te g ra te d
4
lunch co u n te r f a c i l i t i e s .
What began as a  p r o te s t  a g a in s t  seg reg a ted  lunch cou n ters  sp re ad , 
a t  v a rio u s  tim es , to  in c lu d e  a t ta c k s  on seg reg a ted  p a rk s , swimming p o o ls , 
th e a t r e s ,  m ovies, r e s ta u r a n ts ,  chu rches, l i b r a r i e s ,  museums, a r t  g a l l e r i e s ,  
beaches and c o u rth o u ses . W ade-ins, s ta n d - in s ,  s k a te - in s ,  k n e e l- in s , v o te -  
in s ,  and th e  l ik e  were v a r ia t io n s  on th e  theme o f s i t t i n g  down a t  th e  lunch 
co u n te r o f a  s to r e ,  ask in g  fo r  s e r v ic e ,  and w a itin g  even a f t e r  i t  had been 
re fu se d .
Freedom R ides. -  As the  r a r i t y  v a lu e  o f the  lunch co u n ter s i t - i n s  began to  
wear o f f ,  o r  as th e  dem onstrato rs succeeded in  t h e i r  p a r t i c u la r  e f f o r t s ,  
new forms o f  p r o te s t  and new o b je c ts  o f a t ta c k  emerged. In  May>1961, the 
Congress o f R ac ia l E q u a lity  (CORE) announced p lan s  to  sponsor a  s e r ie s  o f 
in te g ra te d  bus t r i p s  through s e c tio n s  o f the  South in  o rd e r to  dem onstrate 
th e  i l l e g a l  o p e ra tio n  o f r a c ia l l y  seg reg a ted  in t e r s t a t e  c a r r ie r s  and 
te rm in a l f a c i l i t i e s .  A fte r  fo rm ally  n o tify in g  P re s id e n t Kennedy of t h e i r  
in te n t io n s ,  th i r t e e n  w hite  and Negro CORE members headed sou th  by bus on 
what James Farm er, CORE*a n a t io n a l  d i r e c to r  and a p a r t ic ip a n t  in  th e  pro­
j e c t ,  c a l le d  a  n o n -v io le n t s i t - i n  on w heels
3 NTT, O ct. 18, I9 6 0 , p .4 7 ; Jan . 29, 1961, p .6 4 .
4 Southern R egional C ouncil, The S tu den t P r o te s t  Movements A
op• c i t , t  p p .14-15. By December, 1961, th e  number had r is e n  to  two 
hundred.
5 NIT, May 5 , 1961, p .17
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The first of the CORE Freedom Rides, which 3Ct off from Washington,
D.C.^for 'Jew Orleans, Louisiana, was treated with no discrimination or
show of force until it arrived in Alabama, where the bus was stoned, set
afire and attacked* Without assurances of local police protection, CORE
was forced to cancel the remainder of the trip and the thirteen riders 
5Areturned home* After this initial display of violence, volunteers from 
all over the country contacted CORE offices and asked to be sent on future 
rides* A second group of college students affiliated with the Student 
Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SKCC) set off from Haahville, Tennessee* 
Although given protective custody when the bus reached Birmingham, they 
were mat by mob action in Montgomery*^ Federal marshals were dispatched 
to Alabama to guarantee safe passage through the state of further rides* 
When the buses reached Jackson, Mississippi, there was no public violence, 
but state authorities instituted a pattern of immediate arrests of the 
riders on charges of breach of the peace or disorderly conduct* The riders 
were found guilty by the local courts and lodged appeals with the federal 
courts*
The two rides were followed by others, most of which were staffed by 
students and ministers* During the course of their travels south, the 
riders tested terminal facilities by entering segregated waiting rooms 
and seeking service at segregated lunch counters; this action prompted 
arrests only in Mississippi*
iKIbid., May 16, 1961, ,.lj May 18, 1961, p.27.
6 Ibid., May 21, 1961, p.l.
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In Septem ber, the I n te r s t a t e  Commerce Commission (ICC) is su e d  new 
re g u la tio n s  to  guaran tee  th e  r ig h t  of in te g ra te d  t r a v e l .  The r id e s  
ta p e red  o f f  as i t  became more d i f f i c u l t  to  f in d  s tu d en t v o lu n te e rs  and 
as e f f o r t s  were co n cen tra ted  e lsew here.
A lbany. G eorgia. In  Jan u a ry , 1961, a  group of Negro le a d e rs  p re sen ted  
th e  C ity  Commissioner w ith  a p e t i t io n  ask ing  f o r  th e  deseg reg a tio n  of 
c e r ta in  o f the  c i t y ’s f a c i l i t i e s ,  b u t th e i r  re q u e s ts  were ig n o red . In  
O ctober, SftCC s e t  up a  v o te r  r e g i s t r a t io n  o f f ic e  in  Albany, as p a r t  o f 
i t s  g en e ra l program fo r  th e  South , b u t th e  Committee had l i t t l e  success 
in  encouraging  Negroes in  th e  su rround ing  r u r a l  co u n tie s  to  r e g i s t e r .
The s ig n a l  fo r  dem onstrations to  begin was th e  a r r e s t  of f iv e  Negro 
youths who had sought s e rv ic e  a t  the  w hite  lunch co u n ter in  A lbany 's 
bus te rm in a l. These a r r e s t s  were fo llow ed by those  o f e leven  Freedom 
R iders who had a ttem pted  to  t e s t  s eg reg a tio n  p ra c t ic e s  a t  th e  ra ilw ay  
s t a t io n .^
A march in  su p p o rt o f the  r i d e r s ,  led  by th e  newly-formed Albany 
Movement, was stopped on the  way to  the  cou rthouse . This s e t  o f f  a 
s e r ie s  o f n o n -v io le n t mass dem onstrations and mass a r r e s t s  on the  te c h n ic a l 
charges o f d is o rd e r ly  conduct, o b s tru c t in g  t r a f f i c ,  and f a i lu r e  to  obey an
g
o f f i c e r .  Among tne  a r r e s te d  were th e  Revs. M artin L uther King and 
Ralph Abernathy of SCLC, who had been in v i te d  to  th e  c i ty  by the  lo c a l  
Negro le a d e rs h ip ; they  were re le a se d  on b a i l  pending t r i a l .
7 I b id .,  D ec.11, 1961, p .4 0 .
g
I b id .,  D ec.13, 1961, p .5 1 ; Dec.14 , 1961, p .4 7 . Some o f the  s tu d e n t 
p a r t ic ip a n ts  su osequen tly  were suspended from c o lle g e  f o r  t h e i r  p a r t  
in  the  dem o n stra tio n s.
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The Movement called off further demonstrations and a bus boycott
and selective buying campaign, which had been started against white
merchants, when the city agreed to comply with the recent ICC ruling on
bus terminals and to release demonstrators who either owned property or
9could show proof of employment* When the city reneged on one of its 
concessions» selective buying and the bus boycott were re-introduced; 
the former tactic was less effective than the boycott» which had succeeded 
in curtailing operations in February* On the whole» emphasis was shifted 
from mass demonstrations to economic pressure, although sporadic demon­
strations still continued*
Demonstrations were reintroduced in Julyt1962* The new wave of 
demonstrations coincided with the convictions of King and Abernathy, and 
their choice of jail over payment of fines, \ assured the city of 
nationwide publicity* Demonstrations - marches, sit-ins and rallies - 
continued throughout the summer, but the city authorities refused to 
negotiate* Further demonstrations were marred by an outbreak of Negro 
violence, when Negro youngsters threw rocks and bottles at the police. 
Although this outbreak was unconnected with the organised protest march 
which had preceded it, King called for a day of penance on the part of 
the Movement: MWe abhor violence so much that when it occurs in the ranks
9Aof the Negro community, we assume part of the responsibility for it*M 
In August, small-scale demonstrations were introduced, but the city
Ibid., Dec*15, 1961, p.29. 
9A Ibid., July 26, 1962, p*l
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a u t h o r i t i e s  e i t h e r  c lo se d  th e  f a c i l i t i e s  b e in g  t e s t e d  o r  s o ld  them to  
p r iv a t e  i n t e r e s t s .  As th e  c o s ts  o f co n d u c tin g  th e  d em o n stra tio n s  mounted 
e f f o r t s  w ere r e s h i f t e d  to  le g a l  a c t io n  and v o te r  r e g i s t r a t i o n ,  w h ile  d i r e c t  
a c t io n  d e m o n stra tio n s  w ere a llo w ed  to  p e t e r  o u t .
The Albany d e m o n s tra tio n s  r a i s e d  th r e e  m ajor problem s f o r  th e  c i v i l  
r i g h t s  movement: (1) th e  en fo rcem en t o f f e d e r a l  law by lo c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  
h o s t i l e  to  t h a t  law ; (2) th e  p e c u l ia r  o p e ra t io n  o f lo c a l  j u s t i c e  w ith  i t s  
s p e c ia l  b ran d  o f j a i lh o u s e  b r u t a l i t y  w hich n e v e r  came b e fo re  th e  p u b l ic  
p u rv iew ; (3) th e  a p p ro p r ia te  r o le  o f  th e  f e d e r a l  governm ent in  lo c a l  c i v i l  
r i g h t s  movements.
Aims and M otives
A in® .- T h is phase  o f  th e  movement was bound by a  common o b je c t iv e  -  th e  
s e c u r in g  o f  e q u a l f a c i l i t i e s  and e q u a l tre a tm e n t f o r  a l l  r e g a rd le s s  o f  
c o lo u r  in  p la c e s  o f  p u b lic  accom m odation. A c t iv i s t s  w anted to  show th a t  i t  
was n o t  r i g h t  f o r  a b u s in e s s  w hich d e a l t  w ith  th e  p u b lic  to  keep in d iv id u a ls  
o u t b ecau se  th ey  w ere N egroes. They w anted to  show th e  i n j u s t i c e  o f  
s e g re g a t io n  in  a co u n try  w hich id e a l iz e d  e q u a l r ig h t s  f o r  a l l .  They s a id :  
"Every norm al human b e in g  w ants to  w alk th e  e a r th  w ith  d ig n i ty  and abhors 
any and a l l  p r o s c r ip t io n s  upon him b ecau se  o f  ra c e  o r  c o lo r . In  e s s e n c e , 
t h i s  i s  th e  m eaning o f  th e  s it-d o w n  p r o t e s t s  t h a t  a re  sw eeping t h i s  n a t io n  
to d a y ."  On a more s p p h is t ic a te d  l e v e l ,  th e  s i t - i n s  aimed to  show th a t
SCLC had s p e n t $30 ,000 , th e  Albany Movement $20 ,000 .
I b i d . Aug. 1 8 , 1962, p .4 4 .
10A
Q uoting  "An A ppeal f o r  Human R ig h ts " ,  Atlanta Journal, M ar.9 ,  1960,
r e p r in te d  in  Nation,  CXC (A p r.2 , 1 9 6 0 ), ' 290.
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law s o r  custom s r e q u i r in g  s e g re g a te d  s e a t in g  arrangem ents  a t  com m ercial
p la c e s  made a v a i la b le  to  th e  p u b lic  w ere in  v io l a t i o n  o f e i t h e r  th e
l e t t e r  o r  th e  s p i r i t  o f  Supreme C ourt r u l in g s  on d e s e g re g a t io n .
The Freedom R ides so u g h t to  d em o n stra te  th e  o p e ra t io n  o f  r a c i a l l y
se g re g a te d  i n t e r s t a t e  c a r r i e r s  and te rm in a l  f a c i l i t i e s  in  v io l a t i o n  o f
o rd e rs  o f th e  I n t e r s t a t e  Commerce Commission (ICC) and r e c e n t  d e c is io n s
o f  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  Supreme C o u rt. CORE had come to  r e a l i z e  t h a t
l i t i g a t i o n  was n o t  alw ays th e  most e f f i c i e n t  method o f  s e c u r in g  eq u a l
r ig h t s  f o r  N egroes. A f te r  th e  Supreme C o u rt’ s d e c is io n  in  1946 d e c la r in g
s t a t e  law s r e q u i r in g  s e g re g a t io n  on i n t e r s t a t e  c a r r i e r s  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , ^
an in t e g r a te d  "Jou rney  o f  R e c o n c i l ia t io n "  spo n so red  by th e  F e llo w sh ip  o f
12R e c o n c i l ia t io n  (FOR) and CORE t r a v e l l e d  th rough  th e  Upper South  to  
c h a lle n g e  rem a in in g  p a t te r n s  o f s e g re g a te d  s e a t in g .  When th e  t r i p  met 
w ith  l i t t l e  o p p o s it io n  and o n ly  one o u tb re a k  o f v io le n c e ,  b o th  o rg a n iz a ­
t io n s  hoped th a t  o th e r  t r a v e l l e r s ,  p r im a r i ly  N egroes in  th e  S o u th , would
13be encouraged  to  p r a c t i c e  th e  d e se g re g a tio n  g ra n te d  by th e  c o u r t s .  Few 
t r a v e l l e r s  d id .  In  1955, th e  ICC in v a l id a te d  r e g u la t io n s  r e q u i r in g
14s e g re g a t io n  in  f a c i l i t i e s  in  w a it in g  rooms s e rv in g  i n t e r s t a t e  c a r r i e r s .
In  December, 1960, th e  Supreme C ourt ru le d  t h a t  i f  an i n t e r s t a t e  c a r r i e r
v
Morgan v . Commonwealth o f  V irg in ia ,  328 IJB. 373 (1 9 4 6 ).
A group w hich aims to  s e t t l e  a l l  k in d s  o f  d is p u te s  p e a c e fu l ly  and to  
r e c o n c i le  w a rr in g  p a r t i e s .  Begun a f t e r  th e  F i r s t  World W ar, in  
a d d i t io n  to  an a n t i-w a r  p o s i t io n  i t  i s  a g a in s t  r a c i a l  s e g re g a t io n  
and th e  use  o f  v io le n c e  to  e n fo rc e  th e  s t a t u s  quo. See F e llo w sh ip  
o f  R e c o n c i l i a t io n ,  What I t  I s 3 What I t  Does (New Yorks F e llo w sh ip  
o f R e c o n c i l i a t io n ,  1963 ).
See s to r y  in  James P eck , Freedom Ride  (New Y ork: Grove P r e s s ,  1 9 6 2 ),
pp . 11-21 .
14
I  RRLR 263, 272 (1 9 5 6 ); I I  RRLR 901 (1957)
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c o n tra c te d  to  o f f e r  te rm in a l  and r e s ta u r a n t  f a c i l i t i e s  to  i t s  p a s s e n g e rs ,  
r a c i a l  d is c r im in a t io n  was d isa llo w e d  u n d er p ro v is io n s  o f  th e  I n t e r s t a t e  
Commerce Act.'*'** In  r e v e r s in g  th e  c o n v ic tio n  f o r  t r e s p a s s  o f a Negro who 
had re fu s e d  to  le a v e  th e  s e c t io n  o f a te rm in a l  r e s ta u r a n t  re s e rv e d  f o r  
w h i te s ,  th e  C ourt av o id ed  th e  b ro a d e r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  q u e s tio n  o f  p r iv a t e  
d is c r im in a t io n  in  p u b l ic  accom m odation; b u t i t  s t i l l  l e f t  CORE w ith  a 
t e s t i n g  ground on e q u a l f a c i l i t i e s  used  by i n t e r s t a t e  p a sse n g e rs  a s  p a r t  
o f t h e i r  t r a v e l s .
Albany was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f th e  f i g h t  bo rn  o f s p e c i f i c  g r ie v a n c e s  
w hich was tu rn e d  in to  a  b a t t l e  f o r  more g e n e ra l demands f o r  i n t e g r a t i o n .  
P r o te s t s  o v e r th e  c i t y ’ s v io l a t i o n  o f  th e  ICC r e g u la t io n  on s e g re g a te d  
t r a n s p o r ta t io n  te rm in a ls  developed  in t o  p r o t e s t s  ov er l e s s  narrow  a im s, 
b u t tn e se  w ere s t i l l  w ith in  th e  framework o f e q u a l access  to  p u b lic  
accom m odation.
A ll o f  th e  d e m o n stra tio n s  aimed to  a ro u se  th e  n a t io n  b o th  to  th e  
meaning o f  s e g re g a t io n  and to  th e  r e b e l l io u s  mood o f th e  N egro. Non­
v io l e n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n  was re g a rd e d  a s  a way to  p u b l ic iz e  o b je c t iv e s  to  
as w ide an au d ien ce  and as many le v e ls  o f a u th o r i ty  a s  p o s s ib le .
Motives*- D em onstra to rs  w ere m o tiv a te d  by a  v a r i e ty  o f re a s o n s . The
i n i t i a l  d e m o n stra to rs  in  th e  s i t - i n s  had been in s p i r e d  by th e  c a re e r s
o f Gandhi and K ing , w hich they  had re a d  ab o u t o r  seen  p o r tra y e d  on th e
t e l e v i s i o n ;  they  had  seen  King p e r s o n a l ly  when he v i s i t e d  G reensboro on
, 16a fu n d - r a is in g  to u r  a t  th e  tim e o f  th e  Montgomery bus b o y c o t t .  They
Boynton v• Virginia,  364 US. 454 (1 9 6 0 ).
16 H elen F u l l e r ,  n ’We a re  A ll So Very Happy"*, New Republic,
CXLII (A pr. 25 , 1 9 6 0 ), 13 .
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thought Gandhi to be "a pretty amazing guy... so fa ith fu l to his 
p e o p le . , . .  I began to wonder sometimes why couldn't I be a Gandhi 
m yself, doing something for the race."*^ King:
gave you the feelin g  you'd been s it t in g  down a l l  
the tim e...« He was speaking t ie  truth. He kind 
of made you fee l es normal people would just have 
to do something to better conditions. He was saying, 
don't hurt anyone, no revenge even while you are 
fighting the bad con d itio n s .... I began to wonder 
why my father had never done something to change 
conditions.
King became the symbol of the assertive Negro, who, with dignity, had 
confronted the white community. Fishman and Solomon, in discussing the 
motivation and sty le  of the students* involvement in the s i t - in s ,  suggest 
that the students f e l t :
. . . . t h e  older generation has come to accept segregation 
and soc ia l in feriority  as the natural order of th in gs.. . .  
However, feelin g  that desegregation was now their right, 
these students experienced increasing frustration with 
i t s  painfully slow implementation and With the seeming 
hypocrisy of adults who paid lip  service to principles 
but took no risks for implementation. 19
Quoted in Fredric Solomon and Jacob R. Fishman, "Youth and Social 
Action: II . Action and Identity Formation in the F irst Student S it-in  
Demonstration, Journal o f  Social Issues, XX (April, 1964), 38.
18
Ib id . ,  p.39. I ta lic s  in the orig inal. For other impressions of the 
four students Involved in the original s i t - in ,  see Robert Penn Warren, 
Who Speaks fo r  the Begro? (Hew York: Random House, 1965), pp.358-61. 
Jacob R. Fishman and Fredric
Solomon, "Youth and Social Action: I . Perspectives on the Student
S it-in  Movement American Journal o f  Orthopsychiatry9 XXXIII 
(October, 1963), 374-75. The authors go on to conclude: .For the 
Negroes, In feriority , submission and deprivation are their childhood 
experience; passive-aggressive resolutions their heritage; Christianity 
their moral background; the Supreme Court decision and the coming of 
age of new African nations part of tha tempo of change. Through these 
influences are filtered  the typical internal pressures and new ego 
capacities of early and la te  adolescence." IbidU 9 p.881.
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The su c c e s s  o f  K in g 's  u se  o f  n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n  in  Montgomery
co n v in ced  young N egroes t h a t  th e re  was som eth ing  th a t  th e y  co u ld  do
f o r  th em se lv es  a lo n g  s im i la r  l i n e s .
O ther p a r t i c ip a n t s  jo in e d  th e  movement f o r  o th e r  r e a s o n s .  A f te r
th e  G reensboro s i t - i n  had been re p o r te d  by th e  lo c a l  and n a t io n a l  p r e s s ,
s tu d e n ts  a t  o th e r  campuses s a id  th e y  f e l t  m o ra lly  o b lig e d  to  show w here
20th e y  s to o d  on th e  ra c e  q u e s t io n .  A f te r  th e  f i r s t  Freedom Ride had been
c a l l e d  o f f ,  some o f  th e  s tu d e n ts  a f f i l i a t e d  w ith  SNCC u n d e rto o k  a second
r id e  in  o rd e r  to  p rove  t h a t  n o n -v io le n c e  was a  more p o w erfu l weapon th an  
21v io le n c e .  O ther d e m o n s tra to rs  chose to  a c t  a f t e r  r a t i o n a l  d e l ib e r a t io n
upon th e  c o r re c tn e s s  o r  l e g a l i t y  o f  e q u a l tre a tm e n t and th e  a p p ro p r ia te n e s s
o f d i r e c t  a c t io n  t a c t i c s ;  o th e # w e re  m o tiv a ted  by f e e l in g s  o f  re se n tm e n t
tow ards th o se  who p r a c t i s e d  s e g re g a t io n  and en th u siasm  f o r  a c t io n  w hich
co u ld  g iv e  v e n t to  t h e i r  f e e l in g s ;  o th e rs  w ere m o tiv a ted  by th e  exam ple
s e t  by t h e i r  p e e r s ;  o th e rs  by th e  f e e l in g  o f p e rso n a l ad v an tag e  to  be
22gain ed  by b e in g  p a r t  o f  an i n f l u e n t i a l  movement.
T a c tic s
RÖte o f  CORE.- As h as  been shown a l r e a d y ,  th e  i n i t i a l  s i t - i n s  w ere 
in s p i r e d  by th e  exam ples o f King and G andhi. However, a s  an o rg a n iz e d  
p r o t e s t  te c h n iq u e , s i t - i n s  w ere n o t n o v e l to  th e  American e x p e r ie n c e .
G ien fo rd  E. M itc h e l l ,  "C o lle g e  S tu d e n ts  Take O ver", in  M itc h e ll  and 
P e a c e , op . o i t . ,  p .7 4 ;  Thomas G a ith e r ,  "O rangeburg : B ehind th e  
C a ro lin a  S to c k a d e " , in  Jim  P eck , e d . , S i t - I n s :  The S tu d en ts  R ep o rt 
(New Y ork: C ongress o f  R a c ia l  E q u a l i ty ,  I9 6 0 ) ,  n .p .
21 Howard Z inn , SNCC: The New A b o l i t io n i s t s  (B o sto n : Beacon P r e s s ,  
1 9 6 4 ), p .4 5 .
Compare w ith  H e b e r le 's  ty p o lo g y  o f  m o t iv a t io n , o p . o t t p p .94 -1 0 0 .22
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CORE, a  n a t io n a l  o rg a n iz a tio n  devoted to  f ig h t in g  r a c ia l  d is c r im in a tio n
23through the  a p p lic a t io n  o f Gandhian techn iques o f n o n -v io len ce , had 
p ioneered  the  method in  1942 and had used I t  p e r io d ic a l ly  s in c e  then* 
CORE had developed a p a r t i c u la r  i n t e r e s t  in  ho ld ing  s i t - i n s  a t  v a r ie ty  
s to re  lunch coun ters  and fo r  reasons s im ila r  to  those  advanced by th e  
a c t i v i s t s  in  I960, V arie ty  s to re s  were th e  r e c ip ie n ts  o f a good d ea l 
o f Negro tra d e  and many o f them were p repared  to  se rv e  Negroes a t
24r e s t r i c t e d  s tan d -u p  s e c t io n s  where th e  food could be c a r r ie d  away,
CORE o b je c te d  to  th e  ban on communal d rin k in g  and e a t in g  w hile  th e re  
was no ban on communal cash  r e g i s t e r s ,
CORE’« fo llo w in g , l im ite d  in  any c a se , was r e s t r i c t e d  p r im a rily  to  
n o rth e rn  urban c e n tr e s ,  w ith  only  minor support coming from bo rd er o r  
sou thern  s t a t e s .  I t  had e s ta b lis h e d  few c o n ta c ts  w ith  th e  g en era l Negro
p o p u la tio n  in  the  South , While I t  had bean su c c e ss fu l In  many o f  th e
25
in d iv id u a l p r o te s ts  which I t  had sponsored , i t  had never been in  a 
p o s i t io n  to  launch a n a t io n a l  campaign even approxim ating th e  one which
b u rs t  upon the  South in  I960,
See Congress o f R ac ia l E q u a lity , This J s  CORE (New Yorks Congress 
o f  R ac ia l E q u a lity , 1962),
See C arle to n  Mabee, "Two Decades of S i t - i n s :  E vo lu tion  o f Non-Violence**, 
Nation, CXCIII (Äug, 12 , 1961), 80, S tuden t le a d e rs  in  1960 s a id ,
NWe f e e l  I f  ve can spend money on o th e r  goods we should  be a b le  to  
e a t  in  the  same e s ta b lish m e n t,"  NIT, Fob, 15, 1960, p ,1 8 . For s i t -  
down s t r ik e s  in  in d u s try  d u ring  th e  D epression , sea  W alter G alenson,
The CIO Challenge to  the AFLs A H istory o f  the American Labor Movement, 
1935-1941 (Cambridge: Harvard U n iv e rs ity  F re e s , 1960), pp, 143-48,
For c o u rt a c tio n  on in d u s t r i a l  s it-d o w n s , see  N ational Labor R el,  Bd•
V, Fco\ateel M etal, Corp* 306 U,S, 240 (1939), James Farm er, n a t io n a l  
d i r e c to r  o f CORE, has s a id  th a t  th e  o rg a n iz a tio n  " lea rn ed  much from 
la b o r"  and from union techn iques such as s it-d o w n s; see  h is  s ta tem en t 
in  NIT, Apr. 7 , 1963, p .5 7 .
See Jim  Peck, Cracking the Color Line (New York: Congress o f R ac ia l 
E q u a lity , n , d , ) .
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CORE's previous activities were unknown to both the students who 
launched the sit-ins and their followers. However, one of the adult 
leaders of the Greensboro Negro community, who, as local head of the 
NAACP had heard of the CORE technique, contacted CORE's national office. 
CORE's subsequent appearance in Greensboro and later in other cities 
contributed a degree of unity and cohesion which the sit-ins might have 
jacked otherwise. By giving instructions in the art and technique of 
non-violent direct action and by helping to structure a direct action 
campaign, CORE placed the professional stamp of its brand of direct action 
on the civil rights movement.
Local youth chapters of the NAACP organized and led sit-ins as well. 
Initially the national office of the Association had had reservations 
about this new form of protest, but the speed with which the tactic was 
adopted, as well as its initial successes, persuaded the Association to 
throw its resources and talents, the most extensive within the civil 
rights movement, behind the skeleton student organization. In many of 
the cities where demonstrations took place, students were affiliated with 
neither of the national organizations; but they could, if they wished, 
look to them as a model to follow or be encouraged by.
Shared Characteristics»- In pace, tactics and specific goals, the 
demonstrations during this phase of the civil rights movement may have 
varied in different locales and at different times, but they had many 
shared characteristics. The typical demonstrators during a sit-in would 
sit quietly at the lunch counter, either staring silently or reading from 
school texts or from the Bible, trying not to respond to taunts of any
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kind. Often at their protest rallies and occasionally at the sit-ins
themselves, the demonstrators would begin to sing hymns, gospels or
patriotic songs, frequently using verses penned for the occasion. Out
of a rich musical heritage, the Negroes used folk music to whip up
enthusiasm for their cause, bolster their morale, disarm their opponents,
26and communicate their message to their audience.
Their code of non-violence required peaceful conduct on their part
at all times, either when left unmolested at the lunch counter, when attacked,
or when arrested for alleged violation of municipal or state laws. The
prescribed code of conduct often included instructions for forbearance:
Don't strike back or curse back if abused.
Don't laugh out. Don't hold conversation 
with floor walkers. Don't leave your seats 
until your leader has given you instruction 
to do so. Don't block entrances to the stores 
and aisles. Show yourself friendly and court­
eous at all times. Sit straight and always 
face the counter. Report all serious incidents 
to your leader. Refer all information to your 
leader. Remember the teachings of Jesus Christ,
Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King.
Remember love and nonviolence.27
The appearance of the activists was often in stark contrast to that 
of the hecklers who came to the demonstrations. One southern newspaper
These songs can be heard on: ,Sit-In Songs: Songs of the Freedom 
Riders (New York: Dauntless Recordings, 1962), No. DM4301;
We Shall Overcome (New York: Folkways Records, 1961), No. FH5591.
Instructions drawn up by Nashville, Tennessee, students acting under 
the direction of the Rev. James M. Lawson, Jr., who had just spent 
three years in India as a Christian missionary.
NIT, Mar. 2, 1960, p. 28.
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lam en ted :
H ere w ere th e  c o lo re d  s tu d e n t s ,  in  c o a t s ,  
w h ite  s h i r t s ,  t i e s ,  and one o f  them was 
re a d in g  Goethe and one was ta k in g  n o te s  
from  a b io lo g y  t e x t .  And h e r e ,  on th e  
s id e w a lk , o u ts id e ,  was a gang o f w h ite  
boys come to  h e c k le ,  a r a g t a i l  r a b b le ,  
s la c k - ja w e d , b lu e  ja c k e te d ,  g r in n in g  f i t  
to  k i l l ,  and some o f them , God save th e  
m ark, w ere w aving th e  proud and honoured 
f l a g  o f  th e  S o u thern  s t a t e s  in  th e  l a s t  
w ar fo u g h t by gen tlem en . Eheu! I t  gave
one p a u s e .28
I t  was l e s s  easy  f o r  th e  opponents o f th e  s i t - i n s  to  b ran d  th e  p a r t i c ip a n t s  
as "beatn iks** , d re s s e d  as th e  s tu d e n ts  w ere in  such r e s p e c ta b le  a t t i r e .
A f te r  th e  s i t - i n s ,  th e  Freedom R ides t e s t e d  th e  d u r a b i l i t y  o f th e  
n o n -v io le n t  code o f  th e  d e m o n s tra to rs . R eports o f  th e  o u tb rea k s  o f v io ­
le n ce  in d ic a te d  t h a t  th e  p a r t i c ip a n t s  a cc ep ted  th e  a t ta c k s  w ith o u t s t r i k i n g  
b ack . When Negro v io le n c e  d id  b re a k  o u t ,  as i t  d id  in  A lbany, th e  non­
v io l e n t  le a d e r s h ip  assumed r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  i t .  But d u rin g  t h i s  phase 
o f th e  movement i t  co u ld  be seen  th a t  f o r  a m in o r ity  o f th e  p a r t i c ip a n t s  
n o n -v io le n c e  was a  way o f l i f e  c o n s is te n t  w ith  t h e i r  C h r is t ia n  h e r i ta g e  
and t r a i n i n g ;  f o r  th e  m a jo r ity  i t  was a t a c t i c a l  weapon th a t  had shown 
i t s e l f  c ap a b le  o f b r in g in g  fa v o u ra b le  r e s u l t s .
T his p h ase  o f th e  d em o n stra tio n s  a ls o  had in  common th e  m id d le -c la s s  
background o f  th e  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  D uring th e  s i t - i n s ,  th e  a c t i v i s t s  w ere 
p r im a r i ly  Negro s tu d e n ts  from  th e  S o u th , jo in e d  on o c c a s io n  by so u th e rn  
w h ite  s tu d e n t s ,  a d u l t  members o f th e  Negro community, w h ite  r e l i g io u s  
le a d e r s  and some w h ite  p r o f e s s io n a ls  and p e rfo rm in g  a r t i s t s ,  f r e q u e n t ly
Q uoting  an e d i t o r i a l  in  th e  Richmond hews L eader  o f  Feb. 2 2 , 1960, in  
C laude S i t t o n ,  "The Mood o f th e  South -  and th e  S ta tu s  Now o f C iv i l  
R ig h ts ,"  I b i d . 9 M ar.6 , 1960, IV , 3 .
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from  n o r th e rn  s t a t e s .  The Negro s tu d e n ts  w ere u s u a lly  from  m id d le -  
c l a s s  background , many th e  c h i ld r e n  o f  p r o f e s s io n a ls .  The le a d e r s h ip  
o f th e  s tu d e n ts  was o f te n  in  th e  hand o f  d iv i n i ty  s tu d e n ts  o r  u n d erg rad ­
u a te s  t r a i n in g  f o r  one o f  th e  p r o f e s s io n s .
W hile th e  Freedom R ides d i f f e r e d  from  th e  s i t - i n s  in  t h a t  p a r t i c i ­
p a t io n  was l im i te d  to  a few d e m o n s tra to rs , h e re  to o ,  most o f  th e  
a c t i v i s t s  w ere s tu d e n ts  and m in is te r s ;  f o r  n o t many o th e r  s u p p o r te r s  
had th e  f r e e  tim e fo r  a w eek 's  t r a v e l  th ro u g h  th e  so u th e rn  s t a t e s .
The d em o n stra tio n s  in  Albany a ls o  c h a ra c te r iz e d  th e  m id d le -c la s s
a s p e c t  o f  t h i s  phase  o f  th e  movement. Albany was a c i t y  o f f i f t y - s i x
th o u san d  w h ite s  and tw e n ty - th re e  thousand  N egroes. L ike  o th e r  a re a s
no lo n g e r  c o n te n t to  rem ain  sm a ll so u th e rn  t r a d in g  c e n t r e s ,  Albany had
grown on in d u s try  from th e  f e d e r a l  governm ent and n o r th e rn  b u s in e s s e s .
As a r e s u l t  o f i t s  changed economy, a  Negro m id d le -c la s s  had em erged
w ith  p ro f e s s io n a ls  and businessm en  l e s s  dependen t upon th e  w h ite s  th an
29th e  Negro w orking  c la s s  and fa rm ers  had b een . The Albany Movement, 
a  c o a l i t i o n  o f  Negro m in i s t e r s ,  SNCC, th e  lo c a l  NAACP, and a  few o th e r  
Negro o r g a n iz a t io n s ,  r e f l e c t e d  t h i s  m id d le - c la s s .  The p r e s id e n t  was 
th e  lo c a l  o s te o p a th , th e  v ic e  p r e s id e n t  was a  r e a l  e s t a t e  a g e n t ,  w h ile  
th e  s e c r e ta r y  was a r e t i r e d  r a i l r o a d  t r a d e  u n io n i s t ,  w hich in  th e  Negro 
community was a h igh  s t a t u s ,  i f  a w ork ing  c l a s s ,  p o s i t i o n .
S tu d e n ts  w ere o f p a r t i c u l a r  v a lu e  f o r  th e y  d id  n o t have jo b s  from  
w hich they  co u ld  be f i r e d  by em ployers who o b je c te d  to  t h e i r  a s s e r t i n g  
them selves on th e  c i v i l  r i g h t s  q u e s t io n .  They w ere f r e e r  from  c o n s t r a in t s
See C laude S i t t o n ,  " P r o f i l e  o f  A lbany, G a ." , NYT3 J u ly  2 2 , 1962,
IV , 5 ; Howard Z inn , Albany: A Study in  N ational R e sp o n s ib ility  
(A tla n ta :  S ou thern  R eg ional C o u n c il, 1 9 6 2 ), p p .1 -2 .
29
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th an  w ere m ost g roups in  th e  s o c ie ty .  Of c o u rs e ,  s tu d e n ts  w ere n ev e r
f r e e  a l to g e th e r  f ro n  r e p r i s a l s ;  th ey  cou ld  be e x p e l le d  f ro n  s c h o o ls ,  and
30In  a few in s ta n c e s  w e re , by sc h o o l board s  w hich d id  n o t  ta k e  k in d ly  to  
t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  But u s u a l ly  s tu d e n ts  w ere f r e e  o f  econom ic 
r e p r i s a l s  an d , in  t h i s  s e n s e ,  formed a lm o st a n a t u r a l  a l l i a n c e  w ith  Negro 
m in is te r s  (and  in  some c a se s  Negro a t to rn e y s )  whose incomes w ere dependen t 
upon th e  Negro community.
Variations . -  Where th e re  w ere v a r i a t io n s  in  th e  d e m o n s tra tio n s , th ey  w ere
th e  r e s u l t  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  lo c a l  g r ie v a n c e s ,  th e  s t r e n g th  o f  th e  d e m o n s tra to rs ,
th e  s t r e n g th  o f th e  o p p o s i t io n ,  and th e  q u a l i ty  o f  th e  Negro le a d e r s h ip .
In  N a s h v il le ,  T en n essee , th e  s i t - i n s  c lim axed  n e a r ly  two y e a r s ' p r a c t i c e
in  n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n  te c h n iq u e s  by th e  Rev. James Lawson, who had
w orked a s  a  C h r is t ia n  m iss io n a ry  in  In d ia  f o r  th r e e  y e a r s ,  and s e v e r a l
o th e r  r e l i g io u s  le a d e r s  who had been In f lu e n c e d  by Ghandhian i d e a s . ^
The s i t - i n s  h e re  r e f l e c t e d  th e  d i s c i p l in e  o f  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  t r a i n i n g ,
and w ere b u t  one t a c t i c  in  a s t r u c tu r e d  d i r e c t  a c t io n  cam paign. In
O rangeburg , South C a ro l in a ,  w here th e  Negro community was e x c e p tio n a lly
w e ll  u n i t e d ,  th e  s i t - i n s  w ere an a n t i- c l im a x  to  a  march o f  more th a n  one
32th ousand  s tu d e n ts  th rough  th e  s t r e e t s  o f  th e  downtown shopp ing  a r e a .
In  B aton Rouge, L o u is ia n a , th e  s i t - i n s  w ere l in k e d  w ith  th re a te n e d  sch o o l 
e x p u ls io n s  by th e  s t a t e  board  o f  e d u c a tio n  and w ere a s  much a  p r o t e s t
S ee , e . g . ,  th e  e x p u ls io n  o f  James Lawson from  th e  V a n d e rb il t  D iv in i ty  
S cho o l; r e p o r te d  in  W allace W e s tfe ld t ,  A Report on N ashville  (N a s h v il le :  
N a s h v ille  Community R e la tio n s  C o n feren ce , n . d . )  p p . 3 -5 .
S ee , The N aehville S it-In  StPry (New Y ork: Folkways R eco rds, 1 9 6 0 ),
No. FH5590.
32 G a ith e r ,  op. a i t . ,  n .p
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a g a in s t  the  p o s i t io n  o f n e u t r a l i ty  taken by Southern U n iv e rs i ty 's  Negro
33p re s id e n t as they were a g a in s t  th e  w h ite  e a rc h a n ts . I t  A tla n ta , G eorgia,
King threw  h is  p e rso n a l w eight and th e  re so u rces  o f SCLC behind the  s tu d e n t
d em o n stra tio n s; t h i s  had the  double e f f e c t  o f ta k in g  th e  s p o t l ig h t  away
from th e  o rg a n is e rs  and b r in g in g  n a tio n a l  and fe d e ra l  a t te n t io n  to  the  
34campaign. In  Monroe, North C a ro lin a , th e  Negro le a d e r ,  Robert W illiam s,
advocated r e t a l i a t i o n  in  kind a g a in s t  w h ite  In tim id a tio n  and posed an
35a l te r n a t iv e  s t r a te g y  to  th e  s i t - i n s  in  o th e r  c i t i e s .  In  a d d itio n  to  
v a r ia t io n s  as th e  r e s u l t  o f lo c a l  c o n d itio n s , dem onstrations o f te n  used 
a v a r ie ty  o f weapons to  accompany t h e i r  p r in c ip a l  one. S i t - in s  m ight be 
accompanied by p ic k e tin g s  to  persuade p ro sp e c tiv e  custom ers n o t to  p a tro n is e  
s to r e s  which p ra c t is e d  d is c r im in a tio n . They m ight be preceded by r a l l i e s  to  
whip up group en thusiasm , o r  follow ed by marches to  la y  demands b e fo re  th e  
governm ental a u th o r i t i e s .
A nother weapon was to  accep t a  j a i l  sen ten ce  r a th e r  than  pay a co u rt 
imposed f in e .  Being a r r e s te d  meant a  v a r ie ty  o f th in g s  to  th e  dem o n stra to rs . 
To some, i t  meant see in g  th e  tra v e s ty  of so u th ern  j u s t i c e  o p e ra te  fo r  only 
so long  fed i t  took to  g e t cases b e fo re  th e  fe d e ra l  c o u r ts ,  w here, what many 
regarded  as t h e i r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l  r ig h t  -  th e  r ig h t  to  eq u a l access to  p u b lic  
accommodation -  had a b e t t e r  chance o f  being  upheld . To o th e r s ,  i t  meant 
an o p p o rtu n ity  to  d ram atise  t h e i r  p o s i t io n  on eq u a l r ig h t s  by being  prepared  
to  go to  j a i l .  These dem onstrato rs em phasised the  m o ra lity  r a th e r  than  the
33 Major Johns, "Baton Rouges H igher Education -  Southern  S ty le " , 
in  Peck, c S it-In s: The Students Report,  op. a i t . ,  n .p .
34 SIT, O c t.20, 1960. p . l .
33 W illiam s, op. a l t .
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l e g a l i t y  o f t h e i r  a c t io n :  " I  cou ld  n o t  c o o p e ra te  w ith  any f a c e t  o f
a s o c ie ty  -  in  t h i s  case  th e  j u d i c i a l  system  -  th a t  p e rp e tu a te s  in
a sen se  s e g re g a t io n  and d is c r im in a t io n  on th e  b a s is  o f  c o lo r .  I f
I  d id  n o t  a c c e p t th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  ray a c t io n ,  th e n  in  f a c t  I
«36would be c o o p e ra tin g  w ith  e v i l .
Many o f th e  Freedom R id e rs  a l s o  chose j a i l  s e n te n c e s  as a  way o f  
in s u r in g  more p u b l i c i t y  f o r  t h e i r  c a u se . D uring  th e  Albany dem onstra­
t i o n s ,  King and A bernathy w ere c o n v ic te d  f o r  h av in g  v io la te d  a  lo c a l
s t r e e t  d e m o n stra tio n  o rd in a n c e . Both men chose j a i l  r a th e r  th a n  pay
37f in e s  an d , in  t h e i r  v iew , c o o p e ra te  w ith  an u n ju s t  l e g a l  sy stem .
K in g 's  a r r e s t ,  l e t  a lo n e  h is  j a i l i n g ,  a s su re d  d e m o n stra tio n s  o f  n a t io n ­
w ide p u b l i c i t y ,  f o r  by 1962, he had come to  be reg a rd ed  by many p e o p le , 
in c lu d in g  th e  f e d e r a l  governm ent, as th e  t i t u l a r  le a d e r  o f  th e  N egroes. 
When h is  f in e s  w ere p a id  anonymously two days a f t e r  he had been j a i l e d ,  
he was robbed  m om entarily  o f  b e in g  th e  symbol o f th e  o p p re ssed  to  whom 
an i n j u s t i c e  had been done.
As nad been th e  ca se  w ith  th e  Montgomery bus b o y c o t t ,  th e  d i r e c t  
a c t io n  d em o n stra tio n s  w ere accom panied by l i t i g a t i o n  a s  a  t a c t i c .
D uring th e  s i t - i n s ,  even where th e  p a r t i c ip a n t s  w ere concerned  p r im a r i ly  
w ith  th e  m o ra l i ty  o f  t h e i r  a c t io n ,  law yers f o r  th e  c i v i l  r i g h t s  movement
Q uoted in  NIT9 May 1 5 , 1961, p .  23 .
For v a ry in g  view s on th e  v a lu e  o f  a r r e s t s ,  se e  D an ie l H. P o l l i t t ,  
"Dime S to re  D em o n stra tio n s : E ven ts and L ega l Problem s o f  F i r s t  
S ix ty  D ays", Duke Law Journal,  n .v .  (Summer, 1 9 6 0 ), 313;
M itc h e l l ,  op•  c i t ,9 p . 84; "An A ppeal f o r  Human R ig h ts " ,  op . e i t , \  
P eggi A lex an d e r, "R ep o rt I " ,  b ro ch u re  in  The Nashville S it-In  Story9 
op, a it,
37 NIT9 J u ly  11 , 1962, p . 1 .
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w ere concerned  w ith  th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  t h e i r  a c t io n .  Jack  G reenberg ,
head  co u n se l f o r  th e  NAACP, argued  th a t  what th e  a c t i v i s t s  c a l l e d
38an u n ju s t  law th e  A sso c ia tio n  c a l le d  an u n c o n s t i tu t io n a l  on e . In
th e  s i t - i n  c a s e s ,  th e  r i g h t  w hich th e  Negroes w ere demanding ( th e
r i g h t  o f  e q u a l a c c e ss  to  p u b l ic  accommodation) had n o t  been f u l l y
e s ta b l i s h e d  when th e  d em o n s tra tio n s  beg an . But as f a r  as c i v i l  r i g h t s
law yers w ere co n ce rn ed , s t a t e  su p p o r t o f  o r  acq u ie scen ce  in  p r iv a t e
d is c r im in a t io n  ( in  in s ta n c e s  w here p u b lic  accommodation was p r iv a t e ly
owned o r  o p e ra te d )  was p r o h ib i te d  by th e  e q u a l p r o te c t io n  c la u se  o f
th e  F o u rte e n th  Amendment. W hile l e g a l  p re c e d e n t h e ^ dth a t  n e i th e r  th e
C ongress , th e  s t a t e s ,  n o r  th e  c o u r ts  had power under th e  F o u rte e n th
Amendment to  p r o h ib i t  p u re ly  p r iv a t e  a c t s  o f  r a c i a l  d is c r im in a t io n ,
argum ents a ro se  o v e r w hat c o n s t i tu te d  " p r iv a te "  and w hat c o n s t i tu te d
" s t a t e  a c t io n " .  The ad v o ca tes  f o r  th e  c i v i l  r ig h t s  movement d id  n o t
q u e s t io n  th e  s a n c t i t y  o f  p r iv a t e  p r o p e r ty ,  b u t r a th e r  th e  a llo w a b le
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on i t s  uses w h eth er d ru g s to re s  w ere d e d ic a te d  to  any o th e r  
39th a n  p r iv a t e  u s e ;  w h e th er r e s t a u r a n t  owners had th e  r i g h t  to  choose
40t h e i r  g u e s ts  o r  cu s to m ers ; w h e th er a r e s ta u r a n t  in  a  p u b lic  p a rk in g
41b u i ld in g  cou ld  r e fu s e  to  s e rv e  N egroes; w h e th er th e  s t a t e  co u ld
42e n fo rc e  i t s  own laws r e q u ir in g  r e s t a u r a n t  d is c r im in a t io n ;  w h eth er
38 Ja c k  G reenberg , "An N .A .A .C .P . Lawyer Answers Some Q u e s tio n s " ,
NIT3 Aug. 1 8 , 1963, V I, 16 .
39 Henderson v. Trailway Bus Company3 194 F. Supp. 423 (1 9 6 1 ).
40 B ell  v . S ta te ,  176 A. 2d 771 (1 9 6 2 ).
^  Burton v . Wilmington Forking A uthority3 365 Ü .S . 715 (1 9 6 1 ).
42 Peterson  t>. City o f  G reenville3 373 U .S. 244 (1 9 6 3 ).
-  68 -
th e  s t a t e  could en fo rce  co n v en tio n s, bu t no t law s, re q u ir in g  d lsc r lm in a - 
43t lo n .  In  a d d it io n , th e  law yers argued th a t  d i r e c t  a c tio n  dem onstrations 
were ex p ress io n s  of th e  F i r s t  Amendment's guaran tee  o f  f re e  speech , 
h i s to r i c a l l y  in te r p r e te d  to  in c lu d e  f re e  e x p re ss io n .
The p r o te s t  campaigns in  Albany a lso  i l l u s t r a t e d  o p e ra tio n s  
o c cu rrin g  on the le g a l  and th e  d i r e c t  a c tio n  le v e l .  D em onstrations took 
the  form o f marches to  C ity  H a l l ,  upon which the  p a r t ic ip a n ts  were a r re s te d  
fo r  p a rad ing  w ithou t a  p e rm it, cong regating  on th e  s id ew a lk s , b lo ck in g  
t r a f f i c ,  d is re g a rd in g  t r a f f i c  s ig n a l s ,  and re fu s in g  to  obey a p o lic e  
o f f i c e r .  There were a ttem p ts  to  use th e  p u b lic  l i b r a r y ,  fo r  which th e re  
were a r r e s t s  fo r  b reaches o f the  peace. There were s i t - i n s  a t  lunch 
co u n ters  fo r  which charges of l o i t e r i n g ,  d iso rd e r ly  conduct and c re a t in g  
d is tu rb a n ce s  were l a i d .  There were p ray e r r a l l i e s  on th e  s te p s  o f C ity  
H a ll ,  fo llow ed by a r r e s t s  on s im i la r  te c h n ic a l ch arg es .
In  a d d itio n  to  f ig h t in g  th ese  charges on le g a l  grounds, th e  le a d e r­
sh ip  in  Albany i n s t i t u t e d  le g a l  a c tio n  o f i t s  own. Q u a lif ie d  v o te rs  
brought a c tio n  in  th e  fe d e ra l  d i s t r i c t  co u rt a g a in s t p u b lic  o f f i c i a l s
seek ing  a d e c la ra to ry  judgment and in ju n c tio n  a g a in s t  th e  m aintenance
44of seg reg a ted  v o tin g  p la ce s  and l i s t s .  In  a d d it io n , in  J u ly ,1962,
the  Albany Movement f i l e d  an omnibus d eseg reg a tio n  s u i t  a g a in s t th e  c i t y 's  
o f f i c i a l s ,  ag a in  in  th e  fe d e ra l  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ,  and backed up i t s  le g a l  
moves w ith  d a i ly ,  n o n -v io le n t d i r e c t  a c t io n . When dem onstrations f a i le d  
to  g e t th e  c i ty  to  n e g o t ia te ,  the  le a d e rsh ip  in te n s i f ie d  e a r l i e r  e f f o r t s
Lombard v . Louisiana ,  373 U.S. 267 (1963).
Andere on v • Courson, 203 F Supp. 806 (1962).44
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to register three thousand Negroes in time for the autumn election 
so as to try to unseat two segregationists on the City Commission*
Three court suits were in progress as well: one sought to prohibit the 
continued arrests of peaceful demonstrators; one asked for a court order 
desegregating all public facilities with the exception of schools; one 
asked for school desegregation* The Movement, still keeping up its 
economic boycott of white stores and its selective buying campaign, 
pushed demonstrations into the background for the time ^eing*
Reactions
Public Reaction.- The sit-ins received the financial and moral backing
45 46 47of religious groups, labor organizations, student bodies, civil
48rights and civil liberties organizations, and the general Negro 
community. The picketing of the northern outlets of chain stores and 
the raising of funds for legal expenses or arrested students were activi­
ties extensively carried out by college students across the country* 
Campuses, dormant during the days of"McCarthyism", sprang to life again 
in the name of equal rights*
The Freedom Rides and the Albany demonstrations also received active 
and moral support from students, religious leaders, and some professionals
^  NYT., Mar. 6, 1960, p.50; Mar. 31, 1960, p.27; Apr. 2, 1960, p.23;
May 26, 1960, p.20; June 3, 1960, p.28; June 4, 1960, p.14.
46 Ibid. , Mar. 6, I960, p.45; Mar. 9, 1960, p.19; Apr. 10, 1960, p.53;
Apr. 20, 1960, p.25.
47 Ibid., Mar. 2, 1960, p.28; Mar. 6, I960,p.45; July 3, 1960, IV, 8;
Oct. 14, 1960, p.24.
48 Ibid., Feb. 12, 1960, p.15.
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of both races. Sympathy picketings of interstate bus lines in areas 
outside the South paralleled earlier picketings of chain stores which 
had southern outlets.
However, the demonstrations raised questions in the minds of some 
persons who considered themselves supporters of the movement’s demands 
for equal rights for Negroes. During the sit-ins, the leadership was 
criticized for having raised the equality issue in an area of personal 
choice; that is, for having demanded equal rights in privately owned, 
if publicly open, accommodation. The leadership was criticized also 
for using tactics, such as sit-ins, which placed Negroes in the position 
of being lawbreakers.
The Freedom Rides added a new dimension to the civil rights movement. 
Some supporters of the movement's objectives began to question the moral 
and legal validity of non-violence which provoked violence. They sugges­
ted that the riders might have baited the local townspeople by their 
daring, rather than protesting, attitude. There was fear that excessive 
Negro militancy might bring about a situation in which moderate southerners 
would be unable to act as a restraining influence on southern conservatism. 
In reply, the riders argued that it was not they who had inflicted violence, 
but they who had been the victims. One of the purposes of the rides had 
been to reveal the power of non-violence and how, as a method, it accepted
violence without returning it in kind. Riders queried what other methods
49could have been used to obtain equal rights without delay.
Dianne Nash, "Inside the Sit-ins and Freedom Rides: Testimony of a 
Southern Student", in Mathew H. Ahmann, ed., The Hew Negro (Notre 
Dame: Fides Publishers, 1961), p.58.
49
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Very few of the store owners or operators welcomed the challenge 
to established custom made by the demonstrations and most decried attempts 
to alter traditional ways. However, some owners, usually those who 
recognized the advantage of increased Negro trade, did agree to integrate 
their establishments; the number of such merchants increased as the move­
ment progressed. Those who were opposed to change regardless of its 
economic advantages either closed their counters or called in local 
authorities to arrest the demonstrators.
Verbal and active opposition from local residents marked many of 
the demonstrations. As soon as the sit-ins were assessed as being neither 
fleeting, schoolboy stunts nor solely the work of outside agitators,^ 
local forces responded with verbal sallies, retaliatory boycotts and 
counter-demonstrations. Those not content with these weapons used violence.
Four points should be noted here. First, most of the demonstrations, 
particularly those in the upper southern and border states, were marked 
by non-violence on both sides. Secondly, where there was violence it 
was usually a form of minor outbreak, such as a fist-fight or a brawl,
Many of the stores were outlets of large companies which had their 
headquarters in the North. The problem arose as to whether policy 
could be set in the North or whether it should bow to local custom.
See Merrill Proudfoot, Diary of a Sit-In (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1962), p.191. Students have treated the 
criticism of outside agitation as an insult: "As students, we 
should be credited with some degree of intelligence and personal 
dignity - at least enough to organize and direct a movement without 
the expert guidance of an outside source. We do not deny that CORE 
has helped the movement, but we maintain that the movement would 
have had the same desirable effect on the nation without the involve­
ment of COSE, or of any other organization for that matter."
Mitchell, op, oit,9 p.91.
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p r e c i p i t a t e d  by w h ite  o p p o n en ts . T h ird ly ,  se v e re  b e a t in g s ,  r i o t s ,
p i s t o l  w h ip p in g s , and th e  l i k e  were re p o r te d  by th e  p re s s  more o f te n
th a n  were th e  raore numerous in s ta n c e s  o f begrudged a c c e p ta n c e . F o u r th ly ,
i n t e n s i t y  ap peared  to  make a  g r e a t e r  im p ress io n  on p u b lic  o p in io n ,  o r  a t
th e  l e a s t  was more new sw orthy, th a n  e x te n s i ty ;  t h i s  may have been  so
b ecau se  th e  v io le n c e  seemed so  co m p le te ly  u n w arran ted . M ajor ne\^  s t o r i e s
w ere n o t  o f  n e g o t ia te d  agreem ents betw een th e  a c t i v i s t s  and th e  s to r e
ow ners, b u t  w ere news r e p o r ts  o f b e a t in g s  in  Montgomery, Alabam a, ra c e
r i o t s  and d ea th s  in  J a c k s o n v i l le ,  F lo r id a ,  b u rn in g s  in  T a l la h a s s e e ,
F lo r id a ,  a c id  bu rns in  A t la n ta ,  G eo rg ia , ammonia b u m s in  Rock H i l l ,
South  C a ro l in a ,  c i g a r e t t e  b u m s in  N a s h v il le ,  T en n essee , dog b i t e s  in
Ja c k so n , M is s is s ip p i ,  h o s in g s  in  fO ran g eb u rg , South C a ro l in a ,  bombings
in  N a s h v il le ,  T en n essee , b o d ily  c a rv in g s  and f lo g g in g s  by th e  Ku Klux
52K lan in  H ouston , T exas.
Local a u th o r i t ie s , -  The o f f i c i a l  r e p ly  o f  m u n ic ip a l and s t a t e  a u t h o r i t i e s
#
to  th e  s i t - i n  d em o n stra tio n s  v a r ie d  ac c o rd in g  to  l o c a l  c o n d i t io n s ,  b u t
f e l l  i n to  c e r t a in  p a t t e r n s .  Where b i r a c i a l  com m ittees w ere a p p o in te d  to
exam ine lo c a l  g r ie v a n c e s ,  o n ly  th o se  w hich n e g o t ia te d  w ith  N egroes a c t iv e
in  th e  p r o t e s t s ,  and n o t w ith  Negroes o u t o f  touch  w ith  c u r r e n t  e v e n ts ,
53w ere a b le  to  re a c h  ag reem en t.
52 Based on in c id e n ts  r e p o r te d  in  NYT9 Feb. 13 , 1960, p .  1 ; Feb. 1 8 , 1960, 
pp . 14 , 18; Feb. 24 , 1960, pp . 2 0 , 28; Feb. 28 , 1960, p .  51 ; Mar. 2 ,
1960, p . 24; Mar. 7 , 1960, p .  1 ; Mar. 13 , 1960, p . 50; Mar. 31 , 1960, 
p . 1 ; Apr. 12 , 1960, p .  28; Apr. 13 , 1960, p .  32; Ju ly  2 2 , 1960, p . 24 ; 
Aug. 28 , 1960, p . 1 ; Nov. 23 , 1960, p . 17; Dec. 7 , 1960 , p .  26 ; J a n . 6 ,
1961, p . 12 ; Mar. 16 , 1961, p .  30; Mar. 2 9 , 1961, p . 25 . See a ls o  
S ou thern  R eg ional C o u n c il, The S tu den t P r o te s t  Movement: A R eca p itu la tio n ,  
op, c i t , 9 p p . 4 -1 3 .
53 The S i t - I n  S to ry : The S tory  o f  the Lunch Room S it - I n s  (New Y ork:
Folkways R eco rds, 1 9 6 1 ), No. FH 5502.
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Where pet icy wes to arrest the demonstrators, it was carried
out either at the request of the store owner or on the authorities'
own Initiative« Although only about five per cent of the participants
were arrested during the campaign, the quality of the arrests often
nade up for what they lacked In quantity« The nethod of arrest or the
name and position of the arrested compensated for the numbers, In a way
similar to the few incidents of violence compensating for more instances
of non-violence« It was noteworthy that 350 students were herded Into
54a stockade alongside the county courthouse In sub-freezing weather; 
similarly, It was newsworthy when Martin Luther King was arrested^ or 
when Negro and white ministers were apprehended In clerical dress.^
During the Freedom Rides, two arrests were reported In details one 
of the arrested was chaplain of Tale University; the other, an assistant 
to the director of the American Church Union, was the son-in-law of the 
governor of New Tork state. Similarly, when Jim Peck, who was white, 
was beaten up by mobs in Montgomery, it was prominently reported; but 
the beating of a Negro, Diaries Person, at the same time, was barely 
mentioned. As has been pointed out previously, Albany became an Item 
of concern to the federal government when King was sent to jail, seven 
months after the demonstrations had begun«
54 Incident in Columbia, South Carolina, SIT, Mar« 16, 1960, p«l« 
Incident In Atlanta, Georgia, i b i d Oct« 20, 1960, p«l«
56 Incident In Atlanta, Georgia, tbid.9 Feb« 16, 1961, p«22
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A rre s ts  were made e i th e r  under e x is t in g  s t a t e  and c i ty  laws o r  under
57
new le g i s la t i o n  s p e c i f ic a l ly  passed  to  meet the  s i t - i n s .  Of th e  3,600
a r r e s t s  in  so u th ern  and b o rd e r s t a t e s  which have been ta b u la te d  fo r  the
s i t - i n s ,  most f e l l  in to  th e  fo llow ing  c a te g o r ie s :  (1) d is o rd e r ly  conduct,
p u b lic  d is tu rb a n c e , o r  b reach  o f the peace; (2) c i v i l  o r c rim in a l t r e s p a s s ;
(3) unlaw ful assem bly. But the  f u l l  range in c lu d ed : f a i l u r e  to  obey an
o f f i c e r ;  l o i t e r in g ;  vagrancy; consp iracy  to  in te r f e r e  w ith  trad e  o r
commerce; im proper language; in c i t in g  to  r i o t ;  p ic k e tin g  w ith o u t a l ic e n c e ;
d is ro b in g  in  p u b lic ;  b lo ck in g  en tran ces  to  b u ild in g s ; de linquency;
c o n tr ib u tin g  to  the  delinquency o f a m inor; c rim in a l m isch ie f ; c rim in a l
58anarchy; c re a t in g  a p u b lic  annoyance; a f f r a y ;  a s s a u l t  and b a t te r y .
In  the  overwhelming m a jo rity  o f c a se s , th e  s t a t e  c o u rts  conv ic ted  the
59dem onstrato rs on the s p e c if ie d  charges.
The l e g i s l a t i o n  d e a l t  w ith  a wide range o f o ffe n se s : d is tu rb in g  th e  
peace; t r e s p a s s ;  r e s i s t i n g  an o f f i c e r ;  unlaw ful assem bly; parad ing  
w ith o u t a p e rm it; o b s tru c tin g  p u b lic  p a ssag es ; aggravated  b a t te r y ;  
b a r r a t r y .  Laws were a lso  passed  to  c u r t a i l  dem onstrations on or 
n ear s t a t e  p ro p e rty  and to  p ro h ib i t  c o n sp irac ie s  to  in ju r e  t r a d e .
V RRLR 525-6, 529-35, 873-80, 897-98, 1240 (1960); VI RRLR 317-19, 
1181 (1961); VII RRLR 258, 925, 1252-53 ( i s b i ) ;  V III RRLR 697, 699-700 
(1963).
For th e  p e rio d  February 1960 to  September 1961; ta b u la te d  ou t of 
a t o t a l  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f seven ty  thousand. See Southern Regional 
C ouncil, The S tu d e n t P r o te s t  Movement: A R e c a p itu la tio n , op, c i t , ,  
pp. 3-14.
See cases re p o rte d  in  VI C iv i l  L ib e r t ie s  Docket [h e re a f te r  CLD]
46-49, 74-76, 97-99, 126-27 (1960-61); VII CLD 30-31, 62-63,
97-98 , 123 (1961-62); VLIICLD 60-63 , 87-88, 146 (1962-3); IX 
CLD 68-69 (1963-64).
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The f ir s t  of the CORE Freedom Rides was treated with no discrimi­
nation or show of force u n til i t  arrived in Alabama, where the bus was 
stoned, set afire  and se t upon. At neither Anniston nor Birmingham 
where the violence erupted were state  police on hand to control the 
mobs, although the Department of Justice had warned loca l authorities 
of the p o ssib ility  of violence. The state  governor had contributed 
to the violence by refusing federal requests to guarantee safe passage 
for the riders through the s t a t e .^  Although the second group of riders
was given protective custody by the c ity  when the bus reached Birmingham,
61they were greeted by mobs in Montgomery. The local authorities
announced that they had "no intention of standing guard for a bunch of
„62trouble-makers coming into our c ity  and making trouble and the sta te
governor said he refused to enrage Alabamans by escorting "bus loads or
car loads of rabble rousers about our sta te  from city  to city for the
avowed purpose of disobeying our lavs, flaunting our customs and tradi-
"63tion and creating racial incidents.
State o f f ic ia ls  in  M ississippi were alerted by the Justice Depart­
ment to the continuation of the rides. As a means of preventing further 
outbreaks when the buses reached Jackson, the M ississippi authorities 
in stitu ted  a pattern of immediate arrests; upon disembarking, the riders 
were arrested on charges of breach of the peace or disorderly conduct.
60 NIT, May 16, 1961, p .lj  May 18, 1961, p.27.
61 Ib id . ,  May 21, 1961, p . l .
62 Quoting the Montgomery Police Commissioner, ib id •
I b id .,  p.78.
63
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A rre s ts  and c o n v ic tio n s  by lo c a l  c o u r ts  in c re a s e d  as th e  c i v i l  r ig h t s  
d r iv e  was ex ten d ed  to  a i r l i n e  and t r a i n  te rm in a ls .  But by th en  the  
r id e $  w ere r o u t in iz e d  enough to  av o id  v io le n c e  and t h e i r  main drama 
was fo u g h t o u t in  c o u r t  and on th e  a d m in is t r a t iv e  l e v e l .
The r id e r s  w ere found g u i l ty  by th e  l o c a l  c o u r ts  and had to  lodge 
ap p e a ls  w ith  th e  f e d e r a l  c o u r ts .  In  th e  l o c a l  c o u r t s ,  ju d g es  re fu se d  
to  a llo w  q u e s tio n s  o f  ra c e  to  be in tro d u c e d  even i f  segrega tion  laws 
w ere a t  i s s u e .  They in s i s t e d  th a t  th e  on ly  r e le v a n t  q u e s tio n s  w ere 
th o se  o f  th e  r i d e s 1 e f f e c t  on th e  community’ s peace  and t r a n q u i l i t y ,
64s in c e  th e  r i d e r s  had n o t been  d iv e s te d  o f  any o f  t h e i r  c i v i l  r i g h t s .
One M is s is s ip p i  ju d g e  argued  th a t  th e  a c t i v i s t s '  methods o f  choosing  
to  defy  th e  s t a t e  s e g re g a t io n  law s w ere c a lc u la te d  to  i n c i t e  mob v io le n c e ;  
i f  th e  law s w ere to  be c h a lle n g e d  p ro p e r ly ,  re c o u rse  la y  th rough  le g a l  
c o u r t  p ro c e d u re : "What th e se  d e fe n d a n ts  seem to  say  by t h e i r  conduct i s  
t h a t  th e y  a re  n o t go ing  to  l e t  any j u d i c i a r y ,  F e d e ra l o r  S t a t e ,  re s o lv e  
th e  q u e s tio n s  p r e s e n t  in  M is s i s s ip p i 's  p r e s e n t  s e g re g a t io n  laws and 
custo m s, b u t t h a t  th ey  a re  going  to  in flam e  th e  peop le  to  f i g h t  i t  o u t 
among th e m s e lv e s ." ^
U n t i l  ap p e a ls  were h ea rd  in  th e  f e d e r a l  c o u r t s ,  th e  r id e r s  and th e  
o rg a n iz a t io n s  su p p o r tin g  them had  to  cope w ith  th e  p ro c e d u ra l bu rdens o f
64 S ta te  v • Farmer,  r e p o r te d  in  VI RRLR 544-45 (1961) See a ls o  Brown v • 
S ta te ,  r e p o r te d  in  VI RRLR 780-81 (1 9 6 1 ); Thomas v . S ta te ,  160 So2d 
657 (1 9 6 4 ). But in  Knights v • S ta te ,  161 So2d 521 (1 9 6 4 ) , th e  c o u r t 
took  j u d i c i a l  n o t i c e  o f  s e v e r a l  m a tte rs  co n ce rn in g  th e  h i s to r y  o f 
ra c e  r e l a t i o n s  in  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  and concluded  th a t  when Negroes 
e n te re d  th e  w h i te s ' w a i t in g  room, i t  was re a so n a b le  f o r  th e  p o l ic e  
to  a c t  to  a v e r t  v io le n c e  by o rd e r in g  th e  Freedom R id e rs  to  move on 
and to  a r r e s t  them i f  they  d iso b ey ed .
65 S ta te  v • Farmer, op• e i t » ,  a t  544
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th e  t r i a l s  (cash  b a i l ,  law yers* f e e s ,  c o u r t  f e e s ,  t r a v e l  expenses 
back to  th e  S o u th , a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  t in e  to  a t te n d  c o u r t ,  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  
o f  th e  c o u r ts  h e a r in g  th e  c a s e s ) . ^  'Ih is  expense had to  be borne even 
when c o n v ic tio n  seemed l i k e l y .
D uring th e  Albany d e m o n s tra tio n s  th e re  w ere s im i la r  a r r e s t s  on 
te c h n ic a l  g ro u n d s: sm a ll g roups p ra y in g  on th e  f r o n t  s te p s  o f  C ity  H a ll 
w ere a r r e s t e d  a s  t h r e a t s  to  p u b l ic  s a f e ty ;  a  SNCC w orker was a r r e s te d  
on s u s p ic io n  o f  v a g ra n c y , even though  he had $59 on h is  p e rso n  when 
app rehended ; a  d e p u ta tio n  o f  N egroes o u ts id e  th e  f e d e r a l  govern m en t's  
employment agency o f f i c e  was a r r e s t e d  because  th e  p o l ic e  c h ie f  had 
o rd e re d  th e  s t r e e t s  c le a re d  a t  th e  t i n e ;  tw elve  p eo p le  p ic k e t in g  a 
v a r i e ty  s to r e  w ere a r r e s te d  f o r  o b s t r u c t in g  t r a f f i c .  These a r r e s t s  
w ere u p h e ld  in  th e  lo c a l  c o u r t s .
The Albany Movement had hoped th a t  th e  c i t y  a u t h o r i t i e s  would 
comply w ith  a c o u r t  o rd e r  on d e s e g re g a t io n ,  e s p e c ia l ly  s in c e  th e  lo c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  had d e c la re d  t h a t  t h e i r  r o le  in  h a n d lin g  th e  d e m o n stra tio n s  
was to  g u a ra n te e  law and o r d e r .  B ut t h i s  a ssessm en t f a i l e d  to  a llo w  fo r  
d i f f e r e n c e s  in  l i v in g  up to  th e  l e t t e r  and to  th e  s p i r i t  o f  th e  law .
In  th e  ey es  o f  th e  w h ite  r e s i d e n t s ,  i t  had been th e  N egroes who had 
b roken  th e  l a v s ,  d e f ie d  th e  c o u r t  in ju n c t io n  and used  v io le n c e .  The 
p o l ic e  w ere a b le  to  m a in ta in  o rd e r  w ith o u t p u b l ic ly  r e s o r t in g  to  v io le n c e  
by a r r e s t i n g  d e m o n s tra to rs  b e fo re  th e  peace  had been b ro k en . But th e
L ouis Lusky, " R a c ia l  D is c r im in a tio n  and th e  F e d e ra l Law: A Problem  
in  N u l l i f i c a t i o n " ,  CoVwibia Lou Review ,  LX III (November, 1 9 6 3 ), 1180. 
Lusky e s t im a te s  b a i l  a t  $1 ,500 a  p ie c e  and th e  o v e r - a l l  ca se  c o s ts  a t  
a c o n s e rv a t iv e  $2 ,000 . He a ls o  p o in ts  o u t  t h a t  no in d iv id u a l  bondsmen 
o r  l ic e n s e d  s u r l t y  com panies in  M is s is s ip p i  would w r i te  b a i l  bond.
See in  t h i s  co n n e c tio n  C ongress o f R a c ia l  E q u a l i ty ,  Ju etioe?  (New 
Y ork:C ongress o f  R a c ia l  E q u a l i ty ,  1 9 6 2 ), p p .2 9 -3 0 .
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p r ic e  f o r  k eep in g  o rd e r  had  to  be p a id  by th e  Movement a t  th e  c o s t o f  
i t s  c o n s t i tu t i o n a l  r ig h t s  to  assem ble p e a c e fu l ly  and to  p e t i t i o n  
governm ent f o r  a re d re s s  o f  g r ie v a n c e s .
I f  th e  p o l ic e  com m issioner won th e  r e s p e c t  o f th e  w h ite s  f o r  
h av in g  e n fo rc e d  law and o r d e r , he d id  so  by o p e ra t in g  what h i s  c r i t i c s  
c a l le d  a form  o f  p o l ic e  s t a t e ,  by making a r r e s t s  when th e re  w ere no r e a l  
th r e a t s  to  th e  p u b l ic  s a f e t y ,  when th e r e  w ere no imminent d is tu rb a n c e s ,  
and when th e re  was no o u tb re a k  o f  v io le n c e .  The v io le n c e  t h a t  d id  o ccu r 
b roke  o u t in  s h e r i f f ’ s o f f i c e s  and in  county  j a i l s ,  b u t was r a r e ly  
e v id e n t to  th e  w h ite  p u b l i c .  I f  th e  p o l ic e  com m issioner cou ld  n o t be 
charged  p e r s o n a l ly  w ith  b r u t a l i t y ,  he n e i th e r  t r i e d  to  p re v e n t i t s  
happen ing  n o r made an e f f o r t  to  p u n ish  th e  p e r p e t r a t o r s . ^
Federal a u th o r itie s . -  T o c q u e v ille  co u ld  w r i te  even in  h is  tim e : " S c a rc e ly
any p o l i t i c a l  q u e s tio n  a r i s e s  in  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  th a t  i s  n o t r e s o lv e d ,
so o n er o r  l a t e r  i n to  a  j u d i c i a l  q u e s t io n .  Hence a l l  p a r t i e s  a re  o b lig e d
to  borrow  in  t h e i r  d a i ly  c o n t ro v e r s ie s ,  th e  id e a s ,  and even th e  language
68p e c u l ia r  to  j u d i c i a l  p ro c e e d in g s ."  On th e  w ho le , Americans have a 
pench an t f o r  c o n s t i tu t io n a l i s m  and th e  fundam ental o rg a n ic  law  w hich 
a f f e c t s  a l l  d is c u s s io n s  o f  p o l i c i e s  and i s s u e s .  The a g i t a t i o n  f o r  c i v i l  
r i g h t s  was n o t a b le  to  e scap e  b e in g  fo u g h t o u t  in  te rm s o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
^  For d e t a i l s  o f  ja i lh o u s e  b r u t a l i t y  se e  S tu d en t N on-V io len t C o o rd in a tin g  
Com m ittee, Freedom in  the A ir: A Documentary on Albany,  Georgia,  1961-  
1962, (A t la n ta :  S tu d en t N on-V io len t C o o rd in a tin g  Com m ittee, 1 9 6 2 ),
No. SNCC-101; Z inn, Albany: A Study in  National R esp o n sib ility ,  o p .c i t ,  
pp . 4 , 7 -8 , 11 -14 ; G eorg ia  C ouncil on Human R e la t io n s ,  Albany,  Georgia: 
Police S ta te?  (A t la n ta :  G eorg ia  C ouncil on Human R e la t io n s ,  n . d ) ,  p p .7 -8 .
66 A lex is  de T o c q u e v ille , Democracy in  America,  P h i l l i p s  B rad ley  ed 
V ol. I  (New Y ork: A lfre d  K nopf, 1 9 5 3 ), p . 280.
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s t r e n g th s  and le g a l  w eak n esses . For th e  NAACP L ega l D efense and 
E d u c a tio n a l Fund, a d iv i s io n  o f th e  NAACP w nich hand led  most o f  th e  
s i t - i n  c a s e s ,  th e  l e g a l  q u e s tio n s  w ere as im p o rta n t as th e  p o l i t i c a l  
and s o c i a l  i s s u e s .  The a c t i v i s t s  who had re fu s e d  to  move from th e  
lu n c h  c o u n te r  a s s e r te d  w ith  t h e i r  b o d ie s  t h e i r  m oral r i g h t  to  be th e r e ;  
th e  NAACP u n d erto o k  to  a s s e r t  w ith  law yers* argum ents th e  l e g a l  r i g h t  
to  be th e r e .  The A sso c ia tio n  p roceeded  to  b le n d  argum ents on m inor, 
l e g a l  t e c h n i c a l i t i e s  w ith  argum ents on d e s i r a b le  s o c i a l  p o l ic y .
In  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  c a s e s ,  th e  s t a t e  c o u r ts  c o n v ic te d  th e  dem onstra- 
to r s  on th e  s p e c i f i e d  c h a rg e s . But from  th e  f i r s t  o f  a s e r ip d s  of 
c a u t io u s  d e c is io n s  handed down in  1961, th e  U n ited  S ta te s  Supreme C ourt
spoke o u t in  fav o u r o f th e  d e m o n stra to rs  and a c te d  as a sp u r to  th e
69movement. In  w eigh ing  c o n f l i c t i n g  r i g h t s ,  such  as th e  r i g h t  of p r iv a t e
p ro p e r ty  v s .  th e  r i g h t  o f N egroes to  be f r e e  o f d is c r im in a to ry  s t a t e  
a c t i o n , th e  C ourt t r i e d  n o t to  pronounce on Negro demands p e r  s e • The 
C ourt so u g h t to  d e c id e  on th e  r i g h t  to  d e m o n s tra te , b u t n o t on th e  
q u e s tio n  of w hat was b e in g  d e m o n stra ted ; on th e  r i g h t  to  a ssem b le , bu t 
n o t on th e  pu rpose  o f th e  assem b lage; on th e  r i g h t  to  m arch, b u t n o t on 
th e  o b je c t iv e s  o f th e  m arch. W hile i t  was t r u e  t h a t  th e  l e g a l  cases  
w hich have developed  o u t o f th e  c i v i l  r ig h t s  movement have p lay ed  a 
m ajor r o le  in  a l t e r i n g  th e  s t a t u s  of th e  N egro, i t  was a ls o  t r u e  th a t  
s u b s ta n t iv e  is s u e s  were l e f t  to  o th e r  governm ental b o d ie s  to  d e c id e .
See th e  fo llo w in g  c a s e s :  Burton v, Wilmington Parking Authority, 
op, a i t , ;  Gamer v, Louisiana,  368 U .S. 157 (1 9 6 1 ); Peterson 
V. City o f Greenville, op, a i t , ; Lombard v. Louisiana, op, a i t . ;  
Gober v. City o f Birmingham, 373 U .S . 374 (1 5 6 3 ); Avent v, North 
Carolina, 373 U .S. 375 (1 9 6 3 ); G riffin v.^garylarid, 378 U .S. 130 
(1 9 6 4 ); Barr v. City o f  Columbia, 378 0 .8 ^ ( 1 9 6 4 ) ;  Robinson v, 
Florida, 378 U .S. 153 (1 9 6 4 ); Bouie v, Columbia, 378 U .S. 347 (1964)* 
B e ll  v , Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 ( -9 6 4 ) .
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In  th e  ca se  o f th e  Freedom R id e s , f e d e r a l  c o u r t  d e c is io n s  were
a l s o  fa v o u ra b le  to  th e  d em o n stra to rs*  But by th e  tim e t h a t  th e  case s
w ent th rough  t h e i r  l e g a l  so m e rsa u lts  on th e  f e d e r a l  l e v e l ,  th e  p r a c t i c a l
70problem s o f th e  r id e s  w ere p a s t .
C o n g ress1 a t t i t u d e  tow ards th e  s i t - i n s  v a r ie d .  The m a jo rity  of
members were s i l e n t ,  b u t s o u th e rn e rs  warned o f monocracy r e p la c in g
dem ocracy, o f m oderate  o p in io n  b e in g  a l i e n a t e d ,  of pend ing  c i v i l  r ig h t s
l e g i s l a t i o n  b e in g  d e la y e d , of la v -b re a k in g  N egroes h y p o c r i t i c a l ly
demanding adherence  to  th e  law by w h ite  s o u t h e r n e r s . ^  how ever, l i b e r a l s
o f  b o th  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  acco rded  th e  s i t - i n s  t h e i r  e n t h u s i a s t i c  su p p o rt
and saw them as "sym ptom atic o f th e  r e f u s a l  to  a c c e p t a  su p p re sse d  
72s t a t u s .
A g a in s t th e  background o f  th e  s i t - i n s ,  C ongress passed a w h i t t le d -  
down v e r s io n  o f th e  A d m in is t r a t io n 's  s e v e n -p o in t c i v i l  r ig  t s  program .
The C iv i l  R ig h ts  Act o f 1960, In  a d d i t io n  to  p ro v is io n s  w hich made i t  a 
f e d e r a l  crim e fo r  a p e rso n  to  use v io le n c e  (o r  th r e a t s )  to  i n t e r f e r e  w ith  
r i g u t s  d ec re ed  by f e d e r a l  c o u r t  o rd e r  and a f e d e r a l  crim e to  bomb sc h o o ls  
o r c h u rc h e s , in c lu d e d  new s t a t u to r y  p ro v is io n s  f o r  a d d i t io n a l  p r o te c t io n
See Lewis v . Southeastern  Greyiiound L ines,  I n c . ,  199 F. Supp. 210
(1 9 6 1 )  ; Taylor  y . Louisiana,  370 U .S . 154 (1 9 6 2 ); B ailey  y . P a tterson ,  
323 F. 2d. 201 (1 9 6 3 ). See a ls o  c a se s  re p o r te d  in  V II C iv i l  L ib e r tie s  
Dooket [ h e r e a f t e r  CLD] 26-28 (1 9 6 1 ); V II CLD 5 8 -6 0 , 9 4 -9 6 , 121-22
(1 9 6 2 )  ; V III  CLD 55-57 (1 9 6 2 ).
See e . g . , Sen. S m athers , CP ,  106: 6781 (M ar. 29 , 1 960 ); Sen. M orton, 
in  SIT, Feb. 28 , 1960, p .4 5 .
Sen . J a v i t s , CP, 106: 3328 (F e b .2 4 , 19 6 0 ); s e e  a l s o  Sen. P ro x m ire , CR, 
107: 1299 (J u ly  2U, 1960 ).
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73for voting rights. The legislation eased the enforcement of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1957, but it offered little in the way of meaningful 
change for the majority of American Negroes,
Similar Congressional sentiments to those expressed at the time 
of the sit-ins were expressed during the Freedom Rides and the Albany 
demonstrations. Support or opposition cut across political party lines: 
southern Democrats and northern liberal Republicans supported them; most 
of the Congress said nothing.
The sit-ins occurred in an election year and became fair game for
comment by candidates of both political parties. Unqualified support
74came from Democratic presidential candidates, while on the Republican
side a more moderate estimation of the demonstrations was advanced,^
From the beginning, the Eisenhower Administration followed a
cautious policy which fitted with the Presidents opposition to federal
intervention in matters of civil rights. Eisenhower preferred to leave
such matters in the hands of local officials until such time as the
latter proved either unable or unwilling to keep order and control.
When asked whether he saw the Gandhi-like demonstrations as manifestations
of moral courage, he said it was ".«difficult to give a sweeping judgment;
some are unquestionably a proper expression of the group which is making
76them; others can be otherwise classified,"
^  Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat, 86-89.
^  NYT, May 5, 1960, p. 26; May 14, 1960, p. 2; June 25, 1960, p. 13.
^  Ibid, j Apr. 13, 1960, p.32; May 16, 1960, p.20; May 17, 1960, p. 25; 
July 25, 1960, p. 16; Aug. 18, 1960, p. 14.
Ibid, 3 Mar. 17, 1960, p.l.
76
-  82 -
The A tto rn ey  G en e ra l, how ever, re c o g n iz in g  th e  im po rtan ce  to
in t e g r a t i o n  o f  th e  a t t i t u d e  o f  n o r th e rn  businessm en who o p e ra te d  in
th e  S o u th , took  p o s i t i v e  a c t io n  by h o ld in g  in fo rm a l d is c u s s io n s  w ith
such b u s in essm en , im p re ss in g  upon them th e  re le v a n c e  o f  in te g r a te d
f a c i l i t i e s  to  th e  American im age. He succeeded  in  g e t t in g  them to
apply  p re s s u re  on so u th e rn  ch a in  o u t l e t s  to  work o u t t im e ta b le s  f o r
and d e t a i l s  o f  a p p ro p r ia te  m easures o f  d e s e g r e g a t io n .77
S en a to r  Kennedy, who had been a  s tro n g  s u p p o r te r  o f  th e  s i t - i n s
77Ad u rin g  th e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  cam paign, and who ap p ea rs  to  have a t t r a c t e d
a m a jo r ity  o f  Negro v o te r s  by a d o p tin g  a  more m i l i t a n t  p o s i t io n  th a n  
78h is  opp o n en t, was l e s s  v o c ife ro u s  in  h is  su p p o rt a f t e r  h i s  v ic to ry  
in  th e  e l e c t i o n .  W hile he d id  n o t t r y  to  r e s t r a i n  th e  movement, he 
f a i l e d  to  p r e s e n t  any l e g i s l a t i v e  p ro p o s a ls  d es ig n ed  to  se c u re  eq u a l 
access  to  p u b l ic  accom m odation. In  th e  e a r ly  s ta g e s  o f  h i s  A d m in is tra tio n , 
Kennedy b e l ie v e d  t h a t  he co u ld  b e s t  h e lp  th e  c i v i l  r i g h t s  movement w ith  
g e n e ra l econom ic m easures and s p e c ia l  ta x  p ro p o sa ls  -  by s t im u la t in g  th e  
economy in  g e n e ra l ,  by im proving  w e lfa re  p rog ram s, and by a t ta c k in g  
d is c r im in a t io n  in  h i r i n g .  In  a d d i t io n ,  he fe a re d  th a t  any g e n e ra l c i v i l
77 HIT, Aug. 1 1 , 1960, p . 14 .
1 ^Having made a c e le b ra te d  phone c a l l  d u rin g  th e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  campaign 
to  Mrs M artin  L u th e r King e x p re s s in g  concern  o v e r h e r  husband*s 
j a i l i n g  f o r  h is  p a r t  in  a s i t - i n  d e m o n s tra tio n , i b i d . 3 O ct. 27 , 1960, 
p . 22; O ct. 28 , 1960, p .  1 ; see  a ls o  O ct. 20 , 1960, p . 20; O ct. 24 , 
1960, p . 20.
See R u s s e ll  M id d le to n , **The C iv i l  R ig h ts  I s s u e  and P r e s id e n t i a l  
V oting  Among S ou thern  Negroes and W hites” , S o c ia l F orces, XL (M arch, 
1 9 6 2 ), 209-15 .
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r i g h t s  m easure would je o p a rd iz e  o th e r  s e c t io n s  o f h is  l e g i s l a t i v e  
program .
D uring th e  Freedom R id e s , Kennedy sou g h t to  c o u n te r  th e  r o le  o f
th e  s t a t e  governm ents a t  t h a t  p o in t  when v io le n c e  had e ru p te d . Four
hundred  m arsh a ls  w ere s e n t  to  Alabama, an a c t io n  acc la im ed  by l i b e r a l
members o f  C ongress b u t  d e p lo re d  by so u th e rn  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s ,  and th e
governm ent a p p l ie d  fo r  and was g ra n te d  an in ju n c t io n  e n jo in in g  th re e
Ku Klux K lan groups from  i n t e r f e r i n g  w ith  f u r th e r  r id e s  in  i n t e r s t a t e  
79commerce. As more v io le n c e  e ru p te d ,  more m arsh a ls  w ere s e n t  i n to  th e
c i t y .  The f e d e r a l  governm ent a l s o  h e ld  to p - l e v e l  t a lk s  w ith  s t a t e
o f f i c i a l s ,  b u t th e se  came to  n o th in g .
To c o u n te r  th e  v io le n c e ,  th e  A tto rn ey  G en e ra l, R obert Kennedy, c a l le d
f o r  a " c o o lin g  o f f "  p e r io d  by th e  o rg a n iz a t io n s  sp o n so rin g  th e  r i d e s ,
80b u t th e  l a t t e r  q u e r ie d  why they  sho u ld  be th e  ones to  co o l o f f .
D uring th e  Albany d e m o n s tra tio n s , th e  e x e c u tiv e  b ran ch  f i r s t  ex p re sse d  
concern  when King was a r r e s t e d .  Kennedy re q u e s te d  a f u l l  r e p o r t  on K in g 's  
a r r e s t  and in s t r u c te d  f e d e r a l  in v e s t ig a to r s  to  exam ine th e  s i t u a t i o n  f o r  
p o s s ib le  l e g a l  a c t io n .  When a  s ta le m a te  had developed  in  th e  c i t y ,  Kennedy
79 ,897
U nited S ta te s  v . U.S. Klans ,  Ina• 194 F. S u p p ./(1 9 6 1 ). T his move
was a l s o  in te n d e d  to  c o u n te r  th e  s t a t e ' s  in ju n c t io n  a g a in s t  any 
f u r th e r  r id e s  c a lc u la te d  to  provoke b re a c h e s  o f th e  p eac e ; see  
S ta te  ex  v e l .  G allion  v • Doe,  r e p o r te d  in  VI RJRLR 542-43 (1 9 6 1 ).
80
NYT,  May 26 , 1961. p .2 1 .  R obert Kennedy became one o f th e  a n t i - h e r o e s  
o f  th e  movement.
One o f  th e  f a v o u r i te  p r is o n  songs o f  th e  Freedom R id e rs ,  sung to  th e  
tune o f " F re re  Jacq u es"  w as:
Are you s le e p in g ?
Are you s le e p in g ?
B ro th e r  B ob,.
B ro th e r  Bob,
Freedom R id e rs  w a it in g ,
Freedom R id e rs  w a it in g ,
E nfo rce  th e  law !
E nforce  th e  law !
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e x p re sse d  amazement th a t  th e  c i t y  was b e in g  as s tu b b o rn  as i t  w as; 
b u t th e  A d m in is t r a t io n 's  in te r v e n t io n  in  th e  form  o f e f f o r t s  to
a r ra n g e  m eetings betw een th e  opposing  s id e s ,  was fu t i le * Some
Congressmen u rged  th e  J u s t i c e  D epartm ent to  in te rv e n e  w herever p o s s ib le
82on b e h a lf  o f  th o se  a r r e s t e d ;  b u t th e  D epartm ent c la im ed  th a t  i t  had 
no grounds on w hich to  ac t«
E v a lu a tio n
S i t - in s . -  Given a l l  o f  th e  l e g a l  and p o l i t i c a l  su p p o rt w hich th e y
re c e iv e d ,  th e  s i t - i n s  ach iev ed  few , i f  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  r e s u l t s .  A ccord ing
to  p ro g re s s  r e p o r t s  is s u e d  by v a r i e ty  s t o r e s ,  by O ctober, 1960, 112
so u th e rn  and b o rd e r  com m unities had in te g r a te d  lunch  c o u n te r s ,  and in
s e v e n ty - f iv e  p e r  c e n t o f  th e s e ,  change had come b e fo re  any d i r e c t  a c t io n
p r o t e s t s  had been conducted  l o c a l l y ;  by th e  end o f  Jan u ary  ,1961, th e
83number had r i s e n  to  125« By S ep tem ber, 1961, th e  S ou thern  R eg io n a l 
84C ouncil l i s t e d  103 key c i t i e s  w hlcn had in te g r a te d  lu n ch  c o u n te r  
85f a c i l i t i e s «  As was to  be e x p e c te d , r e s u l t s  w ere b e s t  in  b o rd e r  and 
u p p er so u th e rn  s t a t e s  and w o rs t in  th e  Deep South«
I b id . ,  Aug« 2 ,  1962, p . l .
I b id . ,  see  a l s o  Rep« Ryan, CR,  108: 15321 (Aug« 1 , 1 962 )j 
NYT, A ug.8 , 1962, p . 63 ; Aug. 2 9 , 1962, p . 14.
J I b id . ,  O ct. 1 8 , 1960, p . 47; J a n . 29 , 1961, p . 64.
84 C a lle d , on i t s  l e t t e r h e a d ,  "A C ouncil to  a t t a i n  th e  id e a l s  and 
p r a c t ic e s  o f  e q u a l o p p o r tu n i ty  f o r  a l l  p e o p le s  in  th e  South” .
See a l s o  Lewis K i l l i a n  and C h arle s  G rig g , Racial C ris is  in  America: 
Leadership in  C on flic t (Englewood C l i f f s :  P r e n t i c e - H a l l ,  1 9 6 4 ) , pp . 1 1 -U
85 S ou th ern  R eg io n a l C o u n c il, The Student P ro te s t Movement: A Recapitulation  
op. c i t . ,  pp. 14 -1 5 . By D ecem ber,1961, th e  number had r i s e n  to  two 
hundred .
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Had there been no protests, southern stores which changed their 
service policies probably would not have done so; but those which 
changed under the impetus of direct action demonstrations did so without 
either violent consequences or loss of business and with a new recognition 
of the economic value of Negro trade. For the demonstrators, the finan­
cial cost of this progress in racial equality was in terms of large outlays 
for lawyers, bail bonds, and fines.
The protests forced changes in the timetable of integration by 
speeding up what might have come of its own. In less precise terms 
than those of integrated facilities, but of greater importance, the 
sit-ins confronted white southerners with the Negro facts of life.
Southern forces which supported the movement said:
Just by their presence, the demonstrators were 
saying: (1) that not all Negro Southerners were 
content with their lot; (2) that agitation was 
not from outside, but burst from within the local 
Negro community; (3) that there were polite, 
educated, well-dressed Negro Southerners; and 
(4) that moreover there were ones brave enough ^  
and dedicated enough to conduct the demonstrations*
There always had been cracks in the southern monolith - areas where 
segregation had been less rigid and southern whites who had spoken out 
against the status quo. The sit-ins helped to widen the crack by making 
the position of the white moderates more difficult, forcing them to take 
a more direct stand on civil rights. The sit-ins also aroused the Negro 
community by giving a boost to slumbering consciences through small
"Direct Action in the South: A Southern Regional Council Report",
New South3 XVIII (October, November, 1963), 3.
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v i c t o r i e s .  There was ev ery  chance th a t  t a c t i c s  w hich had proved 
s u c c e s s fu l  once m ight be used  ag a in  by an a ro u sed  community. For 
N egroes now had f u r th e r  p ro o f  t h a t  they  cou ld  do som ething abou t c i v i l  
r i g h t s .
The s i t - i n s  l e f t  more th an  a f e e l in g  o f su c c e s s . They l e f t  members
t r a in e d  in  b a t t l e  and th e  t a c t i c s  o f  w a r fa re .  The members w ere p r im a r i ly
Negro y o u th ; t h e i r  t a c t i c s  w ere th o se  o f  n o n -v io le n c e . In  1960, when i t
was found n e c e s sa ry  to  c o o rd in a te  th e  p r o te s t s  in  th e  S o u th , SNCC was
formed by s tu d e n t  le a d e rs  a s s i s t e d  by SCLC. Having seen  th e  " r a p id i ty
88w ith  w hich mass a c t io n  can b r in g  ab o u t s o c i a l  change", SNCC s e t  about 
w ith  l i t t l e  money, a minimum o f p a id  s t a f f ,  no membership req u irem en ts  
and a good d e a l o f  p a t ie n c e  to  f ig h t  is s u e s  o th e r  th a n  p u b lic  accom m odation.
Freedom R id e s . -  In  c o n c re te  te rm s , th e  r id e s  prom pted th e  ICC to  is s u e
s p e c i f i c  r e g u la t io n s  co v e rin g  te rm in a l  f a c i l i t i e s  w hich w ere d es ig n ed  to
89e a se  th e  en fo rcem en t o f e x i s t in g  l e g i s l a t i o n .  H ost o f  th e  a c t i v i s t s  
c o n s id e re d  th e se  new r u le s  g r a tu i to u s  and an ex p en siv e  g i f t  when 
co n s id e re d  in  term s o f  f in a n c e  and human s u f f e r in g .  I f  th e  r id e s  accom­
p l i s h e d  a n y th in g , they  showed th e  f u t i l i t y  o f  mere dependence upon c o u r t  
and a d m in is t r a t iv e  a g e n c ie s ;  f o r  w hat th e  l a t t e r  cou ld  la y  th e  groundwork 
f o r ,  d i r e c t  a c t io n  had to  b r in g  in to  e f f e c t .
See Ruby H u rly , S o u thern  D ire c to r  o f  th e  NAACP, in  NYTS J a n .29, 
1961, p . 64 .
Q uoting M arion B a rry , f i r s t  chairm an o f  SNCC, in  tiowor-4 Z inn , 
SNCC: The New A b o l i t io n i s t s , op . c i t p . 35.
VI RRLR 902-03 (1 9 6 1 ).
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Violence had a positive effect by causing some people in the
community to rethink their position on segregation. Educationists
and businessmen realized that violence made it difficult to attract
personnel to areas of racial tension and faculty to schools and univer- 
90sities. Even the very threat of violence, its presence right below
the surface, made the demands of the civil rights movement more palatable.
It seems certain that the fear of the total breakdown of law and order
acted as a force in behalf of the civil rights movement. Opponents were
won over not by any belief in the rightness of the activists* cause, but
out of fear of instability and disorder affecting the community. Senator
Douglas expressed the fears of many supporters of the movement over the
staying power of the non-violent phase of the movement and its ability
to withstand rival black nationalist movements which were becoming more
vocal. Out of these fears, he asked for "sympathy, help, and understanding
91from the white race."
Albany. - After the failure of the Albany Movement, King still argued 
that certain important results had been achieved despite the city’s rigid 
stand. By organizing the local Negroes into action, the Movement assured
NIT, May 18, 1961, pp. 1,27; May 21, 1961, IV, 5; June 4, 1961, p. 76; 
Sept. 3, 1961,1V, 7. For a study of southern leaders* desires for 
new industry and their parallel opposition to extreme measures for 
preserving segregation, see M. Richard Cramer, "School Desegregation 
and New Industry: The Southern Community Leaders* Viewpoint", Social 
Forces, XLI (May, 1963), 384-89.
91 CR, 107: 8919 (May 25, 1961).
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92a "new sen se  o f  d ig n i ty  and s e l f - r e s p e c t "  f o r  thousands o f p e o p le .
SNCC f e l t  t h a t  by le n d in g  d i r e c t io n  and g iv in g  form to  d is c o n te n t  i t  
bad c u t th rough  th e  f e a r  o f th e  Negro community: "When we f i r s t  came 
to  A lbany, th e  p eo p le  w ere a f r a i d ,  r e a l l y  a f r a i d . . . .  There was f e a r  in  
th e  a i r ,  and i f  we w ere to  p ro g re s s  we knew t h a t  we m ust c u t th rough  
th a t  f e a r . "
I f ,  by th e  m iddle o f  1962, th e re  w ere no v i s i b l e  r e s u l t s  in  A lbany, 
th e  le a d e r s h ip  co u ld  p o in t  to  th e  e f f e c t s  w hich th e  d em o n s tra tio n s  had 
had on su rro u n d in g  c i t i e s  w hich d id  n o t w ant th e  same co n fu s io n  to  come 
to  them : "They don’ t  w ant to  lo s e  commerce; th e y  don’ t  w ant to  see  any 
o f th e  n o r th e rn  i n d u s t r i e s  t h a t  m ight c o n s id e r  coming in t o  t h e i r  a re a  
sa y in g  we can n o t go in to  a community w here th e re  i s  co n fu sio n ,* w h ere  
th in g s  a re  u p s e t .
By p re s e rv in g  th e  s t a t u s  quo , th e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  had to  p re se rv e  
s e g re g a t io n ;  by p re v e n tin g  v io le n c e ,  they  had to  f o r f e i t  p r o te c t in g  th e  
r i g h t s  o f  th e  N egroes. The Movement p r im a r i ly  f a i l e d  because  w ith o u t 
v io le n c e  th e  f e d e r a l  governm ent would n o t s te p  in  to  p r o te c t  th e  a c t i v i s t s .
92 NYT, Aug. 18 , 1962, p . 44 . On s im i la r  assessm en t on th e  su c c e s se s  
in  A lbany, se e  W yatt Tee W alker, "The American Dilemma in  M in ia tu re : 
A lbany, G e o rg ia " , in  Papers on P o lice  A dm in istra tion  and C iv i l  
D isobedience  (New Y ork: New York U n iv e rs i ty  G raduate  School o f  P u b lic  
A d m in is tra t io n , 1963), pp . 17-19 .
93 C h arle s  S h e rro d , on S tu d e n t N on-V io len t C o o rd in a tin g  Com m ittee,
Freedom in  the A ir: A Documentary on Albany,  Georgia,  1961-1962, 
op . c i t .
94 S la t e r  K ing , V ic e -p re s id e n t o f th e  Albany Movement, in  Peace News 
[ h e r e a f t e r  PN], Aug. 3 , 1962, p . 1.
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During the Freedom Rides, the federal government acted only when
there was uncontrolled violence. During the Albany demonstrations,
when there was no public violence, it did nothing to protect federal
rights when the state failed to act. Critics of the government argued
that it was the job of the federal government not only to maintain order
but also to guarantee and preserve the processes of justice. Observation
and investigation, or amiaua curiae briefs in support of the Movement's
action on the legal level, were insufficient methods of protection. The
government could have sought federal prosecutions of officials who deprived
95activists of First Amendment rights or who violated ICC regulations,
Albany was an example where the government had the power to intervene in 
a local situation but chose to interpret that power narrowly.
The chances of influencing a state's policy on segregation, let alone 
of altering it in any major way, became remote once the federal government 
decided to offer no assistance to the activists. At bottom, there was 
very little wrong with the methods used by the Movement, It was simply 
that its demands were not attainable if the government in Washington 
refused to be of active assistance, A small and alienated minority of 
the population could have done two things* It could have increased its 
strength both in absolute numbers and influential supporters; this the 
Movement did. It could have convinced the federal government that it 
was in the latter's interests to be receptive to its demands; this it
95 Under Title 18 of the United States Code, section 242; "Whoever, under 
color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully 
subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected 
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punish­
ments, pains or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, 
or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punish­
ment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not 
more than one year, or both.
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failed to do. Until there was an actual or highly probable danger of 
civil disturbance, the government chose to remain undisturbed.
During this phase of the movement, non-violent direct action laid 
bare the discontents of the civil rights movement and the lengths to 
which it would go in demanding implementation of civil rights. By this 
unusual form of coercion, the activists were able to remain, in the eyes 
of many in the audience, psychologically and morally commendable even if 
technically disobedient at times.
It is customary in the South for violence to be committed against 
Negroes. But violence increased the “American Dilemma” posed by Myrdal; 
it widened the gap between the American Creed of equality and justice and 
the real world of group living.
CHAPTER IV
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (3): THE REPERCUSSIONS OF BIRMINGHAM
Introduction
The demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama, during the spring of 
1963, highlighted a new phase in the civil rights movement. First, 
they were characterized by their inclusion of demands that went beyond 
the specific, limited objective of equal access to public accommodation.
The suggested package deal included demands for the desegregation of 
lunch counter and public facilities, fair hiring practices, and complete 
school integration. Secondly, the class composition of the activists 
included more members of the working class than in earlier phases of 
the movement. Thirdly, Birmingham created more social disruption and 
dislocation than the movement had seen to date. It included acts of 
violence from Negro and white sides; non-violent direct action precipitated 
police violence which, instead of going unanswered, was met by violence 
from unorganized Negro elements.
In this chapter, I shall discuss and analyze: (1) the demonstrations 
in the South which preceded the demonstrations at Birmingham; (2) the 
demonstrations at Birmingham in the spring of 1963; (3) the introduction 
of federal civil rights legislation in response to the new demonstrations; 
and (4) the demands of the March on Washington for major measures of 
reform. In particular, I shall look at the respective roles played by 
non-violence, latent violence,and violence.
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Tem poral Phases
E vents B efore Birmingham. The s i t - i n s  and th e  Freedom Rides in s p ir e d  
d a i ly ,  d i r e c t  a c t io n  p r o te s t s  th ro u g h o u t a l l  of th e  so u th e rn  s t a t e s .
A b r i e f  c a ta lo g u e  o f  e v e n ts  would in c lu d e  w ade-in s a t  p u b lic  beaches 
in  B i lo x i ,  M is s is s ip p i ,  and Savannah, G eo rg ia ; courtroom  s i t - i n s  in  
A n n is to n , Alabama; th e a t r e  and cinem a s ta n d - in s  in  Chapel H i l l ,  N orth 
C a ro l in a , N a s h v il le ,  C h a ttan o o g a , and K n o x v ille , T en n essee , and 
T a l la h a s s e e ,  F lo r id a ;  sw im -ins a t  p o o ls  in  J a c k s o n v i l le  and F o rt 
L a u d e rd a le , F lo r id a ,  Lynchbury, V ir g in ia ,  and C a iro , I l l i n o i s ;  bench-
u
in s  in  p a rk s  in  Ja c k so n , M is s is s ip p i ;  s k a te - in s  a t  r in k s  in  L o jL sv ille , 
K en tucky .^
In  Baton Rouge, L o u is ia n a , s tu d e n ts  a t  S ou thern  U n iv e rs ity  boy­
c o t te d  c la s s e s  in  p r o t e s t  o v er th e  su sp e n s io n  o f f o r ty - e i g h t  s tu d e n ts
2
who had p a r t i c ip a t e d  in  a n t i - s e g r e g a t io n  d e m o n s tra tio n s . In  Jack so n ,
M is s is s ip p i ,  and Macon, G eo rg ia , b u ses  w ere b o y c o tte d  in  p r o t e s t  over
3
s e g re g a te d  s e a t in g  r e g u la t io n s .  In  N a s h v i l le ,  T en n essee , N egroes con­
d u c ted  an a l l  n ig h t  s i t - i n  a t  p o l ic e  h e a d q u a r te rs  in  p r o t e s t  o v e r p o l ic e
4
b r u t a l i t y  ev id en ced  d u rin g  r a c i a l  c la s h e s  in  th e  c i t y .  By th e  b eg in n in g  
o f 1961, th e re  had been ov er two hundred  k n e e l - in s  a t  w h ite  chu rches in  
th e  S o u th .* 23 45
^ The ev e n ts  a re  ta b u la te d  from th e  pages o f th e  HIT, r e p o r ts  of CORE 
and SNCC, and r e p o r ts  o f th e  S ou th ern  R eg ional C o u n c il.
2 NIT;, Feb. 1 , 1962, p . 1 ; Feb. 2 , 1962, p .2 0 .
3 I b i d . ,  Apr. 20 , 1961, p .1 2 ;  F e b .13 , 1962, p .3 ;  Mar. 4 , 1962, p . 73.
4 I b i d . ,  Aug. 8 , 1961, p . 19 .
5 I b i d . ,  J a n . 9 , 1961, p . 28.
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Individuals and groups alike struck out at segregation. Dinah 
Washington, the Negro blues singer, demanded a boycott on the sale of 
her records in southern states which sanctioned segregation.6 Floyd 
Patterson was given a guarantee against segregated seating in his title 
boxing match in Miami, Florida.7 *10 The Metropolitan Opera House announced
g
that it would not allow touring companies to appear in segregated halls.
Fifty-four producers of live theatrical shows sponsored by large business
corporations agreed to bar segregation at all performances as part of
9
their new basic agreement with Actors* Equity.
During 1963, it is estimated that 930 individual protest demonstra­
tions took place in at least 115 cities in the eleven southern states.^ 
More than twenty thousand of the Negroes and whites who demonstrated were 
arrested; ten persons died under circumstances directly related to the 
protests and thirty-five known bombings occurred. On the positive side, 
in so far as the civil rights movement was concerned, some progress 
toward racial integration was achieved in most of the southern cities: 
integration of the buses; particular grades in public or high schools 
being integrated; some form of seating plans in public accommodation;, 
other instances of a token nature. There were encouraging signs: the
Arkansas Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional four state laws that the
6 Ibid., Dec. 3, 1960, p. 48.
7 Ibid., Jan. 20, 1961, p.35.
Q
loid., May 24, 1961, p. 1.
 ^Ibid., June 8, 1961, p. 40.
10 Southern Regional Council, Civil Rights: Year-end Sumnary 
(Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1963).
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NAACP had argued suppressed its a c t i v i t i e s a n  ordinance outlawing
racial discrimination in public places of business was passed in
12Louisville, Kentucky; two thousand citizens of Knoxville, Tennessee,
signed a petition sponsored by the Chamber of Commerce asking for
13desegregation of public facilities; in Charleston, South Carolina,
107 merchants publicly agreed to extend equal courtesies to all cus-
14tomers and to commence equal hiring practices.
But the pattern of riot, bloodshed, and even death was there as 
well. Ten persons were shot and many others badly hurt in a fight 
which broke out when small groups of Negroes appeared on the beach in 
Biloxi, Mississippi, in an area normally used by w h i t e s F e d e r a l  
troops were sent to Oxford, Mississippi, to enforce the court-ordered 
admission of James Meredith to the state university, but not until two 
persons had been killed and many others wounded in a race riot on the 
university campus.^ In the end, the defiant state governor had to 
yield and stand to the side as federal marshals led Meredith into the
Southern Regional Council, The Civil Rights Crisis: A Synopsis of 
Recent Developments (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1963), p. 2.
12 Ibid., p. 5.
13 Ibid., p. 11.
14 Southern Regional Council, The Civil Rights Crisis: A Synopsis of 
Recent Developments, III (Atlanta: Southern Regional Council, 1963), 
p. 14.
15 NIT, Apr. 26, 1960, p. 30.
16 Ibid., Oct. 1, 1962, p. 1.
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university. William Moore, a Baltimore, Maryland, postman hiking to 
Jackson, Mississippi, in a one-man civil rights crusade, was found 
murdered near Attalla, Alabama; his bullet-pierced body, still bearing 
the anti-segregation signs he wore, was discovered along a main highway}^
Birmingham• The sit-ins that began in April, 1963# were not the first
Negro protests to be held in Birmingham. Late in 1958, there had been
demonstrations to test new bus regulations, but these amounted to very
little. The city had arrested some of the demonstrators, while the
federal district court warned the local authorities not to enforce
segregated seating regulations which the private bus lines were entitled 
18to issue. Strategy was shifted to a boycott of the buses, but this
failed to get the full support of the Negro community.
Early in 1962, sporadic protests and a boycott of downtown
succeeded in persuading white business leaders to negotiate
Fred Shuttlesworth's Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights (ACHR),
19an affiliate of SCLC. The merchants, fearing large-scale demonstrations,
actively backed by SCLC, promised to Integrate some lunch counters in
return for a moratorium on demonstrations. But when the SCLC executive,
then in Birmingham for its annual convention, left the city, the merchants
20reneged on the agreement.
17 Ibid., Apr. 24, 1963, p. 19.
18 Ibid., Ho t . 14, 1958, p. 1( Mar 27, 1959, p. 47; Ho t . 24, 1959, p. 18; 
see also Bowman v. Morgan, reported ln V CLD 42(1960).
19 NIT, Apr. 22, 1962, p. 63.
20 Martin Luther King, Jr., Vhy V* Can't Wait (New York: New American 
Library, 1963), p. 53.
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SCLC and AChft launched " P ro je c t C o n fro n ta tio n "  In  April» 1963%
w ith  c e r ta in  minimum demands on the  m erchants and th e  c i t y  and backed
up th ese  demands w ith  sm all s c a le  s i t - i n s .  W ithin a week, 102 a r r e s t s
had been made on te c h n ic a l  charges o f t r e s p a s s in g , p a rad in g  w ith o u t a
21p e rm it, c re a t in g  a d is tu rb a n c e , and l o i t e r in g .  As had happened in
Albany, Birmingham became a n a t io n a l  news item  when a conscious a c t
o f c i v i l  d iso b ed ien ce , a  p r o te s t  march in  d e fian ce  o f  a county c o u rt 
22in ju n c t io n ,  re s u l te d  in  the  a r r e s t s  o f K ing, Abernathy and some
s ix ty  o th e rs .  For the  r e s t  o f A p r il ,  th e  p a t te rn  o f p r o te s t  co n tin u ed ,
sp read in g  to  k n e e l- ln s  a t  churches and s i t - i n s  a t  l i b r a r i e s .  F ig h tin g
b r ie f ly  e ru p ted  when Negro b y s ta n d e rs , in  p r o te s t  a t  some o f  th e  a r r e s t s ,
h u rle d  s to n es  a t  th e  p o l ic e ;  b u t th is  was curbed e f f e c t iv e ly  by the  
23a u th o r i t i e s .  A rre s ts  o f  p e ace fu l dem onstrato rs co n tin u ed ; b u t even 
in  th e  face o f  a n in e ty - f iv e  p e r cen t e f f e c t iv e  b o y c o tt ,  m erchants were 
unprepared to  n e g o t ia te .
The n o n -v io le n t s ta lem a te  which had s e t t l e d  over th e  c i ty  was 
broken when over one thousand young c h i ld re n , some as young as f iv e ,  
appeared on th e  l in e s  of march and were a r r e s te d .  For two d ay s , th e  
excitem en t in  Birmingham was th e  c h ild  d em o n stra to rs . Then, on May 4 th , 
w hile  Negro a d u lts  s tood  on the  s id e l in e s  and cheered  on c h ild re n  and 
teen -ag e  d em o n stra to rs , th e  Commissioner o f P u b lic  S a fe ty  o rd e red  th a t  
f i r e  hoses and p o lic e  dogs be tu rn ed  on th e  d e m o n stra to rs . In  a d d itio n
21 NIT, Apr. 8 , 1963, p . 31.
22 C ity  o f  Birmingham v , Walker, re p o rte d  in  V III RRLR 436(1963).
23 NIT, Apr. 15, 1963. p . 1.
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to  th e  e f f e c t  w hich t h i s  u se  o f  fo rc e  had on th e  th in k in g  o f th e
f e d e r a l  governm ent, i t  was an i n v i t a t i o n  to  Negro b y s ta n d e rs  to
r e t a l i a t e .  S tones and b o t t l e s  throw n a t  p o l ic e  by th o se  who would no
lo n g e r  s ta n d  id ly  by w h ile  dogs and hoses w ere u n leash ed  re v e a le d  th e
l a t e n t  fu ry  in  th e  Negro community. SCLC's on ly  re p ly  was to  c a l l  o f f
24f u r th e r  d e m o n s tra tio n s .
A g ain st th e  background o f  mass a r r e s t s  -  by May 6 th  th e  num ber,
25m ost o f  whom were c h i ld r e n ,  had r i s e n  to  2 ,425  -  t a lk s  w ere h e ld  
betw een  Negro and w h ite  community le a d e r s ;  b u t no accord  was re a c h e d .
When r i o t i n g  b roke  o u t f o r  a second tim e as n e a r ly  th r e e  tho u san d  N egroes 
sto rm ed  th rough  w h ite  b u s in e s s  d i s t r i c t s  o n ly  to  be d r iv e n  back by h ig h  
p r e s s u re  hoses and arm oured c a r s ,  th e  need f o r  a t r u c e  became more appa­
r e n t .  A f te r  s e v e r a l  a b o r t iv e  a t te m p ts ,  an agreem ent was reac h ed .
However, th e  agreem ent was c u t £ h o r t  when bombs d e s tro y e d  th e  homes 
o f  some o f  th e  Negro le a d e r s  and s e t  o f f  w id esp read  r i o t i n g  in  Negro 
a r e a s .  A f te r  some d a y s , th e  c i t y  q u ie te n e d . When o rd e r  r e tu r n e d ,  th e  
n e g o t ia te d  agreem ent began to  p ic k  up su p p o r t w ith in  th e  w h ite  community. 
SCLC c a l le d  o f f  f u r th e r  d e m o n s tra tio n s . By J u ly  i n i t i a l  s te p s  had been 
ta k e n  to  im plem ent th e  ag reem en t.
March on Washington• Birmingham s h i f t e d  th e  Kennedy A d m in is t r a t io n 's  
approach  to  o u t r ig h t  s u p p o r t ,  in  th e  form o f  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  f o r  th e  d i r e c t  
a c t io n  d e m o n s tra tio n s . A g a in s t th e  background b o th  o f  grow ing re sen tm en t
I b id . ,  May 5 ,  1963, p . 1 .
See c a se s  in  IX CLD 6 ,8  (1 9 6 3 ).
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w ith in  th e  c i v i l  r i g h t s  movement tow ards p h y s ic a l  o p p o s it io n  to  i t s  
demands and o f  th e  hope in s p ir e d  by th e  Kennedy p ro p o s a ls ,  c i v i l  r i g h t s  
l e a d e r s  is s u e d  a  c a l l  f o r  a March on W ashington f o r  A ugust 28 , 1963,
The o rd e r  and d i s c i p l i n e  sou g h t by th e  le a d e r s h ip  was a c h ie v e d  beyond 
a l l  e x p e c ta t io n .  Two hundred  and f i f t y  thousand  p eo p le  converged  on 
W ashington on th e  day to  demand o f  th e  f e d e r a l  governm ent a b ro ad  programme 
o f s o c i a l  re fo rm .
Aims and M otives
Birmingham• Both b e fo re  and a f t e r  th e  s ta le m a te  in  A lbany, s i t - i n s ,
v o te r  r e g i s t r a t i o n  d r iv e s ,  s e l e c t i v e  buy ing  cam paigns and th e  l i k e  w ere
b e in g  conducted  th ro u g h o u t th e  S ou th . SCLC b e l ie v e d  t h a t  a  s u c c e s s f u l
a t ta c k  on s e g re g a t io n  in  Birmingham "m ight w e ll  s e t  fo rc e s  in  m otion  to
26change th e  e n t i r e  c o u rse  o f  th e  d r iv e  fo r  freedom  and j u s t i c e . "  Towards 
t h a t  e n d , i t  drew up " P ro je c t  C o n fro n ta t io n " , a f u l l y  d e t a i l e d  programme 
o f  n e g o t ia t io n  and d i r e c t  a c t io n  d i r e c te d  a g a in s t  b o th  th e  b u s in e s s  
community and th e  c i t y  a u t h o r i t i e s .  The p r o je c t  o u t l in e d  minimum dem ands: 
(1) th e  d e s e g re g a tio n  o f  lunch  c o u n te rs  and a l l  p u b l ic  f a c i l i t i e s  in  a l l  
downtown s t o r e s ;  (2) th e  im m ediate e s ta b l is h m e n t o f  f a i r  h i r i n g  p r a c t i c e s  
in  th o se  s t o r e s ,  in c lu d in g  th e  employment o f q u a l i f i e d  N egroes f o r  w h ite  
c o l l a r  jo b s ;  (3) th e  d rop p in g  o f  a l l  ch arg es  a g a in s t  th o se  a r r e s t e d  d u r in g  
r e c e n t  s i t - i n s ;  (4) th e  e s ta b l is h m e n t o f  f a i r  h i r i n g  p r a c t i c e s  in  a l l  c i t y  
d e p a rtm e n ts ; (5) th e  re -o p e n in g  o f  c i t y  p a rk s  and p la y g ro u n d s , a l l  o f  w hich 
had been  c lo se d  to  av o id  d e s e g re g a t io n ;  (6) th e  e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f  a  b l - r a c i a l
26 K ing , Why We C an't Wait9 op• e i t ,  3 p .54
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group to work out a timetable for the desegregation of all city public 
schools. 27
The Negro leadership was no longer prepared to wage a fight for 
one particular objective. The aim during the Birmingham demonstrations 
was to present a package deal to which it was hoped both private and 
public interests would respond. In addition, the demands included a 
new objective of civil rights - fair hiring agreements.
March on Washington, Two streams of protest activity merged for the 
March on Washington, represented by the dual themes of jobs and freedom.
A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters 
and the principal Negro trade union leader, had been planning a demonstra­
tion against unemployment in October of some twenty thousand persons to be
9 g
led by the Negro American Labor Council. When it looked as though 
President Kennedy might not introduce any significant civil rights 
legislation, King suggested that civil rights groups might press for 
such legislation by staging a March on Washington, possibly one that
would include civil disobedience in the form of sit-ins in the halls of
29Congress. When the legislation for civil rights was introduced, it 
seemed advisable to advance Randolph's proposed October march and widen 
its scope to confront the expected Southern filibuster against the 
legislative proposals.
27 NIT, Apr. 5, 1963, p. 16.
28 The Negro American Labor Council had been formed in 1960 to act 
as a force for equal rights within the American Federation of 
Labor - Council of Industrial Organizations (AFL-C10).
NIT, June 10, 1963, p. 1. For statement by other ministers on 
the use of civil disobedience, see ibid,, June 12, 1963, p. 25; 
June 26, 1963, p. 22.
29
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President Kennedy told Negro leaders that he thought it best to 
postpone the March while debate on civil rights legislation was in 
progress; but he had the good sense and political acumen not to suggest 
that the March be called off* The Negro leaders, quite prepared to 
pledge themselves to a grass-roots campaign in behalf of the Administra­
tion^ civil rights programme, saw the need for continued peaceful 
demonstrations. While leaders were aware that should violence erupt 
civil rights action might be jeopardized, they felt that pressure from 
the mass of Negro activists made calling off the March extremely difficult. 
In the past, even threatened marches had brought limited success; while 
in the present, it was the use of non-violent direct action that had 
brought the nation to the point where civil rights legislation was even 
a distinct possibility.
The aim of the March was to apply pressure for meaningful civil 
rights legislation. It was hoped to emphasize that the proposed legis­
lation did not go far enough in rectifying economic problems of adjustment 
and inequality. Its aim was to show what the demonstrations in Birmingham 
illustrated: that the civil rights movement was no longer content merely 
with equal access to public accommodation, but now wanted a broad programme 
of social reform.
Birmingham and the March had a further implicit aim. This was to 
announce that after May 1963 no area could consider itself free from the 
reverberations of Negro discontent. Whites and Negroes alike could no 
longer stand aloof; both had to be prepared to take a stand on the question 
of racial equality. Neither time, place nor the individual was able to
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remain neutral any longer. The voices in the movement sang:
They say in Hinds County,
"No neutrals have we met.
You*re either for the Freedom Ride 
Or you*11 Tom for Ross Barnett."
No time for Mr. Charlie 
Don't listen to his lies.
Us dark, folk haven't got a chance 
Unless we organize.
Oh, which side are you on, boy
Which side are you on.
Which side are you on, boy
Which side are you on.
Tactics
Birmingham• Building on the failures in Albany, SCLC decided to 
concentrate rather than scatter its efforts. It was decided that 
demonstrations at Easter, a major shopping period, would bring maximum 
pressure to bear on the merchants. Plans were postponed originally to 
await the outcome of the mayoralty election and the desired defeat of 
Eugene ("Bull") Connor, an ardent segregationist who was then Commissioner 
of Public Safety. Although Connor was defeated, he contested the election 
of Albert Boutwell on legal technicalities. Rather than miss the Easter 
shopping period, SCLC decided against further postponement of the project 
pending final resolution of the mayoralty contest.
In April, demands were presented to the City Commission and backed 
up by daily, small scale lunch counter sit-ins and protest marches by 
small groups of Negro adults most of whom were middle»class activists 
of SCLC. This pattern of protest continued throughout the month, spreading
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to kneeJflns at churches and sit-ins at libraries. Although there had 
been police warnings against unauthorized marches, demonstrations 
continued and arrests were made. Each evening, meetings were held in 
churches to discuss the tactics of non-violence and the goals of 
integration and a task force was enlisted to serve as demonstrators or 
assist in the organizational work of the campaign. Each day, lines of 
activists, often led by northern Negro celebrities in the performing 
arts, went into the streets to face arrest.
In May, the earlier pattern changed. Protests rallied the entire 
Negro community, cutting across class lines. Birmingham was distinguished 
by two tactical Innovations: the first was the planned introduction of
child demonstrators; the second was the spontaneous involvement of the 
unorganized Negro bystander who initially played no active part in the 
project.
If in April, Birmingham appeared to be repeating the n^n-violent 
stalemate which had occurred in Albany, the situation was altered 
radically on "D-Day*1, when over one thousand young children appeared 
on the lines of march and were arrested.
The dramatic introduction of a new dimension of child demonstrators 
succeeded, as the leaders hoped it would, in bringing new energy to the 
campaign. With their enthusiasm and their capacity for excitement, the 
children lit up the spirits of the Negro community: with their sheer 
numbers, they put into effect the Gandhian principle of filling the jails. 
They had been instructed by SCLC leaders in the philosophy of non-violence 
and in the tactics of non-violent direct action. Whether all of the
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children understood what they had been taught was uncertain. However, 
they offered no resistance to the arresting officers as they marched 
out of the church grounds where they had assembled. Many dropped to 
their knees and prayed; others broke out in freedom songs:
I a'int a-scared of your jail 
* Cause I want ray freedom,
Want my freedom, want my freedom,
I a'int a-scared of your jail 
'Cause I want my freedom,
Want ray freedom, NOW! 30
The songs gave them courage, unity, and a method of communication.
Persons who considered themselves sympathetic to the civil rights
31demands of the movement criticized the use of children. In reply, the 
Negro leaders argued: that the campaign needed the refreshment and 
enthusiasm of youth; that the segregated society itself had been using, 
misusing, and abusing children prior to the Birmingham demonstrations; 
that any child bora a Negro had a battle on his hands from the beginning. 
One commentator said:
These children have been Insulted, degraded and 
excluded all of their young lives. Against this 
background they now see the possibility of freedom.
Once the demonstrations developed the momentum they 
did, it was inevitable that some, at least, of the 
children would clamour to take part in them. 32
This situation is recorded beautifully on Pete Seeger, We Shall 
Overcome (New York: Columbia Broadcasting System, 1963), No.BB233109.
See e.g., letter of Paul Ramsey's in NIT, May 10, 1963, p. 32; 
remarks of Malcolm X, ibid,, May 11, 1963, p. 9.
Dave Dellinger, "Beyond Gandhi: The Negroes of Birmingham", 
Liberation, VIII (Summer, 1963), 20-21.
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No one had made th e  c h ild re n  do any th ing  a g a in s t  th e i r  w il ls  **iiov
do you fo rc e  a l i t t l e  g i r l  to  walk up to  a  s n a r l in g  p o lic e  dog, i f
33she la ck s  a tremendous amount o f in n e r  m o tiv a tio n  o f h e r own.”
For two d a y s , th e  excitem ent In  Birmingham was the  c h ild  demonstra­
to r s .  Then on Hay 4 th ,  th e  focus o f  a t te n t io n  s h i f te d .  C hild ren  and 
teen -ag e  d em o nstra to rs  were fo rc ib ly  apprehended by policem en using  
f i r e  hoses and dogs. This use o f fo rce  was an I n v i ta t io n  to  Negro 
b y s tan d e rs  to  r e t a l i a t e .  The changing s iz e  and scope o f  the  dem onstra­
t io n s  were them selves warning s ig n s  o f the  powderkeg w ith in  th e  Negro 
community; now th e  l a t e n t  fu ry  was rev ea led  by s to n es  and b o t t le s  thrown 
a t  the  p o l ic e  by those  who would no lo n g e r s tan d  id ly  by w h ile  dogs and
hoses were u n leash ed . SLC, w ith  no c o n tro l over th e  unorgan ized , could
34do no more than  c a l l  o f f  f u r th e r  dem onstrations by i t s  own members.
The r i o t i n g  showed th e  need fo r  a t ru c e .  When, some days l a t e r ,  
bombs d e stro y ed  th e  homes o f some o f the  Negro le a d e r s ,  w idespread 
r io t in g  in  Negro a re a s  occu rred  a g a in . Nego m in is te r s ,  a s s i s te d  by v o lu n te e r  
c i v i l  defence w o rk ers , were ab le  to  d isp e rse  Negro mobs which were s t i l l  
r e a c t in g  to  th e  o u tra g e s  o f  th e  bombings. K ing, fo r  h is  p a r t ,  v i s i t e d  
pool rooms and o th e r  c e n tre s  in  th e  Negro community in  a  b id  to  r e s t r a in  
h is  u n o f f i c i a l ,  unorganized  fo llo w in g  from resuming v io le n c e .
33
I b id . ,  p . 20. See a lso  K ing, Why We Can’t  Wait,  op. a i t . ,  p . 96.
34
SIT, May 5 , 1963, p . 1
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SCLC had more influence over its membership than over its 
peripheral supporters. King, placing faith in the timetable which 
the white and Negro negotiators had worked out, deterred some of his 
followers from holding further demonstrations. When the state board 
of education ordered the expulsion of some eleven hundred students who 
had been arrested in the demonstrations, some Negro leaders wanted all 
of Birmingham’s Negro students to withdraw from school in sympathy; 
but King’s views prevailed, the school boycott was cancelled, and a
35court suit seeking reinstatement of the students was filed instead.
So as not to upset the negotiated agreement, King asked Negroes to 
refrain from seeking service at white lunch counters despite a recent 
United States Supreme Court decision holding that state enforcement of 
segregation in such facilities was unconstitutional.
The unorganized Negro bystander, who initially played no active 
part in the project, affected the outcome of the demonstrations. For 
either by his acts of violence or by the sympathy which he gave to 
the activists, he was a reminder of Negro forces which did not appear 
on picket lines or at prayer meetings. One observer wrote of the 
unemployed youths and delinquents who joined in the demonstrations in 
May:
The steam has been building in these people for 
weeks. It was they, not the demo strating [sic] 
children, who were the targets of hoses and dogs....
For federal court decision on school cases in which it was held 
that the students were engaged in legally permissible activities 
and were illegally arrested, see Woods v. Weight, reported in 
VIII RRLR 444-45 (1963).
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So the hate built in these bitter souls and 
courage built up too. They had always cowered 
before the cops and held back their hatred - 
to protect their skulls. But suddenly, without 
forewarning, for they had been in no church 
rallies and ridden in no freedom rides, they 
saw Negroes defying the hated cop. So the non- 
privileged decided to make it a fight of their 
own.... 36
These undisciplined forces posed a problem for the SCLC leadership, 
committed to non-violence, as well as for the police. They turned 
latent and overt violence into a positive tactical weapon that might 
be capable of bringing results to civil rights demands.
The Negro leadership was criticized, again by persons allegedly
sympathetic to their objectives, for some of its tactics. Criticism
arose over the timing of the demonstrations; that is, delaying them
37until Boutwell had had time to disclose his intentions. A group of 
white ministers in Birmingham issued a statement calling the street 
demonstrations "unwise and untimely", adding: "When rights are consistently 
denied a cause should be pressed in the courts and in negotiations among 
local leaders, not in the streets." King replied to his critics: that 
pressures had to be brought on the merchants at a peak shopping period 
such as Easter; that a campaign involving so many people in this kin^ Gf
Quoted in Irving Howe, "An End to * Moderation': The Negro Revolution", 
Dissent, X. (Summer, 1963), 207.
37 See, e.g., Attorney-General Kennedy, NIT, May 4, 1963, p. 1.
38 Ibid,, Apr. 14, 1963, p. 46. See also Little Rock Arkansas Gazette 
editorial, reported in ibid,, May 15, 1963, IV, 11; alsoMGo Slow,
Dr. King", Liberation, VIII (June, 1963), 9.
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p r o t e s t  cou ld  n o t be p u t o f f  ag a in  and a g a in ; th a t  r e g a rd le s s  o f th e  r e s u l t
o f th e  m ay o ra lty  e l e c t i o n ,  a s e g r e g a t io n i s t  a d m in is t r a t io n ,  t h a t  would have
needed  p ro d d in g , would have been re tu rn e d  to  o f f i c e ;  t h a t  " i t  was r id ic u lo u s
to  speak  o f  tim in g  when th e  c lo ck  o f h i s to r y  showed th a t  th e  Negro had
39a lre a d y  s u f f e r e d  one hundred  y e a rs  o f  d e la y .”
The le a d e r s h ip  was a ls o  c r i t i c i z e d  f o r  i t s  d e f ia n c e  o f  a c o u rt
in ju n c t io n  in  A p r i l .  King argued  th a t  h i s  con sc io u s a c t  o f  c i v i l
d iso b e d ie n c e  was much co n s id e re d  and th e  r e s u l t  o f  h i s  assessm en t was th a t
" th e  c o u r ts  o f  Alabama had m isused th e  j u d i c i a l  p ro c e ss  in  o rd e r  to  p e r p e t -
40u a te  i n j u s t i c e  and s e g r e g a t io n .” C on sc ien ce , he a rg u ed , d i r e c te d  th a t
th e  Negroes d isobey  th e  s t a t e  c o u r t 's  r u l in g  o u t o f  a l le g ia n c e  to  som eth ing
h ig h e r  th a n  th e  law ; t h e i r  a c t io n  was s im i la r  to  d iso b ey in g  an u n ju s t  law
41"o p e n ly , lo v in g ly ,  and w ith  a w il l in g n e s s  to  a c c e p t th e  p e n a l ty ."
Too o f te n  c r i t i c s  blamed th e  le a d e r s h ip  f o r  n o t  c o n f in in g  th e
d em o n stra tio n s  w ith in  c o n t ro l le d  ch an n e ls  o f  a g i t a t i o n .  K in g 's  re p ly
was p o e t ic  b u t c lo se  to  th e  t r u t h
I t  was th e  p e o p le  who moved t h e i r  l e a d e r s ,  n o t th e  
le a d e r s  who moved th e  p e o p le . Of c o u rs e ,  th e r e  w ere 
g e n e ra ls ,  as th e re  m ust be in  ev ery  army. But th e  
command p o s t  was in  th e  b u r s t in g  h e a r t s  o f  m ill io n s  
o f  N egroes. When such p eo p le  b e g in  to  move, th ey  
c r e a te  t h e i r  own th e o r i e s ,  shape t h e i r  own d e s t i n i e s ,  
and choose th e  le a d e r s  who s h a re  t h e i r  own p h ilo so p h y .
A le a d e r  who u n d e rs ta n d s  t h i s  k in d  o f  mandate knows 
t h a t  he must be s e n s i t i v e  to  th e  a n g e r , th e  im p a tie n c e , 
th e  f r u s t r a t i o n ,  th e  r e s o lu t io n  th a t  have been lo o sed  
in  h is  p e o p le . Any le a d e r  who t r i e s  to  b o t t l e  up th e se  
em otions i s  s u re  to  be blown asu n d er in  th e  en su in g  
e x p lo s io n . 42
K ing, Why We Can't Wait,  op, a i t , ,  p . 66. 
40 I b i d , ,  p . 71.
4^ I b i d . ,  p . 83.
42 I b i d . ,  p . 132.
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March on Washington. At v a r io u s  tim es in  American h i s t o r y ,  o rg an iz ed
groups have marched on W ashington to  p r e s e n t  t h e i r  demands o r  re c o rd  
43t h e i r  g r ie v a n c e s .  Some have marched f o r  p e a c e , o th e rs  to  seek  
clem ency f o r  c o n v ic te d  c r im in a l s ,  o th e rs  to  demand e q u a l v o tin g  r ig h t s  
f o r  women, o th e rs  a g a in s t  unem ploym ent, o th e r s ,  s t i l l » f o r  c i v i l  r ig h t s  
f o r  N egroes. T h e ir  r e c e p t io n s  have been  as  v a r ie d  as t h e i r  c a u se s .
Those w hich w ere m arches f o r  c i v i l  r i g h t s  in c lu d e d  one o th e r  under th e  
le a d e r s h ip  o f  R andolph. In  1941 a  March on W ashington Movement (MOWM) 
under h is  d i r e c t io n  was e s ta b l i s h e d  to  demand an end to  r a c i a l  d is c r im i­
n a t io n  in  d efen ce  employment and in  th e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v ic e s .  Randolph 
p roposed  th a t  te n  thousand  N egroes march on W ashington f o r  t h i s  p u rp o se . 
P r o t e s t  m eetings in  tw e n ty - th re e  s t a t e s ,  o rg a n iz e d  by th e  NAACP and th e  
MOWM, made i t  c l e a r  to  th e  governm ent, and to  P re s id e n t  R o o sev e lt in  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h a t  th e  o n ly  way to  have th e  march c a l l  re s c in d e d  would 
be by m eeting  th e  N egroes ' demands. One month l a t e r ,  R o o sev e lt is s u e d  
an e x e c u tiv e  o rd e r  p r o h ib i t in g  d is c r im in a t io n  in  d e fen ce  work and
fo llo w ed  t h i s  up w ith  the. e s ta b l is h m e n t o f  a  w artim e F a ir  Employment
44P r a c t i c e s  Committee (FEPC).
The m arch, a  d e p a r tu re  from  p re v io u s  Negro p r o t e s t  a c t i v i t i e s ,  was 
r e a c t iv a t e d  as a t a c t i c  in  1948. A f te r  a  s e r i e s  o f  f u t i l e  d is c u s s io n s  
w ith  P re s id e n t  Truman on th e  c i v i l  r i g h t s  q u e s t io n ,  Randolph and o th e r
43 On C oxey 's Army, se e  Donald L. McMurray, Coxey's Army: A Study o f  
the In d u s tr ia l Army Movement o f  1894 (B o sto n : L i t t l e ,  Brown & C o .,
1 9 2 9 ), pp . 72 -74 ; Matthew Jo se p h so n , The P o l i t ic o s  1865-1896 (New 
Y ork: H a rc o u r t ,  B race & C o ., 1938 ), pp . 561-71 .
On th e  Bonus Army, se e  A rth u r M. S c h le s in g e r ,  J r . ,  The Age o f  R o osevelt:  
The C r is is  o f  the Old 0rders 1919-1933 (B oston : Houghton M if f l in  C o ., 
1 9 5 7 ), pp . 256-65 .
44 G a r f in k e l ,  op . c i t . ,  pp . 37-124
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Negro leaders planned to Initiate a civil disobedience campaign,
including a march on Washington, in protest against discrimination
in military service and jobs, but after further consultations with
Randolph, Truman issued two executive orders - one creating a Fair
Employment Board to eliminate racial discrimination in federal
employment and one to establish a Presidential Committee on Equality
45of Treatment and Opportunity in the armed services.
In the 1950*3, there were the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom and 
the Youth Marches for Integrated Schools, both previously mentioned.
Both of these were organized by Bayard Rustln, who was to become the 
chief organizer of the 1963 March. Successful as they were, these 
earlier marches paled in comparison with the latter march. The sheer 
amount of organizational work required on both the local and national 
levels, constituted an enormous task that did not have to be faced by 
the earlier efforts. If by 1963 the march as a tactic was not a sharp 
departure from previous protests, this particular march, involving as 
it did so many people from so many diverse backgrounds, was unconventional, 
to say the least. The existing civil rights organizations might have been 
able to call upon experience from previous situations, but there was much 
that was novel in the new enterprise.
The pressures behind the 1963 March were such that the question was 
no longer whether there would be a march, but what kind of march there 
would be. As Randolph pointed out: "The choice, Mr. President, is between
Ibid,, pp. 161-62, 176.
45
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a c o n t ro l le d  and n o n -v io le n t  d em o n stra tio n  and an u n c o n tro l le d  and 
46v io l e n t  on e" . A nother le a d e r  w arned: "We have a  powderkeg s i t u a t i o n
in  A m erica. N egroes a re  an g ry , u p s e t ,  r e s t l e s s .  They need  c o n s t r u c t iv e ,
47la w fu l o u t l e t s  f o r  t h e i r  f e e l in g s ” . P re s s u re  from  th e  a c t i v i t i s t s  made
c a l l i n g  o f f  th e  March d i f f i c u l t ;  in  any c a s e ,  i t  was im p o rta n t th a t
co n tin u e d  p re s s u re  be p u t on th e  f e d e r a l  l e g i s l a t u r e .
O rg a n iz a tio n a l  s te p s  w ere ta k e n  tow ard making th e  March a " l iv in g
p e t i t i o n "  and a  j o i n t  e f f o r t  o f th e  NAACP, th e  NAACP l e g a l  D efense and
48E d u c a tio n a l Fund, SCLC, SNCC, CORE, th e  N a tio n a l Urban League, and th e
49N a tio n a l C ouncil o f  Negro Women. The seven  Negro o rg a n iz a t io n s  w ere 
jo in e d  by th e  N a tio n a l C a th o lic  C onference f o r  I n t e r r a c i a l  J u s t i c e ,  th e  
N a tio n a l C ouncil o f C hurches, th e  American Jew ish  C ongress, th e  Negro 
A merican Labor C o u n c il, and th e  U n ited  Auto W orkers. These became th e  
o f f i c i a l  sp o n so rs  o f  th e  M arch, w ith  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  NAACP L egal 
D efense and E d u c a tio n a l Fund and th e  N a tio n a l C ouncil o f  Negro Women 
b e in g  covered  by th e  NAACP. The e x e c u tiv e  c o u n c il  o f th e  AFL-CIO s a id
Quoted in  Murray Kempton, "A. P h i l ip  R andolph: 'The C ho ice , Mr. P r e s i -  
d e n t . . . ' " ,  New R ep u b lic , CXL IX (J u ly  6 , 1 9 6 3 ), 17 .
Q uoting  Rev. G. Law rence, NYTr$ June 1 2 , 1963, p . 25 .
I
O r ig in a l ly  concerned  w ith  a d v is in g  and c o u n s e ll in g  so u th e rn  farm  
w o rk e rs ; now i t  a d v ise d  Negro w orkers on urban  problem s and t r i e d  
to  e n su re  e q u a l i ty  o f  jo b  and e d u c a tio n a l  o p p o r tu n i t i e s ;  se e  Urban 
L eague, Urban League Means Equal O pportunity  (New Y ork: The Urban 
L eague, 1964 ).
An o rg a n iz a t io n  devo ted  to  th e  s p e c ia l  problem s o f Negro women; 
s e e  R ayford W. Logan, The Negro in  American L i fe  and Thought: The 
N adir 1877-1901 (New Y ork: D ia l P r e s s ,  1 9 5 4 ), pp . 335 -  37 .
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that while it shared the purposes of the organizers of the Kerch, 
it was unable to give official endorsement."*** The date of the March 
was set for August 28th and more than one hundred civic, labor and 
religious organizers set about to recruit money and marchers.
It was decided to exclude acts of civil disobedience from the 
March, in order to allow a wide range of direct action supporters to 
participate, even if a filibuster on the civil rights legislation was 
in progress. Similarly, plans were abandoned to have state delegations 
contact their representatives and plans were postponed for a religious 
vigil on the Capitol steps. The manual Issued for the March indicated 
the efforts being taken to ensure disciplined unity: only approved signs 
were to be carried; only approved places were to be scenes of demonstra­
tions; no slogans were to be chanted; only one song, "We Shall Overcome"y 
was to be sung.
The order and discipline that had been aimed at were achieved 
beyond all expectations, even though not carried out to the le.tter of 
the manual. Two hundred and fifty thousand people, more than twice the
number expected, of whom eighty per cent were Negro, converged on the
geographic
city of Washington. They came from all classes, all/sections, and all 
age groups. Prophetic warnings of riots seemed absurd when measured 
against the calmness of the day's events. Representatives of all media 
of communication, foreign as well as national, were present to report 
the meaning of the day and to try to capture some of the feelings of the 
thousands who thronged before the Lincoln Memorial.
50
SIT, Aug. 14, 1963, p. 21
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Gospel and folk singers gave the message in song; Joan Baez sang
qof the movement's faith that justice would triumph in the end; Marion 
Anderson readied back into the slave past and sang of God's promised 
land; Bob Dylan borrowed from the current art of topical songs of 
protest to pay tribute to murdered civil rights leaders« White and 
Negro entertainers and celebrities, witness to the Interracial quality 
of the marchy gave the message in speech. Not one ugly Incident marred 
the demonstration; a staged play could not have been performed more 
smoothly. In the heat of the summer, the greatest assemblage Washington 
had ever seen had the air of a hootenanny or of a church picnic. But 
the sounds reverberated with the ideology of American history and the 
traditional chants of the nation's folklore.
As a form of non-violent direct action, the March had been called
for the same reason that sit-ins, freedom rides, prayer rallies and
boycotts had been resorted to - the civil rights movement had taken to
the streets because the authorities had proved to be indifferent to its
demands. The March reflected the various trends in the civil rights
movement and the alignment of the Negroes* racial and religious allies.
All major church denominations were represented and Rabbi Joachim Prinz,
president of the American Jewish Congress, managed to capture some of
their reasons for being there:
When I was the rabbi of the Jewish community in 
Berlin under the Hitler regime, I learned many 
things. The most important thing that I learned 
in my life and under these tragic circumstances 
is that bigotry and hatred are not the most urgent 
problems. The most urgent, the most disgraceful, 
the most shameful and the most tragic problem is 
silence. 51
51 As recorded on Council for United Civil Rights Leadership, The March
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By contrast, there was no official representative from the AFL-CIO,
although national and local unions were individually represented. This
absence, which underlined the traditional discrimination against Negroes
52by the trade union movement, was more notable when some of the civil 
rights leaders called for an alliance of working class whites and Negroes. 
It was a particularly painful absence because, notwithstanding their 
position on colour, the trade unions had been until then the largest 
single organized group pushing for social welfare legislation.
At the March, the Negro leadership offered realistic appraisals of 
the current state of the movement. Of those who spoke, only King, in a 
speech which abounded with imagery, saw a hopeful dream; the others con­
centrated on the struggle ahead and spoke in tough, harsh language. They 
emphasized that the proposed civil rights legislation did not go far 
enough in rectifying economic problems of adjustment and inequality; but 
all except John Lewis of SNCC, who was censored on this point by the other 
March organizers, voted their support for the legislation anyway.
51 (Continued)
on Washington, August 28th 1963: We Shall Overcome. For a critical 
estimation of the churches' role in the civil rights movement, see 
J, Oscar Lee, "The Freedom Movement and the Ecumenical Movement",
The Ecumenical Review, XVII (January, 1965), 18-28.
52 Although the situation has been changing since 1935 with the growth of 
the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), trade unions have prac­
tised discrimination in spite of their ideology of brotherhood. Craft 
unions have discriminated through membership restrictions or other 
internal practices, while industrial unions, when they discriminate, 
do so through external practices in the collective-bargaining process. 
Recognizing that "[w]ithin the labor movement itself civil rights goals 
are celebrated at the higher levels, but fundamental internal barriers 
tend to preserve discrimination at the workingman's level" [United States 
Commission on Civil Rights, 1961 Report: Employment, op. cit.3 p. 151], 
the civil rights movement has been unable to depend to any large extent 
on having its demands presented to the authorities by the trade unions.
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The demands of the March were read out by Bayard Rustin and revealed 
the penetrating influence that he had had on the movement. In little- 
known left-wing journals, Rustin had been arguing that social peace 
through social justice required some profound changes in the country’s 
economic and social structure. The Negroes* problems, he had argued, 
were not exclusively those of civil rights but also of economic wrongs.
To the general public, Rustin was well known for his organizational 
genius; but more than anyone else in the movement to date he had insisted 
that civil rights alone would only be the right to join the underprivileged 
whites.
The March*8 demands for comprehensive civil rights legis, lotion 
included guarantees to access to all public accommodation, adequate and 
integrated education, protection of the right to vote, and authority for 
the Attorney-General to seek injunctive relief when constitutional rights 
were violated. Other political demands were for a reduction of congress­
ional seats in states which disfranchised Negroes, that is, an enforcement 
of section two of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the withholding of federal 
funds from all programmes in which discrimination was practised. In 
addition, there were economic demands: for a massive federal programme 
to train and place all unemployed workers; for better housing; for an 
increase in the national minimum wage to $2,00 an hour; for the extension
of the Fair Labor Standards Act to include exempted fields of employment;
53for a Federal Employment Practices Act,
53 Council for United Civil Rights Leadership (authorized recording), 
op• eit.
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Randolph, a socialist who had accommodated himself to Mew Deal
types of social welfare legislation, elaborated a theme that had become
clearer as demonstrations spread to large urban centres of the North 
54and South - that the demands of the civil rights movement were less 
confined to the Negroes than might appear at first to be the case:
Yes, we want all public accommodation open to 
all citizens, but those accommodations will mean 
little to those who cannot afford to use them.
Yes, we want a Fair Employment Practices Act, 
but what good will it do if profits geared to 
automation destroy the jobs of millions of workers, 
black and white? 55
He argued that to meet the real demands of the civil rights movement,
the "sanctity of private property" had to take second place to the
"sanctity of human personality".“^
Lewis* speech reflected the pessimism of one who had to face the
day-to-day struggle against southern brutality and repression knowing
that the government in Washington cared less than it ought. The proposed
remedy, the civil rights bill, was too little and too late, he said. It
would not bring jobs to the unemployed or benefits to those on starvation
wages; it would not protect the movement from police brutality; it would
not help those who wanted to but were denied the right to vote. He asked
where the social justice of the bill was to be found: "What is in the
54 To be discussed in Chapter V.
55 NXT, Aug. 29, 1963, p. 21.
56 Ibid.
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bill that will protect the homeless and starving people of this 
nation? What is there in this bill to insure the equality of a 
maid who earns $5 [sic] a week in the home of a family whose income 
is $100,000 a year?"**^ He castigated the federal government for 
not having assisted the movement in its fight against southern 
oppression:".«„What did the Federal Government do when Albany's 
Deputy Sheriff beat Attorney C.B. King and left him half-dead?
What did the Federal Government do when local police officials kicked
58and assaulted the pregnant wife of Slater King, and she lost her baby?"
He castigated the federal government for its appointment of racist judges
to southern courts. And he castigated both political parties for having
betrayed the principles of the Declaration of Independence.
He applauded those who had acted against the evil of segregation:
"We all recognize the fact that if any radical social, political and
economic changes are to take place in our society, the people, the masses,
59must bring them about." Nothing and nobody could stop the revolution, 
he warned: "The black masses are on the march."**0
From his jail cell in Louisiana, where he had been arrested for 
his part in the Plaquemine integration demonstrations, James Farmer 
dramatically sent a message of warning:
The uncensored version appears as John Lewis, ".... A Serious 
Revolution," Liberation, VIII (September, 1963), 8.
58 Ioid.
59 rLoo, ott.
60 Loo, oit,
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We will not come off the streets until we 
can work at any job befitting our skills 
any place in the land. We will not stop 
our marching feet until our kids have enough 
to eat and their minds can study and range 
wide without being cramped in Jim Crow schools.
Until we can live wherever we choose, and eat 
and play with no closed doors blocking our 
way. We will not stop till the dogs stop 
biting us in the South and the rats stop 
biting us in the North. 61
Lewis and Farmer spoke the language of those who had more faith in
the Negroes' readiness to face danger than in the government's
readiness to pass meaningful social welfare legislation.
Reaction
Public Reaction. When Connor ordered his men to use fire hoses and 
dogs, he turned himself into the symbol of southern resistance, the 
Negroes into the oppressed and the martyred, and the city of Birmingham 
into an international liability for the United States. The picture of 
Negro children, many as young as five, being set upon by husky southern 
policemen was flashed across the nation and around the world.
The violence which erupted frightened people both inside and outside 
the city. White business interests in the city pressed for a negotiated 
agreement, which in the absence of Negro retaliation they had not been 
prepared to do. The interests which had opposed racial tension and 
social disruption during the phase of the sit-ins and freedom rides 
spoke out at the time of Birmingham as well. This time their numbers 
also included persons who feared that non-violence would fail as a 
tactical weapon unless the Negroes could begin to show some results of 
its use.
61 Reported in PN, Sept. 6, 1963, p. 12
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The protests had received the moral and financial support of
labour, religious and progressive groups; demonstrations and rallies
had been held In major cities to highlight the situation In Birmingham
and at one point pickets even carried their message to the United
61ANations to ask for Intervention In the South.
For the reasons that Birmingham was feared, the March on Washington 
was applauded. Here was an orderly demonstration clothed In the Ideology 
of the American Dream. Few people examined the Implications of the 
demands Rustln read at the March; most were content to see a peaceful 
day's outing of 250,000 pepple.
Local authorities. Initially, the Birmingham authorities contented 
themselves with arresting demonstrators on technical charges of trespass, 
parading without a permit, creating a disturbance, or loitering. Local 
courts upheld the arrests. But when the arrests failed to deter the 
movement, the police resorted to brute force.
Federal authorities. As had happened In Albany, Birmingham became a
national Item when King, Abernathy and some sixty others, all appropriately
dressed In blue jeans and denim shirts to emphasize the Negro boycott of
clothes buying, were arrested. As with Albany, President Kennedy expressed
concern over the jalllngs and asked the Justice Department to keep him
Informed o£
61A NIT, May 10, 1963, p. 16
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62further developments« As before, the Department felt assured that
at present there were no legal grounds for federal Intervention«
On the federal legal side, kihe courts dashed hopes for an Immediate
hearing for the arrested demonstrators when It returned to the state
63courts cases which it had earlier agreed to hear.
The turning point In the civil rights movement came when Connor 
used force against the demonstrators. More than anything else in the 
protest movement to date, it marshalled the fight against discrimination 
and injected into the Kennedy Administration a previously missing 
determination to fight for civil rights.
The direct action demonstrations plntmed by the civil rights leader­
ship were based on various assumptions about the nature of the adversary«
The civil rights movement was prepared to expect the worst from southern 
authorities« But the leadership assumed that the federal authorities 
had a degree of humanity and compassion which placed limits not only on 
their own potential for using force but also on their tolerating ruthless- 
nass in others. In this assumption, the leadership was to be proved correct 
Similarly, what Hancock says of Smuts and Gandhi, one can say of Kennedy 
and King: "More than anything else, it was the force of public opinion, 
that brought Smuts to terms with Gandhi« There was, moreover, something
62 I b i d Apr« 14, 1963, p« 1« Kennedy, as on an earlier occasion, phoned 
Mrs King, expressed concern for her husband and said he hoped that a 
change of government in Birmingham would speed his release from jail« 
IbidU> Apr« 16, 1963, p, 17«
^  City of Birmingham t>. Croekey, 2X7 F. Supp« 947 (1963)«
-  120 -
within Smuts himself which made him receptive of this public opinion
”64and sympathetic towards the man who was inciting it. Behind the 
force of public opinion lay Smuts' and Kennedy's disapproval and fear 
of social disruption.
Another assumption of the civil rights leadership was that the 
federal authorities would prefer not to be faced by prolonged and widespread 
dissension overflowing into violence. This assumption was proved correct 
also. Birmingham, with its reservoir of untapped violence, showed the 
need for legal outlets for pent-up Negro frustration. Birmingham, with 
its dogs and its hoses, added weight to questions both of the power to 
act and of the wisdom of specific proposals.
When Negroes replied with violence to Connor's use of force, the 
federal government ordered troops to bases near the city and, overriding 
the governor, put the Alabama National Guard on the alert. ^  In addition, 
high level truce mediators were sent in to try to resolve the conflicts in 
Birmingham. Kennedy initially indicated that he saw no legal steps which 
the federal government could take in the direction of intervention: "In 
the absence of such violation [of a federal statute] or any other Federal 
jurisdiction, our efforts have been focussed on getting both sides together 
to settle in a peaceful fashion the very real abuses too long inflicted on 
the Negro citizens of that community. He pointed to the Justice
W.K. Hancock, Four Studies of War and Peace in T'his Century (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1961), p. 82.
SYT, May 13, 1963, p. 1. For an interchange of remarks between 
President Kennedy and Governor Wallace, see VIII KRLR 442-43 (1963); 
for Supreme Court decision on troop dispatch, see State of Alabama 
v. United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963).
NYT, May 19, 1963, p. 16.
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Department's previous investigations of voting discrimination in the 
city and its support, in the Supreme Court, of an attack by Negro 
plaintiffs on the city's segregation ordinance, adding that "through 
mediation and persuasion, and, when that effort has failed, through 
lawsuits and court actions, we have attempted to meet our responsibi­
lities in this most difficult field where Federal Court orders have 
been circumvented, ignored, or violated.
But recognizing how damaging Birmingham had become to the country's
reputation abroad, how significant to the Negro voting bloc at home,
and how important to previously uncommitted, as well as committed,
68sections of the public and Congress, Kennedy argued the case for 
legal outlets for pent-up Negro frustrations and emotions.
In May, Congress already had before it an Administration proposal 
for civil rights legislation designed to speed up legal attacks upon 
voting discrimination and to provide federal funds for school districts 
which had desegregated. After the crisis in Birmingham, Senators
67 Ibid.
68 In Congress, support for the Negroes came from liberal members of 
both parties; many Congressmen deplored the use of repressive measures 
by the city, while others hoped that Birmingham would prompt action on 
civil rights legislation. See, e.g., Sen Morse, CR, 109; 7330-31 (May 
6, 1963); Rep. Reid, CR, 109: 7385 (May 9, 1963); Rep. Vanik, CR, 109:
7649 (May 9, 1963); Sen. Gruening, CR, 109: 9351 (May 23, 1963); Rep. 
Lindsay, CR, 109: 10156 (June 4, 1963); Sen. Hart, CR, 109: 9781 (June 
6, 1963).
^ See message from Kennedy, CR, 109: 3080-81 (Feb. 28, 1963). In this 
message, Kennedy attacked racial discrimination because it: (1) 
hampered economic growth; (2) hampered America's world leadership;
(3) marred "the atmosphere of a united and classless society in which 
this Nation rose to greatness [Ibid,, p. 3081]"; (4) increased the 
cost of public welfare; (5) increased crime, delinquency and disorder; 
(6) was wrong.
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Cooper and Dodd opened a bipartisan drive for legislation designed 
to wipe out segregation in virtually every facet of daily business 
Birmingham became a rallying point for effective civil rights legis­
lation which the Administration chose not to ignore.
In asking for broad legislation, Kennedy appealed to the conscience 
of the nation to help stem the tide of discontent which was a threat to 
public safety and appealed to the legislative branch to listen carefully 
to the cries for equality being made in Birmingham and elsewhere in the 
nation:
The growing and understandable dissatisfaction of 
Negro citizens with the present pace of desegregation, 
and their increased determination to secure for them­
selves the equality of opportunity and treatment to 
which they are rightfully entitled, have underscored 
what should already have been clear: the necessity
of the Congress enacting ...legislation providing 
legal remedies for the denial of certain individual 
rights. 71
Organized direct action, "with all its potentially explosive 
72consequences”, would continue if there was federal inaction, "causing
the leadership on both sides to pass from the hands of the reasonable
..73and responsible men to the purveyors of hate and violence," to the 
detriment of the country.
His proposals included: a guarantee of equal access to all public 
facilities; authority for the Attorney-General to sue against school 
segregation when those affected made written complaint and could not
7 CR, 109: 9336 (May 23, 1963).
^  Message to the Congress, CRS 109: 11175 (June 19, 1963). 
72 Ibid.
73 Loo. cit,
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afford the expenses of suing or feared reprisals; a broad attack on
job discrimination, including $400,000,000 in new money for vocational
and literacy training and intensified efforts to eliminate discrimination
by federal contractors« These, If passed, would make demonstrations
unnecessary. Kennedy said, "by providing peaceful remedies for the
grievances which set them off." While the demonstrations had brought
the race problem to the nation's attention, they might soon so inflame
passions as to endanger life and property. With the race problem now
before the Congress, "unruly tactics or pressures will not help and may
75hinder the effective consideration of these measures". Therefore he 
suggested that Negro leaders "do their utmost to lessen tensions and... 
exercise self-restraint [so that] ... Congress should have an opportunity 
to freely work Its will."^
When plans of the March were announced, Kennedy told Negro leaders,
In tones reminiscent of Roosevelt and Truman, that he thought it best to
postpone the March while debate on civil rights legislation was in progress.
Once it was certain that the March would not be postponed, Kennedy gave it
his most enthusiastic support and pronounced it an event consistent with
the American tradition. On the day of the March, he held talks with civil
rights leaders at the White House and expressed support for the March's
77primary objectives, whatever he might have considered those to be.
74 Ibid., p. 11X76.
75 Ibid., p. 11179.
76 Ibid.
77 KIT, Aug. 29, 1963, p. 16.
-  124 -
It Is difficult to assess with precision the effect of the March 
on pending civil rights legislation. Although only seventy-five members 
of Congress accepted invitations to attend the ceremonies, none of the 
others, who tried to go about their routine business as if nothing unusual 
was happening, could escape the message of the marchers. Before the
March, Congressmen were divided into those who wholeheartedly welcomed
78the marchers, those who cautioned against excess and the possibility
79of violence, and those who condemned the March outright as a form of
80mob violence.  ^ After the March, although its peaceful demeanour could 
not be ignored, there were still some Congressmen who contended that they 
were being made to operate under pressure and threats.
Evaluation
Both Birmingham and the March on Washington had broadened the 
objectives of the civil rights movement. The March suggested what the 
demonstrations in the North, to be discussed in the next chapter, made 
clear - that the movement was beginning to consider issues of economic 
equality based on class as well as issues of political segregation based 
on race. In approaching its objectives, the movement in Birmingham was 
assisted by the outbreaks of violence by unorganized Negro bystanders, 
while the March was assisted by the authorities' fear of the outbreak 
of violence.
78 See, e.g., Rep. Nix, CR, 109j 14775-77 (Aug. 22, 1963);
Sen. Humphrey, CR3 109: 15266 (Aug. 28, 1963).
79 See, e.g., Sen. Ribicoff, CRS 109: 11231 (June 27, 1963);
Sen. Mansfield, CR9 109: 11302 (June 28, 1963).
80 See, e.g., Rep. Andrews, CR, 109; 12019 (July 16, 1963);
Rep. Roush, CR9 109: 14247 (Aug. 15, 1963). ___________________
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SCLC's formal demonstrations in Birmingham and the movement's 
one-day demonstration in Washington were marked by their high degree 
of organization and their commitment to non-violence. But their 
effectiveness was attributable in part to the force of violence which 
they had behind them.
Birmingham• On the level of specific results, the Birmingham demonstra­
tions did achieve a negotiated agreement. This included pledges to 
desegregate facilities in large downtown department and variety stores 
within ninety days, a promise to promote qualified Negro employees, and 
a promise to set up a bi-racial committee to examine other aspects of 
desegregation. The white negotiators also promised to recommend to 
the City Commission that charges be dropped against the more than 
twenty-four hundred Negroes who had been arrested. Although this agree­
ment meant a scaling down of SCLC's original demands, neither the old 
nor the new city officials were prepared to give even tacit public approval 
of it. But one month later, initial steps had been taken to implement 
the agreement an^in July the city appointed a bi-racial committee to 
examine possible implementation of the agreement's conditions. One year 
later, King could report the desegregation of lunch counters, libraries 
and schools on a token basis, for him a "small break in the enormous 
fortress of injustice, but considering the strength of the fortress, it 
was a towering achievement.
81 King, Why We Can't Wait, op• ait», p. 114
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Birmingham highlighted old as well as new trends in the civil
rights struggle. On the local level, the authorities were faced with
novel problems - the use of children, the filling up of the jails,
white violence setting off Negro violence. The success of organized
non-violence, when used by the unarmed Negro against the armed power
of the state, was supplemented by the violence of unorganized supporters
of civil rights. Had the hoses and dogs not been used, moderates and
the silenced majority, both inside and outside of Birmingham, that had
avoided taking a stand so far on the question of civil rights might still
have remained silent. Human compassion and conscience, and the economic
effects of racial tension, now brought them to the side of the underdog.
There were the dollars and cents considerations of mass jail-ins
and school absences: the city lost $30,000 a day in state and federal
funds for education; extra police had to be added to the force; retail
stores added up losses of thirty per cent over previous selling figures;
new industry was deterred from locating in the city and surrounding areas
82while they remained spots of tension. Such debits on the balance sheet
indicated why at least some business interests were prepared to rethink
83their position on segregation.
82 "Integration Leaders Examine Lessons of Birmingham", Liberation,VIII 
(June, 1963,) 4.
83 When US Steel was attacked for not having exerted pressure for 
settlement in Birmingham, Roger M. Blough, the president, said:"[F]or 
a corporation to attempt to exert any kind of economic compulsion to 
achieve a particular end in the social area seems to be quite beyond 
what a corporation should do, and I will also say, beyond what a cor­
poration can do." Quoted in Warren, op• cit*, p. 311. Blough's 
attitude assumes that a corporation is silent on racial tension in 
an area, or that it does not support segregation, in effect, by doing 
business with banks, etc., which practise segregation.
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After Birmingham, demonstrations continued, reaching a peak 
during the summer months of 1963. The pattern set by the sit-ins and 
the Freedom Rides of non-violent direct action was repeated in its 
essentials: there were still arrests on technical grounds; there was 
still the bid on the part of the activists for national publicity; 
there was still the outside assistance of national civil rights groups 
to local Negroes in the form of personnel, advice, encouragement, legal 
counsel, bail funds, and active participation in the demonstrations.
The names cf hitherto obscure places where mass arrests were made 
became front-page headlines. New stalemates such as had occurred in 
Albany cropped up. More and more, the glimpses of Negro life that 
emerged showed not only social Inequities but also economic inequalities. 
Parallel to this latter point, until 1963 the movement had been primarily 
middle-class. Birmingham brought to it the urban unemployed and SNCC's 
voting campaigns, such as the one previewed in Albany, the agrarian 
lower class.
March on Washington. Whether it was a tactic of intimidation or an appeal 
to reason and morality, the March forced most of the Congress and the 
rest of the nation to face the presence of direct action. But more than 
this, it seems that a unified, responsible march of a quarter of a million 
people, even if it lacked the coercive effect which some of its more 
militant activists thought it ought to have had, could not fail to 
dramatize the urgency of civil rights legislation. By taking their 
struggle into the streets, the civil rights activists made it more 
difficult for the authorities to remain indifferent to their demands.
CHAPTER V
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (4): THE GHETTOS OP THE NORTH 
Introduction
What has been examined so far are the conditions under which 
non-violent direct action evolved in the South. When demonstrations 
spread to the North, there were changes in the nature of the demands, 
in the tactics of non-violent direct action, and in the composition 
of the activists.
Merton's theory of reference groups hypothesizes that "men
frequently orient themselves to groups other than their own in shaping
„1their behavior and evaluations.... By reference groups, Merton
understands not only membership and non-membership groups but also
2collectivities and social categories. Applying his general comments 
to the civil rights movement, I would suggest that in the South, the 
activists, by and large, took the values and standards of the white 
race as their comparative frame of reference. They demanded rights 
and privileges which members of that race had, irrespective of their 
class, by virtue of their being American citizens, but what they as 
Negro Americans were denied. Thus, they demanded to be served at 
lunch counters where whites were served, to vote in elections where
1 Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, rev. ed. 
(Glencoe: Free Press, 1957), p. 234. Italics in the original.
2 Ibid., pp. 284-300
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whites could vote, to be hired for positions that whites with comparable 
skills could get.
In the North, the activists had two comparative frames of reference. 
First, in most instances, they took the values and standards of the white 
race. As was the case in the South, when activists in the North demanded 
that Negroes be hired for work on construction sites, they were demanding 
privileges which the white worker had. When they demanded that Negroes 
be allowed to buy houses where they chose, they were demanding purchasing 
privileges which white purchasers had. However, in addition the activists 
occasionally adopted a second frame of reference. When they demanded 
decent housing conditions or retraining schemes, they were not demanding 
something which the white race qua race had; they were demanding some­
thing which other classes of both races either had or were able to have. 
The source of their attitudes in both frames of reference may have been 
the American Creed; that is, they based their attitudes on what the 
situation should be in a society where no race and no class were denied 
equality of opportunity. But, in one case they were making race demands, 
while in the other, they were making class demands. In one case, they 
wanted to break away from their inferior ethnic status; in the other, 
they wanted to alter their "life chances" - educational opportunities, 
external living conditions, prospective earning capacity.
Looked at another way, southern activists can be seen as demanding 
alterations in their legal and de facto race position; northern activists 
can be seen as demanding alterations in their de facto race and class 
positions. In the case of the southern sit-ins, the activists were
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demanding rights which they believed to be theirs in the spirit of 
the American Creed of racial equality, if not in the letter of more 
than a decade of federal court decisions on the question of segregation.
In the Freedom Rides and in instances of voting and school deprivations, 
the activists were demanding rights which clearly were theirs, either as 
a result of legislation, administrative regulation, or judicial pronounce­
ment. Birmingham went beyond issues of equal access to public accommodation 
to issues of job opportunities for Negroes. But SCLC's demands were 
still race demands; they wre still demands for the elimination of 
explicit racial barriers to opportunities available to white Americans.
In the North, where legal rights such as were being demanded in the
South already existed, activists were demanding rights and privileges
which had not been denied them by law, even if they had been denied them
by practice. They were asking for an end to ghettoization, which for them
meant alterations in both their race and class positions. The activists
said: (1) no one should be denied a job because he is a Negro; (2) no one
should be denied a job and decent housing and adequate social services
because he is unskilled and poor. The activists in the North were
concerned with conditions of poverty which affected the one-fourth to
one -fifth of Americans who lived below the minimum subsistence level.
If we consider the conservative estimate of forty-four million poor in 
2Athe United States, then the conditions which affect eleven million 
Negro poor (about two-thirds of the Negro population) affected thirty- 
three million whites as well. In contrast to this, southern activists
2 a On poverty, see Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in
the United. States (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963).
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were concerned with conditions that affected only the sixty per cent 
of the Negro population which lived in the South, or about eleven 
million people (but not the same as the eleven million Negro poor)•
The March on Washington, discussed in the last chapter, previewed 
both the race and class demands which characterized the movement from 
mid-1963 on. For in addition to demands for civil rights legislation, 
it included demands for a massive federal programme to train the unem­
ployed and demands to raise the national minimum wage.
Because of the change in demands once the movement spread north, 
direct action tactics which had proved useful in integrating lunch 
counters were sometimes less easy to apply when pressing for more jobs 
or better housing. Since Negroes in the North already had the right to 
eat in restaurants of their choice, the movement conducted sit-ins on 
construction sites which would not hire Negroes. Since they already 
had the right to swim at public beaches, they conducted sit-ins at 
beach areas where their colour held them back from being employed as 
workmen. Since they already had legal rights to equal housing, they 
withheld their rent in order to press for decent housing conditions.
When activists protested against lunch counter discrimination, they 
were engaging in a direct protest by making known their demands to 
persons who were able to alter the situation. However, precision was 
more difficult to apply in the North. When activists protested against 
slum conditions, it was harder to find the specific agent responsible 
for the conditions. For these reasons, demonstrations in the North 
often were more desperate and had less immediately achievable objectives
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than did those in the South.
Northern tactics differed from those in the South in three other 
ways. First, the activists were less dependent upon the established 
Negro leadership and were more prepared to try out new kinds of direct 
action tactics. Secondly, the activists were more prepared to disregard 
the legalism of the NAACP type pressure and, partly as a result of the 
nature of their specific objectives, used litigation as an accompanying 
tactic less often than had been the case in the South, Thirdly, because 
their protests did not appeal to legal deprivations, the activists 
accentuated the civil disobedience aspect of non-violent direct action 
in a way that southern activists did not.
In addition to differences in aims and tactics between northern and
southern activists, there were some differences in the composition of the
respective groups. In the South, even when the civil rights campaigns
were given the backing of all classes within the Negro community, the
objectives and tactics were formulated by a middle-class leadership, often
by ministers or persons in the professions. Although the base of the
movement was widened in time, to include rural workers, urban workers,
and small farmers (usually tenant or sharecropper), the leadership and
initially the membership came from students and the middle-class.
Progressively, a leadership emerged which had a more working class
background but which itself was middle-class. At the end of 1963, Zinn
checked the background of forty-one (one-third) of SNCC’s field workers
in Mississippi. His results were as follows:
Thirty-five of them were Negro, and twenty-five of 
them came from the Deep South. Of the six white 
staff members two were from the Deep South. The 
white youngsters and most of the Northern Negroes
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came fro n  m id d le -c la ss  homes; t h e i r  f a th e r s  
were m in is te rs  o r  teach e rs  o r  c i v i l  s e rv ic e  
w orkers. A ll o f  the  Southern  N egroes, and 
some o f the  N orthern Negroes (tw enty-one 
o u t o f t h i r t y - f iv e )  cane fro n  homes where 
th e  mothers were maids o r dom estics , the 
fa th e r s  fa c to ry  w orkers , tru c k  d r iv e r s ,  
fa rm ers , b r ic k la y e r s ,  c a rp e n te rs . Twenty- 
n in e  (about th re e - fo u r th s )  o f the  t o t a l  
SNCC M iss is s ip p i s t a f f  were between f i f t e e n  
and twenty years  o ld . There were tw elve 
between twenty-two and tw en ty -n in e , and one 
person  each in  h is  t h i r t i e s ,  f o r t i e s ,  and 
f i f t i e s .  T w enty-six , o r  about tw o - th ird s , 
o f the M iss is s ip p i SNCC s t a f f  were e i t h e r  
c o lle g e  g rad u a tes  o r had some c o lle g e  
e d u ca tio n . Ten had f in ish e d  h igh  sc h o o l, 
o r  had some high schoo l ed u ca tio n  and two 
had no more than  p a r t  of an elem entary  
schoo l ed u ca tio n . I f  one were to  g e n e ra lis e  
roughly about th e  SNCC s t a f f  in  the  beep 
S outh , one would say th a t  they a re  young, 
they a re  Negro, they  come from th e  South* 
th e i r  fa m ilie s  a re  poor and of th e  working 
c la s s ,  b u t they have been to  c o lle g e .
N orthern  m id d le -c la ss  w hites and Negroes
a re  in  a m in o r ity . 3
This le ad e rsh ip  p a tte rn  was m odified  during  the  v o te r  r e g i s t r a t io n
campaigns in  r u r a l  a re a s ,  to  be d iscu ssed  in  the  n ex t c h a p te r , where
th e  lo c a l  farm ing and working c la s s  n o t only  com prised the  main
component o f the dem onstrations b u t a lso  th re wup some o f  the  le a d e rs h ip .
As fo r  the  a c t i v i s t s  in  th e  N orth , th e  m id d le -c la ss  and th e  s tu d en ts
were inc luded  w ith in  the  le a d e rsh ip  and membership groups as in  the  South;
b u t the  working c la s s  and th e  unemployed, to  a g re a te r  degree than in  the
South , a lso  c a r r ie d  the  p la c a rd s , gave the c h a n ts , and blocked the
roadways. Among the  m id d le -c la ss  le a d e rs ,  th e re  were fewer m in is te rs
4and more lab o u r le a d e rs  than in  th e  South; b u t the  n o rth e rn  movement
Z inn, SNCC: The Men A b o li t io n is ts  t  op. c i t . 3 ^ .9 - 1 0 .
On the le a d e rsh ip  problems o f n o rth e rn  N egroes, see  James Q. W ilson, Negro 
P o l i t i c s : The Search fo r  Leadership  (G lencoe: F ree P re s s ,  I9 6 0 ).
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threwup more working class leaders even at the initial stages.
In this chapter, I shall discuss the main events which occurred 
iu the North from 1963-64. In particular, I shall examine the situa­
tion in New York City, which provided an exaggerated version of 
conditions in other metropolitan areas where there was a very large 
Negro population. I shall examine the aims and motives of the 
demonstrations, the tactics of direct action which were used to 
publicize those aims, the reaction of both the public and the authorities 
to the spectrum of tactics used, and the results which the demonstrations 
had achieved by the end of 1964.
Temporal Phases
In support of the sit-ins and the Freedom Rides which had been
the
conducted in the South, sympathy demonstrations had been held in/North 
since 1960 to highlight the plight of the southern Negro. Usually 
conducted by local CORE and NAACP chapters, often these were held in 
order to put pressure on northern businesses which had outlets in the 
South. The active participants were usually students, professionals, 
and trade unionists of both races.**
In the summer of 1963, northern demonstrations were conducted to
Martin Smolin, "The North: 'We Walk So They May Sit'", in J4» Peck, ©4., 
Sit-Ins: The Students Report, op. ott., n.p. For such demonstrations 
in New York, see NITS Feb. 14, 1960, p. 30; Feb. 17, 1960 p. 21; Feb.
28, 1960, p. 51; Mar. 6, 1960, p. 45; Mar. 9, 1960, p. 19; Mar. 11, 1960, 
p.15; Mar. 20, 1960, pp. 1, 46; Mar.24, 1960, p. 8; Mar. 27, 1960, p. 62; 
Apr. 10, 1960, p. 53; Apr. 15, 1960, p. 8; Apr. 17, 1960, p. 26; May 16,
1960, p. 51, June 16, 1960, p. 25; Dec. 4, 1960, p. 80; May 18, 1961, p. 
27; June 4, 1961, p. 81. See also sit-in staged at television office of 
national station demanding national order ending racial ban at theatre in 
Austin, Texas, i b i d June 6, 1961, p. 21; June 7, 1961, p. 22; June 8,
1961, p. 20; June 9, 1961, p. 28.
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deplore conditions closer at hand. They occurred in such cities as 
Chicago, Illinois, Chester, Pennsylvania, Los Angeles, California,
Gary, Indiana, Cincinnati, Ohio, Boston, Massachusetts, East St. Louis, 
Missouri, Elizabeth, New Jersey and New York, New York. The tactics of 
non-violent direct action included sit-ins, hunger strikes, picketings, 
lie-downs in front of trucks, school boycotts, chain-ins to pillars, 
stall-ins on major highways. The demands were for changes in discrimi­
natory patterns of school assignment, discriminatory state hiring 
policies, and oppressive slum conditions; they also were for the enactment 
of fair employment and fair housing legislation. In most instances, local 
governments promised to investigate the situations being attacked; in 
some cases, the authorities took concrete steps towards meeting the 
demands•
This pattern of demonstrations and responses continued into 1964,
although the peak period of frequency was during the summer months of
1963. In the summer of 1964, the pattern was broken by the outbreaks
of riots in urban areas in New YoJrk, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Illinois.
As a result of the riots, which came at a time when the Negro leadership
feared the election of Senator Goldwater to the Presidency, some of the
national civil rights leaders called for a moratorium on demonstrations
5Auntil after the elections in November. This study closes at the end 
of the moratorium period with the election of President Johnson.
Aims and Motives
In general, demonstrations in the North sought to point out that 
segregation existed there as well as in the South, that living conditions
5A NIT, July 30, 1964, p. 12
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fo r  th e  n o r th e rn  Negro In  h is  g h e t to  l e f t  much to  be d e s i r e d ,  and 
th a t  th e  n o r th e rn  Negro was no lo n g e r  s a t i s f i e d  w ith  h is  econom ic 
and s o c i a l  p o s i t io n  in  th e  s o c ie ty «  In  th e  N o rth , in s te a d  o f l e g a l  
b a r r i e r s  th e re  were i n s t i t u t i o n a l  b a r r i e r s .  As f a r  as th e  a c t i v i s t s  
were co n ce rn ed , in s te a d  o f  th e  l e g a l ly  s e g re g a te d  sc h o o ls  o f  Birmingham 
th e re  w ere th e  ds fa o to  s e g re g a te d  sc h o o ls  o f Chicago w hich w ere o v e r­
crowded and p h y s ic a l ly  d i l a p id a t e d .  I n s te a d  o f  th e  ja l lh o u s e  b r u t a l i t y  
o f  Albany th e r e  was th e  m ild e r  p o l ic e  b r u t a l i t y  o f New Y ork, bo th  k in d s 
b e in g  beyond rev iew  by c i v i l i a n  s e c t io n s  o f  th e  p o p u la tio n . J u s t  as  
th e  Negro in  th e  South f e l t  t h a t  he had no o th e r  co u rse  b u t d i r e c t  a c t io n  
to  make h is  g r ie v a n c e s  known, s o ,  to o ,  d id  th e  Negro in  th e  N orth f e e l  
t h i s  way.
Some o f th e  d em o n stra tio n s  had s p e c i f i c  a im s: P h i la d e lp h ia  CORE
demanded th a t  a d e f i n i t e  number o f  N egroes be employed on th e  M unicipal 
S e rv ic e s  B u ild in g  c o n s tru c t io n  p ro jec t;**  N o rth ern  C a l i f o r n ia  CORE 
demanded th a t  th e  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e  p ass  a f a i r  h o using  law ;^  S yracuse  
CORE demanded th a t  th e  H o te l S yracuse  s ig n  a  f a i r  employment p o l ic y ;
Los A ngeles CORE demanded th e  r e s ig n a t io n  o f  th e  c i t y , s  p o l ic e  c h i e f ,
9
w ho, I t  a l le g e d ,s a n c t io n e d  p o l ic e  b r u t a l i t y  a g a in s t  N egroes and M exicans.
tb Cor&~Vator, J u ly ,  1 9 6 3 n .p #
^ Ib id . ,  n .p .
Ib id .,  S eptem ber, 1963, n .p .
^ Ib id . ,  M ay-June, 1964, n .p .
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Other demonstrations had less specific aims. South Philadelphia CORE 
demanded that slum conditions be eliminated,^ while East River CORE
demanded improved living and school conditions for people living in
„ . 11 Harlem.
At the time of the protests against discrimination in the New York 
City building trades industries, CORE demanded five specific steps to 
end such discrimination: (1) that all qualified journeymen be accepted 
as members of the various construction industry unions; (2) that objective 
criteria to determine the qualifications of applicants for membership be 
established; (3) that the unions discard present waiting lists for new 
apprentices and accept new applicants without delay; (4) that an appeals 
board made up of representatives of the construction unions, the building 
industry and civil rights groups be set up to review cases in which union 
membership had been denied; (5) that Mayor Wagner revoke contracts on
11Aprojects where job discrimination existed.
At the time of the New York City rent strikes, Community Council 
on Housing (CCH) adopted a legislative programme with far-reaching 
implications. In addition to demands on the federal government for more 
government-supported low rent housing, CCH asked the city authorities to 
increase the power of the civil courts in granting stays of eviction 
when fendlords failed to make repairs or maintain their property. It also 
asked that: court-deposited rents be returned to the tenant if the landlord
^  Ibid,, September, 1963, n.p.
Ibid,, March-April, 1964, n.p.
1 1 a
NYT, Sept.8, 1963, p. 1.
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failed to act within sixty days; courts be granted power over the
deposited rent monies to expend them for such essentiell services as
fuel where a reluctant landlord failed to do so; rents be reduced if
landlords failed to provide the minimum of housing requirements; the
city immediately take over buildings where conditions had so deteriorated
that government control was needed to raise the buildings to a minimum
standard of decency; an emergency housing squad be established to aid
in perilous housing situations; and a long-range programme be instituted
to enable the city to correct violations before conditions deteriorated
11Bto the point that the city receivership was the only remaining remedy.
The City-wide Committee for Integrated Schools demanded plans for 
massive rezoning of school districts, the ’’pairing" of Negro and white 
grades in elementary schools by combining white and Negro school districts 
and dividing the school horizontally rather than vertically, the reorgani­
zation of junior high feeding patterns, the building of "educational 
parks" (centrally located school clusters to which thousands of children
of all school ages were to be transported), and timetables for the
11Ccompletion of specific desegregation plans.
As the price of calling off plans for a stall-in, CORE demanded:
(1) the closing of all city construction sites and a grand jury investi­
gation of all unions that were alleged to have practised discrimination;
As reported in Danny Schector, Deep in the Heart of Hartem (Ann 
Arbor: Students for a Democratic Society, n.d.), p. 4.
Jeremy Larner, "The New York School Crisis", Dissent, XI (Spring, 
1964), 251.
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( 2) c i ty  a u th o r iza tio n  o f rant s t r ik e s  and a grand Jury in v e s t ig a t io n  
o f slum la n d lord s; (3) the i«m ediate d esegregation  o f  a l l  high s c h o o ls ,  
a moratorium ou sch oo l co n stru ctio n  in  gh etto  area3 , and a tim etab le  for  
t o t a l  sch o o l d eseg reg a tio n ; and (4) the estab lish m en t o f  a c iv i l i a n  
review board to in v e s t ig a te  a l l  policem en charged t lth  b r u ta l ity .
T a ctic s
Northern c i t i e s  in  general* Dem onstrations in  variou s northern c i t i e s
fo llow ed  a s im ila r  p a ttern . In C hicago, I l l i n o i s ,  s i t - i n s  and hunger
s tr ik e s  were conducted by CORE in  the o f f i c e s  o f  the Board o f  Education
and the mayor to  demand a review  o f  d iscr im in atory  p a ttern  o f sch oo l
assignm ent; sch o o l s i t e s  were p ick eted  and a r r e s t s  were made when
dem onstrators hurled them selves in  fro n t o f  trucks and lay  down in  the
12mud to  c a l l  a t te n t io n  to  th e ir  cau se . S i t - I n s  were a ls o  conducted
13by the Committee for  Freedom Now in  sch o o ls  in  C hester, P en n sy lvan ia ,
1
and by a CORE group a t  the Board o f Education in  Los A ngeles, C a lifo r n ia .  
Classroom b o y c o tts , p rim arily  by Negro p u p i ls ,  were staged  in  C hicago, 
I l l i n o i s ,  and drew absences o f  225,000 and 172,350 p u p i l s .33 S im ilar  
b o y co tts  drew 16,000 absences in  Gory, I n d ia n a ,^  26,400  absences in
U tW ,  Apr. 16, 1964, p . l .
Ib id*I  Ju ly  15 , 1963, p . 19; Ju ly  19 , 1963, p . 7; Ju ly  20 , 1963, p. 5; 
July 2 3 , 1963, p . 16; Aug-3 , 1963, p . 16; Aug 13, 1963, p . 22; Aug.
17, 1963, p. 8; O ct. 15 , 1963, p . 32; Dec. 11, 1963, p . 48 .
13 Ib id * , May 30 , 1963, p. 10; Nov. 15 , 1963, p . 22; Mar. 29 , 1964, p . 33;
Apr. 3 , 1964, p . 23 .
14 Ib id* ,  S ep t. 14 , 1963, p . 10.
Ib id * , O ct. 23 , 1963, p . 1 ; CORE-lator, M arch-A prll, 1964, n .p .
16 NIT, ‘Apr. 18-, 1964-, p . 16;
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17 18Cincinnati, Ohio, and 20,571 absences in Boston, Massachusetts.
On the question of job discrimination, various organizations
held sit-ins at state government offices in Peoria, Illinois, San
Francisco, California, and East St. Louis, Missouri, in protest
19against discrimination in state hiring policies. In Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, work on city buildings was halted pending an enquiry on 
job discrimination on the part of both job contractors and trade unions;
a temporary truce was broken when a promised change in policy failed to
20eventuate. In Elizabeth, New Jersey, protests against construction
site hiring policies led to picketing, sit-ins on roadways, and chain-ins
21on trucks leading to the site. In San Francisco, California, shop-ins
for fair employment agreements were started by CORE; demonstrators loaded
shopping carts with merchandise, had the purchases rung up on the cash
register, and then asserted that because they could not get jobs in the
22store they had no money with which to pay for their purchases.
In Columbus, Ohio, demonstrators conducted chain-ins and sit-ins 
in the gallery of the state legislature demanding fair housing legislation. 
In San Francisco, Berkeley, and Los Angeles, California, CORE conducted
17 Ibid., Feb. 12, 1964, p. 25.
18 Ibid., Feb. 27, 1964, p. 23.
19
Ibid. 3 July 11, 1963, p. 18; Mar. 19, 1964, p.23; Apr. 12, 1964, p.45; 
Aug. 13, 1963, p. 22; Jan. 1, 1964, p. 10.
20
Ibid. 3 May 16, 1963, p. 24; June 1, 1963, p. 1; June 25, 1963, p. 15; 
June 26, 1963, p. 23.
^  Ibid. 3 Aug. 7, 1963, p. 21; Aug. 17, 1963, p. 8.
22 C0RE-lator3 March-April, 1964, n.p.
23 NIT, June 15, 1963, p. 8.
-  141 -
s i t - i n s  in  r e a l t y  a g en c ie s  w hich would n o t s e l l  to  N egroes. In
P h i la d e lp h ia ,  P e n n sy lv a n ia , CORE members dumped ju n k  c o l le c te d  in
slum s on th e  d o o rs te p  o f  a slum  la n d lo rd ,  demanding th a t  he c o r r e c t
25c o n d itio n s  in  th e  p r o p e r t i e s  he c o n t r o l le d .
C iv i l  r ig h t s  le a d e r s  found th a t  new weapons w ere needed to  keep 
th e  is s u e s  b e fo re  th e  p u b lic  and th e  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Faced by th e  
le th a rg y  and in d i f f e r e n c e  o f  c i ty  a u t h o r i t i e s  to  Negro housing  p rob lem s, 
P h i la d e lp h ia  CORE saw no a l t e r n a t i v e  b u t to  a t t a c k  and in co n v en ien ce  th e  
slum  la n d lo rd s  th e m se lv es . To h ig h l ig h t  th e  s q u a lo r  and e x o rb i ta n t  
r e n ts  o f  slum  h o u sin g  even in  c ity -o w n ed  p r o j e c t s ,  Chicago CORE d e p o s ite d  
r a t s  and cockroaches on th e  m ay o r's  d o o rs te p ;  to  h ig h l ig h t  th e  sev en te en  
p e r  c e n t Negro unemployment r a t e  in  th e  c i t y ,  CORE asked  t h a t  th e
26unemployed be g iven  jo b s  as  r a t  e x te rm in a to rs  and b u i ld in g  in s p e c to r s .
B ecause th e  Bank o f  America would n o t e n te r  i n t o  a h i r i n g  agreem ent w ith
CORE and th e  C a l i f o r n ia  F a ir  Employment P r a c t i c e s  Committee (FEPC), CORE
conducted  s t a l l - i n s  a t  bank b ra n c h e s ; a c t i v i s t s  conducted  le g i t im a te  bank
b u s in e s s  in  th e  s lo w e s t manner p o s s ib le ,  such  th a t  one d em o n stra to r  took
27t h i r t y  m inu tes to  p u rch ase  $9 .50  w orth  o f  change.
New York C ity . New York C ity  p re s e n te d  th e  problem  o f th e  n o r th e rn  Negro 
on an e x a g g e ra te d  s c a l e .  About 1 ,5 0 0 ,0 0 0  N egroes l iv e d  in  th e  m e tro p o li ta n
CORE-lator,  0 ^ 6 ^ 9 6 2 ,  n . p . ;  NYT,  S e p t. 15 , 1963, p .  67.
CORE-lator,  Sep tem ber, 1963, n .p .  See a ls o  " P h ila d e lp h ia  CORE 
Goes Slumming", Real E s ta te  and B u ild in g ,  r e p r i n t  (New Y ork: 
C ongress o f  R a c ia l E q u a l i ty ,  1963 ).
PN, Aug. 28, 1964, p . 10.
I b id , ,  J u ly  10 , 1964, p . 3 .
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area, most of whom were jammed Into concentrated slum districts.
A Department of Labor Survey, in discussing the twenty-three per cent
coloured (fifteen per cent Negro and eight per cent Puerto Rican)
section of the city's eight million people, reported that these groups
had lower median family incomes and higher unemployment rates than any
28other groups within the community.
The general problems in almost all Negro neighbourhoods in New 
York City were predictable - poverty, unemployment, crime, illiteracy, 
bad schools, bad housing. These conditions were aggravated in the last 
decade by new strains on institutional structures: as white attendance 
at parochial and private schools Increased, it also began to appear that 
by 1970 Negro and Puerto Rican children would exceed the rest of the 
school population; Negro unemployment rose as automation eliminated 
more unskilled and semi-skilled workers, of which Negroes were a dis­
proportionate number; housing for Negroes was kept permanently scarce
and rents permanently high as cheap housing was demolished at a far
29faster rate than that at which it was constructed.
If the problems of Negroes in New York were predictable, the methods 
of attack by frustrated people caught in the vicious circle of northern 
ghetto life were less predictable. In 1963, civil rights activists in 
New York City sat down at construction sites, chained themselves to 
iron grilles, dumped garbage on the mayor's doorstep, and refused to pay
28 ATT, June 2, 1963, p. 71. For a penetrating analysis of Negro life 
in New York City, see Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of 
Social Potter (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).
Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot:
The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York 
City (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press and Harvard University Press, 1963), 
pp. 24-85.
29
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rent tedium landlords« In 1964, the protests included these and others 
as well - school boycotts, stall-ins of cars on major highways, and 
uncontrolled disorder and riots« While tactics continually changed, the 
protests shared certain characteristics. First, they were directed at 
both private interests and political authorities; secondly, they illus- 
strated the northern movement's assessment of the futility of mere reliance 
upon legal battles and recourse to courts of lav; thirdly,they pointed up 
differences between the dilemma of the northern Negro and that of the 
Negro in the South«
I shall discuss four different areas with which the civil rights 
activists in New York City were concerned and the tactics used to demand 
alterations in the status quo: job discrimination; slum housing conditions;
school segregations and general ghetto conditions.
The problem of finding jobs for skilled Negro and Puerto Rican 
construction workers had numerous complications. To get jobs, such workers 
had to be trade union members. To become trade union members, they had to 
complete apprenticeship training programmes or snow that they were quali­
fied journeymen,* they had to be nominated for union i^erabership by a sponsor, 
who also had to be a trade union member. Somewhere along the line, coloured 
workers had failed to become union members. Racial discrimination was 
one factor, for the vocational high schools were producing more Negro 
graduates trained for the jobs than the unions were prepared to take on«
But even if th> re were no union discrimination, there would be a shortage 
of skilled Negro workers in this field. In Junet1963, a newly—organized 
coalition group, the Joint Committee for Equal Employment Opportunity 
composed of representatives of the New York Chapters of the NAACP, CORE,
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tne Urban League, the Negro American Labour Council, the Workers*
Defense League, and the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, 
charged labour bias against Negroes and Puerto Ricans in the hiring 
policies of unions and firms on job construction sites. The group, 
presided over by Negro ministers, demanded: that city and state authori­
ties halt work on all city and state construction jobs until construction
30unions adopted a "meaningful program of integration"; that the 
authorities enforce the laws against discrimination in the construction 
industry; that the authorities cancel contracts where discrimination 
existed, and that unions and firms make sure that Negroes and Puerto 
Ricans were hired to make up twenty-five per cent of the construction 
crews at city projects.
To counter the bias, the Joint Committee announced a series of
31picketings at building sites in specified areas of New York. Work on
some sites was halted temporarily by the city while its select panel
conducted an inquiry into the hiring practices; but the work and the
picketing were resumed simultaneously as the inquiry dragged on.
As the summer progressed, demonstrations led by the Joint
Committee, chapters of CORE or the NAACP, or local ad hoc groups, increased
becoming more desperate and more dramatic with time. There were peaceful
32sit-ins at City Hall and at the state governor’s New York City office.
30
NYT, July 13, 1963, p. 18. See also July 7, 1963, p. 43.
31 Ibid., June 12, 1963, p. 28.
32 Ibid., July 10, 1963, p. 1; July 23, 1963, p. 1.
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There were peaceful picketings of housing and other building construction
sites. Demonstrators blocked building sites by darting in frott of
incoming construction vehicles, sitting or lying down on the sites*
roadways, hanging on to cranes, and chaining themselves to mechanical 
33equipment. A group would lock hands and stand in the path of a truck; 
no sooner would they be dispersed, than another line would form ten feet 
behind. The disposal of this and succeeding lines would force the trucks 
to halt several times. Children were used in the line of demonstration 
to dramatic effect, as were adults attached to each other by chains or 
flypaper.
Other tactics accompanied these. The Joint Committee picketed the
United Nations to demand that Latin American, Asian and African nations
insist upon the hiring of more Negroes and Puerto Ricans on construction
34projects at the World's Fair. Five hundred, far fewer than had been
expected, marched on City Hall to protest alleged bias in the construction 
35unions. The NAACP petitioned the New York State Supreme Court for an
injunction to halt the expenditure of $10,000,000 on state and city
projects while bias against Negroes and Puerto Ricans in building trades
36existed; but their injunction was denied. The Bronx chapter of CORE 
served summonses on the Mayor and some other city officials accusing 
them of misuse of public funds by allowing racial bias to continue at
33 Ibid., July 23, 1963, p. 1; July 29, 1963, p.l.
34 Ibid., Aug. 13, 1963, p.21.
35 Ibid., Oct. 21, 1963, p. 37.
3^ Ibid., Sept. 26, 1963, p.29j Nov. 20, 1963, p.l; Apr. 22, 1964, p.l.
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city-sponsored construction sites; but the summonses were dismissed.
Some CORE members even attempted a citizens* arrest of the mayor for
allowing racial bias; but they were arrested for trying to interfere
38with the operation of the mayor's office.
In the summer of 1963, the first of a series of mass arrests began,
reaching over seven hundred by the end of July, on charges of disorderly
conduct, trespass or resisting arrest. The activists usually justified
their action in moral, not in legal terms, arguing that the injustice of
denied opportunity exceeded any offence which they may have committed.
In a situation of powerless frustration, the activists argued that they
needed an element of the unusual to "dramatize to the Mayor that this
39should be first on his agenda." For most of the participants, their
action was one of considered civil disobedience: " ...we blocked trucks
and conducted sit-downs [and] when we did so we were cognizant of the
act of civil disobedience - wilful violation of the existing laws to
protest an unjust situation. We were willing to accept whatever conse-
..40quences were meted out.
Other participants were prepared to test the courts* willingness 
to uphold their novel forms of direct action. They sought protection 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution; they 
argued that their act of civil disobedience was to remedy an alleged
Ibid., May 26, 1964, p. 1; June 13, 1964, p. 21.
oo
Ibid., July 16, 1964, p. 12.
39 Ibid., July 30, 1963, p. 1.
40
Ibid., Feb. 18, 1964, p. 21.
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violation of a guaranteed right, and as such should be upheld.
Undeterred by arrests, protests continued, tapering off after t»ie
summer months. At only one site, a K&rlem bank, remodelling project, a0
accord ended demonstrations when the contractors agreed to employ twcnty-*
42five percent Negroes and Puerto Ricans. When building unions made
some vague promises to promote more construction jobs for minority group«*
and even placed some Negroes as apprentices for the first time, ther*
were pressures within the civil rights movement to call off demonst^a^ic;ns;
but the majority felt that these efforts fell far short of the activ^ts^
concrete demands, .«hen the state governor promised stricter enforcement
of the state's anti-discrimination law, Negro ministers who had nego
with him agreed to call off construction site pickets; but those leading
the demonstrations at the sites spurned the pact out of disgust with
"public relations devices being put forth as a substitute for meaningful 
%3action, and warned that any further pacts would have to be made wl;^ th*e 
activists on the picket line. Nor were demonstrations called off whvQ tbie 
state and city authorities agreed to set up offices to recruit Negro«a an*d 
Puerto Ricans for jobs; promises and tokenism were rejected as being 
insufficient responses by the authorities.
The Appellate Term of the New York State Supreme Court held 2-1 
against the demonstrators' plea of not guilty; but one justice 
was prepared to note the difference between "dry legal conslderat OQ3 
and dynamic social realities." Ibid*3 Oct. 16, 1964, p. 30. ThecaSe*. 
was an appeal when this study closed.
Ibid*, July 17, 1963y p. 1.
I b i d Aug. 7, 1963, p. 1; see also Aug. 8, 1963, p. 1.
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Demonstrations tapered off, but were never officially called off.
Leaders expressed their disappointment that direct action had failed to
achieve integration in the building trades. The hiring practices had been
attacked, but the pattern of discrimination had uot been changed, by tne
middle of October^1964, some 2,600 Negroes and Puerto Ricans nad applied
for positions in the building trades industries; but it was not known
how many had obtained jobs. To this same period, 307 had been judged
44as qualified for apprenticeship or journeymen positions.
Slum housing was another area where direct action tactics were used. 
Junk was dumped on the steps of City Hall and demonstrators chained them­
selves to pillars outside the mayor’s office in protest against slum 
45conditions. These unusual tactics of non-violent direct action were 
matched by rent strikes which began in Harlem, tne largest Negro section 
of the city, in September, 1963. These strikes began in protest over 
housing conditions in slums, exploitation by private landlords, and the 
authorities* failure to force corrections in the conditions. More conven­
tional methods - letter writing, personal pleas, threats of non-payment - 
having failed, tenants in Harlem slum buildings withheld their rent until
their grievances were met. Initially guided by a group of college students
46affiliated with the Northern Students Movement (NSM) who saw themselves
Ibid,, Oct. 16, 1964, p. 30.
Ibid,, Aug. 22, 1963, p. 18; Aug. 23, 1963, p. 1.
A loose confederation of student-staffed projects in eight northern 
cities which began in the fall of 1961 to do civil rights work; its 
originators, white studentsjsaw themselves as the northern wing of SNCC. 
The Movement has “committed itself to enabling people in depressed 
ghettoes to confront and change the complex institutions which now 
so limit their lives." Peter Countryman, "With Our Minds Stayed on 
Freedom", Fellowship, XXIX (Nov. 1, 1963), 18.
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as Che catalysts rather than the leaders of the strike, families in
the buildings formed tenants1 councils to serve notice of their grievances
on high rents and minimal services to both the landlords and the city 
47authorities. In October, the city's Rent and Rehaoilitatiou Administra­
tion reduced rents in the contested building to $1.00 a month because of
uncorrected violations - rat holes, rat infestation, broken plaster,
48broken furniture in premises rented as furnished. As the strikes spread 
to other buildings, rents were lodged with either one of the tenants, NSM, 
or local chapters of CORE which were backing the strike, to be used at the 
discretion of the courts.
With NSM still assisting, strike organization was centred in CCii, 
which operated out of Harlem. Jesse Gray, a militant Harlem personality, 
employed as a shipping clerk, who had been active in left-wing organizations 
since the Depression, headed CCH and announced plans to have thousands of 
buildings on strike by December. He outlined the following activities 
for the strikers: to urge the chief of the Civil Court to refuse to grant
slum landlords the right to evict tenants where there were building 
violations; to appear In court cases with rubber rats tied around their 
necks; to picket the Department of Buildings demanding complete inspection 
of slum housing; to press for a three member arbitration board to settle 
difficulties with landlords rather than let the cases be heard— tangled
47 NJT, Sept. 28, 1963, p. 1. On James Baldwin’s suggestion on September 
22, 1963, for rent strikes, see the report of his speech to a National 
Day of Mourning rally (in honour of the four children killed in a church
bombing in Birmingham) in New York City. James Baldwin, "We can ua
trie Country", Liberation, VIII (October, 1963), 
48
m ,  Oct. 12, 1963, p. 12.
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49up in  th e  le g a l  back log  -  in  th e  p r e s e n t  c o u r t  system .
To th e  s u r p r is e  o f  many la n d lo rd s  and te n a n ts ,  th e  c o u r ts  upheld  
th e  s t r i k e r s  and awarded to  th em selves power to  ho ld  r e n ts  in  q u e s tio n  
pending  r e p a i r s  to  th e  tenem en t; th e  la n d lo rd  cou ld  app ly  to  th e  c o u r t  
f o r  th e  money, b u t on ly  fo r  use  in  c o r r e c t in g  b u i ld in g  v io la tio n s ," * ^  
S u b seq u en tly , th e  c o u r ts  ru le d  t h a t  te n a n ts  co u ld  l i v e  r e n t - f r e e  u n t i l  
housing  e v i l s  w hich menaced h e a l th  and s a f e ty  w ere c o r r e c t e d . ^
With le g a l  s a n c tio n  on t h e i r  s i d e ,  th e  r e n t  s t r i k e s  s p re a d . By 
J a n u a ry ,1964, th ey  in v o lv e d  f i f t y - e i g h t  b u ild in g s  and th e  number had 
r i s e n  to  250 by F eb ru a ry . The c i t y  began a  d r iv e  on r a t s  in  th e  slum s, 
c h a rg in g  th e  owners o f th e  b u ild in g s  w ith  th e  c o s t  o f  e x te rm in a tio n  work. 
In  a d d i t io n ,  a c t in g  under c i t y  r e c e iv e r s h ip  la w s , i t  p re p a re d  to  ta k e  ov er 
slum  b u ild in g s  in  c a se s  w here th e  la n d lo rd s  w ere f i n a n c i a l l y  u n ab le  to  
make r e p a i r s .  By A ugust ,1964, Gray re p o r te d  t h a t  c o r r e c t iv e  c i t y  a c t io n  
had im proved c o n d it io n s  in  m ost o f th e  tenem en ts  on s t r i k e  and t h a t  on ly  
s ix ty  o f th e  o r ig i n a l  325 b u ild in g s  w hich had been in v o lv ed  were s t i l l  
on s tr ik e ." * 2
49 I b i d , ,  Dec. 2 , 1963, p . 30. Gray s a id  t h a t  he had o rg a n iz e d  a 
s im i la r  r e n t  s t r i k e  in  1959; "But th e re  was no community s o l i d a r i t y .  
Now because  o f th e  s t r u g g le s  in  th e  S ou th , th e  community i s  becoming 
aw are o f i t s  r i g h t s . "  I b i d , ,  Dec. 18 , 1963, p . 33.
5U I b i d , ,  Dec. 31 , 1963, p .  1 .
I b i d , ,  J a n . 9 , 1964, p . 1 .
52 I b i d , ,  Aug. 11 , 1964, p . 25.
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De fa c to  sch o o l s e g re g a t io n ,  r a c i a l  im balance r e s u l t in g  from de
fa c to  s e g re g a te d  h o u s in g , was a n o th e r  o b je c t o f p r o te s t s  in  New York
C ity , Such s e g re g a t io n  was most pronounced in  neighbourhood e lem en ta ry
53s c h o o ls ,  f o r  o f te n  h ig h  sc h o o ls  c u t a c ro s s  such  housing  p a t t e r n s .
During th e  summer o f 1963, CORE began s i t - i n s  in  th e  o f f i c e s  o f th e  
S ta te  Commission f o r  Human R ig h ts  and a t  th e  h e a d q u a r te rs  o f  th e  Board 
of E duca tion  seek in g  to  fo rc e  a change in  th e  neighbourhood sch o o l
5 l
assignm ent programme which i t  argued  p e rp e tu a te d  de fa c to  s e g re g a t io n . 
P r io r  to  th e  opening  o f th e  f a l l  te rm , Negro le a d e r s  in  th e  c i t y  c a l le d  
fo r  a b o y c o tt of c lassroom s on open ing  day , bu t c a n c e lle d  th e  c a l l  when
t
th e  c i t y  ag reed  to  s e t  an i n t e g r a t i o n  t im e ta b le  by th e  end o f  th e  y e a r . “
D isp le a su re  w ith  th e  p roposed  t im e ta b le  le d  to  f u r th e r  s i t - i n s  a t  th e
. 56B oard’ s o f f i c e s  and p ro p o sa ls  f o r  a new b o y c o tt in  th e  s p r in g  te rm .
E a r l i e r  sch o o l b o y c o tts  had produced  some ta n g ib le  r e s u l t s ,  even
though th e se  b o y c o tts  were on a  more l im i te d  s c a le .  In  Septem ber^1958,
n in e  Harlem p u p il s  s ta y e d  o u t o f sc h o o l u n t i l  re a ss ig n m e n ts  to  w h ite
E nro llm en t 
301,690 586,131
114,914 208,165
By 1964, th e re  w ere 264, 616 Negro p u p i l s  in  th e  New York C ity  
sch o o l sy stem , a f i f t y - t h r e e  p e r  c e n t in c re a s e  o v er th e  1957-58 
t o t a l :  in  a d d i t io n ,  th e re  were 1 /7 ,5 4 4  P u e rto  R ican c h i ld r e n  in  
th e  sy stem , a  37 ,6  p e r  c e n t in c r e a s e .  T o ta l
Negro P u e rto  R ican O ther 
E lem entary  168,162 116,279
J u n io r  High 56,072 37,179
Academic High 29,870 14,939 158,788 203,597
V o c a tio n a l High 10,512 9 ,147 20 ,964  40,623
S ource : Ib id ,  9 J a n . 6 , 1964, p . 28.
I b id , ,  June 21 , 1963, p . 13; J u ly  6 , 1963, p . 1 .
Ib id , t  Aug. 23 , 1963 % p . 1.
Ib id , s Dec. 17 , 1963, p . 1 ; Dec. 31 , 1963, p , 1 .
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schools were made six months later. In September, 1959, two hundred
Harlem children boycotted classrooms for a week; twenty-three of them
stayed out until they were reassigned six months later. One Negro
student stayed out for six months, from September,1961^to February 1962,
and when reassignment was made in February, the Eoard promised to re-
57examine the entire high school assignment pattern.
When a city-wide boycott was threatened in September ,1960t by the 
Rev. Milton Galamison, then president of the Parent's Workshop for 
Equality, the Board of Education agreed to an open enrolment plan under 
which students from designated, predominantly non-white schools could 
apply for transfer to designated, predominantly white schools; but by 
the end of 1963, only fifteen thousand students, out of a Negro enrol­
ment of 265,000, had chosen to do so.
At the time of the 1964 boycott, the Board had introduced the free- 
transfer plan, under which pupils in predominantly non-white schools 
could apply to any schools outside their area and be assigned, on a 
first-come, first-served basis provided that space was available. While 
this had the effect of integrating the transferred children,it left the 
schools from which they had come as segregated as before. The goal of 
the 1964 boycott was to keep students out of the city's 165 so-called 
"ghetto schools", those whose enrolment was ninety per cent or more 
non-white, and to keep students out of the city's one hundred other 
public schools that were more than fifty per cent non-white. According 
to Galamison, chairman of the organizing City-Wide Committee for Integrated
For these and other instances, see ibid,, Feb. 4, 1964, p. 20.
These efforts were engineered largely by Paul Zuber, a militant,
Negro attorney, who represented the parents of the children concerned.
57
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Schools, which included CORE, the NAACP, Parents' Workshop for Equality,
Harlem Parents Committee, the Urban League, and the National Association
for Puerto Rican Civil Rights, the boycott would be repeated as often as
necessary until the Board produced an acceptable programme for city-wide
racial integration, including a timetable of dates by which steps in the
58programme would be completed. He conceded that the boycott might be a
violation of the state's compulsory school attendance law, but argued that
59there was a "higher, moral law" to be obeyed. The Board's president 
described the boycott as a "lawless course of action"^ and refused to 
be moved by its pressure.
When held, the boycott was responsible for school absences of 360,000 
61above normal. If it failed to gain immediate integration of the school
system, doubtful in any case, it did help to dramatize the aspirations of 
the city's racial minorities.
After the boycott, threatened reprisals by city authorities against
£
teachers who absented themselves from school for the day were called off, 
but the civil rights groups, disagreeing among themselves as to the next 
course of action, did not formulate any further united action for the 
immediate future. Under the sponsorship of several Puerto Rican groups, 
eighteen hundred persons marched on the Board's headquarters to demand
1)0 Ibid., Feb. 3, 1964, p. 1.
59 Ibid.
 ^J Loo. oit.
^  Ibid., Feb .A, 1964, p. 1.
^  Ibid., Feb. 5, 1964, p. 1; Feb. 22, 1964, p.l.
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63better educational facilities and more effective integration. A
second boycott called by Galamison, undertaken without the backing of
the NAACP, CORE or the Urban League, produced only half the previous
64turnout and affected mostly all-Negro schools.
In addition to protests over job discrimination, slum housing, and 
de facto school segregation, there were protests over the general problems 
of ghetto living. Seven members of East River CORE sat down on the 
Triborough Bridge during the evening rush hour; before they were arrested 
by the police, they were pelted by motorists with invective and with the 
garbage which they had dumped on the b r i d g e . I n  leaflets which they 
handed out to the inconvenienced commuters, they argued the case of the 
Negro in the ghetto:
East River CORE is engaging in civil disobedience today 
to protest the unsafe and overcrowded schools in East Harlem.
We regret to inconvenience people passing through our neigh­
borhood on their way to better sections of the city, but we 
are both very sorry and angry about the way Negro and Puerto 
Rican children are treated in the richest city and the wealthiest 
country in the world.... We are asking that New York commuters 
stop for a moment to look at Harlem and the people they leave 
behind, and that they do something about this problem that is 
not only Harlem's but all America's. CORK has participated in 
many great marches - all useful in their time and in their way 
for pug dng the movement for freedom and equality forward. But 
now it is necessary to go to the root of this problem, to organ­
ize in local communities, to help make the poor visible and 
vocal in defense of their rights so they can no longer be 
ignored by America's commuters. 66
^  Ibid,, Mar. 2, 1964, p. 1.
64* Ibid., Mar. 27, 1964, p. 1.
^  Ibid., Mar. 7, 1964, p. 1.
^  Quoted in Nat Hentoff, The New Equality (New York: Viking Press,1964),
pp*  22-23.
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The frustration and hostilities of some civil rights activists 
came to a head at the demonstrations planned for the opening of the 
World’s Fair to be held in New York City. The national office of CORE 
announced plans to demonstrate at the Fair, a monument to American 
affluence, that the Negro citizen was not getting his fair share of 
the glitter and gold. To dramatize its case before the international 
audience that would be in attendance on opening day, CORE planned to 
picket before the pavilions of states which practised discrimination, 
as well as the pavilions of companies that had discriminatory hiring 
policies.^
CORE’s announcement was pushed aside by one of its Brooklyn chapters
which stated its intention to tie up traffic on the opening day of the
Fair: ’’Drive a while for freedom. Take only enough gas to get your car
on exhibit on one of these highways [five major arteries leading to the 
68Fair grounds]". In addition, the chapter announced consideration of 
a programme of intentional water-wasting as an ultimatum to the city: 
it would ask all CORE supporters to open their faucets and let the water 
run, should the proposed stall-in fail to produce immediate working plans 
on housing, schools, employment and police brutality. A new tactic, it 
was planned to inconvenience the entire city and not just specific sections 
within it.
The proposed stall-in provoked sharp disapproval from sections both 
within and outside of the civil rights movement. Farmer, in announcing 
the national office’s suspension of the local chapteVbecause the proposed 
tactic would "merely create confusion and thus damage the fight for freedom"
t7 NIT, Apr. 9, 1964, p. 1.
^  Ibid,, Apr. 10, 1964, p. 1.
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added that the stall-in was "not a relevant confrontation with the power 
69structure.” In a joint declaration, CORE, the NAACP, the Urban League 
and SNCC accused the stall-in proposal of being neither orderly nor non­
violent and out of step with the general civil rights movement: "It is
an essentially revolutionary proposal that might serve the peculiar needs 
and motives of some of its proponents but not the broad interests and needs 
of the Negro people in their normally broad program of effective social 
protest."7^ In reply, Brooklyn CORE said: "We are not promoting violence.
We are preventing violence in that if people do not have some healthy 
outlet to express their frustrations there will be violence."7'*'
The city authorities began to prepare for the demonstrations: prelimi-
71Anary sit-ins were thwarted; legal measures were enacted to make it a
7 IBcrime to run out of gas on highways leading to the Fair; an injunction
V
71Cagainst the proposed stall-in was granted to the city; provisions were 
made for towing away stalled cars;7^  the heaviest concentration of traffic
69
Ibid., Apr. 11, 1964, p. 1.
70 Ibid., Apr. 17, 1964, p. 18. John Lewis of SNCC later retracted 
his earlier statement of denunciation and applauded the tactics.
Ibid., Apr. 18, 1964, p. 1. See Rustin's letter of sympathetic 
criticism, ibid., Apr. 21, 1964, p. 36.
Ibid., Apr. 20, 1964, p. 1.
^^' K~Ibid., Apr. 10, 1964, p. 1.
71B
Ibid., Apr. 15, 1964, p. 1.
11CIhid., Apr. 21, 1964, p. 1.
71DIbid., Apr. 15, 1964, p. 1. However, the head of the sanitation 
union warned that the ten thousand men in his local would not scao 
on civil rights workers by towing away their cars.
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policemen in the city's history was put on duty; talks were neld with
the local CORE chapter to try to settle the dispute; toe public was
advised to stay off the roads and ta*e trains to the Fair wherever
71Epossiole; detention centres were set aside at tne Fair grounds.
The stall-in, which had been extended to include tie-ups in
subways, snarl-ins at ticket gates, and lie-ins on bridges, failed as
a tactic. Only twelve cars turned out, of an alleged pledged number
of twenty-five hundred. There was only one serious attempt to stop a
train. And pickets were successfully kept from entering on to the 
72Triborough Bridge. However, at the Fair grounds, shouting, chanting
and singing demonstrators managed to drown out President Johnson's
opening address. In other activities, three hundred persons were
arrested when they attempted to block doorways and climb exhibits in
"a classic and successful confrontation which has dramatized the urgency
and immediacy with which the nation must deal with its most urgent
73problems, racial discrimination and hatred."
The tactics which nave been discussed were used to attack related
areas to the ones outlined. There were lie-downs in front of moving
cars at the approachway to Jones Beach in a bid to draw attention to
GORE's campaign for the hiring of more Negroes and Puerto Ricans by
74the state park commission. Seven CORE members were arrested for
Jurisdiction over persons charged with illegal acts had been 
given to the Fair authorities by the city in its contract with 
the Fair.
72 Ibid., Apr. 23, 1964, p. 1.
73 Quoting Farmer, in ibid., Apr. 23, 1964, p. 28.
7 ’* Ibid., July 5, 1963, p. 1.
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disorderly conduct when they protested over alleged police brutality
by handcuffing themselves to a large iron grille outside the office
of the Police Commissioner.^“* Two weeks later, eight demonstrators
were arrested for blocking the loading area of a brewery concern; they
had resorted to direct action when negotiations failed to resolve
differences over the company’s hiring policies.^ A week later, eight
CORE pickets were ejected from City Hall after staging a sit-in in
protest over the mayor's failure to take action on the questions of
police brutality and school integration.^
Demonstrations continued to the time at which this study closes,
but none reached the pitch of the protests discussed in detail. There
was dissension within the civil rights movement over tactics. The gamut
of non-violent direct action ran from the legal protest meetings and the
rallies of the NAACP to the more militant, in some cases civilly disobedient,
tactics of CORE. At one end of the spectrum stood Wilkins of the NAACP
who, eve» as late as June,1963, argued that intelligent work in capital
lobbies would be more effective than mass marches on Washington and sit-
78ins in the halls of Congress. But the NAACP, with its regular paid 
staff and its large network of chapters, its half a million members and 
income of nearly $1,500,000 could rely upon legalism and litigation that 
less well-endowed organizations were forced to reject. At the other end
^  Ibid,, Mar. 7, 1964. p. 1.
^  Ibid,, Mar. 21, 1964, p. 12.
77 Ibid., Mar, 28, 1964, p. 20.
7° Ibid., June 21, 1963, p. 14; June 23, 1963, p. 56.
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of the spectrum stood Farmer of CORE, for wtiom there was an organiza­
tional need to extol demonstrations that could produce a reaction 
which CORE’s limited resources could not achieve in any other way.
Independent action groups, local branches of national organizations, 
and the national headquarters of the latter occasionally quarrelled over 
tactics of racial integration. One local leader argued that "anybody 
who is under the aegis of a national organization and who is responsible 
to an anonymous board of directors and a faceless host of contributors
78Acannot function adequately in the current situation as a creative leader’.'
There was the further difficulty of local affiliates who viewed problems
differently from the national bodies; or local leaders who were able to
assess the temper of the immediate activists more accurately. But as
was often the case, it was the national body, or the better-known leaders,
who had the prestige, the organizational ability, and the financial
resources to undertake a long-range programme.
Although the civil rights movement in the North was not bound
slavishly to any one theory of non-violent direct action, there appeared
to be certain well-accepted standards of behaviour. First, even in the
North, direct action was used usually as a last resort, after conciliation
and negotiation had failed to produce results. Farmer said: "We find that
demonstrations are frequently the catalyst - spur the dialogue. Sometimes
79demonstrations start the dialogue."
78A Ibid., June 22, 1964, p. 1.
79 Quoted in Warren, op. oit., p. 198
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Secondly, most of the leaders recognized that militant tactics alone
would not produce a solution. They supported the use of a plurality of
approaches - legal, moral, economic, political as well as the simultaneous
use of a variety of tactics. But they objected to being told to use only
80conventional channels to make their position known. While the appeal of 
militancy was great for those who had come to distrust promises and media­
tion, shock tactics were used only when it appeared that other methods had 
failed.
Thirdly, all of the leaders stressed that they tried to avoid either
provoking violence or interfering with the rights of others; but some of
them argued that they were forced into inconveniencing the public by the
failure of other methods. Galamison said:
The question [of why certain tactics are used] assumes 
that we are not utilizing these direct action tactics 
as a last resort, that we haven't sat around trying to 
negotiate in a civilized way, that we haven't been 
consistently frustrated at every turn.... We have no 
alternative. This is why we turn to tactics that lose 
us friends. 81
The bridge sit-downs and the Fair stall-ins were examples of civil 
disobedience,and for many critics, non-violent direct action which bordered 
on violence. The objectives were just and fair or, at any rate, consistent 
with the goals of the civil rights movement; but the tactics of urgency 
only infuriated the mor.orists whose cars were (or might have been) halted 
by the action. In the North, however, specific objectives were easier to
80 See the argument in Oscar liandlin, Fire-Bell in the Night: Tne
Crisis in Civil Rights (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964).
"Backlash", The New Yorker3 XL (May 30, 1964), 26.
81
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formulate than specific oppressors were to Identify. Galamison said:
"We're living in a society where it's Increasingly hard to find who's
responsible. It's difficult to determine at whom you direct your
* * »82 protests.'
Some within the civil rights movement who had opposed the bridge
sit-downs end the atall-ins on tactical grounds were prepared still to
come to the defence of the militants. Whitney Young, executive director
of the Urban League, attacked the critics who bemoaned the tactics used
by the Negro but who themselves gave no concrete assistance to the movement:
"The white man is concentrating on the inconveniences and disturbances and
82Anot on the basic cause of die problem: poverty."
Attacks on the use of particular methods of direct action assumed that 
the leadership could dictate explicit guide lines for acceptable demonstra­
tions, which could apply at different times and in different locations. 
Senator Javits had asked the leadership to issue s statement on the "proper 
limits of protest" so as to ease racial tension and assure the public that 
protests were not heading in the direction of unlawfulness and violence. 
Robert Gore, assistant community relations director of CORE, had pointed 
out earlier: "The time is past when any person or group of persons can 
assume the prerogative of determining the time, place or type of demonstra­
tion which should be held to break down segregation - Northern or Southern
style - often, if not always - the only way to accomplish this is through
84Socratic gadfly techniques...."
02 Ibid.
82a Quoted in Warren, op. ait., p. 162. Italics ln the originai.
HIT, June 11, 1964, p. 1.
Ibid., July 13, 1963, p. 16.
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Farmer argued against Javits* position that allowances had to be 
made for situational changes which made certain tactics correct in one 
case and inappropriate in another. Even with respect to the stall-in, 
which he had opposed at the time, an occasion might arise when such a 
tactic would be acceptable:
I was not opposed in principle, I was opposed in 
tactics and timing. 1 consider a stall-in to be 
an essentially revolutionary tactic which requires 
a revolutionary situation - to be in the same category 
as a general strike, a general work stoppage - and it 
has certain prerequisites. First, unity in the Negro 
community. Second, an almost absolute polarization 
between the races. It would be a desperate measure.
For instance, in Plaquemine, Louisiana, I have 
recommended to the Negro community that they explore 
the idea of a general strike. There you have the total 
polarization, and the absolute unity, so that such a 
measure would be justified; while in New York it would 
be neither justifiable or workable. Also there is the 
extent to which you have been able to get dialogue, and 
in New York at least we have had dialogue. 85
The protests of the northern civil rights movement, in spite of 
their militancy, were disciplined, organized, and executed with a minimum 
amount of "provocative nonviolence". In contrast to these were the riots 
which erupted in New York and other northern cities in the summer of 1964.
The riots followed a similar pattern, but were not connected organizationally. 
Routine police behaviour provoked crowds to gather; there were voiced objec­
tions to the police’s behaviour, followed by interference with the latter’s 
duty. Mob action began; law and order broke down; ill-assorted weapons 
were thrown at the police; store windows were broken, looting followed.
White persons visiting the neighbourhoods were attacked; fire alarms were
85 Quoted in Warren, op. oit.9 pp. 197-98
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pulleci; cars were overturned, 71hs- civil rights leadership within the 
coesounity was unable to restore order; only the authorities* superior
force was able to do that.
A Harle» rally, called by CORE to protest the killing of a Negro
boy suspected of robbery by an off-duty policeman, set off a week of
6brioting, looting and stealing in the area. Appeals by local aud
national Negro leaders, asking that Negroes get off and stay off the
streets, were offset by the call of scan local Negro leader» for "100
skilled black revolutionaries who are ready to die”,, to correct
conditions in ilarlea. Similar riots were touched off by other instances
of alleged police nauhandllug in the Negro section of Brooklyn and
throughout the summer months spread to Rochester, New York, Chicago,
Illinois, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Jersey City, Paterson, and Elizabeth,
&aNew Jersey.
Sraelser characterizes a riot a» ✓ form of hostile outburst
mm
within which participants are mobilized on the basis of a hostile belief.
He suggests that "the degree of overt expression of these lover-level 
components in norm-oriented aicvetaents depends largely on the conditions
66 HIT, July 19, 1964, p. 1.
$7 Quoting Jesse Gray, ibid*, July 20, 1%4, p. 16.gg
See comparative reports of riots in ibid., Sept, 27, 1964, p. 61,
S3 Smelser, op. oit., p. 226,
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o f s t r u c t u r a l  conduciveness and th e  b eh av io r  o f a g e n c ie s  o f s o c ia l  
c o n t r o l . ” In  th e  Harlem ra c e  r i o t ,  one f a c t o r  which s e t  th e  o u tb u r s t  
in  m otion was th e  k i l l i n g  o f th e  Negro boy and th e  f a i l u r e  o f  th e  p o l ic e  
com m issioner to  reprim and  th e  p o licem an . T h is was j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  many 
o f th e  p a r t i c ip a n t s  to  f e e l  th a t  they  cou ld  n o t  ex p ec t a f a i r  d e a l from 
phe a u t h o r i t i e s .  The n o r th e rn  r i o t s ,  a l l  o f w hich had begun o b s c u re ly , 
were c h a ra c te r iz e d  by t h e i r  u n d efin ed  g o a ls  and t h e i r  la c k  o f a c lo s e ly  
K n it ,  i d e n t i f i a b l e  le a d e r s h ip .  A tta ck s  on p o l ic e  b r u t a l i t y  were a t ta c k s  
r a th e r  th an  demands. Formal demands fo r  a c i v i l i a n  rev iew  b o a rd , f o r  
exam ple, were made e i t h e r  b e fo re  th e  r i o t  began o r  a f t e r  th e  r i o t  had 
su b s id e d .
Tne r i o t e r s  them selves w ere by no means a c r o s s - s e c t io n  o f th e  Negro
community. They were composed la rg e ly  o f te e n a g e rs  and young men, many of
whom were e i t h e r  on sch o o l v a c a tio n  o r  in  th e  ran k s  o f th e  unem ployed;
they  bore  a resem blance to  th o se  who had r e t a l i a t e d  a g a in s t  C onnor's  men
91d u rin g  th e  Birmingham d e m o n s tra tio n s . T h e ir  a g g re s s io n  was n o t n e c e ssa ­
r i l y  c l a s s  a g g re s s io n ,  a lth o u g h  i t  has been su g g es ted  th a t  i t  m ight have 
been s in c e  th e  lo o t in g  of lu x u ry  item s p red o m in a ted . The r i o t e r s  appeared
90 I b id . ,  p . 272.
Q1
ATT, Ju ly  20 , 1964, p . 1; Ju ly  25 , 1964, p . 8; J u ly  26 , 1 9 6 4 ,IV , 3 .
See a ls o  Bayard R u s tin , "The Harlem R io t and N onv io lence" , WEL News, 
Ju ly -A u g u s t, 1964, n .p .  For f u r th e r  l i t e r a t u r e  on r i o t s ,  se e  H. O tto  
D ahlke, "Race and M in o rity  R io ts  -  A Study in  th e  Typology o f V io le n c e " , 
S ocia l Forces, XXX (May, 1 9 52 ), 419-25; A.D. Grimshaw, "Urban R a c ia l 
V io len ce  in  th e  U n ited  S ta t e s :  Changing E c o lo g ic a l C o n s id e ra t io n s " ,  
American Journal o f  Sociology, LXVI (S ep tem ber, 1 9 6 0 ), 109-19 ; K. S m e llie , 
" R io t" ,  Encyclopedia o f  trie Socia l Sciences, X III  (1 9 3 1 ), 386-88.
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to be aggressive towards the symools of their version of the white 
power structure, such as the police and white storeowners. The looting 
was indicative also of a substantial lawless element within the riots. 
This latter point, in addition to the riots having been spread 
exclusively by grapevine and not by local or national civil rights 
organizations, separated them from the main body of the civil rights 
movement. The national Negro leadership was powerless, on the whole, 
to aeal with the violence. What leadership was asserted on the side of 
pacification was mainly by local figures. If there was a positive effect 
of the riots for the civil rights movecient, it was that the established 
Negro leaders could point to them as a possibility for the future when 
putting their case for positive and immediate beneficial action from the 
authorities,
Rustin, himself a disciple of non-violence, argued that the civil
rights leadership had to understand the reluctance of suppressed Negroes
to rely upon non-violence. The latter regarded it as a tactical weapon
that often was inadequate to deal with their objective needs, "[IJt is
wrong," Rustin argued "to turn one’s back on people who have been so
demoralized and trampled on that they literally have no choice except to
91Afight bacR, and then turn to them and say that was naughty,”
Non-violence was more acceptable as a pragmatic political weapon 
by those who saw it as consistent with their religious training in 
Christianity or their tradition of minimizing offences to whites. In 
this sense, it was more applicable to southern Negroes for whom it was
Q 14
Bayard Rustin, "Nonviolence on Trial", Fellowship^ XXX (July,
1964), 8.
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"a natural outgrowth of the traditional passive and submissive role in
the face of white domination and potential retaliation"• In addition,
the philosophy of non-violence could be understood by the educated and
sophisticated: "But it is unlikely that it can be accepted with full
understanding by the masses of Negroes, Their very attempt to cope
with this type of philosophical abstraction in the face of the concrete
injustices which dominate their daily lives could only lead to deep and
91Cdisturbing inner conflicts and guilt".
A moratorium on demonstrations was called by the national leadership
after the Harlem riot to counter any swing towards Goldwater for president,
Wilkins, King, Young and Randolph urged their respective followings to
observe a moratorium until after the elections in November and to use the
pre-election period to enlist voters (presumably for Johnson), press for
enforcement of the newly passed federal Civil Rights Act, and win allies
to their cause: "Our own estimate of the present attitude is that it presents
such a serious threat to the implementation of the Civil Rights Act and
to subsequent expansion of civil rights gains that we recommend a voluntary,
92temporary alteration in strategy and procedure,..• ” Farmer and Lewis 
(of SNCC) refused to agree to the moratorium, although Farmer associated 
himself with that part of the statement which denounced the rioting and 
looting by Negroes in some urban areas.
9 IB Fishman and Solomon, "Youth and Social Action: I. Perspectives of 
the Student Sit-in Movement", op, ait,9 p. 880.
91C Kenneth B. Clark, "The New Negro in the North", in Ahmann, op, oit,9 
p. 37.
92 SIT, July 30, 1964, p. 12
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Behind the dissent of Fanner and Lewis lay their assessment of 
the difficulty of channelling the released energies and emotions of 
the activists into conventional political pressure tactics; that is, 
of having them return to earlier methods such as lobbying and legal 
action. This assessment had been reflected in Fanner’s earlier reply to 
Kennedy’s request for a truce when the civil rights bill had been intro­
duced. He then had said that the leadership could not call demonstrations 
off even if it wished to; but, in any case, he felt that demonstrations
would not damage the bill’s chance but would "help persuade the legisla-
93ture of the urgency of the situation."
Reaction
Public reaction.- As the civil rights movement grew, more white people 
of liberal persuasion had become involved. By the time that the demon­
strations spread to the North, influential organizations had become 
attracted to the movement. But such groups as Freedom House, the American 
Jewish Congress, and the Americans for Democratic Action had been attracted 
to the movement when it was at a stage of development where legal segre­
gation was being attacked. As the movement spread to the North, many of 
these white organizations became hostile to some of the new demands being 
raised and some of the new tactics being advanced. For many Negroes in 
the civil rights movement, the term "white liberal" became one of derision, 
just as in 1954 the terra "moderate" had been similarly transformed. Young, 
never noted for his rejection of white support,said:
93 Ibid*, June 20, 1963, p. 1
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But one th in g ,  i f  n o th in g  e l s e ,  1963 d id  f o r  us -  
i t  ta u g h t us t h a t  no lo n g e r  can we g e n e ra liz e  
about ou r f r ie n d s  and ou r e n e m ie s . . . .  As lo n g  as 
some o f th o se  f a i r  w eather f r ie n d s  cou ld  ex p ress  
l i b e r a l i s m  in  term s o f  in d ig n a t io n  abou t a ly n c h in g  
in  M is s is s ip p i ,  t h i s  i s  one th in g ;  when i t  comes to  
hav ing  somebody move n e x t door to  them , t h i s  i s  
som ething e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t .  94
The term  "w h ite  b a c k la sh "  was in tro d u c e d  in to  th e  p u b lic  ja rg o n  
to  e x p la in  th e  a l le g e d ly  grow ing w h ite  r e j e c t i o n  o f c i v i l  r i g h t s  o b je c ­
t i v e s  and c i v i l  r i g h t s  s u p p o r te r s .  But because  o f  th e  d iv e rs e  number o f 
i s s u e s  on w hich th e  1964 p r e s id e n t i a l  c o n te s t  betw een Johnson and G old- 
w a te r was ru n , i t  was d i f f i c u l t  to  a s s e s s  th e  p r e c i s e  r o le  which th e  
"w h ite  b a c k la sh "  a g a in s t  th e  c i v i l  r i g h t s  movement p la y e d .
There i s  no q u e s tio n  th a t  th e  n o r th e rn  d em o n stra tio n s  aro u sed
o p p o s it io n .  To c i t e  one exam ple: In  March 1964, ta k in g  t h e i r  case  in to
th e  s t r e e t s  fo r  th e  f i r s t  t im e , more th an  te n  thousand  w h ite  p a re n ts
marched on New Y ork’ s C ity  H a ll  in  p r o t e s t  o v er sch o o l " p a ir in g "  and th e
95"b u sin g "o f c h i ld r e n  o u t o f neighbourhood s c h o o ls .  E ngineered  by a 
lo o s e ly  k n i t  f e d e r a t io n  r e p re s e n t in g  a  wide v a r i e ty  o f i n t e r e s t s ,  th e  
d e m o n stra to rs  w ere bound by t h e i r  c o lo u r  and t h e i r  o p p o s it io n  to  any p la n s  
w hich c a l l e d  f o r  th e  in v o lu n ta ry  t r a n s f e r  o f  c h i ld r e n  from  neighbourhood 
s c h o o ls .  The l a r g e s t  o f  th e se  g ro u p s , P aren ts*  and Taxpayers (PAT),
Q uoted in  W arren, op• a i t . ,  pp . 162-63 .
NYTß Mar. 13 , 1964, p . 1 . E a r l i e r ,  a  s t a t e  c o u r t  ru le d  t h a t  th e  Board 
o f  E d u ca tio n  had th e  r i g h t  to  rezo n e  s c h o o ls  to  prom ote in t e g r a t i o n  
b u t u p h e ld , as  w e l l ,  th e  r i g h t  o f p u p i l s  to  a t te n d  th e  sch o o ls  
n e a r e s t  to  t h e i r  homes. T h is  l e f t  open th e  q u e s tio n  as  to  th e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  o f a sch o o l b o a rd 's  a c q u ie scen ce  in  de fa c to  
s e g re g a t io n .  See i b i d . 9 J a n . 11 , 1964, p . 1 . For o th e r  c a s e s ,  
see  Balaban v • Rubin9 r e p o r te d  in  IX CLD 26 (1 9 6 3 ); IX CLD 64 
(1 9 6 4 ).
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organized a boycott, in protest over the Board of Education's programme
on limited pairing of schools, which successfully cut attendances by
175,000 above normal.9** This was followed by sit-ins in the disputed
97schools and arrests which the courts refused to uphold.
To cite another example of reaction to the demonstrations in New 
York: Critics of the school boycott argued that "keeping children out
of school is not an effective answer to poor and segregated public educa-
98tion" and called it a weapon which tried "to force a situation that by
99its very nature is not subject to the use of force." Critics also 
pointed out that there were genuine practical problems attached to 
integrating schools which had little to do with racial discrimination.
They queried if integration entailed a race-to-race proportion in every 
school or a general balance proportionate to the population as a whole. 
They said that after racially motivated gerrymandering had been declared 
illegal, the problem remained of assigning Negro and white children to 
each other's schools; even where ghetto schools were integrated, there 
was the further problem of transporting ("busing") children into distant 
neighbourhoods. Galamison argued, "Anyone who is opposed to busing is 
opposed to integration. With this his critics disagreed. It was not
96 BIT, Sept. 15, 1965, p. 1; Sept. 16, 1964, p. 1.
97 Ibid.3 Dec. 4, 1964, p. 33. The court held that the arrests on charges 
of loitering on school premises were made on procedural irregularities.
96 Ibid., Feb. 3, 1964, p. 18.
QQ
I b i d Feb. 4, 1964, p. 21. See also editorial in ibid.,Feb. 3, 1964,
p. 26.
Quoted in Midge Decter, "The Negro & the New York Schools", Commentary, 
XXXVIII (September, 1964), 27.
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that they were against their children being educated alongside Negroes, 
but that they were against sending their children into slums (which
happened to be Negro) and to inferior schools (which also happened to
v XT , 101 be Negro).
Set against this opposition, it is to be noted that some of the 
moremilitant organizations, such as CORE, reported that after the 
demonstrations began in the North, their financial contributions did 
not fall off. Public support for giving the ghetto Negro a chance to 
improve his status continued, even where there was opposition to some 
of the way sin which the objectives were being approached.
Official reaction,- City and state officials showed a similar ambivalence 
toward the demonstrations. While they were sympathetic to most of the 
goals, they were opposed to many of the methods. The first attitude of 
sympathy if not support for the aims of the movement kept the dialogue 
which Farmer referred to open; the second attitude of opposition was 
reflected in the legal methods used to counter the demonstrations.
On the question of job discrimination, both New York City and New 
York State agreed to set up offices to try to recruit qualified Negroes 
and Puerto Ricans for jobs in the construction industries. Both the mayor 
and the governor promised stricter enforcement of the state’s anti-dis­
crimination laws. But the mayor refused to cancel construction projects 
where discriminatory hiring practices existed, most probably because he 
was unprepared to jeopardize the building of housing projects and schools 
which were being undertaken on these sites.
101 Ibid, 3 pp. 31-32. For a fuller analysis of the boycott, see Larmer, 
op. c i t pp. 243-69.
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On the question of slum housing, New York's Rent and Rehabilitation
Administrations reduced rents in the contested slum buildings; city
courts upheld the strikes and the city prepared to take over slum buildings
in cases where the landlords were financially unable to make repairs.
Under pressure from CCH, tne city also began a drive on rats in the slums.
In a bid to institutionalize the strikes, the mayor asked the state to
legalize the strikes, to create special housing courts and more effective
methods of vacating run-down buildings and relocating tenants, and to
enact measures to increase penalties for violations affecting health and 
102safety. But the legislation was not pressed for by the Democratic 
supporters of the mayor in the Republican state legislature and was never
passed.
On the question of school integration, the New York City Board of 
Education took steps for greater integration only when pressed into doing 
so. But it failed to state a timetable when desegregation efforts would 
be undertaken; without the timetable, the civil rights movement would not 
recognize that the Board had made any positive efforts to resolve the 
conflict.
The authorities opposed some of the tactics used. After junk was 
dumped on the steps of City Hall and demonstrators chained themselves to 
pillars outside the mayor's office in protest against slum conditions, 
the mayor ordered that the demonstrators be arrested. Until that time, 
he had allowed the sit-ins in his office to continue "not because they 
had the legal right to do so - because they did not - but because of my
102iOT, Jan.6, 1964, p. 1.
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103deep sympathy for their objectives."
From the middle of 1963 on, the effect of the demonstrations in 
the North on Kennedy*s civil rights proposals became a matter of concern 
for the civil rights movement. Even the most ardent supporters of civil 
rights feared the consequences of certain kinds of civil disobedience 
demonstrations. Senators Humphrey and Kuchel, the bipartisan floor 
managers of the civil rights bill, warned that illegal and unruly de-mon- 
strations would hur t congressional efforts to get the bill passed; those 
struggling for civil rights, they argued, would greatly help their clause 
if they conducted their peaceful crusade with the good manners, fore—  
bearance and devotion so abundantly displayed the previous August in the 
civil rights march on Washington.
Local authorities joined the ranks of those who deplored the *t*ali~in 
tactic, as did the congressional members from New York who warned th*at it 
could well injure the cause of civil rights and pending legislation.^^ 
Senator Javits, otherwise sympathetic towards the objectives of the ccivil 
rights movement, at least toward that part of the movement which att^c^kcd 
racial barriers, argued: "The utility of demonstrations will have teeen 
lost if there is no focus on the problems which the law can attempt tto 
solve. President Johnson harped on a similar theme, arguing ttatt
103 Ibid
103A
104
105
Ibid
See, 
CR,
Aug. 23, 1963, p. 11.
Apr. 16, 1964, p. 1.
e.g., Sen. Javits, CRS 110: 8243-45 (Apr. 17, 1964) 
110: 8244 (Apr. 17, 1964).
-  173 -
violence and threats to safety "do the civil rights cause no good."^^ 
The Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy, cautioned against "irresponsible 
a c t i v i t i e s " , b u t  warned that the white community must act to relieve 
the Negroes of their desperate frustrations.
Acts of civil disobedience alienated those in the society who gave 
highest priority to the rule of law and who feared that tactics of law­
breaking invited and fomented violence and anarchy. Courts, even where 
sympathetic to the Negroes* depressed condition, warned that disregard 
of the laws could only lead to serious consequences, even to anarchy:
Peaceful demonstrations are not violative of the 
law. But what if the brakes on that truck had 
slipped and someone had been injured? A riot 
would have broken out and you couldn't have 
convinced the crowd that it was an accident. You 
cannot decide what laws to obey and what laws to 
disobey. If you don't like a law the remedy is 
to go to the Legislature, to the trade unions, 
to the city fathers - not to take the law in your 
own hands. This will result in anarchy.... 108
Evaluation
Had there been no direct action protests in northern cities, fewer 
people among the public or the authorities would have been confronted with 
the problems of ghetto living. Bayard Rustin, who had acted as the main 
organizer of the New York City school boycott, expressed the views of many 
within the civil rights movement: "The boycott and the rent strike are 
fair warning that the civil rights revolution has reached out of the South
106
107
NYT, Apr. 17, 1964, p. 1. 
Ibid,
108 Ibid, 9 July 30, 1963, p. 13; see also ibid,, Oct. 3, 1963, p. 20.
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109and is now knocking at our door.” In addition to the significance 
which he attached to Negroes and Puerto Ricans having joined forces 
for the protest, Rustin emphasized the role of conflicts in social 
change. The battle for integrated education (or one could add, for 
other social reforms) had to be fought, he said, even if people were 
inconvenienced and victory was not immediate. The Board of Education 
had to be pried loose from its position of refusing to examine Negro 
views on the school problem. Even if the explicit goals were not achieved, 
people learned about their society by fighting battles in the civil rights 
struggle. Rustin argued that since school integration had been the subject 
for so long of volumes of research, speeches, policy statements, emergency 
meetings, newspaper and magazine articles, scholarly symposiums, public 
debate and demonstration, a boycott was needed to call attention afresh 
to the gchool situation: ”You can only get this thing over to the people 
by results. The threat of a boycott got the school board to get out a 
comprehensive plan for the first time in its existence. Maybe after a 
series of one-day boycotts, the board will come up with something 
significant and meaningful.
Other leaders as well emphasized the importance of merely getting 
people into the streets. Calamison argued that even if the goal is not 
achieved ’’people learn a lesson in struggling for f r e e d o m . F a r m e r  
echoed remarks that King had made at the time of the Montgomery bus 
boycott: ’’One of the most valuable functions of demonstrations is to
1 OQ
Ibid. s Feb. 4, 1964, p. 1.
110 Ibid., Feb. 3, 1964, p. 18.
New York Posts Jan. 28, 1964, p. 23.
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weld people together In unity, and to recruit.••• We have found, too,
112that we have to have demonstrations to build a movement."
Short-range and long-range evaluations can be applied to the civil
rights movement in the North. Only the rent strikes, of all of the New
York City demonstrations discussed, were successful in short-range
objectives, in that they left judicial and administrative marks. But they
had long-range success, too. Their success opened up the possibility of
directing released energies of dissent into channels for other objects of
protest. Gray, operating out of CCH, was able to organize several marches
on New York’s City Hall in protest over living conditions in the city’s
slums; he also arranged for the sending of written protests to the White
House in support of the claims of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party
113and threatened to storm the convention at Atlantic City. A leader who 
is able to deliver success on one issue finds it easier to get support in 
the next issue which arises.
However, it was one thing to succeed in getting improved building code 
enforcements and some Improved housing conditions. It was another to wipe 
out housing discrimination, slum deterioration and overcrowded living 
conditions. These problems remained even after the strikes had succeeded.
112
Quoted in Warren, op. eit., p. 198.
113 Ibid.,f. 137n.
CHAPTER VI
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT ( 5 ) :  FROM PROTEST TO POLITICS
I n tro d u c t io n
In  t h i s  co n c lu d in g  c h a p te r  on th e  c i v i l  r ig h t s  movement, I  s h a l l  
d is c u s s  a new phase  o f  th e  movement -  th e  t r a n s i t i o n  from  p r o t e s t  to  
p o l i t i c s  ( th e  p h ra se  i s  R u s t in 's )*  D ire c t a c t io n  was n o t d is c a rd e d ,  
b u t i t  was fu sed  w ith  p o li t ic a l  action  -  a  co n sc io u s e f f o r t  to  g e t 
p o l i t i c a l  power*
The y e a r  1964 saw th e  c lo s e  o f  a s p e c i f i c  p e r io d  In  th e  movement*
In  th e  S o u th , two approaches w ere o c c u r r in g  s im u lta n e o u s ly ; f i r s t  , 
th e re  w ere s t i l l  d i r e c t  a c t io n  d e m o n stra tio n s  f o r  demands w hich ranged  
from th e  l im i te d  package d e a l  p rev iew ed  a t  Birmingham to  th e  more f a r -  
re a c h in g  demands such  as w ere made by th e  movement in  A t la n ta ;  se c o n d ly , 
th e re  was m ajor r e l i a n c e  upon v o te r  r e g i s t r a t i o n  cam paigns, e s p e c ia l ly  
in  a re a s  w here th e re  was a  h ig h  p ro p o r tio n  o f  N egroes. As th e  f i r s t  
approach sp read  to  in c lu d e  more com prehensive dem ands, th e  d em o n stra tio n s  
began to  resem ble th o se  in  th e  N orth ; as  th e  second approach  s p re a d , th e  
low er c la s s  was b ro u g h t in to  th e  movement a s ,  in  many w ays, i t  had a lre a d y  
been b ro u g h t in  in  th e  North*
In  th e  N o rth , th e r e  was a q u e s tio n in g  o f  th e  u s e fu ln e s s  o f  d i r e c t  
a c t io n  t a c t i c s ,  and w h ile  no p r e c i s e  answ ers w£re p ro v id e d , new methods 
o f  a t ta c k  w ere suggested*  I t  had been ag reed  by th e  c i v i l  r ig h t s  
le a d e rs h ip  th a t  s t r e e t  d e m o n s tra tio n s , b o y c o t ts ,  and r e n t  s t r i k e s  had
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made a larger percentage of the public and more of the authorities aware 
of the race question; but it was agreed also that solutions to the 
problems of the poor were still to be made concrete. The questioning of 
direct action, especially of shock tactics, concerned the role of such 
tactics in bringing about social change.
In the country at large, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, which wrote into legislation much of what had been demanded by 
the movement in the South in the period 1960-63, But the bill was proposed 
at a time when the ghetto minorities of the urban North had not been drawn 
actively into the movement. Few, if any, of the bill's provisions were 
applicable to the de facto race and class problems that had been thrown 
up once the movement spread north. After the Act had destroyed the legal 
foundations of discrimination, the movement was faced with pressing for 
legislation to destroy other vestiges of inequality.
By 1964, the aims of the movement were no longer those of the early 
phase. In many instances the demands went beyond those of civil rights.
In all Instances, whether the demands were race or class demands, they 
presented various problems: on the wisdom of the movement's fusing poli­
tical with direct action; on the need to have allies; on whether the civil 
rights movement could remain one of reform (that is, norm-oriented) or had 
to be transformed into one of revolution (that is value-oriented).
In thi3 chapter I shall examine the voter registration campaigns which 
were undertaken in the South, the tactics suited to those campaigns, and 
the reactions to the voting drives. These campaigns raised the question 
for both the northern and southern sections of the movement of the precise
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n a tu re  o f p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n ,  t h a t  i s ,  w h e th er i t  was to  be u n d erta k en  
w ith  r e s p e c t  to  th e  e x i s t in g  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  F in a l ly ,  I  s h a l l  o f f e r  an 
e v a lu a t io n  o f w hat th e  movement had succeeded  in  do ing  in  th e  p e r io d  
1954-64 .
Tem poral Phases
B efo re  d is c u s s in g  th e  movement*s e f f o r t s  to  fu se  p o l i t i c a l  w ith  
d i r e c t  a c t io n ,  I  s h a l l  d is c u s s  e v e n ts  in  th e  South  a f t e r  th e  March on 
W ashington . The p e r io d  a f t e r  Birmingham was c h a r a c te r iz e d  by o ld  and 
new t r e n d s .  N o n -v io le n t d i r e c t  a c t io n  was s t i l l  th e  m ajor t a c t i c a l  
weapon, b u t as  d em o n s tra tio n s  co n tin u ed  in  c i t i e s  w here agreem ents on 
p u b l ic  accom m odation and sc h o o l d e s e g re g a tio n  had a lre a d y  been re a c h e d , 
th ey  added new demands f a r  b ro a d e r  in  sco p e .
Dem onstrations a f t e r  Birmingham. -  W hile d em o n stra tio n s  w ere o c c u rr in g  
in  th e  N o rth , new d em o n stra tio n s  w ere m arking th e  so u th e rn  sc e n e . Any 
chance o f com placency s e t t i n g  in  a f t e r  th e  tr iu m p h an t March on W ashington 
was ru le d  o u t by two e le m e n ts . One was th e  s p o ra d ic  o u tb u r s ts  o f v io le n c e  
w hich g re e te d  new cam paigns in  th e  s o u th ;  th e  o th e r  was lo b b y in g  p re s s u re s  
f o r  th e  p a ssag e  o f Kennedy’ s c i v i l  r i g h t s  l e g i s l a t i o n .
Birm ingham , q u ie t  a f t e r  th e  l a t e  s p r in g  d e m o n s tra tio n s  in  1963, was 
th e  scen e  o f  a  bomb b l a s t  in  a Negro church  w hich took  th e  l i v e s  o f fo u r  
Negro g i r l s ;  en su in g  r a c i a l  c la sh e s  in  th e  c i t y  le d  to  two more d e a th s ,  
t h i s  tim e o f  Negro boys ( one a t  th e  hand o f  a  w h ite  p o lic e m a n ), and 
i n j u r i e s  to  tw enty  o th e r  p a r t i c i p a n t s . 1 Bombin8s and Po l i c e  b r u t a l i t y
1 NYT, S e p t .  1 6 , 1963> p>
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w ere n o t r a r e  in  Birmingham o r  any o th e r  so u th e rn  c i t y ;  b u t th e  e x p lo s iv e
shock v a lu e  o f th e se  ev e n ts  -  so  soon a f t e r  th e  p e a c e fu l  M arch, th e  m urder
o f s i x  c h i ld r e n  in  a s in g le  day , th e  ta k in g  o f l i v e s  in  a  Sunday sc h o o l -
had an im m ediate im pact on much o f th e  c o u n try . N a tio n a l c i v i l  r ig h t s
le a d e r s  s e n t  o u t p r o te s t s  and w arn ings th a t  Negro p a t ie n c e  was b e in g  ta x e d .
A N a tio n a l bay o f Mourning was h e ld  in  many c i t i e s  in  th e  n a t io n ,  su p p o rted
2by th e  fo rc e s  w hich had backed th e  March. In  r e t a l i a t i o n  f o r  th e  m u rd ers ,
a  group o f Negro w r i te r s  and a r t i s t s  announced a n a tio n -w id e  cam paign
a g a in s t  C hris tm as sh o p p in g ; b u t they  re c e iv e d  th e  su p p o r t o f  v e ry  few
c i v i l  r ig h t s  le a d e r s .  Most o f  th e  l a t t e r  a rgued  th a t  such  a  b o y c o tt would
have d i f f i c u l t y  in  su c c e e d in g , would on ly  p e n a l iz e  N egroes who depended
upon sp a re  employment d u rin g  th e  C hristm as shopp ing  ru s h ,  and would H urt
3
m erchan ts w ith  re c o rd s  o f su p p o r t f o r  c i v i l  r i g h t s .
The v io le n c e  in  Birmingham was n o t an i s o l a t e d  o c c u rre n c e . In  
T u sca lo o sa , Alabama, th r e e  Ghanain s tu d e n t s ,  a  w h ite  s tu d e n t  and a w h ite  
m in is te r  from  ouc o f s t a t e ,  d r iv in g  th rough  th e  c i t y ,  w ere ta k en  in to  
custody  by th e  p o l i c e ,  r e le a s e d ,  and l a t e r  s to p p ed  and b e a te n  on th e
highw ay. Four in t e g r a t i o n  le a d e r s  w ere s e v e re ly  b e a te n  a t  a  Ku Klux Klan
5
r a l l y  in  S t .  A u g u stin e , F lo r id a .  T ear gas was used  to  d is p e r s e  s tu d e n t 
d e m o n stra to rs  in  P laquem ine and S h re v e p o r t,  L o u is ia n a .^  A r re s ts  in  c i v i l
2 I b id . ,  S e p t. 23 , 1963, p .  1 .
3 I b id . ,  S e p t. 22 , 1963, p . 1.
4 S ou thern  R eg io n a l C o u n c il, C iv il R ights: Year-end Summary, op. o i t . ,  p .2 .  
3 I b id . ,  p . 3 .
6 I b id . ,  pp . 7 -8 .
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rignts demonstrations in Orangeburg, South Carolina, exceeded fifteen
nundred, many of which were accompanied by rough handling on the part 
7of the police. In Atlanta, Georgia, demonstrators clashed with the Ku
g
Klux Klan. In Princess Anne County, Maryland, police dogs interrupted 
9a march. In Jacksonville, Florida, a Negro woman was slain in a race
riot.~^ Mobs attacked Negro demonstrators in St. Augustine, Florida.^
There were, of course, some encouraging signs. Merchants began to
12hire Negroes for non-traditional jobs in Augusta and Macon, Georgia.
Members of the City Commission and the Chamber of Commerce of Johnson
City, Tennessee, as individuals, signed and circulated for public approval
13a resolution calling for the complete integration of public facilities.
A league in Danville, Virginia, with over two hundred white citizens,
14petitioned the mayor tp approve a biracial committee.
In many cases, the continuing pattern of protests wassimilar to 
that of earlier instances, but often the demands were changing. In some 
areas, it was true that goals still centred dn the limited field of public
 ^Ibid, a p. 14.
8 NYT, Jan. 20, 1964, p. 15; Jan. 27, 1964, p. 1.
9
Ibid., Ffeb.27, 1964, p. 1.
^  Ibid, 9 Mar. 24, 1964, p. 1.
X'L Ibid, 9 June 26, 1964, p. 1.
12 Southern Regional Council, Civil Rights: Yeca*-end Sianmary3 
op* *t*3 p* 5•
13 Ibid., p. 15.
•4 Ibid., p.16.
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accommodation; but the case of Atlanta, Georgia, was typical of new
developments in the South, namely tae dissatisfaction with, and even
contempt for, toaeu desegregation«
When demonstrations were renewed in the city in becemoer, 1963,
there already had been token desegregation of schools, public accommodation,
hospitals and Jobs« To the mayor, there was reason to be proud: "With
justifiable pride we have viewed Atlanta's racial progress in racial 
15amity." To Martin Luther ling, however, these achievements were 
dismissed with scorn in comparison with the "hard and ugly facts about 
conditions in A t l a n t a . D i s s a t i s f i e d  with the progress of talks on 
desegregation and recalling the achievements of earlier demonstrations,
Negro leaders of various degrees of militancy put forth a comprenensiv. 
list of demands: the total desegregation of all public accommodation; the 
establishment of private and governmental programmes to guarantee fair 
employment practices; the desegregation of all housing and the appointment 
of Negroes to housing boards and agencies; the passage of an open occupancy 
ordinance; the total desegregation of all schools, including administration, 
clerical and teaching personnel; the Increased Negro participation on trial 
juries and the appointment of Negro lawyers to tne staffs of city and county 
attorneys, and to judgeships on municipal and traffic courts; the desegre­
gation of all public health facilities and increased Negro representation on
^  Quoted in Pat Vetters, "Atlanta: Fruits of Tokenism", Nation, CXCVIII 
(Feb. 17, 1964), 162.
16 Ibid\
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health and welfare boards; the desegregation of penal and correctional 
institutions and the appointment of more Negro policemen and probation 
officers.'1^  While these demands were still race demands, they were 
applicable to more classes within the Negro community than had been the 
case with earlier demands.
These demands were not met, even when backed up by non-violent direct
action demonstrations which were intensified when a section of the United
Nations Subcommittee on the Prevention of Discrimination visited the city
18at the invitation of the mayor. Mass arrests, police mistreatment, and 
counter-picketing by the Ku Klux Klan, when added to a drain on the limited 
financial resources of the participating groups, resulted intthe tapering 
off of demonstrations. By the time that the Civil Rights Act had been 
passed in July,1964, some sporadic demonstrations were still being con­
ducted; but only a limited accord on public accommodation and school 
integration had been reached.
The kind of demonstrations which had been held in Atlanta were held 
in other urban areas in the South throughout 1964. Sometimes they reached 
the limited accord that had been obtained in Atlanta; sometimes the door of 
negotiation remained barred to the movement and the use of non-violent 
direct action failed to knock it open.
m 3 Jan. 19, 1964, p. 43.
Slice’s version of the visit appears on Freedom Singers, Utie Freedom 
Singers Sing of Freedom Now (New York: Mercury Records, 1963), No.
MG 20924.
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Voter y*eoi ntrcrti o n .-  A nother k in d  o f  d e m o n stra tio n  in  th e  South  was bound
u n  w ith  th e  movement’ s e f f o r t s  to  fu se  p o l i t i c a l  and d i r e c t  a c t io n .
E f f o r t s  to  r e g i s t e r  more Negro v o te r s  in  th e  South were i n t e n s i f i e d  when
d i r e c t  a c t io n  d em o n stra tio n s  were begun in  1960. By e a r ly  1963, SNCC
had begun in te n s iv e  c o n c e n tra t io n  on v o te r  r e g i s t r a t i o n .  F o ca l p o in ts
f o r  SNCC a c t i v i t y  w ere th e  ’’b la c k  b e l t ” re g io n s  o f  M is s is s ip p i  and Alabama,
so  c a l le d  o r ig i n a l l y  f o r  th e  c o lo u r  o f  t h e i r  r i c h  s o i l ,  b u t now so named
f o r  t h e i r  heavy c o n c e n tra t io n  of Negro p o p u la tio n .  In  th e  f a l l  o f  1962,
SNCC w ent in to  Selm a, Alabama, in  D a lla s  C ounty, where on ly  0 .9  p e r  c e n t
19o f th e  e l i g i b l e  Negro v o te r s  w ere r e g i s t e r e d .  Hie county  , ty p i c a l  o f
o th e r s  in  th e  a r e a ,  was a lm o st e x c lu s iv e ly  r u r a l .  Im p o v erish ed , i t  was
among th e  p o o re s t  in  th e  U n ited  S ta t e s :  e ig h ty - f iv e  p e rc e n t o f th e  N egroes
l iv e d  below  th e  minimum s ta n d a rd  o f s u b s i s te n c e ;  s ix ty - s e v e n  p e r  c e n t o f  th e
N egroes had l e s s  th an  a s ix th  g rade e d u c a tio n ; 5 .7  p e r  c e n t o f  th e  e l i g i b l e
N egroes in  a l l  n in e te e n  c o u n tie s  in  th e  ”b la c k  b e l t ” w ere r e g is t e r e d  to  
20v o te .  For SNCC: Those c o u n tie s  w ith  th e  h ig h e s t  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  N egroes
a re  g e n e ra l ly  th e  p o o re s t ,  w ith  N egroes h o ld in g  th e  lo w e s t pay ing  jo b s .
N egroes in  B lack  B e lt  Alabama a re  h e ld  in  p o v e rty  by job  d is c r im in a t io n
and la c k  o f  e d u c a tio n . Selma a d e q u a te ly  d em o n stra te s  how Negroes a re
21den ied  th e  means to  ch an g e .”
SNCC e f f o r t s  a t  v o te r  r e g i s t r a t i o n  moved v e ry  s lo w ly . In  O c to b e r,
S tu d e n t N on-V io len t C o o rd in a tin g  Com m ittee, Specia l Report: Selma9 
Alabama3 Moorion,  Alabama,  the Black B elt  (A t la n ta :  S tu d e n t Non- 
V io le n t C o o rd in a tin g  Com m ittee, 1965 ), n .p .
20 Ib id .
21 Loc. c it ,
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1963, SNCC launched a south-wide "One Kan - One Vote" campaign at a 
Selma Freedom Day. But still voter registration continued at a snail's
pace.
In 1964, the goal of voter registration, as set for these southern 
rural areas, with emphasis on Mississippi, was broadened to include other 
forms of political and direct action, as well as small scale attempts at 
academic vocational and cultural training of deprived southern Negroes
by 750 field workers of the Council of Federated Organizations (C0F0).
,lyThe latter Included most/teachers, lawyers, ministers and students 
affiliated with SNCC, SCLC, the MAACP, and some Mississippi community 
groups.
Parallel to C0F0, the Freedom Democratic Party was set up in Missi­
ssippi to duplicate the steps through which the regular state Democratic 
party selected delegates to the presidential nominating convention. The 
Party entered candidates in the regular Democratic primary in June and after 
their expected defeats, campaigned as independents in the November presi­
dential elections. As a result of the activities of C0F0 and the Freedom 
Democratic Party, one hundred thousand Negroes were registered with the 
Party, a figure almost twenty per cent higher than the number of Missi­
ssippi's Negroes of voting age which had been registered to vote previously. 
A delegation was sent to the national Democratic convention in August
1964, and with the assistance of CORE and SNCC conducted sit-ins outside
22convention headquarters. The delegation pleaded its case for rectgnitlon 
before the Credentials Committee and a seating compromise was proposed
22 NIT,Aug. 23, 1964, p. 1
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23betw een i t  and th e  r e g u la r  M is s is s ip p i  D em ocratic p a r ty .  A g a in st th e  
ad v ice  o f  some c i v i l  r i g h t s  l e a d e r s ,  th e  Freedom D em ocratic P a r ty  
r e j e c te d  th e  com prom ise.
Aims and M otives
Two problem s faced  c i v i l  r i g h t s  l e a d e r s ,  b o th  in  th e  N orth  and in  
th e  South  -  how to  g e t Negroes r e g i s t e r e d  and how to  g e t them to  v o te .
In  th e  N o rth , th e  prob lem  in v o lv ed  overcom ing apa th y  and o f f e r in g  th e  
p o t e n t i a l  Negro v o te r  a  c a n d id a te  and a  programme th a t  had som eth ing  f o r  
him . In  th e  S ou th , th e  problem  was more com plex. In  some a r e a s ,  th e  
problem s w ere th e  same a s  in  th e  N o rth ; in  m ost a r e a s ,  th e  p e rc e n ta g e  
o f  Negro v o te r s  was m in is c u le  a s  a  r e s u l t  n o t  o n ly  o f  g e n e ra l a p a th y , 
b u t a l s o  o f  in t im id a t io n  by lo c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  and em ployers who th re a te n e d  
p h y s ic a l  r e p r i s a l s  and jo b  d i s m is s a l s ,  l o c a l  r e g i s t r a r s  who lo a d ed  th e
l i t e r a c y  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  a g a in s t  them , and th e  i n a b i l i t y  to  pay lo c a l  p o l l
„ 24ta x e s .
Ibid» 9 Aug. 26 , 1964, p . 1 .
W illiam  B rink  and L ouis H a r r i s ,  The Negro Revolution in  America 
(New Y ork: Simon and S c h u s te r ,  1 9 6 4 ), pp . 84 -85 . See a ls o  Donald 
R. Matthews and James W. P ro th ro ,  " P o l i t i c a l  F a c to rs  and Negro V oter 
R e g is t r a t io n  in  th e  South” ,  American P o l i t ic a l  Science Review,  LVII 
(M arch, 1 9 6 3 ), 2 4 -4 4 ; Donald R. M atthews and James W. P ro th ro ,
P o l i t i c a l  F a c to rs  and Negro V oter R e g is t r a t io n  in  th e  S o u th " , American 
P o li t ic a l  Science Review9 LVII ( J u n e , 1 9 6 3 ), 3 55 -67 . See U n ited  S ta te s  
Commission on C iv i l  R ig h ts ,  1961 Report: Voting (W ashington: U .S . 
Government P r in t in g  O f f ic e ,  1961 ).
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SNCC Instituted a campaign to counter the apathy and the fear*
It set about to prepare people for an act which in the South required 
courage - the appearance at the county registration office* It set about 
to unify Negroes in rural southern areas and to develop leadership within 
the local communities* SNCC and COFO did not want to be the personal 
demonstrators; they wantedtoorganize communities of the poor and the 
frightened. The aim of the Freedom Democratic Party was to show, in terms 
of facts and figures, that Negroes currently denied the right to vote 
would do so if allowed.
Overcoming fear was the immediate aim of voter registration* The 
secondary aim was to translate political potential into a political power 
base* The potential Negro vote in the South, as indicated by the follow­
ing table, was capable of radically altering the composition of the southern 
governments and, by extension, Congress itself*
Per Cent in Per Cent of Eligible
Population Registered Unregistered
Voters Negroes
Mississippi 42 7 396,000
South Carolina 35 8 358,000
Louisiana 32 14 356,000
Alabama 30 5 415,000
Georgia 28 6 454,000
North Carolina 24 10 340,000
Arkansas 22 12 120,000
Virginia 21 9 340,000
Florida 18 9 287,000
Tennessee 17 8 179,000
Texas 12 7 338,000
Total 3,583,000
25
Cited in Brink, op, oit,s p . 83 .
25
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Tactics
The tactics of the voter registration campaigns can be examined 
on two levels: first, the specific tactics of the campaigns in the 
South in 1964*, secondly, the tactical questions concerning the uses to 
which the political power base of the registered voters was to be put.
Initially, SNCC had been split over whether to concentrate on 
voter registration drives or on direct action demonstrations to desegre­
gate public facilities. The former approach had the support of white 
liberals and even some forces within the federal government; but this 
very support was suspect by those who had already felt let down by these 
groups and who feared that voter registration might be an attempt to
cool down the organization's militancy. SNCC compromised by embarking
26upon political and direct action campaigns. But even if the organi­
zation had decided just to concentrate on voter registration, it would 
not have had to forgo the militancy or appeals of direct action. For 
the holding of mass rallies at churches, the door-to-door canvassing 
of potential voters, and the distribution of educational material in the 
"black belt" areas of the South were as much a form of unconventional 
protest as had been the sit-ins or Freedom Rides.
SNCC field workers, usually Negro students, went into rural Negro 
communities and lived and worked with the local people whom they were 
trying to organize. The activists bore similarities to the Russian 
Narodniki in several ways: first, the SNCC (and later COFO) volunteers 
were often young intellectuals who left their homes and studies to go 
"to the people"; secondly, many had a moral idealism which saw "the 
people" as the bearer of the new social order.
26 Zinn. SNCC : The New Abolitionists- on- ait.. d o. 58-59.
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Because of their concern with the rural South, replete with well- 
established caste systems and semi-feudal traditions,SNCC had to use
tactics different from those used in southern cities. Because of the
%
normal harassment and terrorization faced by Negroes in the areas, SNCC 
had to rid the people of their fear before they could attempt to organize 
them.
COFO, a specific project designed to concentrate on Mississippi, 
used tactics similar to those of SNCC. In addition, it set out to 
"invade" the state at one point in time with large numbers (750) and 
cause the federal authorities to show a greater concern for the plight 
of the Mississippi Negroes. A field worker for COFO said:
No administration in this country is going to commit 
political suicide over the right to vote of Negroes.
This is part of what we are doing, and getting tne country 
involved through yourselves, that is, to open this up to 
the country and get the backing of the country and get 
pressure- public pressure, continual, mounting, steady 
public pressure - on all of the agencies of the Federal 
Government and on all of the informal processes of this 
country. That's the only way we'll get any kind of creative 
solution to what's going on down there. 2 7
COFO operated on the direct action and legal levels. On the first, 
it helped to register potential Negro voters; it operated freedom schools 
to educate the local Negro community; it ran community centres to counter 
the fear. On the second level, it filed several suits against officials, 
private groups and individuals who arrested COFO workers and it sought to 
enjoin the holding of county and state Democratic conventions until Negroes 
had had a fair chance to register to vote.
27Quoted in NYTS June 21, 1964, p. 1
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The Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, whose leaders were 
sharecroppers, housewives, teachers, ministers and SNCC officials, set 
out to duplicate the steps through which the regular state Democratic 
Party selected delegates to the presidential nominating conventions.
The Party was designed to serve as the organizing mechanism for Negroes 
in Mississippi; its campaign served as the focus for the voter registra­
tion activities of COFO. Those Negroes not allowed to register on the 
official books of the state, for discriminatory reasons, were registered 
on the Party's unofficial registration books. Once it was shown that 
Negroes presently denied the vote would do so if allowed, the Party could 
challenge the seating of selected Congressmen on the grounds that a 
significant percentage of the state's voting population had been denied 
the right to vote.
As a result of protest activities, one hundred thousand Negroes were
registered with the Party. Considering the risk of registering with the
Party, this twenty per cent figure was extremely significant. While a
further chink was made in Mississippi's "closed society", the price paid
by the civil rights movement was high: three people were murdered; four
were shot and wounded; fifty-two were beaten or otherwise injured; 250 
28were arrested; thirteen Negro churches were destroyed by fire; seventeen
other churches and buildings were damaged by fire or bombs; ten automobiles
29were damaged or destroyed.
no
IX CLD (July, 1964) 79, 84-85.
IX CLD (July, 1964), iii.29
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A delegation, sent to the national Democratic convention, pleaded
its case for recognition before the Credentials Committee and before
millions of television viewers. It told how Negroes were systematically
denied the right to take part in the process of selecting delegates from
precinct meetings to the state convention. Witnesses also told of the
brutality and the terror they experienced while trying to register and
vote. In an attempt to avoid a floor fight, the leaders of the delegation
were offered a compromise which promised the seating of ah all-white
Mississippi delegation as well as two members from the Party. In addition
to the seating provisions, the compromise provided that the call for the
presidential nominating convention ini 968 was to include language that
would insure non-discriminatory selection of delegates and a place for all
30Democratic electors on the ballots of each state. However, a split 
developed within the Freedom Democratic Party and the compromise was 
rejected.
Legally, the Party did not have a fool-proof case. Its strength was
moral and emotional, with the result that it could not be so easily brushed
aside by the Credentials Committee. But behind the Party lay the threat of
violence erupting on the Negro side:
There are many Negroes that feel they have been 
patient too long, and that the Justice Department 
is not doing anything about their grievances, and 
therefore they feel that they must take things into 
their own hands, and here you have the pc ssibllity 
of violence erupting from the Negro against the 
white group.... all these harassments and frustrations 
[viz., the voting difficulties in 1964] are just at the
30 NIT3 Aug. 26, 1964, p. 1. For demonstrations at Republican convention, 
see ‘ibid.j July 15, 1964, p. 1;. July 16, 1964, p. 19.
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e x p lo s io n  p o in t  fo r  a l o t  o f p eo p le 31
The s p l i t  over th e  compromise r e v e a le d  a  d eep e r s p l i t  w ith in  th e
c i v i l  r ig h t s  movement as  a w hole over w hether th e  p o l i t i c a l  power base
sh o u ld  be a f f i l i a t e d  w ith  e i t h e r  o f th e  two m ajo r p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .  I t
was n o t  an even s p l i t  because  th e  m a jo r ity  o f th e  le a d e r s h ip  ag reed  w ith
R u s tin  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n  had to  be " w ith in  th e  D em ocratic p a r ty  where
32
o n ly  th e  m e an in g fu l p rim ary  c o n te s t s  in  th e  South a re  fo u g h t."  R u s tin
arg u ed  t h a t  th e  i s s u e s  a w a it in g  th e  c i v i l  r i g h t s  movement w ent beyond
sim p le  q u e s tio n s  o f  c i v i l  r i g h t s ;  once l e g a l  d is c r im in a t io n  had been
a b o l is h e d ,  th e  movement had to  adop t new demands -  f u l l  em ployment, th e
a b o l i t i o n  o f s lu m s, th e  r e c o n s t r u c t io n  o f th e  e d u c a tio n a l  sy stem , new
d e f in i t i o n s  o f  work and l e i s u r e .  These dem ands,he c o n tin u e d , co u ld  b e s t
be a ch iev ed  by b o ls te r in g  th e  l i b e r a l  fo rc e s  w ith in  th e  D em ocratic P a r ty :
"We must see  to  i t  t h a t  th e  r e o rg a n iz a t io n  o f  th e  'c o n se n su s  p a r ty 1 [ th a t
i s ,  th e  m a jo r ity  o f  th e  D em ocratic P a r ty  p lu s  some l i b e r a l  e lem en ts  in
th e  R epub lican  P a r ty ]  p ro ceed s  a long  l i n e s  w hich w i l l  make an e f f e c t iv e
33v e h ic le  f o r  s o c ia l  r e c o n s t r u c t io n . - . "
I n te g r a t in g  lunch  c o u n te rs  and o th e r  in s ta n c e s  o f n o n -v io le n t  c o e rc io n  
w ere t a c t i c s  t h a t  co u ld  depend upon r e l a t i v e l y  few in d iv id u a ls  a c t in g  a lo n e . 
But th e  new aims o f  th e  movement demanded p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n  t a c t i c s  w h ich , 
in  tu r n ,  depended upon o rg a n iz e d  num bers. The c i v i l  r i g h t s  movement,
Q uoting a so u th e rn  c i v i l  r i g h t s  w orker in  W arren, op, o i t , 9 p . 63.
Bayard R u s tin ,  "From P r o te s t  to  P o l i t i c s :  The F u tu re  o f th e  C iv i l  
R ig h ts  Movement", Commentary,  XXXIX (F e b ru a ry , 1 9 6 5 ), 25.
33 I b id , j  p • 30
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Rustin continued, had to identify the forces which could help it achieve
a "radical" solution of the existing political and economic issues. It
inneeded allies. It needed to join /a coalition with the country’s progres­
sive forces - the trade unions, the liberals, the religious groups. Then 
it needed to transform that coalition into the effective political majority. 
"The task of molding a political movement out of the March on Washington
coalition is not simple, but no alternatives have been advanced. We need
34to choose our allies on the basis of common political objectives."
Some members of the civil rights movement, crystallized around SNCC
and the Freedom Democratic Party, in opposition to Rustin argued the case
for independent political action. They argued against supporting the
Democratic party which for them worked on underlying assumptions of foreign
policy alien to their view of world politics and a short-sighted domestic
programme made possible by a continuing armaments economy. These members
had lost faith (if they ever had it) in the liberal wing of the Democratic
party: "We find allies outside the Democratic establishment: the restless
poor, students and other independent middle class insurgents. We seek to
bolster their movement, through the variety of political forms which it may 
35take." Their allies were those who were either culturally alienated 
(some intellectuals) or economically alienated (some workers)•
They conceived the movement centred around the Freedom Democratic 
Party to be the beginning of a radical opposition movement to the existing
34 Ibid., p. 29.
35 Tom Haydei and Staughton Lynd, "Reply: The New Radicalism: Sect or 
Action Movement?", Studies on the Left, V (Summer, 1965), 133.
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structures in American society. If this new, radical group were to be 
forced into a position of cooperation with the Democratic party, it would 
be forced to compromise its radicalism.
Given these divergent views, it is still true that any concrete 
political action group, such as the Freedom Democratic Party, did not 
find that the political situation in 1964 presented these two clear-cut 
alternatives. It found it meaningful to work within the Democratic party 
for a realignment of the progressive forces. It found that even to build 
it» own power base it had to run its own candidates within an existing 
party. At the same time, it went outside of the national Democratic 
party for its objectives, and tried to manoeuvre within the party structure 
for the moment when it could realize these objectives.
The split over the compromise offered to the Freedom Democratic Party
was symptomatic of the two views within the movement on what kind of
political action was necessary. Rustin approved of the compromise because
he considered it important to preserve unity within the Democratic Party
and because he thought that the Democratic Party was necessary for the
realization of the civil rights movement’s objectives. Rustin, in other
words, did not want to alienate the allies of the movement, as he saw them.
SNCC did not care as much about the political victory of forcing the
Convention into recognizing its existence as about the moral and publicity
rewards of staging a floor fight. Farmer assessed the rejection of the
36compromise as being "morally right but politically wrong,"
36 Quoted in Warren, op• ait,, p. 117n
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Rustin was the reformer working within the existing social order, 
who wanted to assimilate into the society, who did not attack capitalism 
itself but the way in which it was run. SNCC was the revolutionary which 
wanted to create a new social order.
Reaction
Public reaction. - There was strong opposition by local white residents
to the voter registration efforts. SNCC and COFO faced daily harassment:
there were job dismissals of Negroes who attested to register; there were
bomb threats to houses where volunteer workers were boarding and threats
were occasionally followed through with action. As has already been
mentioned, by the middle of August, four field workers had been shot
and wounded, fifty-two had been beaten or otherwise injured, 250 had been
arrested, three had been slain, thirteen Negro churches had been destroyed
by fire, seventeen other churches and buildings had been damaged by fire or
37bombs, ten automobiles had been damaged or destroyed. Protest meetings
had been held outside of the South demanding federal intervention after
three civil rights workers (one southern Negro and two northern whites)
had been reported missing and were presumably dead. A poll taken by a
national concern showed that public opinion in the country at large was oppos
to the Mississippi summer project two to one, but that the group polled
was heavily in favour of sending in Federal troops to the state should
38violence break out. As had been the case in Birmingham, the infliction 
37
IX CLD (July, 1964), iii, 84-85.
O Q
NYT3 July 8, 1964, p. 20.
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o f  v io le n c e  on th e  c i v i l  r ig h t s  a c t i v i s t s  succeeded  in  g e n e ra tin g  su p p o rt 
f o r  some o f  th e  movement’ s a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  m igh t o th e rw ise  have been
m iss in g .
Local r e a c tio n . -  The v o te r  r e g i s t r a t i o n  cam paigners fa c e d  d a i ly  h arassm en t
from  lo c a l  law  en fo rcem en t a g e n c ie s  as w e ll a s  from  l o c a l  p r iv a t e  c i t i z e n s .
SNCC and COFO w orkers w ere a r r e s te d  on f a l s e  i d e n t i t y  c h a rg e s ,  on ch a rg e s
o f i l l e g a l l y  c i r c u l a t i n g  l i t e r a t u r e ,  and o f  prom oting  b o y c o t ts .  The
o r g a n iz a t io n s ' h e a d q u a r te rs  w ere ra id e d  and m a te r ia ls  and a f f i d a v i t s  from
o f f i c e  f i l e s  c o n f is c a te d .  N egroes had to  s ta n d  in  l i n e s  su rro u n d ed  by
c i ty  and county  p o l ic e  and fa c e  slow-downs on th e  p a r t  o f  county  r e g i s t r a r s
who would p ro c e s s  no more th a n  tw e n ty -f iv e  p eo p le  a  day and a r r e s t s  f o r
39u n law fu l assem bly .
FedeT'al r e a c tio n . -  From th e  m idd le  o f  1963 u n t i l  th e  p assag e  o f  th e  
C iv i l  R ig h ts  Act in  J u l y ^1964, th e  e f f e c t  o f  th e  d e m o n s tra tio n s  in  bo th  
th e  N orth  and th e  South  became a m a tte r  o f  concern  f o r  p eo p le  in  th e  
f e d e r a l  governm ent. However, th e re  was more i n t e r e s t  d u rin g  t h i s  p e r io d  
in  th e  m i l i t a n t  d e m o n stra tio n s  in  th e  N orth  th a n  in  th e  v o te r  r e g i s t r a t i o n  
p r o je c t s  in  th e  South .
I n i t i a l l y ,  th e  governm ent s a id  i t  had no power to  send a g e n ts  in to  
M is s is s ip p i  to  p r o te c t  th e  v o lu n te e r  w o rk ers . However, when v io le n c e  krroke 
o u t in  th e  S o u th , as i t  d id  in  P h i la d e lp h ia ,  M is s i s s ip p i ,  th e  f e d e r a l  
governm ent o rd e re d  th e  FBI and th e  J u s t i c e  D epartm ent to  ta k e  an a c t iv e  
r o le  in  M is s is s ip p i .  V io len ce  s p o t l ig h te d  d i r e c t  a c t io n  a s  i t  had done
See co p ie s  o f S tu d en t Voice9 November, 1963 -  J u ly ,  1964; Z inn ,
SNCC: The Neu A b o l i t io n i s t s  9 op, c i t ,  9 pp . 79-166; S tu d en t Non- 
V io le n t C o o rd in a tin g  Com m ittee, S p e c ia l R eport: Selma9 Alabama9 
Marion,  Alabama9 the  B lack B e l t ,  op, c i t .
39
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in Birmingham; violence committed the federal government as non-violence
had failed to do.
Evaluation
Smelser says, "Unlike the panic, the craze, and the hostile outburst,
the norm-oriented movement, if successful, leaves an observable mark - a
40norm or an organization - in its wake. Measured by this rule, the civil 
rights movement was successful in that it left the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, two national pressure groups, and numerous local, grass-roots 
pressure groups.
However, success is not as simple to measure as Smelser suggests.
First of all, success depends upon the evaluator's vantage point.
What may appear to be successful in Greensboro, North Carolina, might 
not appear to be so in Hew York City.
Secondly, success depended upon what the aims of the movement were.
Where there were diverse aims, success was more difficult to assess. The 
narrower the aims, the more likely was it that there would be a measure of 
success. But often narrow objectives did not match the problems confronting 
key sections of the movement. If one were to regard the Negroes of the North
and of the South as a composite group, then the Civil Rights Act was not a 
great success. For the mass of Negroes, only when the movement hit hard 
at problems of poverty, public works, social welfare, and automation, to 
name some of the major ones, was there a chance of improving the group's 
economic and political situation. It was often argued within the movement
40 Smelser, op. cit., p. Ill
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that there was no use having equal access to restaurants if one did not 
have the money to pay the bill; that there was no use asking for equal 
job opportunities in semi-skilled and unskilled occupations when auto­
mation was shrinking job opportunities or in skilled occupations when there 
were not enough Negroes being trained to fill the vacancies; that there 
was no use "busing” children into white schools, if the quality of public 
education left much to be desired for both races. For the mass of Negroes, 
the Civil Rights Act had not faced the shortcomings of the private economy.
Thirdly, because the goals of the movement changed as the movement 
progressed, success was difficult to isolate at any one time. The Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 might have been regarded as a mark of success had it 
been passed three years earlier. By 1964, the movement had moved beyond 
the Act’s written provisions.
Given these three qualifications, which themselves overlap, one could 
still credit the civil rights movement with a series of successes. History 
will be the final arbiter of their comparative worth.
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1964. Kennedy’s assassination and
Lyndon Johnson’s succession to the presidency still left the civil rights 
movement with White H#use leadership active in its behalf.^1 Previous to 
his new-found role, Johnson, himself a southerner, had never enjoyed the 
confidence or admiration of the movement. Although he had been instrumental 
as Senate majority leader in getting civil rights legislation through in 
j-957 and 1960, his role had been more one of the political manager than the
See Negro leaders* praise of Johnson's speeches on civil rights,
NUT, Nov. 28, 1963, p. 21; Jan. 9, 1964, p. 18.
41
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political supporter of the bills. In his new role, he pledged himself 
to carry on a fight for racial equality and for the enactment of meaningful 
civil rights legislation; he played this part as skilfully as his earlier 
ones.
The bill was passed by the House in February, 1964fby a coalition of
42northern Democrats and Republicans, and by a similar coalition in the 
43Senate in June. As signed by Johnson in July, the Civil Rights Act of
1964: outlawed racial discrimination in most hotels, restaurants, theatres
and similar places of public accommodation; authorized the Attorney General
to initiate suits or to intervene in behalf of aggrieved persons in school
desegregation or other cases involving racial discrimination; forbade
racial discrimination by employers or unions; permitted the halting of funds
to federally aided progranmes in which racial discrimination was allowed
to persist, prohibited registrars from applying different standards to
44white and Negro voting applicants.
The civil rights movement couüd consider itself the architect of the 
bill. By its direct action demonstrations, it made the government more 
responsive to the urgency of the Negroes* situation; by its persistence in 
the streets, it changed the government*s conception of what was urgently 
needed in the way of civil rights legislation. But the bill was drawn at 
a time when the street demonstrations were occurring in the South; the bill
42 Passed 290-130, Cß3 110:2805 (Feb. 10, 1964).
43 Passed 73-27, CRS 110: 14511 (June 19, 1964).
44 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78Stat. 241.
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reflected the early phase of the civil rights movement's activities 
and, therefore, ignored the problems of the gnetto minorities.
The federal government could have chosen to disregard the civil 
rights demands, ignore the activists, or even repress the direct action 
demonstrations. If it nad chosen to do any of the three, it would not 
have arrested the growth of civil rights dissension. Repression was likely 
to cause more trouble that it was worth; it might have forced the hand of 
the less militant Negro leadership and pushed the movement into other than 
non-violent channels. It realized that if change by political means was 
made hopeless and change by the persuasion of direct action was made useless, 
the activists would be forced into other than norm-oriented channels. This 
fear of other than political or direct action characterizing the movement 
may have been the prime mover in getting the federal government to take 
meaningful action.
Whether repression would have unleashed the alleged powderkeg within 
the Negro community is less important than that the authorities feared 
that it would. That the black nationalist sects, the black Muslims in 
particular, were less intent on using violence than Kennedy and Johnson 
imagined was less important to the civil rights movement than the govern­
ment's preparedness to assume that tney were.
In choosing to accommodate itself to the movement, for reasons of 
either political expediency or morality, the government recognized various 
factors In the movement's favour. First, that there was a consensus in 
the country about equality. Secondly, that non-violent direct action was 
more acceptable as a political weapon than the violence believed to be 
otherwise possible. This assessment took into account the consequences
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of even non-violent direct action being able to chalk up a victory; if 
the activists could show success on one score, they night use non-violent 
direct action to demand more and other groups in the society might adopt 
it for their particular purposes.
Thirdly, the civil rights movement was a popular movement which drew 
its inspiration and sustenance from the ideology of the United States 
itself. Civil rights leaders took great pains to align themselves with 
the Boston Tea Party, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution 
and the American Creed.
But the government accommodated itself to the movement at a time when 
the demands were race demands, the leadership was respectable middle-class, 
and the perpetrators of violence vjere southern whites. The government 
might shift its position as the movement shifted its emphasis.
2. The solidification of the Negro community. The civil rights 
movement brought about substantial class unity within the Negro caste 
structure. Negroes of all classes identified themselves with the middle- 
class students who sat down at the lunch counters, the middle-class 
ministers who rode the freedom buses, the unemployed youth who retaliated 
against the Birmingham police, the clerical workers who organized rent 
strikes, the sharecroppers who tried to register and vote. Colour cut 
across class lines and became a cohesive element. Many lower class Negroes 
became involved in political protest for the first time; and, for the 
first time, they themselves, not some-one acting in their behalf, began to 
exert pressures for change.
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3. O ther fo rc e s  s e t  in  m o tio n . The movement th rew  up new c i v i l  
r i g h t s  g ro u p s: n a t io n a l ly  th e re  was SCLC (1 9 5 7 ), SNCC ( I9 6 0 ) ,  COFO(1964); 
l o c a l l y ,  th e r e  w ere such groups a s  th e  Montgomery Improvement A sso c ia tio n  
(MIA), th e  Alabama C h r is t ia n  Movement f o r  Human R igh ts  (ACMHR), th e  llon- 
V io le n t A ction  Committee (NVAC) in  Cam bridge, M aryland, th e  Community 
C ouncil on Housing (CCH) in  New York C ity ,  th e  C h es te r  Committee fo r  
Freedom Now (CCFN) in  C h e s te ryP e n n sy lv a n ia , and Harlem Youth O p p o r tu n it ie s  
U n lim ited  (HARYOU) in  New York C ity .
In  a d d i t io n ,  once th e  movement began to  g a th e r  momentum, more g e n e ra l 
k in d s  o f p re s s u re  g roups a s s i s t e d  i t  in  p re s e n t in g  a p a r t  o f i t s  c a s e ,  f o r  
exam ple, th e  American Bar A s s o c ia t io n ,  th e  N a tio n a l E du ca tio n  A s s o c ia t io n , 
and Bnai B r i th .  The movement i t s e l f  threw  up g e n e ra l k in d s  o f  p re s s u re  
groups o f d i s s e n t  as w e l l ,  such as S tu d e n ts  f o r  a D em ocratic S o c ie ty  (SDS), 
which in c lu d e d  demands f o r  c i v i l  r i g h t s  and f o r  new p o l i c i e s  on Cuba,
Vietnam and China among i t s  o th e r  demands f o r  changing  American s o c ie ty .
The movement r e in v ig o r a te d  th e  a r t  o f  d i s s e n t ,  te m p o ra r ily  s i le n c e d
d u rin g  "M cCarthyism ". As one w r i t e r  s a id ,  th e  Negro was w inning back th e
A3freedom  a p p a re n tly  l o s t  by th e  Communists. The movement became th e  c e n tre  
o f r a d ic a l  a c t i v i t y  of a l l  k in d s . N egroes d ram a tized  th e  is s u e s  of p o v e r ty ,  
o f au tom ation  and o f y o u th . They g o t th e  churches moving and r i d  th e  
u n iv e r s i t i e s  o f  much o f  t h e i r  se lf - im p o se d  s i l e n c e .
[The Negro has] u n c o n sc io u s ly  become a r e v o lu t io n a r y ,  
and a c a t a l y t i c  a g e n t . . . .  When he to u ch es a r e n t
43 H arry K alven , J r .  ]The Negro and th e  F ir s t  Amendment (Columbus: Ohio 
S ta te  U n iv e rs ity  P r e s s ,  19 6 5 ), p . 6 .
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s t r i k e ,  w hat happens i s  n o t  m ere ly  th a t  
a  few N egroes g e t t h e i r  r e n t  reduced  and 
a few r a t s  and ro ach es  a re  c le a n e d  up , 
and h o t w a te r  i s  g iv e n , b u t we a re  f in d in g  
th a t  more i s  now o c c u rr in g  around th e  r e n t  
s t r i k e :  law , which say s  t h a t  human r ig h t s  
m ust n o t any lo n g e r  be s u b je c te d  to  p ro p e r ty  
r i g h t s .  H ere th e  Negro i s  th e  c a t a l y s t .
Quoted in  W arren, op. c i t . ,  p . 238. See a l s o  rem arks o f  Bayard 
R u s tin  in  "The Negro Movement: Where S h a ll  I t  Go Now?" D issen tj 
XI (Summer, 1964 ), 285.
CHAPTER VII
THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT MOVEMENT (1) : INTRODUCTION
As in  th e  case  o f  th e  c i v i l  r i g h t s  movement,'*' th e  n u c le a r  disarm am ent
movement a ro se  in  a  co u n try  w hich had a  v a lu e  system  o f  d em o cra tic
c a p i ta l i s m  o f w hich th e  fo llo w in g  w ere com ponents: u n iv e r s a l  s u f f r a g e ;
m a jo r i ty  r u l e ;  e l e c t i o n s ;  governm ental r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  to  th e  e l e c t o r a t e ;
and p r iv a t e  ow nership  o f  m ost o f th e  means o f  p ro d u c tio n , d i s t r i b u t i o n
and exchange. As w ith  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s ,  G rea t B r i t a in  had fo rm al and
In fo rm a l r u le s  w hich d e te rm in ed  how th e  system  was to  be run and w hich
a llo w ed  fo r  th e  fu n c tio n in g  o f p o l i t i c a l  movements. H ere , to o ,  th e re
w ere i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  s t r u c t u r e s  th rough  w hich demands f o r  a l t e r i n g ,
m o d ify in g , o r  changing  fo rm al o r  in fo rm a l r u le s  w ere made, as  w e ll  as
2
ch an n e ls  f o r  in f lu e n c in g  th e  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  r u le s  and r e g u la t io n s .
There w ere i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  ch an n e ls  o f a g i t a t i o n  th rough  w hich groups 
c o u ld  make known t h e i r  demands, p a ss  a lo n g  t h e i r  in fo rm a tio n , and e x p re ss  
t h e i r  g r ie v a n c e s ;  in  a d d i t io n ,  th e re  w ere i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  ch an n e ls  o f  
com m unication, such  a s  th e  p r e s s ,  th rough  w hich th e se  demands co u ld  be 
made known.
See C h ap te r I I .
2
On B r i t i s h  p re s s u re  g ro u p s , s e e  Samuel H. B ee r, " P re s s u re  Groups 
and P a r t i e s  in  B r i t a i n " ,  American P o l i t ic a l  Science Review,  L 
(M arch, 1 9 5 6 ), 1 -2 3 ; H arry  E c k s te in ,  Pressure Group P o l i t ic s :
The Case o f  the B r i t is h  Medical A ssocia tion  (London: George A llen  
& Unwin, I9 6 0 ) ;  S .E . F in e r ,  Anonymous Empire: A Study o f  the Lobby 
^n Great B r ita in  (London: P a l l  M all P r e s s ,  19 5 8 ); A lle n  P o t te r  
Organized Groups in  B r i t is h  National P o li t ic s  (London: F aber a id  
F a b e r , 1 961 ); J .D . S te w a r t ,  B r it is h  Pressure Groups: Their Role in  
R ela tion  to the House o f  Commons (O xfo rd : C larendon P r e s s ,  1958).
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The nuclear disarmament movement chose to use propaganda methods 
which were similar, in part, to those usel by pressure groups within 
the society - speeches, letter writing to the press and to parliamen­
tarians, and mass lobbying. But with the inception of its demonstration
pilgrimage from London to Aldermaston, undertaken to show the urgency of
*its cause, the movement brought an unconventional method to the British 
political scene, both in quality and in quantity.
Over Easter weekend 1958, four thousand people started the first 
march from London to the British government's atomic research establish­
ment at Aldermaston in protest against nuclear instruments of war. The 
nuclear disarmament campaign in Great Britain, of which this march became 
an integral part, did not spring into being suddenly. It was a long 
fermenting expression of the emotions and feelings which were released 
when the first atomic bomb explosions went off during Che Second World 
War. While these expressions were not articulated into mass action until 
1958, more than a decade of thought and abortive action had been preparing 
the groundwork. Behind that decade lay the cultural context of British 
politics, the values and activities of earlier peace movements, and a 
British tradition of dissension and reform. All of these left their 
imprint on the nuclear disarmament movement; from them, the movement 
borrowed some of its members, part of its programme, and many of its 
tensions. The movement took on its own peculiar colorations, but some 
of the dye was there already.
It should be noted that pers°ns active in peace movements frequently 
were active in labour and reform movements as well. None of these three
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movements in  G rea t B r i t a i n ,  in  t h e i r  lo n g  c a r e e r s ,  had become m oribund, 
e x t i n c t ,  o r  o b s o le te .  More q u ie s c e n t a t  some tim es th an  a t  o th e r s ,  they  
w ere alw ays on hand , even i f  in  th e  background , w ith  g e n e ra l programmes o u t 
o f  w hich s p e c i f i c  phases  o f th e  movements cou ld  draw t h e i r  s u s te n a n c e .
The c h ie f  f a c t o r  in  w orld  p o l i t i c s  a f t e r  th e  Second W orld War was
th e  atom ic  bomb. The U nited  S ta te s  and th e  S o v ie t U nion, whose r i v a l r y
began d u rin g  th e  War, p o s se s s e d , o r ,  in  th e  ca se  o f  th e  S o v ie t U nion, was
on th e  way to  p o s s e s s in g  th e  bomb. G rea t B r i t a in  had emerged from  th e  war
w ith  a p o s i t io n  o f econom ic and m i l i t a r y  power d im in ish ed  v is - ä ~ v is  th e
U n ited  S ta te s  and th e  S o v ie t U nion:
W ith empty cu rren cy  r e s e r v e s ,  an em pire demanding 
se lf-g o v e rn m e n t and th e  w orld  c o n te s te d  betw een 
two powers whose home t e r r i t o r y  was c o n t in e n ta l  
in  s c a le  and whose p o p u la tio n s  w ere numbered in  
h u n d red s , in s te a d  o f  te n s  o f  m i l l i o n s ,  i t  was 
obv ious t h a t  B r i t a i n ’ s a c t i v i t i e s  in  th e  w orld  
would in  fu tu r e  be d w a r f e d . . . .  3
The c o u n try  accep ted  w ith  r e s ig n a t io n  th e  d e c l in e  o f  B r i t i s h  pow er. I t
fo llo w e d , th e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  G reat B r i t a in  was le d  in to  deep invo lvem en t
w ith  th e  U n ited  S t a t e s ,  in  th e  form  o f b o th  c r e d i t  commitments and o f a
ju n io r  p a r tn e r s h ip  in  n u c le a r  w eapons. Her economy made in s o lv e n t  by th e
War, G rea t B r i t a in  had a d e b t o f £3 ,000  m i l l io n  on o v e rse a s  b a la n c e s .
I n i t i a l l y ,  th e  co u n try  had no bomb o f i t s  own; b u t  b ecau se  b o th  Labour
and C o n se rv a tiv e  governm ents re g a rd e d  th e  bomb as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a t u s
symbol and a weapon o f  s e l f - d e f e n c e ,  th e  c o u n try  u n d erto o k  to  m anufac tu re
i t s  own n u c le a r  bombs -  th e  a to m ic  bomb in  1952 and th e  hydrogen bomb in
1957.
3 Anthony H a r t le y ,  A S ta te  o f  England (London: H u tch in so n , 1963 ), 
p p . 58 -59 .
<I t  has been su g g es ted  th a t  bo th  Labour and C o n se rv a tiv e  governm ents
w ere r e lu c ta n t  to  a c c e p t th e  t o t a l  suprem acy o f th e  U n ited  S ta te s  to  th e
p o in t  where th e  l a t t e r  cou ld  d ec id e  th e  u l t im a te  is s u e s  o f peace  o r  w ar.
T his re lu c ta n c e  a cc o u n ted , in  p a r t ,  f o r  governm ent d e c is io n s  to  u n d e rta k e
4s e p a r a te  n u c le a r  arms programm es. However, th e  armaments ra c e  in  m is s i le s  
and d e l iv e ry  system s proved  too ex p en siv e  f o r  th e  co u n try  to  e n te r  indepen­
d e n t ly ;  once th e  d e c is io n  to  have m is s i l e  weapons v/as made, G reat B r i t a in  
was fo rc e d  to  t i e  h e r s e l f  to  th e  American n u c le a r  apron  and to  th e  N orth 
A t la n t ic  T rea ty  O rg a n iz a tio n  (NATO) a l l i a r c e .
W ith th e  e x p lo s io n  o f atom ic bombs 6n H iroshim a and N agasak i, problem s 
o f war and peace were d eb a ted  in  new te rm s . War as an in s tru m e n t o f 
n a t io n a l  p o lic y  was c o n d itio n e d  by th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f th e  d e s t r u c t io n  o f  
a l l  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  p a r t i e s :  " In  th e  n u c le a r  age w ar was l i k e ly  to  be s e l f ­
d e s t r u c t iv e ;  and th e re  was* th e r e f o r e ,  an em ergent o r  secondary  dilemm a: 
s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n ,  on th e  one h an d , o r  p iecem eal lo s s  o f v i t a l  i n t e r e s t s  on 
th e  other."**
By th e  1950*s ,  th e rm o n u c lea r w eapons, which tu rn e d  th e  e a r l i e r  a tom ic 
weapons in to  c h i l d 's  p ie c e s ,  fo rc e d  a r e a p p r a i s a l  o f  p re v io u s  p o s i t io n s  on 
th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  n u c le a r  s t r u g g le .  The weapons w ere new n o t on ly  w ith  
r e s p e c t  to  th e  d eg ree  o f t h e i r  e x p lo s iv e  power b u t  a ls o  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  
t h e i r  k in d  o f  d e s t r u c t io n .  The newveapons u n le ash e d  energy  and gave r i s e  
to  r a d io a c t i v i ty  which cou ld  be n e i th e r  te m p o ra lly  n o r  s p a t i a l l y  l im i te d .
A 0 9 0 -F .S . N o rthedge , B ritish  Foreign Policy: The Process o f  Readjustment, 
1945-1961 (London: George A llen  & Unwin, 1 9 6 2 ), p . 171.
** John W. B u rto n , Peace Theory: Preconditions o f  Disarmament (New York: 
A lfred  A. K nopf, 1962 ), pp . 29 -30 .
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A bomb exploded a t one geographic p o in t could  produce r a d io a c tiv e  
“fa l l -o u t"  in  o th er  geographic p o in ts .  Such " fa ll-o u t"  could  a lso  
induce h ered ita ry  changes a t la t e r  tim es in  p la n ts  and an im als.
The bombs transform ed the nature o f  war and w ith  i t  the nature o f  
s u r v iv a l.  Concepts o f  the o r g a n isa tio n  o f  the c i v i l i a n  p op u lation  a g a in st  
n u clea r  a tta c k , as w e ll  as p lans fo r  evacu ation  and s h e lte r in g  o f n a t io n a ls ,  
had to  be rethought a g a in st the background o f  weapons o f  t o t a l  d e s tr u c tio n  
and v u ln e r a b il ity  to  s t r a t e g ic  a ir  a tta c k s . M ilita ry  s t r a t e g i s t s  had to  
fa c e  such problems as th e  e f f e c t s  o f b la s t  and " fa l l-o u t" ,  decontam ination  
tim es , s to ra g e  o f  a g r ic u ltu r a l produce, adjustm ent o f crop p a tte r n s ,  
s to c k p il in g  o f  in d u s tr ia l  m a te r ia ls , and th e l i k e .  I t  was becoming 
apparent th a t th ere  were few adequate means o f  p r o te c t io n  a g a in st n u clear  
weapons. W riting in  1957, the C onservative M in ister o f  Defence sa id :
I t  must be f r a n k ly  re c o g n ise d  th a t  th e re  i s
at p resen t no means o f  prov id in g  adequate 
p r o te c t io n  f o r  th e  p eo p le  o f t h i s  co u n try  
a g a in st  th e  consequences o f  an a tta ck  w ith  
n u c le a r  w eapons. Though, in  th e  e v en t o f  w ar, 
th e  f ig h te r  a ir c r a f t  o f  th e  Royal A ir Force 
would u n q u e s tio n a b ly  b e  a b le  to  ta k e  a  heavy 
t o l l  o f enemy bombers, a p roportion  would 
in e v i ta b ly  g e t th ro u g h . Even i f  i t  w ere on ly  
a dozen, they could  w ith  megaton bombs i n f l i c t  
w idesp read  d e v a s ta t io n .  6
I f  th ere  were few d isagreem ents in  Great B r ita in  and o th er co u n tr ies  
about th e p o te n t ia l  d e s tr u c tiv e n e ss  o f  the new weapons, th ere  were sharp 
oisagreem ents over the b e s t  methods o f  r e ta in in g , r e s tr a in in g , or  banning  
th ese  weapons. Those who a r t ic u la te d  th e ir  view s on th ese  weapons c lash ed
6 “D efence: O u tlin e o f  Future P o lic y " , Command Paper 124 (A p r il, 1 9 5 7 ), 
pp. 2 -3 .
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over whether the bombs were a moral Issue or a problem of power politics, 
or both. Not only were there disagreements over solutions to the control 
of the weapons but also over the moral and political terms in which the 
debate was to be conducted.
For their part, international disarmament negotiations had proved 
unable to resolve the problem, although they were able to provide forums 
for the conflicting points of view. By the middle of the 1950's world 
developments had changed the substance and spirit of the disarmament 
discussions and negotiations that were being carried out under the auspices 
of the United Nations.^ De—Stalinization in the Soviet Union, accompanied 
by the thaw in relations between western and eastern bloc countries, 
affected the attitude of both the Soviet Union and the West and made 
shifts in policy to accommodate the technological changes more acceptable.
The ideas of liuclear stalemate" and a "balance of terror" were gaining 
ground, as was the evaluation that the country which struck first would 
itself be annihilated by a second, retaliatory strike. But there was 
still the fear of war by accident, of technical errors, of the escalation 
of small scale conflicts, and of increases in the number of nuclear powers 
(the "n'th power" problem). The possibility of nuclear disarmament seemed 
more likely in the mid-1950*s than it had earlier; for although the United 
Nations negotiations seemed to h ^ e  led to an Impasse, there were some 
basic points of agreement between the British, the Americans and the Russiat 
which had not existed previously.
For a history of these negotiations, see Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, 
Postwar Negotiations for Arfns Control (Washington: The Brookings 
Institute, 1961).
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By tn e  m id -^ S O ’ s ,  a f t e r  G reat B r i t a in  had exp loded  h e r  own atom ic  
:>omb and announced p la n s  f o r  m a n u fa c tu rin g  and t e s t i n g  th e  hydrogen bomb, 
th e re  w ere c u r r e n ts  o f  o p in io n  in  th e  co u n try  opposed to  th e  governm ent’ s 
p a l ic y  on th e  p o s se s s io n  o f  n u c le a r  w eapons. I t  was th e  f e a r  o f  th e  
d e s t r u c t iv e  p o t e n t i a l  o f n u c le a r  weapons and th e  a p p a re n t in e f f e c t iv e n e s s  
o f  c i v i l  d e fen c e  m easures t h a t  h e lp ed  to  i n i t i a t e  th e  n u c le a r  disarm am ent 
movement. The governm ent’s  D efence W hite P aper o f  1957, which in c lu d e d  
a d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  co n cep t o f m assive r e t a l i a t i o n  w ith  n u c le a r  w eapons, 
s e t  o f f  argum ents on th e  p r ic e  o f  v ic to r y  sh o u ld  th e se  weapons be u sed . 
E s ta b lish m e n t f ig u r e s  such  as S i r  S tepnen  K in g -h a l l ,  a  fo rm er Member o f  
P a r lia m e n t, a u th o r  o f  v a r io u s  n a v a l and m i l i t a r y  w o rk s, and fo u n d er o f  
th e  H ansard S o c ie ty ,  p o in te d  o u t th e  n o v e lty  o f  th e  new w eapons: "The 
f i r s t  - t h a t  t h e i r  d e s t r u c t iv e  c a p a c ity  i s  so enormous t h a t  th e r e  i s  
no p r a c t i c a l  p h y s ic a l  means o f  d e fen ce  a g a in s t  th e se  w eap o n s.. . .  The 
s e c o n d . . .  i s  th a t  each  tim e one o f  them i s  t e s t e d  th e re  i s  an a d d i t io n
g
to  th e  p o l lu t io n  o f  th e  e a r t h ’ s s u r fa c e  and a tm o sp h e re .” At th e  same 
tim e , some o f th e  w o rld ’ s le a d in g  s c i e n t i s t s  w ere p o in t in g  o u t th e  
d e v a s ta t io n  th a t  would r e s u l t  from use o f  th e  bombs, th e  g e n e t ic  e f f e c t s  
o f r a d i a t i o n ,  th e  in c re a s e  o f  h a rm fu l p a r t i c l e s  in  th e  e a r t h ’ s a tm o sp h ere ,
and th e  dangers  to  c h i ld r e n  in  th e  in c re a s e  o f  s tro n tiu m -9 0  in  th e  w o rld ’ s
9 10m ilk  su p p ly . S c i e n t i f i c  l i t e r a t u r e  on th e  e f f e c t s  o f r a d ia t io n  w ere
g
Stephen  K in g -H a ll, " R e f le c t io n s  on D efen ce" , in  David B o u lto n , e d . , 
Voices from the Crowd: Against the E-Bomb (London: P e te r  Owen, 1 9 6 4 ), p . 
29 .
9
The Times (London) [ h e r e a f t e r  I T ] ,  J u ly  27 , 1957, p . 4 ;  Aug. 8 , 1957, 
p . 4 . See a ls o  P h i l ip  N oel-B aker, The Axtms Race: A Programms fo r  
World Disarmament (London: S tevens and S ons, 1 9 5 8 ), pp . 250-63 .
10 S ee , e . g . , A. Haddow, e d . ,  B io log ica l Hazards o f  Atomic Energy: Being 
the Papers Read a t  the Conference Convened by the I n s t i tu te  o f  Biology
_______________  /std ;
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being rewritten for popular journals and daily, mass circulation 
newspapers.
^ertrand Russell aad pressed for an international conference of 
scientists to discuss the problems of disarmament and his proposals were 
realized in the series of Pugwasli conferences which were initiated in 
1957.*^ Some prominent church leaders were adding to the arguments of
12the scientists their charges of the immorality of the new weapons.
At the same time, publishing houses were bringing out important works 
which were discussing the consequences and destructive potential of 
nuclear weapons.^
Within Great Britain, proposals for disarmament ran the full gamut: 
unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons; unilateral renunciation of 
nuclear weapons tests; partial measures of arms control; reduction of 
conventional armaments and armed forces; reduction or removal of missiles 
and rockets; abolition of military bases in foreign territory; cessation
of the manufacture offissionable materials; cessation of the stockpiling
10 [Ctd.]
and the Atomic Scientists9 Association, October, i960 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1952); Alexander Hollaender, ed., Radiation Biology, 3 vols.
(Mew York: McGraw-Hill, 1954-56); Douglas Edward Lea, Actions of Radiatiom 
on Living CMlls,2nd ed., (Cambridge: University Press, 1956); James J. 
Nickson, ed., Symposium on Radiobiology: The Basic Aspect of Radiation 
Effects on Living Systems, Oberlin College, June 14-18, 1960 (New York:
John Wiley 6 Sons, 1952).
11 „Bertrand Russell, nThe Early History of the Pugwash Movement” in Seymour 
Melman ed., Disarmament: Its Politics and Economics (Boston: American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1962), pp. 18-31; see also J. Rotblat, 
Science and World Affairs: History of the Pugwash Conferences (London: 
Dawson of Pall Mall, 1962).
LT, Apr. 3, 1957, p. 6; May 28, 1957, p. 5; Aug. 6, 1957, p.4.
13 Gilbert McAllister, ed. The Bomb: Challenge and Answer (London: B.T.Batsfoi 
1955); P.M.S. Blackett, Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1956); T.E.M. KcKitterick and Kenneth Younger, eds.
. Fabian International Essay3 (London: Hogarth Press, 1957);George F. Kennen, 
Russia, the Atom, and the West: The BBC Reith Lectures, 1967 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1958).
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of nuclear weapons; chemical (poison gas, incendiary weapons, biological)
disarmament; prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to countries
which did not have them already, or restricting such weapons solely to
the United States and the Soviet Union, However, the majority opinion
of those favouring some form of nuclear disarmament seemed to be similar
to that of Russell's - British unilateral renunciation with respect to
14both nuclear weapons and tests.
In the early 1950's, two independent approaches to the objective
of nuclear disarmament began to move towards each other. Pacifist groups
began to turn their study of the idea of non-violent resistance into
concrete direct action, attracting some non-pacifist elements as they did;
at the same time, there was growing willingness among some discontented
sections of the Labour Party to speak out more forcefully against the
government's defence policy. The Aldermaston March in 1958 linked six
years of direct action with this labour discontent.
In 1952, eleven members of the Peace Pledge Union (PPU) staged a
15sit-down outside the War Office in protest against nuclear weapons.
The Union had been founded by Canon Dick Sheppard in 1934 to collect 
pledges of opposition to fighting should war break out. By the middle 
of 1936, one hundred thousand members had bound themselves to the Pledge: 
"I renounce War and never again will I support or sanction another, and 
I will do all in my power to persuade others to do the same."^ When
See Bertrand Russell, Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1959).
Hugh Brock, "The Century of Total War", PN, May 5, 1961, p. 6.
Peace Pledge Union, Pacificism (London: Goodwin Press, 1958), p. 14.
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war c a n e , th e  PPU co n fin e d  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  to  p u b li s h in g  l i t e r a t u r e  and 
a p p e a lin g  f o r  c o n s c ie n tio u s  o b je c to r s .  In  th e  p o s t-w a r  p e r io d ,  i t  sou g h t 
to  become more a c t iv e  th a n  i t  had been in  th e  p a s t ,  w h ile  s t i l l  rem ain ing  
p a c i f i s t .
In  1949, th e  PPU formed a  N on-V iolen t Commission to  e x p lo re  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  u s iu g  n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n  te c h n iq u e s  to  advance 
i t s  p a c i f i s t  p o s i t i o n .  The d em o n s tra tio n  o u ts id e  th e  War O f f ic e  in  
W h ite h a ll in  1952 was p a r t  o f  th e  U nion’s ’’O p e ra tio n  G andhi” ,  a  p a c i f i s t  
a p p e a l f o r  " n o n -v io le n t  r e s i s ta n c e  as  th e  r i g h t  and h o n o u rab le  c o u rse  f o r  
th e  d e fe n c e  o f  o u r  c o u n t r y I n  a d d i t io n  to  th e  s it-d o w n  fo r  which 
th e  a c t i v i s t s  w ere a r r e s t e d  and f in e d ,  "O p e ra tio n  G andhi", whose name was 
su b se q u e n tly  changed to  th e  io n -V io le n t  R e s is ta n c e  G roup, engaged in  
p e a c e fu l  p ic k e t in g  o u ts id e  th e  Aide m a s to n  a i r  b a s e ,  conducted  a  p o s te r  
p a rad e  and a b r i e f  s it-d o w n  o u ts id e  H ild e n h a ll  a i r  b a s e ,  and h e ld  a 
s im i l a r  d e m o n s tra tio n  a t  th e  germ w a rfa re  s t a t i o n  a t  b a r to n .  The o b je c ­
t i v e s  w ere : th e  c e s s a t io n  o f  G rea t B r i t a i n ’ s m an u fac tu re  o f  n u c le a r  w eapons;
th e  c o u n t ry 's  w ith d raw a l from  &ATO; th e  c o u n t ry 's  a labandm ent o f  i t s  armed
18f o r c e s ;  and th e  w ith d raw al o f  Am erican fo rc e s  from  B r i t i s h  s o i l .
In  1954, some c h u rc h , peace and la b o u r  o r g a n iz a t io n s ,  jo in e d  by s i x
Labour Members o f  P a r l ia m e n t ,  formed th e  hydrogen Bomb Campaign, which
p e t i t i o n e d  f o r  th e  convening  o f  a  disarm am ent c o n fe re n c e  and th e  s t r e n g th -
19e n in g  o f  th e  U n ited  N a tio n s ; b u t th e  Campaign f a i l e d  to  sp a rk  o f f  any 
mass r e a c t io n s .
P re ss  r e l e a s e  o f  th e  PPU, quo ted  in  b ro c k , op. o i t . s May 5 , 1961, p . 6 .
Peace P ledge  U nion, op. d t . 9 pp . 3 -b .
C h r is to p h e r  D r iv e r ,  The Disarmera: A Study in  P ro te s t  (London: Hodder 
and S to u g h to n , 1 9 6 4 ), p .  26 ; s e e  a ls o  r e p o r t  o f  a  r a l l y  o f  f iv e  thousand  
in  T r a f a lg a r  S q u a re , in  Tribunej S e p t. 27 , 1957 , p .  7 .
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In 1957, the National Committee for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons
Tests was formed, again by church, peace and labour groups. It had an
impressive list of sponsors and the support of allied groups working for
disarmament; but although it conducted several well-organized and well-
20attended demonstrations, it failed to muster sufficient numbers for a 
sustained campaign.
In April 1957, once more under the sponsorship of church, labour and
peace groups, the Direct Action Committee Against Nuclear War (DACANW) was
set up. It supported and raised money for the Steeles, a Quaker couple who
attempted to sail into the Pacific area of Christmas Island, which had
been closed for the British tests of the hydrogen bomb. In addition, it
planned cooperation with Japanese and American organizations doing similar
21peace work and provided a base for further direct action when necessary. 
DACANW was in favour of appeals to politicians, marches, and public meetings; 
but it did not rule out more dramatic kinds of direct action tactics. It 
was the parent of the Aldermaston March idea, as well as the practitioner 
of sit-downs outside air force bases.
By 1958, events within the Labour Party consolidated opinion favourable 
tc protest action on the question of nuclear disarmament. While in office 
during the period 1945-51, Labour, by and large, had followed the policy 
which had been set by its predecessors. Its economic dependence on the 
United States rationalized its strategic commitments. The left wing of 
the Party had tried to offer an alternative foreign policy favouring a
20 See, e.g., LT9 May 13, 1957, p. 6.
21 PN, Apr. 12, 1957, p. 1
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"Third  F orce", which e n ta i le d  id e o lo g ic a l and in te rn a t io n a l  independence
22o f the  two power b lo c s ;  b u t the P arliam en tary  Labour P a r ty , in s is te d
t h a t ,  in  th e  words o f  Clement A t t le e ,  Labour had to  face  **the grim fa c ts  o f 
23the s i tu a t io n « "
From th e  beg in n in g , th e re  was o p p o s itio n  w ith in  th e  Labour P arty  to
th e  le a d e r s h ip 's  p o l ic ie s  on both  dom estic and fo re ig n  is s u e s .  The oppo-
s i t i o n ,  most ev id en t in  th e  co n stitu en cy  p a r t ie s  and in  th e  tra d e  u n ions,
cen tred  around th e  s iz e  o f th e  B r i t i s h  rearmament programme and the
rearm ing o f West Germany« Labour p o lic y  on armaments was never made
p re c ise  and l e f t  I t s e l f  open to  d i f f e r e n t  in t r a - p a r ty  in te rp re ta t io n s «
But both Labour and C onservative governments had committed th e  country
to  peacetim e c o n sc r ip tio n , to  im proving conven tional fo rc e s ,  and to  becoming
and rem aining a n u c lea r power. One w r ite r  p o in ts  o u t:
The d iv e rg en c ie s  o f view w ith in  the  Labour 
movement on the  problem s o f defense and re ­
armament were a m a tte r o f degree ra th e r  than  
o f k in d . W hile acc e p tin g  th e  n e c e s s ity  fo r  
d e fen se , th e re  were th o se  who f e l t  th a t  too 
la rg e  an armament program m ight d estro y  th e  
economic and s o c ia l  achievem ents and aims of 
a s o c i a l i s t  government, rev ive  th e  m ili ta r ism  
of th e  d e fea ted  F a s c is t  s t a t e s ,  and p e rp e tu a te  
an arms race  between E ast and W est, thus ren­
d e rin g  in e v i ta b le  a world-wide c o n f la g ra tio n .
These f e a r s ,  expressed  a t  th e  annual conferences 
o f both  th e  Trades Union Congress and the Labour 
p a r ty ,  were evidence o f th e  h e s i ta t io n s  and th e  
q u a l i f ic a t io n s  w ith  which th e  governm ent's re ­
armament program was endorsed . 24
22Leon D. E p s te in , Britain  -  Uneasy Ally  (Chicago: U n iv e rs ity  o f  Chicago 
P re s s , 1954), pp. 113-27.
23 Quoted in  E la ine  W indrich, B ritish  Labour98 Foreign Policy (S tan fo rd : 
S tan fo rd  U n iv e rs ity  P re s s , 1952), p . 233.
24 Ib id . ,  p . 231
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Once the  Labour P a rty  had been d e fea ted  a t  th e  p o l l s , o p p o s itio n  to
o f f i c i a l  government p o lic y  as p re sen ted  by th e  C onservatives oecame more
pronounced. In  1955, when th e  C onservative government announced i t s
in te n t io n  to  m anufacture hydrogen bombs, th e  Labour P a rty  went on reco rd
in  support o f th e  d e c is io n , as w e ll as in  support o f th e  need fo r  the
t e s t in g  o f n u c lea r weapons, bu t remained c r i t i c a l  o f d e f ic ie n c ie s  in  th e
co n v en tio n al armed s e rv ic e s ,  however, s ix ty -tw o  Labour members, invoking
25th e  conscience c la u s e , ab s ta in e d  from v o tin g .
In  1957, th e  Labour P a r ty , w ith o u t o f f i c i a l l y  and p re c is e ly  renouncing
a l l  n u c lea r t e s t s ,  p ressed  th e  government to  suspend scheduled  hydrogen
bomb t e s t s  a t  C hristm as I s la n d ;  in  a d d i t io n , i t  condemned the  government
f o r  l in k in g  th e  a b o l i t io n  o f t e s t s  to  th e  concluding  o f a g en era l d isan a a -
26mens agreement a t  th e  U nited N ations disarmament n e g o tia t io n s . But only  
f i f t y  Labour members supported  a  motion ta b le d  in  th e  House which suggested  
th a t  the  dangers a r i s in g  from n u c le a r  weapons t e s t s  had been d e l ib e ra te ly  
minim ised by the  B r i t i s h ,  R ussian and American governments and which urged 
the  B r i t i s h  government “ to  la y  p ro p o sa ls  b e fo re  the  Disarmament Commission 
fo r  an immediate ban on th e  t e s t in g  o f  any f u r th e r  n u c le a r  d e v ic e s .^
When the  government, f o r  budgetary and manpower re a so n s , decided  to  s h i f t  
i t s  defence s tra te g y  to  prim ary re l ia n c e  on n u c lea r weapons, th e  Labour 
P arty  o f fe re d  no c r i t i c i s m  excep t to  ask  fo r  th e  postponement o f t e s t s  fo r
25 See debate  a t  Parliam entary Debated (Comnone) [h e re a f te r  PD(C) ] ,
537 J 2066-2199 (Mar. 2 , 1955).
26 LT, ,  Apr. 1 , 1957, p . 10. The L ib e ra l P a rty  req u ested  th e  government 
to  s top  t e s t s  u n t i l  mors In fo rm ation  was made a v a ila b le  about the  
harm ful e f f e c t s  o f  n u c le a r  e x p lo s io n s . I b id ,M Apr. 3 ,  1957, p . 10.
^  I b i d , t  Apr. 3 , 1957, p . 10.
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a limited period of time while the government pressed for an international
28agreement on the subject.
Proponents of some form of British disarmament had placed their hopes
in Aneurin Bevan's appointment as Labour Shadow Foreign Secretary in 1957.
Bevan, more concerned with socialist doctrine than was Hugh Gaitskell,
who had succeeded Attlee as Party leader, and committed to opposing German
rearmament, had gathered around him an impressive group of left-wing
members of the Party ("Bevanites"); but the latter were never in a powerful
or even a majority position within the Party as a whole. At the Party
Conference in 1957, Bevan had to reply for the Party Executive to a
composite resolution that asked that Mthe next Labour Government will
take the lead by itself refusing to continue to test, manufacture or use
nuclear weapons, and that it will appeal to people of other countries to 
29follow that lead." He disappointed many of his supporters with his 
attack on unilateralism, which, he said, was an “emotional spasm" which
30
would send a British Foreign Secretary "naked into the Conference Chamber."
Bevan argued that while he agreed with the sentiments expressed by the 
unilateralists, he could not be a party to destroying existing treaties 
into which the British government had entered. He still held out the prom­
ise, however, that other treaties could be written to reduce the tension
28 Ibid, s Apr. 4, 1957, p. 10. In its White Paper on Defence, the 
Conservative government announced reductions in the armed services, 
cuts in Great Britain's NATO force contribution,and plans to test 
and stockpile megaton weapons. See debate in PD(C)S56B : 38-170 
(Apr. 1, 1957) and questions at 230-34 (Apr. 2, 1957) and 394-96 
(Apr. 3, 1957).
29 LTS Oct. 4,1957, p. 4.
30 Ibid,
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and polarization that existed in the atomic age. Bevan, as Shadow 
Foreign Secretary, was forced to compromise; Bevan without that position  
had been able to argue against the p o lic ies which he was now forced to 
accept. In a mass party, i t  was easier to question Labour foreign policy 
the further one was situated from the seat of power. Conference, for i t s  
part, that year rejected a policy of unilateralism  by a vote of 5,836,000 
to 781,000.31
Resolutions on the bomb were being brought up at trade union meetings,
32Cooperative Party conferences, and Labour Party branch meetings and
33conferences. At the 89th Trade Union Congress (TUC), the General Council
was urged to organize and lead a strong demonstration of a l l  trade unionists
to serve notice on the government that in continuing to manufacture and test
nuclear weapons i t  was acting against the people's wishes. In submitting
the motion, i t  was argued: "We could have the greatest demonstration since
„34the days of Chartism. Although the motion was not approved, the TUC 
called for an immediate halt in the manufacture and testing  of nuclear
Loo, d t .
Founded in 1917, i t  was allow ed to  a f f i l i a t e  w ith  co n stitu en cy  Labour 
parties and, with the Trade Union Congress, is  joined in the National 
Council o f Labour. I t  ran  can d id a tes  a t  p a rliam en tary  e le c t io n s  w ith 
the Labour Party. For further discussion, see R.T. McKenzie, B ritish  
P o litic a l P arties: The D istribution  o f  Power w ith in  the Conservative 
and Labour Parties (London: William Heinemann, 1955), pp. 320, 530, 555.
Ralph M iliband, Parliamentary Socialism: A Study in the P o litic s  o f  
Labour (London: George A llen  & Unwin, 1961), pp. 340-44. See also LT9 
Apr. 23, 1957, p. 4; May 31, 1957, p. 6; June 13, 1957, p. 7; July 12, 
1957, p . 4; S ept. 7, 1957, p. 3.
LTt Sept. 7, 1957, p. 3.
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weapons, leaving direct action tactics to be initiated by others.
Differences within the Labour Party on the questions of nuclear 
weapons had several consequences. They allowed opinion in the labour 
movement to become agitated not only over the subject of disarmament 
but also over the varying Labour interpretations of the subject. Differ­
ences also kept open the question of whether agitation outside the Party 
could find comfort and support within the Party, and if so, where and 
from whom. There were many people within the labour movement who believed 
that more discussion of the bomb might affect Labour Party policy as well 
as alert the national conscience.
In addition to the agitation of labour and peace bodies, the energies 
which were eventually released for the nuclear disarmament movement were 
given a boost by three events which occurred almost simultaneously during 
1956 outside Great Britain. These were: (1) the British use of force at 
Suez; (2) de-Stalinization within the Soviet bloc; and (3) Soviet repres­
sion of the Hungarian uprising. The Suez crisis caused an outburst in 
sections of the labour movement against the whole post-war society of 
which nuclear weapons and the use of force had come to be regarded as 
meaningful symbols. The Labour Party itself expressed its opposition to 
the government's use of force. The National Council organized public 
protest meetings, but called "upon the British people to bring effective 
pressure to bear" on the government "through normal constitutional parlia­
mentary methods" and "to refrain from taking industrial action as a means
35of influencing national policy in the present crisis."
Quoting Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1957, in Miliband, 
op, oit. , p. 338.
35
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Suez was also the first time since the Second World War that youth, 
especially in the universities, was faced with a cause that was capable 
of stirring it from its complacency and indifference. In addition, as
VJorsley suggests:
For the young people who had accepted this 
picture [of a benevolent Britain], Suez was 
a devastating experience in disillusion. And 
the peculiar intensity of the reaction in this 
country arose from the conjunction of Old Left 
reacting to Old Imperialism, and the new young 
liberal generation reacting to the betrayal 
of all they had been taught of a reformed 
Britain, the dutiful servant of the United 
Nations and of the Free World. 36
A side effect of Suez, therefore, was to temporarily unite the Old Left, 
the New Left, and the rest of the Labour Party.
Events within the Soviet bloc, both the revelations of the Twentieth
Party Congress (and its relationship to de-Stalinization) and the Soviet
action in Hungary, brought resignations from some members of the British
Communist Party, some of whom were then added to the store of trained
37political activists on the left of the Labour Party.
All three international events, but Suez in particular, precipitated
a loss of faith for some (more so, perhaps, among intellectuals than among
38other strata in the society ) in the operations of political parties and
Peter Worsley, "Imperial Retreat", in E.P. Thompson, ed., Out of Apathy
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1960), pp. 114-15.
See, e.g., Neal Wood, Communism cold British Intellectuals (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 195-213.
See early Issues of Universities and Left Review, a representative 
journal of the student milieu*, and the New Reasoner, a representative 
journal of the reslgnees and expellees from the British Communist Party. 
For soul searchings on the left, see Norman. Mackenzie, ed., Conviction 
(London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1958); Thompson, op. d t $
For demonstrations at the time of Suez,see LT, Aug.15, 1956, p. 6;
Sent. 13. 1956 .TA in. n  i o * a  -  a _______________________ .
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a r e v u ls io n  a g a in s t  th e  b u r e a u c ra t iz a t io n  o f  p u b lic  l i f e .  The m a jo r ity
o f B r i t i s h  c i t i z e n s ,  o f  c o u rse , w ere unmoved by th e  ev en ts  and w ere p re ­
p a red  to  su p p o r t th e  f ia s c o  o f  Suez. But Dr. Donald S o p er, a  M ethod ist 
m in is te r  and Labour p u b l i c i s t ,  e x p re sse d  th e  se n tim e n ts  o f  a  v o ca l m in o rity  
when he c a l le d  on t r a d e  u n io n is t s  to  r e fu s e  to  h an d le  arms and advoca ted  
c i v i l  d iso b e d ie n c e  by a l l  B r i t i s h  c i t i z e n s .  "T hat i s  n o t an  easy  th in g  to  
s a y ,  b u t as I  th in k  o f  th e se  p eo p le  o f  H ungary, o f  Egypt and I s r a e l ,  and 
th e  p eo p le  o f  t h i s  c o u n try , I  am f i n a l l y  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t ,  u n t i l  one community
i s  p re p a re d  to  b ase  i t s  p o lic y  on n o n -v io le n t  a c t io n ,  no r e a l  p ro g re s s  can 
39be m a d e . . . . ” At th e  same tim e , th e  Cambridge U n iv e rs i ty  new spaper r e p o r te d  
t h a t  f i f t y  p e r  c e n t o f  th e  U n iv e r s i ty ’ s r e s e r v i s t s  would come o u t a g a in s t  
r e c a l l .  ^
Id e a s  become fo rc e s  when th e re  i s  a r e c e p t iv e  au d ien ce  p re p a re d  to  do
b a t t l e  in  t h e i r  honou r. The words o f  th e  a g i t a t o r  a re  ta k e n  up because
th e r e  i s  a peo p le  fo r  whom th e s e  words f i l l  a  n eed . By 1958 , th e  Campaign
f ^ r  N u clea r Disarmament (CND) f i l l e d  th e  need by o rg a n iz in g  in to  a c t io n
th o se  co n n ec ted  w ith  p e a c e , la b o u r  and refo rm  movements who w anted to
in f lu e n c e  and ed u c a te  th e  P a r l ia m e n t, th e  Labour P a r ty ,  and th e  e l e c to r a t e
on th e  consequences o f  n u c le a r  w a r fa re .  A g ita t io n  fo r  n u c le a r  disarm am ent
41came from  p e rso n s  t r a in e d  in  th e  p a c if is m  o f  Q uakerism , th e  o rg a n iz e d
Sermon quo ted  in  B rock , op. c i t , ,  May 1 2 , 1961, p . 6 .
I b id .
See e . g . , Rufus M. J o n e s ,  The L a ter  Periods o f  Quakerism,  2 v o ls .  
(London: M acm illan & C o ., 192 1 ); R obert 0 . B yrd , Quaker Ways in  
Foreign Policy  (T o ro n to : U n iv e rs i ty  o f  T oron to  P r e s s ,  I9 6 0 ) .
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passive resistance of the No-Conscription Fellowship, " tue conscientious
43 44objection of the No More War Movement, end the secular faith of the PPU.
I»y the end of the Second World War, the Quakers and the PPU were still veil­
es tab lisaed, organized bodies capable of undertaking and advising on protest 
action. There were, as well, activists in the labour movement and within
the Labour Party who were either P.^cifists or objected to the horrors of
45war, members who were either part of Labour's anti-war tradition or those
recentiy shocked by tne consequences of atomic warfare.
In laying the foundations for a new peace movement, one specifically
directed against nuclear weapons, aout people in Great Britain could draw
upon their own experiences in wartime or tueir activities xa the suffragette
movement. To these ranks could oe added persons woo had been caught up,
often in the thick of the struggle, in earlier Movements of dissent and
reform - against capital punishment, hunger, poverty and colonialism, and
46for better living conditions.
Sea, e.g., A.C.F. Beales, Tne History of Peace: A Short Account of tne 
Organized Movements for International Peace (London: G. dell k Sons, 
1931), pp. 282-89.
Ibid», p. 287.
Peace Pledge Union, op. ait.
For a discussion of the pacifist tradition in the Labour Party, see 
G.D.H. Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 1914 (London: Routledge 
& Regan Paul, 1948), pp. 318-35; see also Raymond Postgate, The Life of 
George Lanobury (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1951), pp. 306-36.
The roots of agitation are meticulously traced in Driver, op• eit», 
pp. 12-51. See also Brock, op. cit., Mar. 31, 1961, p. 3; Apr. 7,
1961, p. 9; Apr. 14, 1961, p. 8; Apr. 21, 1961, p. 7; Apr. 28, 1961, 
p. 7; May 5, 1961, p. 6; May 12, 1961, p. 6; May 19, 1961, p. 5.
See also Roger Fulford, Votes for dorten: The Story of a Struggle 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1957).
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Tne cam paign a g a in s t  th e  n u c le a r  arms ra c e  and th e  t h r e a t  o f
u n iv e r s a l  genocide was f a th e r e d  by th e  N a tio n a l Committee f o r  th e
A b o lit io n  o f  N u c lea r Weapons T e s t s ,  DACANW, p e rso n s  g a th e re d  around
th e  le f t - w in g  w eek ly , th e  New Statesm an, groups o f  p r o f e s s io n a l  cause
p ro m o te rs , and what C o ll in s  c a l le d  th e  ”prim a donnas o f th e  cam paigning 
47b u s in e s s .” But b eh in d  th e se  la y  th e  c u l t u r a l  c o n te x t o f  B r i t i s h  
p o l i t i c s  which h as  j u s t  been d is c u s s e d .
Quoted in  D r iv e r ,  op, a i t , ,  p . 42 .
CHAPTER VIII
THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT MOVEMENT (2); FROM ALDERMASTON, THROUGH 
SCARBOROUGH f TO BLACKPOOL
Introduction
Members of the nuclear disarmament movement in Great Britain, 
themselves convinced of the threat presented by nuclear weapons, wanted 
to convince the British public of the decisive consequences of nuclear 
warfare* Once the public was so convinced, it was thought possible to 
obtain renunciation by the government of nuclear weapons* Similarly, 
some members of the movement thought that once the Labour Party was 
convinced and returned to office, it would be possible to expect a 
policy of unilateralism: "We are determined to channel the existing
feeling in the country and create a climate of opinion which the poli­
tical parties would have to follow**.."^ The movement attempted to 
argue that protecting British interests by possessing nuclear bombs was 
both futile and immoral* Self-preservation, the avoidance of a Third
World War, and the protection of democratic institutions, it was argued, 
were worthy objectives which were endangered by the escalation of the 
arms race far more than they were assisted by the "balance of terror"*
The questions facing the nuclear disarmament movement were three­
fold* First, it had to be decided what precisely was meant by unilateral 
and unconditional rejection of nuclear weapons* Secondly, it had to be
1 Quoting Collins in George Clark, Second Wind: The Story of the Campaign 
and the Committee of 100 (London: Workshop Publication, 1963), p. 4.
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decided what tactics would best be able to advance the position of 
unilateralism. The movement, which in the initial phase was presided 
over by CND, relied primarily on tactics of legal persuasion; but, at 
the same time, different, but not conflicting tactics, were used by other 
groups and individuals within the movement. These latter tactics, which 
at a later point would cause a split within the movement, emphasized the 
civil disobedience aspect of non-violent direct action.
Thirdly, it had to be decided against whom the tactics adopted would 
be directed most profitably. Here a central problem was the role which the 
movement, and CND in particular, should follow with respect to the political 
(namely, Labour) parties. It had to be decided whether CND was a ginger 
group to try to convert the Labour Party, the possible alternative govern­
ment, to a position of unilateralism, or a pressure group to make demands 
for an alteration in official policy on whatever party happened to be in 
office at the time. In addition, questions arose of whether to by-pass 
the political parties, whether to raise the issue of nuclear disarmament 
outside the framework of the traditional parties, and whether to moderate 
aims and tactics for reasons of political expediency. Many within CND 
thought in terms of parliamentary manoeuvring; others within the movement 
thought in terms of mass non-cooperation. The initial phase of the nuclear 
disarmament movement, which I shall discuss in this chapter, was character­
ized by its attempts to answer these assorted questions.
One further point needs to be made here. The nuclear disarmament 
movement was labelled an "umbrella movement" by affectionate supporters, 
apologists and stem critics alike. It was held responsible for sheltering
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thousands of persons who had little otherwise in common than their views
on disarmament, however, in addition to the shared objective of wanting
to do something to alter the course of events which they thought likely
to eventuate with the retention of nuclear weapons, the movement's
composition revealed certain similar features.
While there have been no detailed studies of the composition of the
movement as a whole, newspaper reports, court cases, personal accounts, and
literature produced by groups within the movement allow the analyst to infer
certain shared characteristics of the activists: (1) that professionals,
students and housewives - persons whose circumstances of employment allowed
them the time to demonstrate without posing a threat to their (often
2independent) incomes - predominated; (2) that, at least on marches and
3other forms of symbolic action, young people, viz., those under twenty- 
five years, comprised the largest age group; and (3) that of those who 
were party political, the overwhelming majority were supporters of the 
Labour Party. A poll taken in January, 1960, before departure for the 
Harrington missile base(produced the results which follow; however, it 
should be noted that the poll was of the fifty more militant members of 
the group, that is, those who were prepared to be arrested, and may be 
less than representative.
Priestley emphasized that uncommitted or free intellectuals, such 
as authors, critics, university persons, and so on, had joined 
while other groups felt that their official status or political 
commitments precluded their appearing of public platform; see his 
letter to the Hew Statesman$ LV (May 24, 1958), 668.
3 See Appendix "A"
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1
Ages P o l i t i c a l  P arty
Over 50 4 
30-50 9 
20-30 28 
Under 20 9
None 24 
Labour 20 
Commonwealth 2 
A narch ist 1 
C onservative 1 
P a c i f i s t  1 
"A ll have f a i le d "  1
R elig ions O ccupation
Son© 20
A gnostic 3
A th e is t ic  1
Quaker 7
Church <f England 4
M ethodist 3
Roman C a th o lic  1
B a p tis t  1
Jew 1
C h ris tia n  6
F ree -th in k in g  d e i s t  1
S tudent 14 
C lerks 6 S ec 'y s  8 
Teachers 4 
Housewives 4 
Nurses 3 
Farmers 2 
W rite rs  2 
None 4 
O thers 9
Sex
Male 28
Female 18
In  th i s  c h a p te r , I  s h a l l  d iscu ss  th e  chronology o f even ts le ad in g  
from the  form ation  o f the CND in  1958, through th e  conversion  o f  the  Labour 
P a rty  to  a  u n i l a t e r a l i s t  p o s i t io n  a t  Scarborough in  1960, to  th e  P a r ty 's  
r e je c t io n  o f th a t  p o s it io n  a t  B lackpool in  1961. In  so do in g , 1 s h a l l  
analyze the  aims o f the movement, th e  t a c t i c s  o f  le g a l  p e rsu as io n  which 
c h a ra c te r iz e d  th is  phase o f the  movement, th e  re a c tio n  to  those  t a c t i c s ,  
and th e  s ta t e  o f  the  movement by 1961, I  .shall re se rv e  a  d isc u ss io n  o f  the  
t a c t i c s  o f the  Committee o f 100 u n t i l  C hapter IX, even though in  term s o f 
sequence i t  f a l l s  between even ts a t  Scarborough and Blackpool«
LI, Jan . 4 , 1960, p . 6.
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Tfc tap oral Phases
Formation of CHD,- The initiative for organizing against the declared 
nuclear policies of the two major political parties came from persons 
connected with more general social movements, in particular, peace, labour 
and reform movements. These joined forces in the centralized but loosely 
organized CND.
With respect to the sponsors, of the nineteen persons who were on 
the executive during the first year, thirteen were listed in Who*8 Who3 
while the list of thirty-eight sponsors was equally impressive.^
L.J. Collins, canon of St. Paul's Cathedral in London and an experienced 
fund raiser and cause promoter, was elected as Chairman and Bertrand 
Russell, member of the House of Lords, philosopher and writer, as 
President, by the fifty British personalities who had been invited by 
Kingsley Martin, editor of the New Statesman> to initiate the campaign. 
Other members of the executive included Ritchie Calder, Michael Foot,M.P., 
Kingsley Martin, J.B. Priestley and J. Rotblat, while some of the sponsors 
were Dame Peggy Ashcroft, Lord Boyd Orr, Benjamin Britten, Dame Edith 
Evans, E.M. Forster, Victor Gollancz, Barbara Hepworth, the Rev. Trevor 
Huddleston, Sir Julian Huxley, Doris Lessing, Sir Compton Mackenzie,
Henry Moore, Sir Herbert Read, Flora Robson, Michael Tippett, Vicky, and 
Barbara Wootton. A group of eminent British figures including a number 
of Labour Party sympathizers, most had been associated at various times 
with movements of social reform.^
'Driver, op, ait, 9 pp. 43-45.
^Ibid,9 p. 44. On the role of the Hew Statesman in left-wing politics, 
see Edward Hyams, The Hew Statesman: The History of the First Fifty Years9 
1913-1963 (London: Longmans, 1963); John Mander, "The 'New Statesman' & 
the English Left"', Cormentary9 XXXVII (February, 1964), 47-53.
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CND had a national office in London, run by a handful of paid staff, 
and local groups all over the country. Although some areas had a regional 
office with a paid organizer» tr,ost of CKD*s work was carried out by 
volunteers. CND had no membership as such and no fees; its work was 
financed by fund-raising projects and by voluntary contributions* Its 
rules provided that such bodies as DACAHW were to have the same status 
within the Campaign as had local CND groups and committees; while it would 
support the activitiee of such bodies» it would not take any direct responsi­
bility for their tactics and objectives.^
At the inaugural meeting held on February 17, 1958, five thousand 
people turned up to hear a panel of distinguished speakers - Russell,
Collins, King-liall, J.B. Priestley, Michael Foot, and A.J.P.
Taylor - put the cas<j against the nuclear arms race and pledge themselves 
to a sustained campaign in that direction. After the meeting in Central 
Hall, about one thousand people from the audience went to Downing Street 
where they chanted “ban the bomb” slogans; some conducted a sit-down there 
and five were arrested and fined for obstructing or assaulting the police.
With a modicum of success from its initial meeting and others held 
throughout the month, CND was able to extend its sphere of influence.
During the rest of 1958 and for the duration of the movement, CND organized 
various non-violent direct action projects. It organized an annual march 
between London and the nuclear weapons plant at Aldermaston. It began a 
grass-roots campaign through street groups, neighbourhood meetings, and 
the collection of signatures on various petitions of protest; it lobbied
' Driver, op• p. 48.
8 LT, Feb. 19, 1958, p. 5.
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Members o f P a r lia m e n t;  I t  p u b lish e d  l i t e r a t u r e ;  and i t  conducted  v i g i l s ,  
m arches, d em o n stra tio n s  and p ic k e t in g ,
A c t iv i ty  w ith in  the Labour P a r ty . -  S u p p o rte rs  o f n u c le a r  disarm am ent 
who were members o f  th e  Labour P a r ty  and o f t r a d e  un ions began to  con­
c e n t r a te  on c o n s ti tu e n c y  b ran ch es  and un ion  lo c a l s  in  an e f f o r t  to  make 
t h e i r  im pact on o f f i c i a l  Labour P a r ty  p o l ic y .  The y e a r  1959 was one o f  
a  G eneral E le c tio n  and many a c t i v i s t s  in  th e  n u c le a r  disarm am ent movement 
worked to  r e tu r n  th e  Labour P a r ty ;  b u t th e  C o n se rv a tiv e s  under Prim e 
M in is te r  M acm illan w ere r e e le c te d .
A f te r  L abour’ s d e f e a t  a t  th e  p o l l s  e v e n ts  moved q u ic k ly  tow ard 
changing  th e  P a r ty ’ s p o lic y  on n u c le a r  w eapons. R a n k -a n d -f i le  o p in io n  
w ith in  th e  c o n s ti tu e n c y  b ra n c h e s , a id ed  by th e  s t r e n g th  o f  t r a d e  un ion
view s on th e  s u b je c t ,  r e s u l t e d  in  th e  d e le g a te s  a t  Scarborough e n d o rs in g
9
a p o lic y  o f  u n i l a te r a l i s m .  But e f f o r t s  were made in  th e  P a r ty  to  u nder­
c u t th e  v ic to r y .  In  March ^1961, th e  N a tio n a l E x ecu tiv e  Committee o f  th e  
P a rty  d e f ie d  th e  C onference p o s i t io n  by r e a f f i rm in g  i t s  own, n o t C onfer­
e n c e ’s ,  o f f i c i a l  d e fen ce  s t a t e m e n t .^  In  O c to b e r, 1961, C onference v o te d  
a g a in s t  u n i l a t e r a l i s m ,  a lth o u g h  i t  v o te d  a ls o  a g a in s t  P o la r i s  b a se s  and 
th e  t r a i n in g  o f  West German tro o p s  on B r i t i s h  s o i l . ^
O ther A c t i v i t y . -  S e c tio n s  o f  th e  n u c le a r  disarm am ent movement o th e r  th a n  
CND w ere engag ing  in  d i f f e r e n t  forms o f  n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n  a t  t h i s  
tim e . In  D ecem ber^1958, c i v i l  d is o b e d ie n c e , th e  f i r s t  s in c e  th e  movement 
had begun o f f i c i a l l y ,  o c c u rre d  a t  th e  N orth Pickenham ro c k e t  b a se . T h is 
was fo llo w ed  by a s im i la r  d e m o n s tra tio n  a t  a  m is s i le  b ase  n e a r  B a rr in g to n ,
Ib id .  9 O ct. 6 , 1960, p . 14.
^  I b i d . ,  Mar. 23 , 1961, p . 8 .
1 I b i d .9 O c t. 5 ,  1961, p .  8 .
-  230 -
Northamptonshire. In September 1960, plans of Russell and the
Rev. Michael Scott for a civil disobedience campaign were made public.
These will be discussed in Chapter IX.
Aims and Motives
A policy for nuclear disarmament had to provide answers to a whole 
range of problems: (1) whether nuclear weapons should be banned (a) uni­
laterally and (b)for a limited period of time; (2) whether nuclear tests 
should be suspended (a) unilaterally, and (b) for a limited period of time; 
(3) whether (1) and (2) should be steps in a general disarmament agreement, 
that is, whether they should be tied to an agreement for the reduction of 
conventional arms and forces; (4) whether (1) and (2) should be tied to 
an "n*th power” limiting agreement which would include such prohibitions 
as that against the equipping of West German forces with nuclear weapons; 
(5) whether (1) and (2) should be tied to an adequate inspections system; 
and (6) whether foreign bases should be removed from British soil, and, if 
not, who should control them, Great Britain or the United States.
As expressed through CND, the aim of the movement was:
We shall seek to persuade British people that 
Britain must: (a) Renounce unconditionally 
the use or production of nuclear weapons and 
refuse to allow their use by others in her 
defense, (b) Use her utmost endeavour to 
bring about negotiations at all levels for 
agreement to end the armaments race and to 
lead to a general disarmament convention.
(c) Invite the co-operation of other nations, 
particularly non-nuclear powers, in her renun­
ciation of nuclear weapons. 12
12 Quoted in Driver, op• cit., p. 47.
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la particular, the government was asked to act on specific issues,
pending the success of the major objectives: "(a) Halt the patrol
flights of planes equipped with nuclear weapons, (b) Make no further
tests of nuclear weapons, (c) Hot proceed with the agreement for the
establishment of missile bases on her territory, (d) Refuse to provide
13nuclear weapous for any other country."
The initial objective of unilateralism, as expounded first by CNb
and supported by subsidiary groups within the movement, was clarified
as tne movement progressed to include withdrawal from NATO as the first
step in multilateral disarmament.
All CND spokesmen were united by their opposition to government
policy. The basis for the Conservatives' rejection of unilateralism was
three-fold: (1) by precipitating the breakup of NATO and drastically
upsetting the balance of power, unilateralism would make war all the more
likely; (2) unilateralism would leave Great Britain open to Russian
aggression; and (3) unilateralism would not succeed in getting the United
States and the Soviet Union to disarm. The government's position, that war
was most likely to be prevented if the enemy knew that Great Britain could
and would retaliate with nuclear weapons, underlay the 1937 and 1958
14defence proposals which put a greater emphasis on nuclear weapons.
13 Ibid.
14
See, "Defence: Outline of Future Policy",, op. ait.; "Report on 
Defence: Britain's Contribution to Peace and Security", Command 
Paper 363 (February, 1958).
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By promising to end National Service in 1960 and by relying less upon 
conventional weapons, the government could reduce estimates from 
41,600 million to 41,483 million. Recognizing the difficulties of 
defence against nuclear weapons, the government saw its strength in 
being able to Mthreaten retaliation with nuclear weapons.** To do this, 
Great Britain would need an independent nuclear deterrent.
In reply, members of the CND argued that it was unlikely that an 
unarmed Great Britain would be the go-ahead signal for Russian domination 
of Western Europe. But even if such were to be the case, unilateralism 
was worth the risk: "We must say that we think it a lesser evil that the 
world should be dominated by Russia than that the world should be destroyed 
or mutilated by nuclear warfare.**^ The argument of "better-dead-than-Red" 
set some of the terms of the debate; Taylor gave the sharpest reply for his 
side:
, •••they would prefer suicide to life under 
Communism. So would I. Our wish can be met 
simply and cheaply by issuing a phial of 
poison to every registered anti-Co— un 1st.
But why should we insist that the rest of 
the population accompany us on this death 
ride; that many millions of Russians also 
be obliterated; and that the atmosphere be 
polluted so that future generations will be 
b o m  maimed or monsters? 16
If the policy of CND was clear enough, the grounds of that policy 
varied. The activists had both moral and rational reasons - Christian 
morality, atheistic humanism, military security, scientific necessity,
Philip Toynbee, "Answer to Those Who Oppose Nuclear Disarmament", in 
Boulton, Voices from the Crowd: Against the H-Bomb, op• ait,,
p. 61.
16 IT, Mar. 11, 1958, p. 11
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political realIsa. Some activists argued that it was wrong to bring a 
ghastly death to millions, others that it was not rational to stake a 
country's safety on a threat which, if carried out, meant national suicide« 
Since retaliation was certain and defence was Impossible, CND reasoned that 
Great Britain would have to give a clear lead towards peace under a policy 
of unilateralism. Evidence was offered to show that the testing of 
nuclear weapons was poisoning the air with radioactivity, that the manufac­
ture of nuclear weapons was taking monies and energies away from more 
important projects, viz., social welfare, and that the existence of such 
weapons made nuclear war more likely. Collins argued: "To choose for 
oyself the risk of suffering or death rather than dishonour is for me a
proper choice. But for me to choose suffering and death for others (lndu-
”18ding yet unborn children) is the height of wickedness. Russell rejected
the benevolence of both the Soviet Union and the western powers, but
reasoned that ’’the hope that we can defend the west by means of the H-bomb
..19is illusory because to use this weapon would be suicide.” konni Zilliacus
M.P., asking that Great Britain head a non-nuclear club of nations, said:
"Those of us who want Britain to cease being at the tall end of the nuclear
suicide club... believe we have reason and realism on our side, as well
„20as conscience aud principle.”
^  See, e.g., Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament handbill, HI , the Undersigned 
Reject a Policy of Nuclear Insanity Because", (n.d.); Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament handbill, "Let Britain Lead", (1960); Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament handbill, "Why Do We March?", (1962).
18 LI, Kar. 17, 1958, p. 11.
19 Ibid,, Mar. 6, 1958, p. U .
20 Ibid.,Mar. 4, 1958, p. 9.
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Other speakers began to ask for a new, positive defence and foreign
policy based on non-nuclear strategy, support for a policy of non-alignment,
and cooperation with uncommitted nations. There were also speakers who
argued that Great Britain should be building up her conventional forces,
while others argued that she should give up all arms, conventional as well
as nuclear, immediately. In the extreme, Alex Comfort, an anarchist writer
and biologist, called for widespread refusal of military service, arguing:
"We have a moral duty to make sure that we are not going to be the people
21who press the button."
One of the problems that faced the movement with respect to its policy 
objectives was to substitute something for the movement's negative attitude 
on nuclear weapons. But once the policy was made more positive, there was 
the chance of alienating particular sections of the broad movement. The 
movement needed a definite policy; but It had to balance taking a position 
of clarity against too extreme a position. This was a problem which had 
taxed the patience and resources of many protest movements in the past.
Tactics
Legal persuasion.- Unilateral nuclear disarmament was an objective, not 
a programme of action. With that objective in mind, various sections of the 
nuclear disarmament movement, CND being but the largest and best known, 
sought to make their moral and political views known through different 
tactics. They sought to publicize their demands to as large an audience 
as possible, politicians included; they sought to concern the public with 
their aims and objectives.
21
Ibid., Mar. 5, 1958, p. 6
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Because th e  m ovem ent's s i n g l e ,  most p l e n t i f u l  re so u rc e  was i t s
n u m e rica l s t r e n g th ,  i t  ten d ed  to  c o n c e n tra te  on th e  p o l i t i c a l  w ing o f 
22th e  governm ent. I t  d id  t h i s  by making d i r e c t  a p p e a ls  to  th e  government 
o r  to  th e  Labour P a r ty ;  o r ,  a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  i t  sough t to  c r e a te  a  la rg e  
fa v o u ra b le  p u b lic  t h a t  would be p re p a re d  to  p u t p re s s u re  on th e  p o l i t i c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  e i t h e r  by engag ing  in  d i r e c t  a c t io n ,  as th e  a lre a d y  com m itted 
a c t i v i s t s  were d o in g , o r  by u s in g  t h e i r  v o tin g  power to  r e tu r n  a  r e c e p t iv e  
governm ent.
Both th e  g e n e ra l o b je c t iv e s  and th e  t a c t i c s  w ere l e s s  p r e c i s e  th a n
th e y  m ight have been had th e  le a d e r s h ip  been c irc u m sc rib e d  by a  t i g h t l y
23k n i t  o rg a n iz a t io n  r a th e r  th an  a h e te ro g en eo u s  p o l i t i c a l  movement. CND 
i t s e l f  o f f i c i a l l y  chose l e g a l  methods o f  p e rs u a s io n  to  p r e s e n t  i t s  c a s e .
I t  began w ith  a p r o t e s t  m eeting  in  C e n tra l  H a ll in  F eb ru a ry ^ 1958, to  w hich 
f iv e  th ousand  p eo p le  came to  h e a r  a d is t in g u is h e d  p a n e l o f  sp e a k e rs  p u t th e  
ca se  f o r  u n i l a t e r a l i s m .  W ith a modicum o f su c c e s s  from  i t s  i n i t i a l  m e e tin g , 
w hich was fo llo w ed  by o th e r s  th ro u g h o u t th e  m onth, CND was a b le  to  ex ten d  
th e  range o f  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s .  I  s h a l l  d is c u s s  two com ponents o f  i t s  a c t i ­
v i t i e s :  f i r s t ,  th e  u n co n v en tio n a l A lderm aston  M arches; seco n d , th e  spectrum  
o f  n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n  t a c t i c s  employed s im u lta n e o u s ly  by CND.
Aldermaston Marches3 1958-61. -  A dopting  an e a r l i e r  p ro p o sa l o f DACANW,
CND o rg a n iz e d , o v e r E a s te r  weekend 1958, s i x  thousand  p eo p le  o f  d iv e rs e  
p e rs u a s io n  on th e  f i f t y - tw o  m ile ,  fo u r  day march from  London to  th e  n u c le a r
22 C f. w ith  p re s s u re  g ro u p s ' ch an n e ls  o f  a c t io n ;  see  E c k s te in ,  op . c i t . 3 p .20 
23 C f. w ith  Sm elser on in c lu s iv e  b e l i e f s ,  op . c i t . 3 p p . 299-301.
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weapons p la n t  a t  A iderm aston , where th e  number sw e lle d  to  te n  th o u san d .
A com bination  o f  q u a l i ty  and q u a n t i ty  made th e  march u n lik e  o th e r  m arches
24th a t  had o c c u rre d  in  B r i t i s h  h i s t o r y .  The spec tru m  o f  m a rc h e rs , may have
d is a g re e d  on some o f  th e  fundam en ta ls  o f  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e ,  b u t on what P h i l ip
25Toynbee c a l l e d  " c e r t a in  minimum th in g s " ,  namely th e  o p p o s it io n  to  n u c le a r  
w a r fa re ,  th e  m archers d id  a g re e . The inarch was g iven  a d d i t io n a l  u n i ty  by 
th e  new ly -adop ted  symbol o f  CND, w hich was c a r r i e d  on s ig n s  and b a n n e rs , 
d es ig n ed  on b u tto n s  and b ad g es , sk e tc h e d  a c ro s s  c a n v a ss , o r  p a in te d  on 
w a te rp ro o f  " lo l l ip o p s "  -  th e  com posite  form  o f th e  semaphore s ig n a l  f o r  
th e  l e t t e r s  N and D. The d e s ig n e r ,  G erald  Roltom , r e f e r r e d  to  th e  c e n t r a l
26m o tif  as  sy m b o liz in g  th e  w o rld , and th e  background a s  sy m b o liz in g  e t e r n i t y .
The s lo g an  "ban th e  bomb" was s im p le , d i r e c t  and vague enough to  accommodate 
th e  m yriad m arch ers .
The q u a l i t i e s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  l a t e r  A lderraaston Marches w ere ev id en ­
ced d u rin g  th e  f i r s t  o n e : th e  c e l e b r i t i e s  (L abour Members o f  P a r l ia m e n t ,
w r i t e r s ,  a c t o r s ,  p r o f e s s o r s ,  m u s ic ia n s ) ;  th e  songs and th e  d an c in g : th e  y o u th ; 
and th e  s h e e r  num bers. The m archers l e f t  London a f t e r  sp e a k e rs  in  T ra f a lg a r
24 For s u f f r a g e t t e  m arches in  London, see  F u lfo rd , op . c i t , ,  pp . 179-84 ; 
f o r  Hunger Marches d u rin g  th e  1930*s '  D e p re ss io n , see  W illiam  G a lla g h e r ,
The R o llin g  o f  the Thunder (London: Lawrence and W ish a r t ,  1 9 4 7 ), p p . 110-12 
1 18 -21 , 132-35 ; R obert Graves and Alan Hodge, The Long Week-End: A S o c ia l 
h is to r y  o f  Great B r ita in  1918-1929 (London: F aber and F a b e r , 1 9 4 0 ), p p . 
403-05 ; Wal H ann ing ton , Unemployed S tru g g les  1919-26: My L ife  and S tru gg les  
Amongst the Unemployed (London: Lawrence and W ish a r t ,  19 3 6 ); A lle n  H u tt ,
The Post-War h is to ry  o f  the B r it is h  Working Class (London: V ic to r  G o lla n cz , 
1 9 3 7 ), pp . 214-43 .
25 LT3 A pr. 5 , 1958, p . 6 .
26 See h i s  comments in  Ph3 June 2 , 1961, p . 6 .
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Square wished them well; along the route they heard speeches from Collins,
Harold Steele, Foot, Toynbee, Comfort, Tippett, Frank Allaun, M.P., Fenner
Brockway, M.P., Michael Randle, Soper, John Berger, Ian Mikardo, M.P.,
Michael Scott, Stephen Swingler, M.P., and Stuart Morris. They marched
as individuals or under the banner of a political party, a trade union,
or a religious organization. Through song, through shared tiredness,
through common smiles to the curious occasionally hostile, onlookers,
through searching for beds for the night, through participation in a
joint political act, the marchers demonstrated their united cause. If the
demonstration was a prank of the misguided, as many observers and newspapers
argued, noting only the prevalence of many young marchers in their early
twenties, bearded, long-haired and in duffle coats, it was a misguided
melange that was joined by some of Great Britain's most respected pacifists,
humanitarians, religious leaders, left-wing political activists, scientists,
writers, actresses, and Labour Members of Parliament. In the main, one
27observer said, the marchers were middle-class and professional; the 
orderly dignity of the March reflected this.
In March, 1959, the second Aldermaston March was held; the format was 
similar, but this time the march was from the nuclear research centre to 
London. It got under way with 4,500 people; the number had swelled to
28twenty thousand when the march drew to a conclusion at Trafalgar Square.^
As in the first March, there were many young people, Labour supporters, 
middle-class liberals, religious and moral pacifists, trade unionists, mothei
^  Daily Mail3 Apr. 8, 1958, p. 1.
28 LT, Mar. 31, 1959, p. 4.
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pushing babies in prams, left-wing activists, and celebrities. According 
to one survey it is suggested that forty-one per cent of the marchers were 
under twenty-one years, perhaps a higher percentage than in 1958; sixty 
per cent of the marchers regarded themselves as political activists; seventy 
per cent were marching in the hope of affecting political events; ninety 
per cent of the youth on the March supported the CND for moral reasons; 
only about four per cent of the marchers were working class, while the major 
occupational groups represented were students, teachers, librarians, clerks, 
civil servants, journalists and social workers. With respect to tactics, 
only six per cent supported DACANW's "voters1veto*' campaign (to be discus­
sed later) against candidates who had not declared themselves for unilat­
eralism, but thirty-one per cent supported DACANW's civil disobedience 
29activities.
The objective of the March, according to the text of a "Chatter for
Nuclear Disarmament" delivered to the Prime Minister, was to urge the
government to secure the total abolition of nuclear weapons; to this end,
CND called upon the government to "renounce the testing, manufacture and
use of nuclear arms and to do so independently as a lead to negotiations
•30and not as a condition thereof. Any finer points of policy than those 
expressed in the Charter would have to be argued out away from the Alder- 
maston to London route, the leadership insisted.
In April I960, following a similar format, the third annual Aldermaston 
March was begun by ten thousand activists, who were organized, by and large, 
29 Based on a survey by Perspectives, reported in Driver, op• ctt,, pp. 59-60, 
Text in PN$ Apr. 3, 1959, p. 1.
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in to  r e g io n a l  u n i t s  w ith  a  d is t in g u is h in g  c o lo u r  fo r  th e  b anners  o f  
each re g io n . The number o f  m archers reach ed  s ix ty  thousand  as the
31m archers moved in to  T ra f a lg a r  Square and w ere jo in e d  by London s u p p o r te r s .  
A f te r  h e a r in g  v a r io u s  sp e a k e rs  make t h e i r  p e rso n a l commitment to  th e  u n i­
l a t e r a l i s t  p o s i t i o n ,  th e  m archers l i s t e n e d  to  Foot warn t h a t  n u c le a r  
weapons cou ld  d e s tro y  d em o cra tic  i n s t i t u t i o n s  b o th  d i r e c t l y  and in d i r e c t l y  
by rem oving th e  d e c is io n  to  use  them f u r th e r  and f u r th e r  away from  e le c te d  
r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s .  Foot ex p re sse d  a cy n ic ism  th a t  had c re p t  in to  th e  move­
ment s in c e  i t s  in c e p t io n  when he p r a is e d  th e  March as  a d em o cra tic  p r o t e s t
32a g a in s t  th e  “m i l i t a r y  d ic ta to r s h ip "  in to  which th e  co u n try  was s l ip p in g .
In  A p r i l ,  1961, th e  fo u r th  A lderm aston March was u n d e rta k e n , th i s
tim e w ith  th e  a d d i t io n  o f  c i v i l  d iso b e d ie n c e  a c t i v i t i e s  ( to  be d is c u s se d
in  C hap ter IX ). The March was d iv id e d  fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e in to  two d i v i s i o n s ,
s in c e  CND chose to  march from  bo th  A lderm aston , th e  p r in c ip a l  n u c le a r
re s e a rc h  e s ta b l is h m e n t ,  ana W e th e rs f ie ld ,  a m ajor NATO b ase  f o r  th e  U nited
S ta te s*  S t r a t e g ic  A ir Command. Ten thousand  p eo p le  began on b o th  w ings o f
th e  March and th e  w e ll-o rg a n iz e d , g a i ly  c la d  column o f  m a rc h e rs , whose
average  age ap p ea red  to  be  under tw e n ty -f iv e  y e a r s ,  g a th e red  s u p p o r te r s
each day. The r e p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  y o u th , t r a d e  u n io n i s t s ,  r e l i g io u s  b o d ie s ,
an
and le f t - w in g  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  was supplem ented  by / i n te r n a t io n a l  s e c t io n
33of s u p p o r te r s  from  tw e n ty - th re e  c o u n t r i e s .  By th e  tim e  th a t  th e  o r ig i n a l
31 LT3 Apr. 19 , 1960, p . 10 . CND s e t  th e  T ra f a lg a r  Square number a t  one 
hundred th o u san d .
32 Ib id .
33 PNa Apr. 4 ,  1961, p . 5
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band reach ed  T ra f a lg a r  S q u are , th e  number o f m archers had r i s e n  to  betw een 
one hundred  thousand  and 150 ,000 , W hile assem b led , th e  m archers h eard  
speech es from  Frank C ousins o f  th e  T ra n sp o r t and G eneral W orkers ' U nion,
Jack  H om er o f  th e  F ir e  B rig ad es  Union and R u s s e l l ,  among o th e r s ;  they  a l l  
spoke o f  th e  h o r ro r s  o f  n u c le a r  war and th e  need  f o r  u n i l a t e r a l  d isarm am ent. 
The M arch, CND p e r s i s t e n t l y  a rg u e d , was n o t  a s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  reasoned  
d eb a te  b u t  a means o f  c o n fro n tin g  th e  governm ent w ith  th e  s t r e n g th  o f  th e  
n u c le a r  d isarm am ent movement, as w e ll  as a  means o f  la y in g  th e  groundwork 
f o r  p e rs u a s io n . In  1961, S a n ity ,  th e  th en  u n o f f i c i a l  p a p e r  o f  CND, e s tim a ­
te d  t h a t :
The f i r s t  A iderm aston March made th e  campaign 
a  mass movement, The second proved  t h a t  i t  was 
h e re  to  s t a y .  The th i r d  was th e  im m ediate p re lu d e  
to  th e  t r a d e  u n ion  d eb a te s  and d e c is io n s  w hich 
changed Labour P a r ty  p o l ic y .  And a l l  th r e e  have 
la r g e ly  c o n t r ib u te d  to  th a t  change in  th e  p o l i t i c a l  
c l im a te  which has p u t disarm am ent h igh  on th e  i n t e r ­
n a t io n a l  agenda and t a c i t l y  ou tlaw ed  n u c le a r  t e s t s .  35
I f  th e  c la im s w ere l e s s  th a n  S an ity  s u g g e s te d , th e  A lderm aston Marches 
s t i l l  in d ic a te d  th e  d eg ree  o f  s e l f - o r g a n iz a t io n  on t h i s  s in g le  is s u e  o f  
p r o t e s t .  The movement had n e i th e r  th e  re s o u rc e s  n o r  th e  r i g i d  and p ro fe s ­
s io n a l  machine to  m o b iliz e  th e  number w hich i t  d id ,  w ith o u t a f e e l in g  o f 
m oral in d ig n a t io n  and a w idesp read  a p p re c ia t io n  o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  conse­
quences o f  n u c le a r  w eapons. I f ,  f o r  some, A lderm aston was th e  chance to  
p ic n ic  away from home, itw a s  fo r  most an o p p o r tu n i ty  to  in f lu e n c e  d e fen ce  
p o l ic y .  R eg ard less  o f  i n t e n t ,  by 1961 th e  Marches w ere too  b ig  to  be 
t o t a l l y  ig n o re d .
^  LT9 Apr. 4 ,  1961, p . 8 .
^  S a n ity s Feb. 1961, p . 3 .
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Other n o n -v io len t d ir e c t  action  ta c t i c s , -  A f te r  i t s  i n i t i a l  su c c e ss  w ith  
m eetings and m arches, CND began to  use o th e r  forms o f  n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  
a c t io n  in  o rd e r  to  induce  a f e e l in g  o f  p r o t e s t  in  o th e r s .  I t  began a g ra s s ­
ro o ts  campaign th rough  s t r e e t  g ro u p s , neighbourhood m e e tin g s , and th e  lo c a l
c o l le c t io n  o f  s ig n a tu r e s  on v a r io u s  p e t i t i o n s  o f  p r o t e s t .  I t  began to
36p u b lis h  l i t e r a t u r e  in  la rg e  q u a n t i t i e s ,  e x p la in in g  i t s  p o s i t i o n .  In
a d d i t io n  t o  town m e e tin g s , d e b a te s ,  forums and f ilm s  and t r a v e l l i n g
e x n ib t t i o n s ,  i t  conducted  lo c a l  m arches to  a c q u a in t v i l l a g e r s  w ith  th e
37lo c a t io n  o f n u c le a r  b ases  which had war p r e p a r a t io n  s t o r e s .  I t  lo b b ie d
38Members o f  P a r lia m e n t ,  som etim es in  fancy  d r e s s .  S u p p o rte rs  who were
members o f  th e  Labour P a r ty  began to  c o n c e n tra te  on c o n s ti tu e n c y  b ran ch es
and t r a d e  un ion  l o c a l s .  I t  conducted  v i g i l s  o u ts id e  A lderraaston , w ith
39
a tte m p ts  to  d is c u s s  n u c le a r  disarm am ent w ith  th e  p l a n t 's  w o rk e rs . I t
conducted  a tw e n ty -fo u r  h o u r v i g i l  o u ts id e  th e  German Embassy in  p r o t e s t
40o v e r p la n s  to  arm West German fo rc e s  w ith  n u c le a r  w eapons; i t  a ls o
d em o n stra ted  o u ts id e  th e  American Embassy in  p r o te s t  o v e r th e  American
41d e c is io n  n o t to  m a in ta in  i t s  fo rm al su sp e n sio n  o f  n u c le a r  t e s t s .  I t  h e ld
See Tribune, Mar. 27 , 1959 , p . 7.
37 Se$, e . g . ,  PR, J u ly  1 0 , 1959, p . l j  LT,  Mar. 7 , 1960. p . 7.
3° LT, Feb. 2 5 , 1958, p . 4 ;  S o c ia l is t  Leader, May 2 4 , 1958, p . 1 .
39 LT, Apr. £ , 1958, p . 6 . For d e t a i l s  o f a n ine-w eek  p ic k e t in g  ro u tin e  
a t  A lderm aston in v o lv in g  170 p e rs o n s , see  PR, O c t. 3 ,  1958, p . 3 .
LT, Apr. 18 , 1958, p . 6 .
41 I b id , ,  J a n . 4 ,  1960, p .  6 . For o th e r  v i g i l s ,  see  i b i d , ,  J u ly  2 7 , 1960,
p . 4 ; J u ly  29 , 1960, p . 4 ;  J u ly  30 , 1960, p . 3 .
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a p r o te s t  march to  th e  U nited S ta te s  Army A ir Force base a t  B rize  N orton,
42O x fo rd sh ire . I t  h e ld  a tw en ty -fo u r hour dem onstration  o u ts id e  Downing
S tr e e t  in  p r o te s t  a g a in s t th e  governm ent's d e c is io n  to  a llow  the p ro d u c tio n
43o f p lu tonium  f o r  weapons in  atom ic power s t a t i o n s .  I t  o rgan ized  a Women's
44Campaign to  make propaganda on th e  e f f e c t s  o f th e  new weapons on c h ild re n .
I t  w rote l e t t e r s  to  th e  Queen, to  th e  disarmament n e g o tia to rs  a t
Geneva, and to  th e  R ussian and American governments when th e  l a t t e r  resumed
45bomb te s t in g .  I t  dem onstrated a t  c i v i l  defence e x e rc is e s  in  S ta f fo rd . I t  
conducted p ic k e tin g s  le d  by th e a t r i c a l  c e le b r i t i e s  in  a  b id  to  co u n ter th e
46
Royal A ir F o rc e 's  " B a ttle  o f B r i ta in  Week" w ith  "N uclear Disarmament Week."
47I t  h e ld  numerous mass r a l l i e s  o f  up to  tw elve thousand p a r t i c ip a n ts .  I t
48h e ld  p r o te s t  marches w ith in  London.
In  newspaper e d i to r i a l s  and in  l e t t e r  lo  th e  e d i to r  columns, as w e ll 
as on th e  ra d io  and te le v i s io n ,  th e  co n tro v ersy  ra is e d  by th e  n u c le a r  
disarmament movement f lo u r is h e d . What th e  a c t i v i s t s  in  th e  movement had 
f a i l e d  to  get d isc u sse d , bo th  in  moral and in  p o l i t i c a l  te rm s, by any o f 
th e  m ajor p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  o r  in  P arliam en t i t s e l f ,  they  succeeded in  g e ttin g
48
I b i d . ,  May 26, 1958, p . 4 . May 27 , 1 9 5 8 ,p .1 1  .
I b i d . ,  June 30, 1958, p . 6 .
I b i d . ,  Ju ly  7 , 1958, p . 5 .
I b i d . ,  May 11, 1959, p . 5 .
PN, S ep t. 25, 1959, p . 8 .
See, e . g . ,  L I ,  S ep t. 21 , 1959, p . 6 ; Feb. 16 , 1960, p . 7 .
See. e . g . ,  march o f  one thousand in  p ro te s t  over th e  Summit breakdown; 
i b i d . ,  May 23, 1960, p . 6 . See a lso  the  three-w eek march from Edinburgh 
to  London done in  r e la y s ,  i b i d . ,  S ep t. 26, 1960, p . 7 .
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49d is c u s s e d  in  o p in io n  jo u r n a l s  o f  h ig h  re p u te  and in f lu e n c e .  The Times,  
th e  Observer,  th e  Manchester Guardian,  th e  Neu Statesman  and Tribune became 
p r iv a t e  d e b a tin g  chambers fo r  th e  c o n tro v e rsy  ov er n u c le a r  w a r fa re .
A cross t h i s  sp ec trum  o f  n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n  t a c t i c s ,  CND, f o r  
o n e , was a b le  to  p u t i t s  ca se  th ro u g h  te c h n iq u e s  o f  l e g a l  p e r s u a s io n ,  to  
a rgue  d is p a s s io n a te ly  t h a t  th e  governm ent wa3 fo llo w in g  a p o lic y  o f  
d e s t r u c t io n ,  and to  la y  b a re  i t s  b e l i e f s  as to  why th e  co u n try  sho u ld  
renounce n u c le a r  w eapons.
By th e  end o f t h i s  p hase  o f  th e  n u c le a r  disarm am ent movement, th a t  
i s ,  by th e  m iddle o f  1961, n o t  on ly  had th e  m ajor forms o f  n o n -v io le n t  
d i r e c t  a c t io n  w hich w ere to  c h a r a c te r i z e  th e  movement been t r i e d  b u t  a ls o  
some m ajor t a c t i c a l  problem s o f  th e  movement had been r a i s e d .  F i r s t  th e re  
was th e  problem  o f s u s ta in in g  th e  a c t i v i t y  and en th u s ia sm  o f th e  movement, 
and o f  g u a rd in g  a g a in s t  i t s  lo s in g  i t s  f re s h n e s s  and im a g in a tio n  and 
becoming te d io u s ,  d u l l  and r i t u a l i s t i c .  Even CND, th e  s e c t io n  o f  th e  
movement w hich came c lo s e s t  to  b e in g  an o rg a n iz e d  a s s o c ia t io n ,  was h an d i­
capped by h av in g  rem ote o b je c t iv e s ,  an I n d e f in i t e  m em bership, and an 
absence  o f  f u l l  p ro f e s s io n a l  o r  e x p e rie n c e d  o rg a n iz a t io n  to  o p e ra te  i t .
To i t s  ad v a n ta g e , how ever, w ere th e  backgrounds o f  th e  p e rso n s  a s s o c ia te d  
w ith  i t ,  r ic h  In  th e  cau ses  w ith  w hich th e y  had been  a f f i l i a t e d  and w ith  
e x p e rie n c e s  w hich cou ld  be u s e fu l  in  fo rm u la tin g  t a c t i c s  and g o a ls ;  in  
a d d i t io n ,  CHD had a u n i ty  made p o s s ib le  by th e  a c t i v i s t s ’ sh a re d  o b je c t iv e  
o f  n u c le a r  disarm am ent and th e  w il l in g n e s s  o f  la rg e  numbers to  a c t  on 
t h e i r  c o n v ic t io n s .
S ee , f o r  exam ple, th e  b o o k le t p u b lish e d  by Tue Times9 The Nuclear Dilemma 
(London: The Times P u b lis h in g  Con^axxy, 1 9 5 8 ), c o n ta in in g  a le a d  a r t i c l e  
and a s e le c t io n  o f  th e  l e t t e r s  to  th e  e d i to r  in  re sp o n se  to  i t .
49
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S eco n d ly , CND, as w e ll  as o th e r  s e c t io n s  o f  th e  n u c le a r  disarm am ent 
movement, had to  c l a r i f y  i t s  r e l a t io n s h ip  to  th e  la b o u r  movement and to  
th e  Labour P a r ty  in  p a r t i c u l a r .  Two d i f f e r e n t  p o s i t io n s  w ere advanced 
w ith in  th e  movement, c h a ra c te r iz e d  by th e  de fa o to  p o l i c i e s  o f  DACANW 
and CND, on th e  a p p ro p r ia te  r o le  to  be fo llo w ed  v is -A -v is  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s •
DACANW's p o s i t io n  was t h a t  th e  movement sh o u ld  assume th e  r o le  o f  
a  p o l i t i c a l  p re s s u re  g ro u p , a c t in g  e q u a l ly  upon th e  governm ent and th e  
p a r ty  in  o p p o s it io n  and a v o id in g  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w ith  e i t h e r .  The move­
ment sh o u ld  p u t p re s s u re  on th e  p a r ty  in  o f f i c e ,  t r y i n g  to  g e t i t  to  
a l t e r  o f f i c i a l  p o l ic y .  DACANW was opposed to  h av in g  e i t h e r  an o f f i c i a l  
o r  an u n o f f i c i a l  a f f i l i a t i o n  w ith  th e  Labour P a r ty .  I t  w anted to  
ed u c a te  th e  p u b l ic  so t h a t  i t  w ould demand c e r t a in  th in g s  o f  p a r lia m e n t­
a r ia n s  and p a r lia m e n ta ry  c a n d id a te s ;  i t  w anted to  c o n v e rt p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s  and r e tu r n  to  P a r lia m e n t th o se  who fav o u red  n u c le a r  d isarm am ent. 
Along th e se  l i n e s ,  i t  w anted to  v o te  su p p o r t ( l a t e r  o n , th e  In dependen t 
N u clea r Disarmament E le c tio n  Committee (INDEC] p u t fo rw ard  convinced  
opponents o f  n u c le a r  w a rfa re  as  c a n d id a te s  in  p a r lia m e n ta ry  e l e c t i o n s )  
f o r  any c a n d id a te  who fav o u red  n u c le a r  d isarm am en t, w h ile  a t  th e  same 
tim e i t  w anted to  w ith h o ld  v o te s  (V o te r 's  v e to " )  from  a l l  c a n d id a te s  
who took  a  p o s i t io n  a g a in s t  n u c le a r  d is a rm a m e n t .^  In  o th e r  w o rd s, i t  
sou g h t to  use  th e  m ovem ent's m ajor r e s o u rc e ,  i t s  p o t e n t i a l  v o tin g  
s t r e n g t h ,  to  " c o n tr o l  v o t e s . . . .  so  t h a t  th e  H-bomb is s u e  can je o p a rd iz e  
r e s u l t s  a c ro s s  p a r ty  b o u n d a rie s .* * ^  DACANW was l e s s  concerned  e i t h e r
For " v o t e r '8 v e to " ,  s e e  D r iv e r ,  op, d t , 9 
51 PN9 Hay 16 , 1958, p .  4 .
pp . 68-70
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w ith  co n cen tra tin g  on ga in in g  a m ajority  at Labour Party Conferences or  
w ith  working fo r  the return  o f  a Labour government than w ith  awakening 
the con scien ce  o f  the e le c to r a te .
At no tim e did CND d isa llo w  appealing  fo r  support from members o f  
a l l  p a r t ie s .  P>ut many spokesmen w ith in  th e  o rg a n iza tio n  wanted major 
e f f o r t s  o f  the appeal to  be concentrated  on th e Labour P a rty , s in c e  they  
f e l t  th a t the movement had very l i t t l e  chance o f  persuading the Conser­
v a t iv e  Party to  reverse  i t s  arms p o lic y  and renounce i t s  n u clear a l l ia n c e s .  
These spokesmen wanted to m ob ilize  th e e le c to r a te  and th e  Labour Party 
at the same tim e. S ince they valued very h ig h ly  the Labour Members o f  
Parliam ent and Labour supporters among CND’ s membership, they were prepared  
to moderate t a c t ic s  in  order to avoid p r o sc r ip tio n  by th e  P arty .
For th ese  spokesmen, th e  h is t o r ic a l  and p o l i t i c a l  circum stances o f
party alignm ent in  Great B r ita in  in  the 1950*s ,  when added to  th e  tr a d it io n s
o f  p a c if ism  and reform found w ith in  the B r it is h  Labour P a rty , made i t
u n r e a l i s t ic  not to expect th at a la r g e  s e c t io n  o f  the n u clear disarmament
movement would want to  con cen trate  i t s  a tte n t io n  on in f lu e n c in g  op in ion
w ith in  th e  Labour Party and working fo r  i t s  return  to  o f f i c e .  For them
i t  was im portant th at i t  was Labour which had a le f t -w in g  r e c e p tiv e  to
u n ila te r a lis m , not the C on servatives. T aylor’ s argument f e l l  on ready
e a rs:  " . . .  u lt im a te ly  we have to convert the Labour Party jiiß t as the
52Anti-Corn Law League converted  S ir  Robert P e e l."  Even th ose w ith in  
52 A .J .P . T ay lor , "Campaign Report", New Statesm an ,  LV (June 21 , 1958),
800. For com parison, s e e  Henry Donaldson Jordan, "The P o l i t i c a l  
Method o f  the Anti-Corn Law League", P o l i t ic a l  Science Q u arterly9 
XL 11 (March9 1927), 58-76; Norman McCord, The Anti-Corn Law League31838-1 
(London:  George A llen  a&4 Unwin, 1958).
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th e  P a r ty  who d e p lo re d  Labour*s e q u iv o c a l s ta n d  on n u c le a r  weapons p o in te d
o u t th e  need  to  change p o l ic y  th ro u g h  th e  Labour P a r ty .  Donald Soper on
t h i s  p o in t  argued  t h a t  p o l i t i c s  had to  be p a r ty  p o l i t i c s :  " I  w alked p a r t
o f  th e  way to  A iderm aston a s  th e  e x p re s s io n  o f  a m oral p r in c i p l e .  Now
th a t  p r o t e s t  has to  be t r a n s l a te d  in t o  p r a c t i c a l  and i n d u s t r i a l  a c t io n ,
53and c h a n n e lle d  th rough  a p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y . "  J u d i th  H art s a i d ,  in  much
th e  same v e in :  "The f u l f i lm e n t  o f  s o c i a l  m o ra lity  in  th e  modern w orld  can
be a ch iev ed  on ly  th rough  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p o w er.. . .  a  p o l i t i c a l
p a r ty ,  w ith  a l l  i t s  i r r i t a t i o n s  and f r u s t r a t i o n s ,  i s  th e  o n ly  means I  have
54o f  g iv in g  e f f e c t iv e  e x p re s s io n  to  my e t h i c a l  b e l ie f s '.
C iv il disobedience . -  The d iv e r s i t y  o f  argum ent was n o t  th e  o n ly  th in g  w hich 
c h a r a c te r iz e d  th e  in a u g u ra tio n  o f  th e  n u c le a r  disarm am ent movement. A f te r  
th e  m eeting  in  C e n tra l  H a ll  in  February , 1958, ab o u t one thousand  p eo p le  
from  th e  au d ien ce  w ent to  Downing S t r e e t  w here th ey  ch an ted  "ban th e  bomb" 
s lo g a n s ;  some conducted  a s it-d o w n  and f iv e  w ere a r r e s t e d  and f in e d  f o r  
o b s t r u c t in g  and a s s a u l t in g  th e  p o l i c e . ^  T his a c t  o f c i v i l  d iso b e d ie n c e , 
w h ile  n o t  an o f f i c i a l  p a r t  o f CND's in a u g u ra l  m e e tin g , marked th e  b i r t h  o f  
th e  movement j u s t  as  much as d id  th e  ro u s in g  speech es d e l iv e r e d  in s id e  th e  
H a ll .
53 Donald S o p er, "The P o l i t i c s  o f  th e  N o n - P o l i t i c a l" ,  Tribune,  A pr. 1 8 , 
1958, p. 4 .
54 J u d i th  H a r t ,  "The C hallenge  o f  P o l i t i c s " ,  in  B o u lto n , Voices from
the Crowd: Against the H-Borrbs op, c i t , ,  p . 95 .
55 LT, Feb. 19 , 1958, p . 5 .
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In  Decemberv19589 th e  use  o f  c i v i l  d iso b e d ie n c e  as  a  t a c t i c  f o r  th e  
f i r s t  tim e s in c e  th e  movement had begun o f f i c i a l l y ,  o c c u rre d  a t  th e  N orth 
Pickenham ro c k e t b a s e . T h is  w i l l  be d is c u s s e d  in  C hap ter IX , when th e  
g e n e r a l ,s p l i t  w ith in  th e  movement o v e r  t a c t i c s  w i l l  be in tro d u c e d .
R eac tio n
P ublic  Reaction . -  T his phase  o f  th e  n u c le a r  disarm am ent movement provoked 
w id esp read  r e a c t io n  to  th e  o b je c t iv e s  o f  u n i l a t e r a l i s m ,  i f  l e t t e r s  to  th e  
e d i t o r ,  l e c t u r e s ,  b o o k s , r a d io  and t e l e v i s i o n  programmes and th e  l i k e  a re  
any in d i c a t io n .  T here was l i t t l e  o r  no o b je c t io n  to  th e  m ovem ent's use 
o f  t a c t i c s  o f  l e g a l  p e r s u a s io n .  Many o b s e rv e rs  would have ag reed  w ith  what 
A .B irch  s a id  a t  a  t r a d e  un ion  c o n fe re n c e : HI  d o n 't  a g re e  w ith  th e  A lderm as- 
to n  M arch, b u t I  re g a rd  th e  march as an e x p re s s io n  o f  th e  co n sc ie n ce  o f  
B r i t a i n . " ^  The d isag ree m en t was w ith  CND's advocacy o f  u n i l a t e r a l  d i s ­
armament fo llo w ed  by w ith d raw a l from  NATO.^
One p s y c h i a t r i s t  has d iv id e d  th e  ran g e  o f  re sp o n se  to  n u c le a r  w a rfa re  
i n to  m a lad ap tiv e  and a d a p tiv e  c a t e g o r ie s .  The f i r s t  d iv i s io n  In c lu d e d
ig n o r in g ,  becom ing h a b i tu a te d ,  deny ing  and becom ing anx ious o v e r th e  dan -
58g e rs  o f  such  w a r fa re .  The second d iv i s io n  became one o f  a  s e r i e s  o f  
reaso n ed  re sp o n se s : a t  a  showdown, th e  s id e  w ith  th e  s u p e r io r  d e s t r u c t iv e  
fo rc e  would w in ; in  a c o n f l i c t ,  one had to  g iv e  o n e 's  l i f e  f o r  o n e 's
Quoted in  Tribune ,  Apr. 3 ,  1959, p . 1 .
CND B u lle t in ,  March, 1960 , n .p .
Jerom e D. F ran k , "E m otional and M o tiv a tio n a l A spects o f  th e  
Disarmament P ro b le m " ,  Journal o f  S o c ia l I s su e s9 XVII (1 9 6 1 ), 21 -23 .
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b e l i e f s ;  in  a c o n f l i c t ,  one had  to  av o id  show ing f e a r  in  th e  fa c e  o f  
59th e  enemy. Most o f  th e  v e rb a l  re sp o n se s  to  CND's o b je c t iv e  o f 
u n i l a t e r a l i s m  f e l l  in to  th e  second d iv i s i o n .  I t  was arg u ed  by some t h a t  
th e  r e n u n c ia t io n  o f  n u c le a r  weapons would weaken th e  c o u n t ry 's  b a rg a in in g  
pow er; t h a t  G reat B r i t a in  needed  th e  p r o te c t io n  a f fo rd e d  by th e  "b a la n c e  
o f  t e r r o r " ;  th a t  th e  co u n try  must be  p re p a re d  as she  was n o t in  th e  1 9 3 0 's ,  
an d , th e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  she  must be as  s u s p ic io u s  o f  th e  u n i l a t e r a l i s t s  as 
she  sh o u ld  have been o f  th e  p re-S econd  W orld War p a c i f i s t s ;  t h a t  u n i l a t e r a l  
r e n u n c ia t io n  was a  f u t i l e  g e s tu r e ,  s in c e  i t  d id  n o t r e a l l y  m a tte r  what 
G rea t B r i t a in  d id .
As f a r  a s  p u b lic  o p in io n  p o l l s  w en t, re sp o n se s  appeared  to  in d i c a te
th a t  th e r e  w ere r e l a t i v e l y  few c o n v e r ts  to  th e  m ovem ent's o b je c t iv e  a f t e r
th e  d i r e c t  a c t io n  p hases had begun. A ccord ing  to  f in d in g s  o f  th e  B r i t i s h
I n s t i t u t e  o f  P u b lic  O p in io n , th e  fo llo w in g  p e rc e n ta g e s  w ere in  fa v o u r  o f
a  p o s i t i o n  o f  u n i l a t e r a l i s m :  in  1955, t h i r ty - o n e  to  th i r ty - tw o  p e r  c e n t
o f  th e  p eo p le  w ere a g a in s t  G rea t B r i t a i n 's  d e c is io n  to  make th e  hydrogen
b o m b ;^  in  1958, tw e n ty - f iv e  p e r  c e n t w ere in  fa v o u r o f  u n i l a t e r a l i s m ; ^
in  1959, tw e n ty - f iv e  to  t h i r t y - t h r e e  p e r  c e n t w ere in  fav o u r o f  u n i l a t e r a -  
62lis m . For th e  y e a rs  1960 and 1961 th e  r e s u l t s  a r e  a s  fo llo w s :
59 I b i d . ,  pp . 23 -25 .
Q uoted in  W illiam  P. S nyder, The P o l i t i e s  o f  B r i t is h  Defense P o lic y ,  
1945-1962 (Columbus: Ohio S ta te  U n iv e rs ity  P r e s s ,  1 9 6 4 ), p . 59 .
61 Ibid .
62 rLoo. e t t .
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ATTITUDES OF THE BRITISH PUBLIC TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1960-61* 
(P e rc e n ta g e  F av o u rin g  Each Response)
Date Response
1 . 2, 2, 4.
1960
A p ril 26 J9 31 24
May 33 27 24 16
J u ly 27 34 28 11
Septem ber 21 31 36 12
O ctober 21 32 37 10
1961
Ja n u a ry -A p ril 19 26 36 19
June 20 30 35 15 —
Q u e s tio n : What p o l ic y  sh o u ld  B r i t a in  fo llo w  abou t n u c le a r  
weapons?
R esponses: 1, Give up n u c le a r  weapons e n t i r e l y .
2, Poo l a l l  n u c le a r  weapons w ith  o th e r  NATO 
c o u n t r ie s  and r e ly  m ain ly  on American 
p ro d u c tio n .
2, C ontinue to  make o u r own n u c le a r  w eapons.
4, D o n 't know. 63
Labour movement. -  W ith in  th e  Labour P a r ty  a t  th e  tim e th a t  th e  n u c le a r
disarm am ent movement began , th e r e  w ere some o f  th e  same s o u l- s e a rc h in g s  
as had made th e  movement I t s e l f  p o s s ib le ;  b u t th e r e  was a ls o  a  c e r t a in  
amount o f  unease  o v e r  CND and i t s  a f f i l i a t e s  a s  a p r o t e s t  movement.
63 Ib id , ,  p . 60 . For a n a ly s i s  o f  p re s s  coverage  o f  th e  movement 
d u rin g  t h i s  p e r io d ,  see  John M a ru llu s , '"T h e  T im es' P lay s  
S p o t- th e -R ed s  on th e  Road to  A ld erm asto n ", Tribune,  A pr. 1 1 , 
1958, p . 4 ; R ichard  C lem en ts, "4 Days from  A lderm aston", 
i b i d , ,  A pr. 2 2 , 1960, p . 4 ;  David B o u lto n , " F le e t  S t r e e t  and 
th e  M arch", i b i d , ,  A pr. 7 , 1961 , p p . 6 -7 .
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Partially in response to CND, partially as a result of genuine disagreement
with government policy, and partially to quell dissension within its own
64ranks from the "Victory for Socialism" group, the National Executive 
Committee and the General Council of the TUC, in March, 1958, issued a 
joint document entitled Disarmament and Nuclear War. The document argued: 
(1) that Great Britain should suspend nuclear tests, unilaterally and 
immediately, for a limited period of time; (2) that Great Britain support 
an international declaration banning the use of nuclear weapons; that any 
American bases set up in Great Britain be under British c o n t r o l T o w a r d  
these objectives, the Labour Party and the TUC launched a national 
educational campaign on disarmament, leading off with a meeting in Trafal­
gar Square and followed by a few more public and private meetings*
For many in the nuclear disarmament movement, this educational 
campaign had all the ear-marks of a direct counter to CND. Taylor vehemently 
accused the Labour Party of trying"to kill us [CND], not the bomb',1^  and 
credited the Party with having had some success in this direction. However, 
he went on to say: "The unspoken accusation against the campaign is untrue. 
We are not seeking to disrupt the Labour Party nor to challenge the present 
leadership. We are seeking to win it over.. .."^
64
65
66
A left-wing socialist group revived in 1957 as an intra-party 
ginger group; its membership in Parliament was about forty strong.
1958
LT3 Mar. 7,/pp. 6, 10.
Taylor, "Campaign Report", op. cit.s p. 800.
67 Ibid,
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Later that year, the Annual Conference of the Labour Party issued
a less direct statement of its views on disarmament than that contained
in the joint document with the TUC. While renewing its appeal to the
government to end nuclear tests, it made no demand for the country's
68unilateral cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons. A 
resolution calling upon the next Labour government to cease the manufac­
ture and testing of nuclear weapons unilaterally and to prohibit their 
use on British territory was defeated 5,611,000 to 890,000.*^
As has already been suggested, throughout the 1950's, pressures 
within the Labour Party and within the TUC for a reexamination of Party 
policy on nuclear disarmament had been applied. But these pressures were 
not acted upon by the Parliamentary Labor Party until Junef1959^ when, 
under the impetus of internal pressures from the left-wing and in reaction 
to changes in the platforms of the Conservative and the Liberal Parties 
a new policy was formulated. While still not explicit on the question of 
nuclear tests, the Party did advance the plan of a "non-nuclear club" of 
all nations except the United States and the Soviet Union; it coupled this 
with proposals for disarmament by all nations in specified stages.
66 LT, Sept. 27, 1958, p. 6.
Ibid., Oct. 3, 1958, p. 4.
^  What the Times assessed as being "outflanked" by the government on 
the right (with it6 moves towards Summit talks and limited test 
suspension and the Liberals on the left (with their conditional 
suspension of testing). Ibid., June 15, 1959, p. 6.
^  Ibid., June 25, 1959, p. 6.
-  252 -
A change in Labour policy was also being demanded in the trade
unions. In June ,1959, the National Union of General and Municipal Workers,
notably not a left-wing union, voted at its conference for a policy of 
72unilateralism. That its vote was representative of similar sentiment 
within the trade union movement was evident by the reception given the 
Labour Party’s new policy. For while Gaitskell was able to count on the 
support of such unions as the National Union of MLneworkers and the National 
Union of Railwaymen, other trade unions, such as the Constructional Engineer­
ing Union, the Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers, the National Union 
of Tailors and Garment Workers, the Transport and General Workers Union, 
and the Fire Brigades Union had rejected the official policy in favour of 
alternatives closer to the unilateralist position. However, the TUC 
Conference in September,1959( endorsed the official policy over thgbbjections
and influence of Frank Cousins, head of the powerful Transport and General 
73Workers’ Union; in addition, the Conference carried a protest against
American missile bases being sited in Great Britain.
Events moved quickly after Labour’s defeat at the polls in October
1959( towards changing party policy on nuclear weapons. In April, the
Co-operative Party Conference had passed a composite resolution advocating
unilateral renunciation of the production and testing of nuclear weapons
and calling upon the trade union movement and the Labour Party to urge
74this policy on the government. The Independent Labour Party (ILP) 
called on trade unions throughout the world to ban the development,
72 Ibid., June 5, 1959, p. 8.
/3 Ibid., Sept. 1Ü, 1959, p. 12.
7^ Ibid., Apr. 18, 1960, p. 6.
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manufacture, transportation, and handling of nuclear supplies.7^
Policies in support of unilateral disarmament, often with provisions 
against foreign missile bases on British soil, were adopted by many trade 
unions during the year as well. Prior to the TUC Conference in September 
I960, the following unions were pledged against the use of nuclear 
weapons: the Amalgamated Engineering Union; the Union of Shop, Distri­
butive and Allied Workers; the Uaited Society of Boilermakers; the 
Chemical Workers' Union; the Electrical Irades Union; the Fire Brigades 
Union; the Amalgamated Union of Foundryworkers; tne National Society of 
Operative Printers and Assistants; the National Union of Public Employees; 
the Sneet hetal Workers' Union; the Transport ana General Workers Union; 
the National Union of Vehicle Builders; and the Amalgamated Union of 
Building Trade Workers. Pledged against unilateral nuclear disarmament 
were: the Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union; the Union of Post 
Office Workers; the Transport Salaried Staffs' Association; the Associated 
Society of Woodworkers; and the National Union of General and Municipal 
Workers (the last having uone a turn-about).7^
By September,1960, the TUC after its conference found itself in the 
position of having adopted two incompatible policies. It had approved the 
nuclear disarmament resolution of the Transport and General Workers' Union, 
while at the same time it had approved tne official Labour Party defence 
policy statement.77
75 Ibid.,p. 10.
7° Ibid., June 10, 1960, pp. 8, 17. This tentatively set the vote at 
2,553,000 for to 1,047,000 against unilateral nuclear disarmament.
77 Ibid., Sept. 8, 1960, p. 12.
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In earlier instances, the Labour Party had met the challenge to 
Gaitskell's defence policies with measures geared to shift the spotlight 
away from the policies of the nuclear disarmament movement in general 
and of CND in particular, by a variety of means. It had set up a 
disarmament campaign of its own which expired after a pamphlet had been 
Issued and a few meetings had been held; it had put forward proposals for 
a non-nuclear club; it had pressured the leadership of the National Union 
of General and Municipal Workers' Union to recall the membership and 
revoke the vote on unilateralism* At the time of this new challenge to 
the Party's official line, the leadership had to contend with both the 
left-wing's voice in the constituency parties and the trade unions' 
numerical strength in favour.of unilateralism. The Party could not avoid 
fighting the issue at Conference.
As the Annual Conference approached, the number of resolutions on 
disarmament far exceeded those under any other subject headings of the 
435 resolutions from constituency parties and trade unions, over thirty- 
seven per cent (162) were on disarmament; of these, between 115 and. 122 
advocated unilateral nuclear disarmament; of the latter, most specified
withdrawal from NATO and/or the removal of American bases from Great
78Britain. Rank-and-file opinion within the constituency branches, when
added to the strength of trade union feeling on the subject, resulted in
79the delegates at Scarborough endorsing the policy of unilateralism.
7" PN, July 29, 1960, p. 1.
79 LT, Oct. 6, 1960, p. 14.
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i>ut tae conflict between previous» official policy and tue Conference
decision aeemeu certaiu to result in a determined effort to overturn the
vote on unilateraliscu Cousins, who led the presentation of the case for
the unilateralists, based his arguments on the Mu vth power" position,
that if Great Britain possessed nuclear weapons, other countries would
follow suit and a general drift towards war would be on. tie did not view
the position he was advancing as one that demanded «1 immediate withdrawal
from NATO; for he said that fcATO was an organization in which Great Britain
could use its Influence to advance its position on nuclear warfare. The
implications of Cousins' argument were disputed sharply by Gaitskell. The
latter was prepared to reject the Conference decision and reaffirmed nis
bond to the parliamentary party and the official policy it advanced in June.
Gaitskell asked the Conference to understand the dilemma of Labour Members
of Parliament, "the vast majority of [whom]... are utterly opposed to
h ÜQunilateralism and neutralism. he continued 1 "Do you think we can become 
overnight the pacifists, unilateralists and fellow travellers that other
people are?"^
Conference ^ then, was committed to the Iransport and General Workers'
Union motion which called for "a complete rejection of any defence policy
82baaed on the threat of the use of strategic or tactical weapons" and the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union's motion which demanded the "unilateral
Tknd*, p. 19.
01 Ibid.
^  Passed 3,282,000 for to 3,239,000 against; ibid., p. 14.
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r e n u n c ia t io n  o f  th e  t e s t i n g ,  m a n u fa c tu re , s to c k p i l in g  and b a s in g  o f a l l
**b3n u c le a r  weapons in  G rea t B r i t a in .
CND a n a ly se d  th e  v o te  a t  Scarborough n o t  a s  a  v ic to r y  ach iev ed  "by 
lo b b y in g  and i n f i l t r a t i o n ,  b u t by a  p u b lic  cam paign w hich a f f e c t e d  t r a d e
M
u n io n i s t s  a lo n g  w ith  th e  r e s t  o f  th e  p o p u la tio n . But th e  ° rg a n ia a t io n  
was l e s s  th a n  s a t i s f i e d  w ith  th e  c lo se n e s s  o f  th e  v o t e .  I t  re c o g n is e d ,  
a s  d id  G a itsk e i l ,  t h a t  th e  P a r lia m e n ta ry  Labour P a r ty  was d is tu rb e u  by 
th e  v o te  f o r  u n i l a t e r a l i s m  and th a t  th e  P a r ty  le a d e r s h ip  would f i g h t  w ith  
a l l  i t s  re s o u rc e s  to  have t h a t  p o lic y  r e v e r s e d .  The v o te  f o r  u n i l a t e r a l i s m  
came a t  a  tim e when th e  P a r ty  le a d e r s  had abandoned th e  p o lic y  o f  an 
in d ep en d en t n u c le a r  d e t e r r e n t  f o r  G reat B r i t a in ;  b u t n o t b e fo re  th e  Blue 
S tre a k  m is s i le s  had proved  to  be a f i a s c o ,  bo th  in  term s o f  expense and 
te c h n ic a l  in n o v a tio n , and th e  governm ent I t s e l f  had appeared  l i k e l y  to  
abandon th e  In dependen t r o le  f o r  th e  c o u n try .
Tj*ijuner0 e s t im a t io n  o f  S carb o ro u g h , t h a t  i t  was"[A] mighty sw e ll o f
r a n k - a n d - f i l e  o p in io n . . . [w hich] has changed th e  d i r e c t io n  o f  th e  Labour
63P a rty  on th e  p r in c ip a l  I s su e s  o f  th e  d a y " ,°  was l e s s  th a n  a c c u r a te .  For 
th e  P a r t y 's  r e a c t io n  to  th e  d e c is io n  in d ic a te d  th a t  i t  s t i l l  had to  be 
conv inced  o f  th e  w orth o f  th e  "b v em en t's  o b je c t iv e s .  S ta r t in g  w ith  
G a i t s k e l l 's  speech  a t  th e  C o n fe ren ce , th e  P a rty  le a d e r s  began to  underm ine
83 P assed  3 ,3 03 ,000  fo r  to  2,Ö96,ÜUÜ a g a in s t ;  th e  o f f i c i a l  d e fen ce  p o l i c y ,  
w hich was d e fe a te d  3 ,0 4 2 ,0 0 0  f o r  to  3 ,3 3 9 ,0 0 0  a g a i n s t ,  s u r re n d e re d  an 
in d ep en d en t B r i t i s h  d e te r r e n t  and .sough t to  f u l f i l  th e  c o u n t ry 's  
o b l ig a t io n  to  h e r  a l l i e s .  Ibid*
84 CUD B u lle t in ,  O c to b e r, 1960, n . p . ;  se e  a ls o  Annual C onference R eport 
in  S a n ity ,  A p r i l ,  1961, n .p .
85 Tribune, O ct. 7 , 1960, p . 1 .
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the efforts of the nuclear disarmament movement to have unilateralism 
adopted in both letter and spirit by Party leaders, members, and Conference.
If Scarborough was a measure of the movement's success, Blackpool was
a measure of its failure. When the National Executive Committee of the
Labour Party met in March f1961, it reaffirmed its official defence state»
ment which said that Great Britain could not oppose on principle the
establishment of allied bases on her territory, but must remain free to
decide according to circumstances whether or not any particular project
should be accepted. Polaris missiles, the statement continued, as
retaliatory second strike weapons would be acceptable, but Thor missiles
would not be. It then went on to criticise the government for having
entered .into the Polaris agreement without: (1) having first obtained an
assurance that they »would remain retaliatory weapons; (2) having made sure
that the Thor bases would be removed; (3) having demanded adequate, if
even partial, control over their operation; (4) having asked that a site
86in a less populous place than Holy Loch be chosen.
Other events foreshadowed a change in labour sentiment on unilateral­
ism. First, some trade unions which had voted for unilateralism in 1960 
began to reverse their votes. Secondly, a centre group began to emerge 
around Richard Crossman, M.P., which feared splitting the Party. Thirdly, 
organized opposition spearheaded by the "Campaign for Democratic Socialism," 
was backed by the machinery of the Party and began to put the case for 
multilateralism and continued membership in NATO. In February,1961, some 
thirty Labour Members of Parliament and other speakers against the "folly
86 LT, Mar. 23, 1961, p. 8
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o f  u n i la te r a l i s m "  h e ld  a  " m u l t i l a te r a l  m arathon” w hich ran  f o r  f iv e  
87n ig h t s .  This work was co n tin u ed  by th e  r ig h t-w in g  Campaign f o r  
D em ocratic S o c ia lism  a t  m e e tin g s , th rough  un ion  lo c a l s  and c o n s ti tu e n c y  
b ran ch es  and v ia  p r in te d  b u l l e t i n s .  As D riv e r  p o in ts  o u t ,  "F a r  from  
f in d in g  th a t  a p o sse  o f  d e te rm in ed  u n i l a t e r a l i s t s  aw aited  them in  every  
t r a d e  un ion  b ra n c h , th e  C°S d isc o v e re d  t h a t  a  l i t t l e  encouragem ent went 
a very  lo n g  way in  q u a r te r s  w here p re s s u re  groups had n o t h i t h e r to  
p e n e t r a te d .
But even w here th e  movement had made an im p a c t, i t  had n o t conv inced  
th e  t r a d e  un io n s as s t r o n g ly  as i t  sh o u ld  have done; i t  had n o t made them 
confirm ed  and conv inced  u n i l a t e r a l i s t s  a b le  and w i l l i n g  to  w ith s ta n d  th e  
p re s s u re  from  c o n tra ry  argum en ts . T h e re fo re ,  i t  was n o t a  com plete  s u r p r i s e  
when th e  Scarborough v ic to r y  was o v e r tu rn e d ,  a lth o u g h  th e  C onference a t
B lackpoo l d id  v o te a g a in s t  P o la r i s  b a se s  and P an zers  (West German tro o p s
89 9(
t r a i n in g  in  G rea t B r i t a i n ) .  The n a tu re  o f  th e  v o te  a t  B la ck p o o l, how ever,
in d ic a te d  th a t  Labour was s t i l l  d iv id e d  on u n i l a t e r a l i s m  and t h a t  i t  m ight
s t i l l  be p o s s ib le  to  re c o n v e r t  th e  P a r ty  to  i t s  e a r l i e r  p o s i t i o n .  The
E x ecu tiv e  d e fe a t  on b a se s  and German tro o p s  was en c o u ra g in g , as  was th e
' I b id . ,  Feb. 1 4 , 1961, p . 8 .
88 D riv e r ,  op. c i t . ,  p . 96.
89 LTy O c t. 5 ,  1961, pp . 8 -9 . C onference su p p o rte d  th e  N a tio n a l Execu­
t i v e  C om m ittee 's Policy fo r  Peace, 4 ,5 2 6 ,0 0 0  v o te s  to  1 ,7 5 6 ,0 0 0 .
90 For a  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  Labour C onference v o te s  s e e  K e ith  H in d e ll  and 
P h i l ip  W illia m s , "S carborough  and B la ck p o o l: An A n a ly s is  o f  Some V otes 
a t  th e  Labour P a r ty  C onference o f  1960 and 1961, "P o li t ic a l  Q uarterly, 
XXXIII ( J u ly ,  1962) 306-20 .
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p a ssag e  o f  two emergency r e s o lu t io n s ,  one d e lp o r in g  th e  resum ption  o f
n u c le a r  t e s t i n g  and th e  o th e r  e x p re s s in g  deep concern  ab o u t th e  B e r l in
c r i s i s .  C o u sin s , in  a  mood o f  deep b i t t e r n e s s ,  c o u n se lle d  u n i l a t e r a l i s t s
in  th e  c o n s t i tu e n c ie s :  "Be n o t d i s p i r i t e d  by any v o te  t h a t  i s  taken  h e re
to d a y . I t  w i l l  mean as much o r  as l i t t l e  in  some c i r c l e s  as a p p a re n tly
91th e  v o te  t h a t  was ta k en  l a s t  y e a r  m e an t."  The m oral o f  B lackpoo l was 
t h a t  th e  n u c le a r  disarm am ent movement had to  cam paign much h a rd e r  w ith in  
th e  la b o u r  movement in  o rd e r  to  win i t s  c a s e .
Government. -  The C o n se rv a tiv e  governm ent, a s  w e ll  as th e  C o n se rv a tiv e
P a r ty ,  chose to  be s i l e n t  on th e  n u c le a r  disarm am ent movement. Im m ediately
a f t e r  th e  o v e rflo w  m eetings in  C e n tra l  H a ll  in  F eb ruary  1958, Mr. Sandys,
M in is te r  o f  D efence, warned th e  Labour P a r ty  a g a in s t  th e  p a c if is m  w ith in  
92i t s  r a n k s , w h ile  S i r  E r ic  Edw ards, Chairman o f  th e  N a tio n a l E x ecu tiv e
Committee o f  th e  C o n se rv a tiv e  U n io n is ts  A s s o c ia t io n ,  v o ic e d  h i s  m isg iv in g s
ab o u t th e  m isgu ided  p a c i f i s t s  en co u ra g in g  y o u th  to  ad v o ca te  u n i l a t e r a l
d isarm am ent? " I f  we c h e r is h  o u r  co u n try  we m ust s to p  t h i s  madness b e fo re
i t  i s  too  l a t e .  There i s  no se n se  o r  lo g ic  in  th e  cam paign ."  D uring
th e  1959 G eneral E le c t io n  cam paign, th e  C o n se rv a tiv e s  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  th e
94Labour P a r ty  was d is u n i te d  on m a tte rs  o f  fo re ig n  p o l i c y ,  b u t  th e  movement
91 LT, O c t. 5 ,  1961, p .  8 .
92 Speech to  th e  C e n tra l  C ouncil o f  th e  N a tio n a l Union o f  C o n se rv a tiv e  
A s s o c ia t io n s ,  r e p o r te d  in  i b i d . ,  Mar. 1 4 , 1958, p .  6 .
93 I b id .  See a ls o  th e  rem arks o f  Mr. Du-Cane a t  th e  C o n se rv a tiv e  P a r ty  
c o n fe re n c e  a t  B lackpoo l w arn ing  t h a t  h o n o u rab le  t i t l e s  and p r i e s t l e y  
garb  d id  n o t  mean t h a t  th e se  p eo p le  had th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  c o u n try  
a t  h e a r t .  I b id . s O ct. 1 1 , 1958, p .  4 .
94 D.E. B u t le r  and R ichard  R ose, The B r it is h  General E lec tio n  o f  1959 
(London: M acm illan & C o ., 1 9 6 0 ), p .  26 .
-  260 -
95itself was little discussed during the campaign.
When the CND presented their demands to Prime Minister Macmillan 
after the 1959 Aldermaston March, he pointed out his constant pre­
occupation with the problem of nuclear weapons, but he failed to see 
what could be gained by personal talks with CND spokesmen.Mr. Butler,
Home Secretary, speaking fot the Prime Minister, said that the government 
did not consider that the CND either represented the views of a majority 
of the people or was in the best Interests of the country: ”We are for­
tified in this belief by the fact that they are at variance with the
97policies proclaimed by both the major parties in this House.”
Questions by nuclear disarmament supporters, when raised in Parliament,
were usually about matters of civil liberties, rather than substantive
matters of the movement whether the police were investigating nuclear
disarmament protest meetings so as to obtain information on organizers,
9 8speakers, or the audiences; whether police were taking photographs of
99 100Aldermaston inarches; and about the police authorization of meetings.
95 Ibid., pp. 65, 71-72.
96 PDlC) 603:809 (Apr. 14, 1959).
97 Ibid.
98 Mr. Silverman, PD(C), 572:130 (July 4, 1957).
99 Mr. Swingler, PD(C), 603:371-72 (Apr. 9, 1959).
See statement of Mr. Butler, PD(C)9 587:114 (May 8, 1958).
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Evaluation
A full evaluation of the movement will be found in Chapter IX.
Suffice it to say at this point that by 1961 the movement had introduced 
political debate on the issue of nuclear warfare. While it is difficult 
to credit the movement with any substantial achievements by 1961 with 
respect to disarmament, the movement had produced a climate of opinion 
favourable to such disarmament had any of the political sections of the 
society (such as the government or the political parties) decided to 
favour unilateralism. What Christoph says of anti-hanging societies 
can be said of the nuclear disarmament movement: it kept the issues 
alive; it kept the cause from being branded a crackpot cause; it mobilized 
favourable public opinion; it provided external support for Members of 
Parliament committed to such a position; it showed the Parliament what 
a section of the public thought; and it showed the sympathetic public 
what it could do to convert the parliamentary political leadership 
Since neither of the two political parties was prepared to adopt 
unilateralism as a positionv the nuclear disarmament movement was able 
to present ideas and attitudes to the public and the Parliament which 
otherwise might have gone unpresented.
James B. Christoph, Capital Punishment and British Politics: The 
British Movement to Abolish the Death Penalty 1945-57 (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1962), pp. 188-90.
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CHAPTER IX
THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT MOVEMENT (3); FROM POLITICS TO PROTEST
Introduction
The unilateralist victory at Scarborough came three weeks after 
a serious split had developed within the nuclear disarmament movement 
over the use of civil disobedience as a tactical weapon.. From its 
inception, when such bodies as DACANW had been allowed to affiliate 
with CND, the movement had tolerated the use of diverse tactics to 
present its case for unilateralism. Most of the tactics which had 
been used were legal, if occasionally uncoventional, such as the 
Aldermaston March; but some of the tactics were illegal, if non­
violent and public, such as the sit-down in Downing Street, while 
others blended legal and illegal elements, such as the use of 
printed matter to announce the North Pickenham demonstration of 
civil disobedience. Big names, reputable personalities, and mass 
marches and rallies of an unprecedented size had kept CND's tactics 
of legal persuasion very much in the forefront of the movement.
The situation was altered in 1960, CND being pushed into the back­
ground, when the practitioners of civil disobedience were able to 
offer novel methods, a galaxy of stars and a multitude of disciples.
Writing in 1959, the New Statesman contrasted CND and DACANW 
as "the conflict between the Propagandists —  those who believe 
that the task of the reformer is to assist the gradual evolution 
of opinion - and the Witnesses, who feel morally constrained to
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give full and immediate expression to their convictions."* The
journal went on to evaluate this conflict "between expedience and
2principle" as a traditional feature of British reformism. Seen
historically, the militancy of DACAKW and later of the Committee
of 100 troubled some within the movement in much the same way as
in Chartism the practitioners of "physical force" troubled the
3practitioners of 'moral force"; or in the way that the antics
of the Pankhursts troubled the Pethick-Lawrences during the
4Suffragette campaigns.
Dissatisfied with CND's conventional tactics and with the 
country’s conventional (that is, Conservative, Liberal, Labour) 
politics, the Rev. Michael Scott and Bertrand Russell'organized 
the Committee of 100 to "take every action that is possible with 
a view to awakening our compatriots, and ultimately all mankind, 
to the need of urgent and drastic changes of policy. In
^“Propagandists and Witnesses", New Statesman, L V H  (Jan. 3, 1959), 1.
2Ibid.
3See, e.g., Asa Briggs, ed., Chartist Studies (London; Macmillan &
Co., 1959); G.D.H. Cole, Chartist Portraits (London: Macmillan &
Co., 1941); Mark Hovell, The Chartist Movement, T.P. Tout, ed.,
2nd ed. (Manchester; Manchester University Press, 1943).
^See, e.g., Fulford, op, cit. ; Homer Laurence Morris, 'Parliamentary 
Franchise Reform in England from 1885 to 1918“, Columbia University 
Studies in History, Economics and Lau, XCVI (1921); Christabel 
Pankhurst, Unshackled: The Story of How We Won the Vote, preface by 
Lord Pethick-Lawrence (London: Hutchinson, 1959); E. Sylvia Pankhurst, 
The Suffragette Movement: An Intimate Account of Persons and Ideals 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1931).
Committee of 100 handbill, "Act or Perish", (n.d.)5
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Chapter VII, it was emphasized that the nuclear disarmament move­
ment was the product of the cultural context of British politics, 
the values and activities of earlier peace movements, and a 
British tradition of dissent and reform. The Committee of 100 
also fell into this pattern. It joined the anti-militarist, 
anti-authoritarian humanism of Russell with the religious pacifism 
of Scott. It combined the talents of one who had been an objector
during the First World War with one who had taken part in
£
satyagraha campaigns in South Africa during the 1940's. It 
allowed for activists who wanted an organized chance to make 
effective propaganda as well as for activists who wanted a personal 
chance to bear witness.
In contrast to CND's tactics of legal persuasion and 
agitation, the Committee of 100 used more unorthodox methods of 
non-violent direct action. It institutionalized a civil dis­
obedience campaign in urban centers, at military sites, and as 
an adjunct to the legal direct action demonstrations of CND.
The Committee, as the CND before it, had to resort to a mass 
direct action campaign, for its supporters had neither the ear 
of a political party nor the confidence of administrative officials. 
It sought added numerical strength to compensate for its unpopular 
]political viewpoint. By its exemplary acts of civil disobedience,
:it sought to shock and shame the people of Great Britain into
*^See Bertrand Russell, Justice in War-Time (Manchester: National 
Labour Press, 1915); Michael Scott, A Time to Speak (London:
Faber and Faber, 1958).
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joining with it in agitating for unilateralism; it sought to 
threaten the authorities with non-cooperation (and the resultant 
social dislocation) should its demands not be met.
Mervyn Jones, writing in Tribune3 posed the problem of
the practice of civil disobedience:
Anyone who says that the issue at North 
Pickenham is the wrongness of trespass 
and interference with work, rather than 
the wrongness of rocket war, accepts the 
proposition that obedience to law is right 
whatever the law....If direct action is 
not the way to oppose the rocket bases... 
then parliamentary opposition must be made 
effective....Suppose, despite all opposition, 
the Government relies on a docile though 
obsolete majority in Parliament and continues 
with a course opposed by a majority of the 
people. What is the duty of the citizen? 7
The nuclear disarmament movement in effect, spent the years
1960-64 answering that last question and adjudicating between
reform by persuasion and reform by physical intervention.
In this chapter, I shall discuss the second phase of the 
nuclear disarmament movement, in which the activitists had to 
reassess the consequences of objectives which made it difficult 
to deliver piece-meal victories and tactics which tended to over­
shadow the objectives of the movement. By 1961, the movement’s 
aim of unilateralism had been expanded into a policy of positive 
neutralism. At the same time, a section of the Committee of 100 
raised the problem of whether unilateralism and positive neutralism 
were possible within the framework of the existing political and
^Mervyn Jones, "Is There Any Other Way?”, Tribune , Dec. 12, 
1958, p. 6.
-  266
economic system. Michael Randle, the Committee Secretary, argued 
that in order to implement unilateralism there had to be profound 
political and social changes in the current political framework.
He suggested that unilateralism involved a complete break with 
the military tradition of the country, that it required the dis­
banding of the vested interests in the arms program, and that 
it entailed a new concept of defense based on non-violent direct 
action.
After examining the broadened objectives being advanced 
in the movement, I shall discuss the old and new tactics used 
to advance the program and the reaction to both the broadened 
program and new tactics. I shall then offer an evaluation of 
the movement for the period 1958-64, suggesting reasons why 
the numerical strength of the movement, which was its major 
res ource, waned.
Temporal Phases
Developments within the nuclear disarmament movement occurred 
against a background of Great Britain's changing defense policy.
8In signing the Bermuda agreement with the United States in 1957, 
Great Britain laid the groundwork for possessing an independent 
nuclear deterrent. Still in essential cooperation with and 
technical dependence on the United States, Great Britain began 
to develop Blue Streak, a liquid-fuelled missile comparable to
O°"Final CommuniauA from the Bermuda Conference", Command Paper 
126 (March, 1957).
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the American Atlas missile. The project was abandoned in April; 
1960^7 the United States and, therefore, by Great Britain for 
economic and technological reasons. Blue Streak replaced by4
the Skybolt missile, but the latter similarly was abandoned for
technological failures in the fall of 1962. In December, 1962,
Great Britain and the United States signed the Nassau agreement
under which the United States agreed to supply Great Britain
with Polaris missiles, which, in the future, could be included
9in a NATO multilateral nuclear force. By a single clause 
in the agreement —  'except where her Majesty's Government may 
decide that supreme national interests are at stake'1^  —
Great Britain managed to retain (although this became a debatable 
point in the country) plans for an independent nuclear deterrent. 
But Great Britain was still in a position where the United States 
could terminate the British deterrent or continue its development 
at a price fixed by the Americans. The Conservative Government 
was committed to what it regarded as an independent nuclear 
deterrent, if for no other reason than its reduction of the total 
dependence upon the United States. This was still the situation 
in 1964 when this study closes.
!
A
9.,Bahamas Meetings, December, 1962, Texts of Joint Communiques", 
Command Paper* 1915 (December, 1962).
10_,.,Icna,, p. 5.
"^"Statement on Defense, 1964", Command Paper 2270 (February, 
1964).
-  268 -
Ou the disarmament front» In July,1963#Great Britain,
the United States and the Soviet Union reached agreement on a
12treaty providing for a limited ban on nuclear testing. The 
treaty provided for the banning of all nuclear tests by the 
three powers in the atmosphere, in space, and underwater and 
for continued negotiations on the question of underground tests« 
All other nations were invited to sign the treaty, which con­
tained the following escape clause: Each Fsrty shall in
exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw 
from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events,
related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized
13the supreme Interests of its country.’
C iv il  disobedience. At the end of 1958, a sustained
campaign in the practice of civil disobedience was begun in
protest over the government*« policy on nuclear warfare. A
* squat-in” at the car park outside the Alderroastoo nuclear plant,
in protest over a refusal to be granted an interview with the
14Director of the plant„ was followed by DACANW’s demonstration 
at the Royal Air Force base at North Plckanhan. None was
arrested, but two weeks later, fortysix persons, including the
12 ’Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space and Under Water”, Ccnmand Paper 2245 
(January, 1964).
13 I b id . , p. 3.
U  L?t Sept. 23, 1958, p. 4.
I b id , , Dec. 8, 1958, pp. 6, 10.
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Rev. Michael Scott and three other leaders of DACANW, were
16arrested during a similar demonstration. The following day,
three persons were arrested for a demonstration in Whitehall
in support of the earlier demonstration.^7
At the end of 1959, another act of civil disobedience
was announced by DACANW, this time at a missile base near
18Harrington, Northamptonshire. Immediately, summonses were
served on six members prior to the proposed action. Upon
refusing to be bound over to keep the peace for twelve months,
as required by the Peace Act of 1361, the six were sent to
prison for two months. The announced missile base protests
went on as planned, leading to the arrests of eightytwo persons.
DACANW continued to use its brand of tactics against the
Ministry of Supply at the atomic weapons research establishment
20on Foulness Island and at the Finningley Royal Air Force 
21base; each time demonstrators faced arrest who refused to 
enter into recognizance to be of good behaviour for a set period 
of time.
In September,1960, plans of Russell and Scott for a civil
19
LT, Dec. 22, 1958, p. 8; Dec. 30, 1958, p. 3.
17 Ibid,, Dec. 23, 1958, p. 6.
18 PN, Jan. 1, 1960, p. 1.
19 LT3 Jan. 4, 1960, p. 6; Jan. 7, 1960, p. 6.
20 Ibid,, Apr. 26, 1960, p. 4; May 3, 1960, p. 6. 
21 Ibid,, Aug. 1, 1960, p. 10.
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disobedience campaign were made public. In seeking support for
22"non-violent resistance to nuclear war", Russell and Scott
wanted responsibility to rest with a "Committee of 100", in turn
supported by at least two thousand volunteer activists, which
would act outside the confines of CND. The Executive of CND,
after consideration of the appeal, reaffirmed its earlier policy —
that the case for unilateral disarmament could be argued best by
legal and democratic methods of persuasion and demonstration.
There were some unpleasant personal clashes between Russell and
Collins over the proposals, but these differences were sorted out
23with time and Russell's resignation from the presidency of CND.
At the inaugural meeting of the Committee of 100 in October, 
1960, Russell was elected president and Michael Randle, previously 
chairman of DACANW, secretary. The Committee, a smaller, more 
tightly knit organization than CND, had in common with the latter 
a sponsorship of persons prominent in British life, although more 
heavily weighted with persons of anarchist thinking. Included 
among the sponsors were Lindsay Anderson, Robert Bolt, Alex Comfort, 
Christopher Logue, Hugh McDiarmid, George Melly, John Osborne,
22 LT3 Sept. 29, 1960, p. 12. For the background of the letter, 
see Driver, op. eit.9 pp. 111-13.
23 LT3 Sept. 30, 1960, p. 4; Oct. 25, 1960, p.13; Nov. 7, 1960
p. 8.
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Sir Herbert Read and Arnold Wesker. As had been the case with
CND, professionals, students and housewives, those who had the
available time to demonstrate, composed the hard core of the
activists. In so far as presenting its case was concerned, the
Committee as a whole would decide policy, which policy would be
24set into operation by a working committee.
The Committee had postponed any formal demonstrations until
after the Labour Party conference at Scarborough. In December,
1960, Russell announced its first demonstration of civil disobedience—
a four hour sit-down outside the Minfetry of Defense in London in
February to coincide with the arrival of the American depot ship
Proteus carrying Polaris missiles for Holy Loch. A call was made
for at least two thousand volunteers to challenge directly the
government's nuclea* weapons policy. The Committee received pledges
25daily, and the total number of participants was over five thousand.
In Scotland, demonstrators tried to impede the Polaris submarines by
26bodily obstructing the moorings; at Holy Loch, fifty sea demon­
strators in canoes and boats attempted to board the Proteus3 while
one hundred land demonstrators sat in front of a pier on the Loch
27and blocked incoming traffic.
2A Clark, Second Wind: The Story of the Campaign and the Committee 
of 1003 op, cit,, p. 8.
25 LT3 Feb. 20, 1961, p. 16.
2^ Ibid, 3 Mar. 4, 1961, p. 6.
27 PA’, May 26, 1961, p. 4. Earlier, fourteen persons were arrested for 
a sit-down in Edinburgh as part of a march to the Polaris base; see 
LT3 May 13, 1961, p. 6; May 15, 1961, p. 8; May 16, 1961, p. 10.
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The Polaris protests were followed by others of a similar
nature. In the Committee’s sit-down ’’Public Assembly'’ in Parliament
Square, preceded by a rally of five thousand and a supporting march
by CND of six hundred, over eight hundred people were arrested,
28including many British notables. In response to the Berlin
crisis in the summer of 1961, the Committee sponsored a ”No War
Over Berlin” rally in Hyde Park; but for its contravention of Park
regulations prohibiting the use of microphones, four executive members 
29were fined. Undeterred by the refusal of the Ministry of Works
to grant permission to hold a civil disobedience demonstration on
the 17th of September, the Committee went ahead with its plans to
conduct sit-downs in London and Holy Loch. Thirty-two members of
the Committee, including Lord and Lady Russell, were sentenced to
terms of imprisonment of up to one month for refusing to be bound
over on a summons accusing them of inciting others to break the law
and commit a probable breach of the peace at the proposed demonstration.
At the demonstration itself, twelve thousand persons assembled in
Trafalgar Square (the police had banned sit-ins in Parliament Square)
31and 645 arrests were made; on the same day, 351 persons were arrested 
at the Holy Loch pier, but foul weather stopped the proposed seaborne 
picketing of the Proteus,
9 00 LTy May 1, 1961, p. 6.
?Q
Ibid, y Sept. 14, 1961, p. 6.
30 Ibid.y Sept. 13, 1961, p. 5.
31 Ibid,y Sept. 18, 1961, pp. 6, 10.
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In December,1961, six officers of the Committee were arrested
32under the Official Secrets Act for their intent to conduct civil
disobedience demonstrations at NATO bases; they were subsequently
brought to trial and convicted. At the demonstrations themselves,
held at Wethersfield, Brize Norton and Ruislip, 860 of the more than
33six thousand participants were arrested.
The Committee still managed to draw out reasonable numbers for
its demonstrations. In March 1962, 1,172 persons were arrested
during a sit-down in the five roadways leading into Parliament Square
34which had been called to * declare Parliament in contempt. In 
the summer of 1962, it conducted civil disobedience demonstrations 
at the United States Air Force base at Greenham Common, near Newbury,
and outside the American Embassy in London in protest against a space
35bomb test; in October, five hundred demonstrated and forty-four
36were arrested at Honengton Royal Air Force station, Suffolk.
32
Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5c. 28; Official Secrets
Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5c. 75: Official Secrets Act, 1939, 2 & 3 
Geo. 6c. 121.
33LTy Dec. 11, 1961, p. 7. See a similar demonstration at the Porton 
germ research center, Ibid., July 1, 1963, p. 6.
34Ibid., Mar. 26, 1962, p. 6. Earlier in the year, the Committee had 
held a sit-in in Parliament demanding an end to hydrogen bomb tests, 
PA, Jan. 26, 1962, p. 10, and a sit-in at the Bristol tax office 
in protest against taxes being used for nuclear purposes, Ibid.,
Mar. 2, 1962, p. 11.
33LT, June 25, 1962, p. 6; July 10, 1962, p. 10.
36Ibid., Oct. 22, 1962, p. 6.
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At the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Committee
37held demonstrations outside the Russian and American embassies
and a mass demonstration of several thousand in defiance of a ban
38by the Ministry of Public Buildings and Works.
The tactics of civil disobedience were also used by the
39Committee on the Aldermaston Marches from 1961-64.
Other Activities. CND continued with activities similar to 
those discussed in Chapter VIII. In addition to the yearly 
Aldermaston March, changed in 1964 to an Easter March within London 
itself, CND took part in a campaign against the Polaris bases on 
the Clyde, held protests at the time of the Berlin crisis in 1961, 
the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and on the occasion of the visit 
of the Greek King and Queen to Great Britain, and conducted support­
ing rallies for some of the Committee of 100's enterprises.
Presumably under the pressure of other work, but still expressing 
support of the movement's objectives, Collins resigned as chairman of 
CND in April 1964 and was replaced by Olive Gibbs. The theme 'Is 
CND Dead?' was then played to its full by supporters and critics of 
the movement alike.
37
LTy Oct. 25, 1962, p. 8.
38
IbicLy Oct. 29, 1962, p. 6. For other demonstrations at the time 
see P/7, Oct. 26, 1962, p. 12; Nov. 2, 1962, p. 12.
39
LT} Apr. 4, 1961, p. 8; Apr. 24, 1962, p. 6; Apr. 15, 1963, p. 5; 
Apr. 16, 1963, p. 10; Mar. 31, 1964, p. 6.
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With the accession of Harold Wilson to the leadership of the 
Labour Party in 1963, CND recognized a more sympathetic Party leader, 
but the Party platform still did not measure up to CND expectations. 
Although the Labour Party had rejected the Conservative’s version 
of the independent nuclear deterrient, all it had promised to do 
was reexamine the current nuclear weapons policy, renegotiate the
Nassau agreement, strengthen the conventional forces, and integrate
. 40NATO s nuclear weapons under effective political control. Even
with the Labour win at the polls in October 1964, CND viewed the
possibility of real progress on disarmament against the background
41of a hard fight to alter the nuclear alliance system.
Aims and "Motives
Both CND and the Committee of 100 had programs which emphasized 
certain positive policies for the British government to adopt. In 
addition to negative demands for the renunciation of nuclear weapons, 
the movement’s program asked for a foreign policy based on positive 
neutralism, disengagement in Europe, peaceful coexistence with 
eastern bloc countries, a strengthened United Nations, efforts to 
effectuate a general, multilateral disarmament agreement, and a 
world-wide, united attack on hunger, poverty and disease. By 1963, 
the movement's opposition to weapons of mass destruction had been 
widened to include chemical and biological weapons, as well as nuclear 
ones.
40 See its manifests The New Britain, in Ibid. s Sept. 12, 1964, p. 7.
41 Sanity, November, 1964, p. 12.
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The test-ban treaty signed in July ^ 963,was greeted with mild 
enthusiasm by the movement, most activists viewing it as a first 
step toward peace but one that had to be backed up by further arms 
reductions, by the withdrawal of nuclear bases from foreign soil, 
by the beginning of disengagement in Europe, and by the establishment 
of nuclear-free zones. Policy within the various organizations of 
the movement shifted somewhat after the treaty had been signed, but 
not only as a result of the treaty.
By 1963, there was soul-searching within the movement as to
the adequacy of its program. On the one hand, objectives were
sought which were more readily obtainable than those in the stated
program. It was thought that a program which could allow for tangible
accomplishments in the foreseeable future, that is, one that had more
limited demands, would have greater appeal to the mass of activists.
Peace Hews called for an objective which is closely related to the
goal of unilateral disarmament but which is rather less messianic 
42and utopian.' The need was seen for the occasional success which
would be more likely if there were specific aims, such as the abolition 
of civil defense programs, and abuses towards which the activists 
could direct their energies.
To this effect, CND began to emphasize short term objectives 
as well as long term aims. It placed emphasis on British withdrawal 
from NATO, on the renunciation of the British deterrent, ana on the
PA\ Jan. 18, 1963, p. 4.
42
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active use of British influence to achieve limited disarmament agree­
ments as steps toward general disarmament; but it also passed re­
solutions urging the government to remove strontiura-90 from the milk
supply, asking for the admission of China to the United Nations, and
43endorsing the Spies for Peace disclosures (to be discussed later).
In addition to a search for more limited objectives, there were
some within the movement who wanted to tie the objective of unilateralism
to a general attack on the existing political and economic framework
of the society. Unilateral nuclear disarmament, Randle argued;
involves a complete break with the military and political tradition
of the country...the millions of pounds spent since the war in the
nuclear armaments industry have created a tremendous vested interest
in the present policy, which is shared by almost everyone Involved 
44in the industry. Unilateralism, he continued without being more
specific, involved profound changes that were not possible within 
democratic capitalism.
But the overwhelming majority of activists, rightly or wrongly, 
regarded unilateralism as being attainable within the present system 
of government. To many in CND, it would only be possible with a Labour 
government in power; but in no case would it require a complete
43
S a n i t y November, 1963, p. 7.
44
PN. Mar. 10, 1961, p. 9. See also views of Alan Sillitoe on the 
revolutionary implications of nuclear disarmament;quoted in Nicolas 
Walter, Because He Is a Man*', Anarchy, No. 10 (December, 1961),
294-95.
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transformation of the power structure. Even within the Committee 
of 100 there were elements that found much wrong with the present 
state of democratic capitalism in Great Britain, but who still 
saw the possibility of reform without rejecting the existing 
political parties or posing a direct threat to the state.
Both the CND and the Committee of 100 were for unilateralism; 
both were opposed to all weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, 
chemical and biological; both advocated withdrawal from nuclear 
alliances. But the Committee spoke with a militancy that CND 
did not:
We have found that we cannot oppose nuclear war 
without addressing ourselves to the causes of war; 
that we cannot advocate non-violence without con­
sidering all the causes of violence; that we cannot 
resist the "defense'5 policy of the government with­
out coining up against the problem of the location 
of power in our society....Not all of us are agreed 
that this means we must reject the political parties 
and challenge the state in all its forms, but all 
of us are agreed that something is very serously 
wrong with democracy in this country. Not all of 
us *re agreed that we are a revolutionary movement, 
but we are all agreed that we want to see a revolution 
in the values of our society. 45
The Committee's policy statement for 1964 illustrated the 
tendency to go beyond the objectives of nuclear disarmament:
45
Committee of 100, "1963 Policy Statement", (n.d.)
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It is not enough to be merely anti-war.
We are interested in the problems of 
building a new non-violent society....
We are, for example, actively involved
in new thinking and action about education,
housing, health, communication, transport
and industrial relations. We have broken
with party politics....We have ceased to
believe in dependence upon representatives
and officials. 46
Once again, it should be noted that the movement’s heterogeneity 
made it difficult to expound the finer points of unilateralism. As 
was shown in Chapter VIII, there were those for whom the immorality 
of nuclear weapons made the issue one of simply renouncing their 
use, be it by Great Britain alone or as a contributory nation in 
NATO. Others wanted the movement to have as simple and united a 
policy as possible, with a fuller discussion of issues taking place 
in trade unions, party branches and Parliament. Still others were 
prepared for Great Britain to renounce the use of nuclear weapons 
while remaining within NATO and while seeking, although not 
immediately, the removal of American missile bases from British 
soil. The fine points of unilateralism differed even more than 
is suggested, but all arguments were joined by an overriding 
revulsion from nuclear weapons in spite of real differences in 
seeking a solution to the problem.
At times, the movement made demands that did not involve the 
alteration of some particular policy or that were not directed
46
Plf, July 3, 1964, p. 4
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primarily at the British government. At the time of the Berlin 
crisis in 1961, CND urged people in the country to speak out 
against Berlin's being made an excuse for war; but its solution 
was that the Western powers as a unit negotiate their position 
with the existing government in East Germany, that East Germany 
endorse the 1951 conditions of occupation in Berlin, that both 
sides consider the possibility of making Berlin a city of the 
United Nations, and that both sides consider the creaton of a 
neutral, nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. Of the British 
government, CND asked that it make clear its refusal to go to 
war over Berlin and that it press for immediate negotiations 
on the disupted issues.
At the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, there was 
little that the movement could do in Great Britain. Collins wrote 
to U Thant; vigils and demonstrations were conducted outside Russian 
and American consulates; Russell wrote to Khruschev and Kennedy; 
but there was little to demand of the British government. In the 
Greek demonstrations in 1963, the objective was a protest against 
the confinement of Greek political prisoners by the Greek government; 
but there were no demands made on the British government itself.
Tactics
In the societies discussed in this thesis, disobedience of the 
rules of the political order occur infrequently; conformity to con­
ventional and legal obligations is the normal pattern. The breaking 
of speed laws, the illegal performing of abortions, the failure to
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pay income taxes, and the taking of narcotics are exceptions, even 
if fairly commonplace ones, to regularized law-abidingness; they 
are, as well, the activities of individuals done in private, concealed 
from the eyes of the authorities, and committed with the express 
intention of not being caught. Organized community or group dis­
obedience, committed by people who are prepared to accept the consequences 
of their action, occurs very rarely. The infrequency with which civil 
disobedience occurs makes the groups which adopt and practice it all 
the more significant. In this section, I shall examine the reasons 
why DACANW and the Committee of 100 engaged in civil disobedience, 
their justifications for its use, the assumptions which underlied 
their practice, the forms which it took, and the reaction within the 
nuclear disarmament movement to its use. I shall then look at the 
tactics of legal persuasion used by CND for the period 1961-64; this 
will be followed by an examination of instances in which CND and the 
Committee of 100 together faced specific problems— the introduction 
of Polaris missiles, the Berlin crisis, the Cuban missile crisis, 
the Greek demonstrations, the role of independent political candidates, 
the role of industrial action, and the Aldermaston Marches.
Civil disobedience. As defined in Chapter I, civil disobedience
is non-violent direct a dion taken in open defiance of a positive law 
for the purpose of opposing governmental policy. In the case of the 
nuclear disarmament movement, civil disobedience was of a primarily 
symbolic nature; the laws which were broken were not themselves 
objectionable, but they served as a convenient symbol of the Conservative 
government's nuclear policy. There were two exceptions to this symbolic
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aspect of civil disobedience: one was the case of the Spies for Peace 
publication of classified information in direct violation of the 
Official Secrets Act; the other involved cases where there was direct 
physical obstruction of nuclear plants by sit-downs on the spot so as 
to stop or delay work at the plant or attempts to "reclaim” the 
plants for peaceful purposes.
There was unity within the nuclear disarmament movement on the
objective of unilateralism; but from the very beginning there were
differences on the most suitable tactics to be used in presenting
the case. Collins, Priestley, Kingsley Martin and others would have
agreed with Scott that demonstrations were needed to "bring home to
47our fellow countrymen the depth of our convictions." Where there
was
was disagreement /with respect to the tactics most likely to convince 
the public and the government of the correctness of their position. 
Scott and others were disillusioned with the parliamentary process 
and had lost confidence in parliamentary debate; Collins and others 
felt that persuasion by constitutional and democratic means could 
still make the nation and the nation’s politicians aware of the con­
sequences of nuclear warfare.
DACANW regarded its acts of civil disobedience— trespass on Air 
Ministry property, attempts to enter the missile base, and climbing 
the security fence if no entry was possible—  as being illegal but 
morally necessary. It argued that such tactics made clear its refusal
47
LTj Dec. 30, 1958, p. 3; s,ee also Socialist Leader, June 3, 
1959, p. 5.
to cooperate with what it considered to be an immoral government.
In examining instances In which civil disobedience was used at
nuclear weapons establishments, it can be seen that the activists
had a multiplicity of objectives: first, to make the townspeople
aware of the nature of operations at the establishment; secondly, to get
the trade unions to declare "black” work on the site; thirdly, to
get individual workers to leave the plant; fourthly, to raise the
issue in the public consciousness: fifthly, to show the government
the deoth of feeling of a section of the population against its
defense policy; and sixthly, to clarify and vitalize the problem by
contributing to the creation of a conflict situation which might force
48the government into a confrontation on the defense issue. As 
one writer supporting such tactics pointed out, civil disobedience 
at this level tried to break down people*s emotions, prejudices and 
thoughts on the disarmament question where argument and debate had 
failed:
Until you can break open that complex you are 
not usually able to convince people. And you 
are not usually able to break open the complex 
by argument. It is usually some kind of action 
that is needed that will open people up, so they 
will listen to argument. The demonstration aimed 
to do this opening up. 49
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The best discussion of the objectives of local, civil disobedience 
problems is found in Pat Arrowsmith’e novel Jericho (London: Cresset 
Press, 1965).
49 Alan Lovell, ‘ Where h'ext for the Campaign?", Universities and Left 
Review, Ko.6 (Spring, 1959), 5.
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DACANW used civil disobedience as an act of personsl witness- 
to show people its willingness to suffer for its beliefs. In 
addition, it regarded divil disobedience as a tactical weapon capable 
of focussing attention on the policy of the government-at a time when 
there was little discussion of that policy in other quarters.
The Committee of 100 was organized to emulate the work of 
DACANW on a mass scale: "A new campaign is needed— larger and more
radical than any that has previously taken place— to halt the land­
slide to catastophe.”^  The Russell-Scott call for volunteers cited 
the periods of the government's present policy, the manner in which 
facts on the dangers of nuclear weapons were being kept from the 
public, and the reasons why more had to be done in the way of mass 
action to awaken the government to the dangers of the present situation. 
Just as Great Britain was unable to wait for other powers to change 
their current policies on warfare of their own initiative, so too was 
the Committee unable to rely any longer on ordinary constitutional or 
lawful methods of persuasion:
Unfortunately, the opposition to sanity and 
mercy on the part of those who have power is 
such as to make persuasion by ordinary methods 
difficult and slow, with the result that, if 
such methods alone are employed, we shall 
probably all be done before our purpose can be 
achieved. Respect for law is important and only 
a very powerful conviction can justify actions 
which flout the law.
51
50
Committee of 100 handbill, "A Call to Action", (n.d.).
51
Reprint of letter of Michael Scott and Bertrand Russell, "Act or 
Perish", (1960).
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Scott, in his letter appealing for volunteers, said, "It is
my conviction that the effectiveness of our campaign is becoming
52dependent upon its endorsing a program of civil disobedience."
Those who volunteered to become activists in the campaign, while 
recruited from diverse sources, were joined in the belief that the 
public had to be made aware more fully and more dramatically than 
had been done so far of the dangers of nuclear war. Civil dis­
obedience, whether a tactical weapon or part of a philosophy of
life, was incorporated in a political program "to persuade Britain to
— 53abadon reliance upon the illusory protection of nuclear weapons."
54It was a 'shock tactic to rouse people to the danger", a way of 
giving the public a jolt and of showing it that it was not impotent 
in matters of social change; it was "a method of challenging the 
image of loyality, permanence and inevitability that surrounds all 
government programs and particularly its arms program."“*”*
It appears from the literature of the Committee of 100 that 
activists were pledged to take part in civil disobedience action for 
two kinds of reasons. Sir Herbert Read presented the personal case 
for civil disobedience based on support for the individual conscience 
against the authority of government :"My intention to commit an act
52
LT3 Sept. 29, 1960, p. 12.
53
Scott and Russell, op. cit.
54
Quoting Michael Randle in P N Mar. 10, 1961, p. 9.
55
Ibid.
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of civil disobedience in opposition to official policy that contemplates 
atomic warfare is neither strategical nor political: it is instinctive. 
Russell presented the political case for civil disobedience. It was 
a tactic to try to change the government’s policy, to use the necessary 
means of propaganda to counter the authorities (the politicians, the 
technical advisers, and the mass media of communication) who kept 
the truth about nuclear warfare from the public. He applauded the 
valuable work done by CND, but added: "...the press is becoming used 
to its doings and beginning to doubt their news value. It had there­
fore seemed to some of us necessary to supplement its campaign by
57such actions as the press is sure to report.’' Civil disobedience 
would show the depth of feeling against nuclear weapons and would 
cause "people to ask what had induced us to adopt such a course of 
action."^
The Committee appealed to people in Great Britain to act In 
their own behalf. In the declaration of intent posted on the Ministry 
of Defense's door during one of the sit-downs, the Committee compared 
Hitler's deeds with those of the East and West:
56
Herbert Read "Disobedience Against Polaris", Ibid,, Jan. 20, 
1961, p. 8.
Bertrand Russell, "Civil Disobedience", New Statesman, LXI 
(Feb. 17, 1961), 246.
Quoting Russell, LT, Sept. 13, 1961, p. 5.
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We call upon people everywhere to rise up
against this monstrous tyranny. We call
upon the scientists to refuse to work on
nuclear weapons. We call upon workers to
black all work connected with them and to
use their industrial strength in the
struggle for life. We call upon people
from all walks of life to take direct
action to bring the production of nuclear
weapons to a halt. 59
Where there were demonstrations at nuclear weapons plants, 
air bases and germ research centers, the objectives of the 
Committee of 100’s activists were the same as the six reasons 
cited with respect to DACANW's activists. Where there were demon­
strations in central London, the activits’ prime concern was to 
create alternative means of publicity and to focus public attention 
on the question of nuclear disarmament.
In instituting a campaign of civil disobedience, the Committee 
of 100 assumed that the British government could not function 
indefinitely if faced with prolonged and widespread non-cooperation, 
which situation the Committee hoped to bring about, coupled with 
active opposition to its policies. It assumed that the government 
at that particular time did not reflect the will of the majority: 
the ’’electorate has had no opportunity of expressing itself on the 
subject. "60 in addition, it assumed a certain minimum of popular
59
Committee of 100 reprintt Declaration Poster on the Door of the 
Ministry by Bussell and Scott," (1961).
60
Quoting Scotty in Tribune, Jan. 16, 1959, p. 6.
-  288 -
control at all times such that what it regarded as being incorrect 
policies could be changed as soon as a majority of the citizens 
were persuaded of the need to do so. Perhaps above all, it assumed 
a measure of compassion on the part of the British government and 
a belief that it would not use repressive force to counter the acts 
of civil disobedience.
In so far as the precise forms of civil disobedience were con-
61cemed, the spectrum included: sit-downs on public thoroughfares;
6 2sit-downs in the path of nuclear plant equipment;  ^ attempted entrance
63into prohibited places; going limp or otherwise refusing to co-
64operate when asked to move; and refusing to enter into recognizance 
(being bound over) that the activist would not cause any further 
breaches of the p e a c e . U s u a l l y  the tactics of civil disobedience 
were accompanied by methods of legal persuasion: distribution of
printed material; factory gate meetings; canvassing of villages; 
vigils, marches; and mass rallies. Those who agreed to participate 
received instruction leaflets and a legal briefing setting out the 
position of civil disobedience before the law. There were instructions
61
See e. g. JJX3 Sept. 18, 1961, pp. 6, 10.
62
See, e. g. Jdbid. y Dec. 8, 1958, pp. 6, 10.
63
See, e. §. , Ibid . 3 July 1, 1963, p. 6.
64
See, e . Jibid., May, 1, 1961, p. 6.
65
See, .e. g, , Ibid. J)ec. 30, 1958, p. 3.
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on non-violent discipline, binding over, non-cooperation, state­
ments to the police, legal advice and welfare, as well as advice 
on how to deal with various situations which might arise.
When the nuclear disarmament movement first began, CND was 
not prepared to welcome divil disobedience as a formal tactic of 
the movement. While making allowances for membership in DACANW,
CND stressed the need not to alienate Labour Party and trade union
66law. As the movement progressed, CND recognized that there
was room for both conventional and law-breaking policies. But it
still feared that an excessive use of civil disobedience would
alienate public opinion, especially Labour Party opinion.
After the Russell-Scott call for the Committee of 100, Collins
issued a statement to the Times in which he said ”1 think it is
important that the campaign should not be associated with views
that it does not represent, and particularly important that the
Labour Party should not think the campaign stands for things which
6 7are the views of certain individuals.” Soper, who himself had 
engaged in civil disobedience as a member of DACANW, elaborated 
upon the movement’s relationship to the Labour Party, stressing the 
need for CND to express itself constitutionally in order to have its
66
CND Bulletin, March,1960, n.p. The year before, the Executive 
had stated its disfavour towards civil disobedience, arguing 
it is difficult to justify in a country with democratic rights”. 
Ibid.3 March, 1959, n.p.
LT3 Sept. 29, 1960, p. 12.
67
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aims incorporated into the program of a political party. Other 
members of CND found the split in tactics unfortunate at a time 
when the situation was particularly ripe for ’’converting not 
alienating public opinion,— which means, of course, primarily 
opinion inside the Labour Party."**^
It was argued further that since the means of persuasion being 
used by CND appeared to be having success, it was important that 
they be continued. Sanity contended that law breaking tactics 
were not warranted when persuasion by constitutional and democratic 
means were still possible.^ At a different angle, Mervyn Jones 
warned that such tactics would merely gain publicity for themselves, 
but not for the arguments on unilateralism.^
But those who supported the call for civil disobedience were 
far less concerned with influencing opinion exclusively or primarily 
within the Labour Party and far less convinced that the movement 
had, by September 1960, brought itself to a position of strength. 
They were more concerned with personal convictions, 'that right must 
be done even if the established institutions of the state do stand
68
Donald Soper, "Socialism and the Bomb”, Tribune, Oct. 21,
1960, p. 4.
69
Kingsley Martin, "Gaitskell and the Unilateralists", New 
Statesm an, LX (Nov. 12, 1960), 721.
70
S a n ity, February,1961, p. 1; bee also Donald Soper, "The Case 
Against Civil Disobedience", Tribune, Mar. 3, 1961, p. 3.
71 Mervyn Jones, "Civil Disobedience", New Statesman, LXI (Feb. 24, 
1961), 302.
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* 72Che way- as they usually do.* In addition, some of the
activists agreed with Randle that where majority rule did not
respect human rights, as he alleged was the- case with the govern-
73üient's nuclear weapons program, such rule had to be disobeyed.
In any case, after the defeat of unilateralism at Blackpool, 
the nuclear disarmament movement had to decide upon appropriate 
tactics: how best to continue to make the argument about nuclear
strategy vital and important; whether tc continue to work within 
trade union branches and constituency Labour parties; what role 
to take with respect to independent political candidates; and 
whether to increase the use of civil disobedience demonstrations.
The defeat at Blackpool appeared to affect the Committee of 100 
less than it did CNR: if anything, it strengthened the former’s 
determination to resort to non-violent direct action utilizing 
civil disobedience. For there were many people in the Committee 
who, while believing that a Labour win was necessary for the realiza­
tion of a policy of unilateralism, felt that the tactics of civil 
disobedience, by impressing the public would assist the Party at 
the polls.
Legal pevsuasion. After the split within the nuclear disarma­
ment movement over the use of civil disobedience, CNR still used 
tactics similar to those discussed in Chapter VIII: cross-country
72
Ouoting Nicolas Walter, anarchist writer, L!T, Oct. A, 1960, p. 13.
73
P/V, Apr. 21, 1961, p. 6.
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marches; vigils; protest rallies and marches within London; 
and the like. In 1962, CND instituted "Operation Peanuts”, a grass­
roots campaign to draw in new supporters. Operating out of a 
Campaign Caravan, CND volunteer workers travelled ever five thousand 
miles around Great Britain to acquaint local villages of the work 
of the organization and to present the case for unilateralism. Out 
of this campaign came the idea for Caravan Workshops, a mobile
exhibition center to work with local CND groups in broadening the
77Campaign. In Novembery1963, CKD began ' Operation Fallex 63’ , 
aimed at making known the results of the NATO military exercises,
Fallex 62, conducted in September^1962, and based on information 
published in the German newspaper Der Spiegel. Its purpose was to 
acquaint the British people with the governments arrangements for 
dispersal before a nuclear war.
Joint activities of CUV arid the Committee of 100. CND joined 
forces with the Committee of 100 over various issues which arose in 
the period 1961-64. The tactics used by both groups will be discussed 
below; in addition, I shall examine the different approaches used by 
the two groups with respect to independent political candidates and 
industrial action.
74
Ibid., Sept. 26, 1960, p. 7; Dec. 28, 1960, p. 5.
75
Ibid., Aug. 6, 1962, p. 4.
76
Ibid., Sept. 4, 1961, p.6.
77 George Clark, ' The Image of the Campaign1 , Tribune, May 31, 19$3, p. 7.
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(a) Polaris. At the time when Polaris missiles were being 
sited in Great Britain, the Committee of 100 demanded that the 
government renounce the Polaris base agreement made with the United 
States. It appealed to people in all walks of life to take action 
against Polaris: ‘Ive call upon local tradesmen to refuse to supply
the base. We appeal to the Labour Movement to black all work 
connected with the base and to support the demonstrations...* We
ask for an increasing wave of protest that can lead to the removal
78of US bases and to a Britain free of nuclear weapons.” In its
appeal for support, the Committee also attacked the government for
its infringments on the right of free speech and the right of assembly
by banning its meetings "solely because of the potential effectiveness
,79of mass civil disobedience. It was important to protest now,
the Committee warned, for it might be for the last time. In the 
middle of September, it held sit-downs in Central London in protest 
over both Polaris and the Berlin crisis.
The Committee’s demonstration against the Polaris missiles should 
be examined alongside other forms of direct action used by the nuclear 
disarmament movement at the time. The government’s decision to buy 
Polaris missiles and to provide anchorage for the carrying submarines 
in the Holy Loch off Scotland’s Firth of Clyde was opposed even by 
Labour members who had been reticent about unilateralism in general.
78
Committee of 100 handbill, "No War over Berlin!", (n.d.).
79
Committee of 100 advertisement, ’Banned", New StatesmanLXII 
(Sept. 8, 1961), 315.
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Most had objected to the bases being placed so close to a large
center of population. A protest campaign had been initiated in
the autumn of 1960 by the joint efforts of regional CND groups,
ministers of the Church of Scotlana, and an active local trade union
and labour movement. While sit-downs for unilateralism were conducted
in London in February t1961, ten thousand persons participated in a
Polaris protest march in Scotland— the largest demonstration in the
qQarea since the 1926 General Strike/ In addition to other marches
in Glasgow and Dunoon in Marcht1961, demonstrators at Holy Loch tried
81to impede the Polaris submarines, and block the pier.
(b) Berlin. CND and the Committee of 100 pooled their resources 
at the end of July 1961, when the Berlin crisis began and the danger 
of nuclear war appeared to many activists to be imminent. CND urged 
people in Great Britain to speak out against Berlin's being made an 
excuse for war; it set out to explain the facts of the current crisis 
to the public and to show why the West had to negotiate its rights in 
Berlin with the existing government of East Germany. War, CND argued, 
was not the solution to the crisis, but skilful and tough negotiations 
were. As to concrete action, CND activists were urged to write to 
the Prime Minister and the American and Russian ambassadors to Great
80
LT3 Feb. 20, 1961, p. 16.
81
Ibid. 3 Mar. 4, 1961, p. 6; see also Mar. 3, 1961, p. 6; Mar. 6, 1961, 
p. 7; Mar. 13, 1961, p. 7.
PN3 May 26, 1961, p. 4. Earlier, fourteen persons were arrested for 
a sit-down in Edinburgh as part of the march to the Polaris base which 
had left London six weeks previously; see ibid3 May 13, 1961, p. 6.
May 15, 1961, p. 8; May 16, 1961, p. 10.
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Britain pressing for immediate negotiations to solve the Berlin
. . ?; 82 crisis.
In addition, CND held protest marches and meetings. One week 
after a ’March in Shame' of two thousand against Russian resumption 
of nuclear weapons testing, CND held a No War Over Berlin” rally 
at which the current crisis was blamed on the policies which the 
major powers had been pursuing. Great Britain must make it clear,
CND emphasized, that she refused to contemplate the possibility of
nuclear war over Berlin and must demand immediate negotiations on
83the disputed issues.
Protest activity was intensified as the Berlin crisis continued 
and when the United States and the Soviet Union resumed nuclear test­
ing. To commemorate Hiroshima Day, the Committee of 100 sponsored its 
‘ No War Over Berlin' rally in Hyde Park. While the rally was in 
progress, supplemented by sit-downs outside the American and Russian 
embassies, Russell, then eighty-nine and with failing voice, and three
other Committee members were fined for contravention of park regulations
84prohibiting the use of microphones.
CND handbill, "No Nuclear War for Berlin”, (1961).
83
PN, Sept. 15, 1961, p. 10.
84
LT, Sept. 14, 1961, p. 6; see also ibid. ^ Aug. 6, 1961, p. 4; 
Aug. 21, 1961, p. 5.
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(c) Cuban missile crisis. The two protest organizations joined 
forces again when the Cuban missile crisis broke out in September 
1962. Most of the activists were too bewildered by the swiftness 
of events and the sudden build-up of missile sites in Cuba to do any­
thing about the crisis, assuming that something could have been done 
85in Great Britain. Collins sent a letter to U Thant, Secretary-
General of the United Nations, calling for ’the dismantling of all
86nuclear and missile bases wherever they may be'; similar sentiments 
were expressed by the National Council of CND and in regional and 
local meetings. In addition, some local CND groups held vigils out- 
siue various Russian and American consulates in Great Britain.
Russell sent letters to Khruschev and Kennedy and the Committee 
of 100 held rallies and sit-downs outside the Russian and American 
Embassies demanding Hands off Cuba— East and West.' Amass demon­
stration over Cuba was called in defiance of a ban by the Ministry
87of Public Buildings and Works;" when held, the demonstration
88attracted several thousand people and 150 were arrested. Violence 
broke out between demonstrators and the police and arrests were made 
when demonstrators, who had been protesting at the Russian and Cuban
85
See the impressions of Ray Gosling, "No Such Zone", in Boulton, 
Voices from the Crowd: Against the H-Bomb, op. cit. pp. 146-50.
86
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87
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88
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Embassies, surrounded the American Embassy; at the same time,
eighty-six people were arrested in Bristol after a two mile protest
march which ended in a sit-down and fifty-three in Manchester for
89obstructing footpaths and interfering with the police.
(d) Greek political prisoners. Confrontation with the police 
marked another demonstration in 1963. In June, Collins warned that, 
contrary to government assurances to the Greek government, CND would 
stage a protest against the confinement of political prisoners 
during the state visit of the Greek King and Queen, since many of
these prisoners had expressed sympathy with the cause of nuclear dis-
90armament. The following month, CND conducted a quiet march to honor
the memory of a member of the Greek parliament, G. Lamrakis, who had
91been active in the disarmament movement before his death. Violence 
broke out two days later when police battled with members of the
92Committee of 100 (whose composition was becoming more anarchistic)
89
PA7, Oct. 26, 1962, p. 12; Nov. 2, 1962, p. 12.
90
LTy June 26, 1963, p. 9. Earlier, Russell had endorsed the cause
of Greek political prisoners. G. Lambrakis, a left-wing Greek MP 
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countries. For background of Greek protests, see Mark Arnold-Foster, 
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LT3 July 8, 1963, p. 8.
92
See, X . , Nicolas Walter^, Non-violent Resistance: Men Against War 
(London: Nonviolence 63, 1963), p. 32.
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who, in protesting against the confinement of political prisoners
in Greece, had broken through police barricades in an attempt to
reach the palace where the Greek King and Queen were dining. Ninety-
four persons were arrested for their part in the demonstration and
93subsequent sit-down in the road. Another protest which involved 
booing of members of the British royal family resulted in another
scuffle between demonstrators and the police, and further arrests
, 94were made.
Many of those arrested argued that the physical outbreaks against 
the police were precipitated by various factors: the London police 
ban on demonstrations and leaflet distribution in key areas of the 
city; the Minister of Works' ban on the use of Trafalgar Square for 
a meeting prior to the arrival of the Greek King and Oueen; the notifi­
cation by police that the wearing of black sashes would constitute the
wearing of a uniform; the rough handling of demonstrators at the actual
95demonstration. With other channels of agitation closed or curtailed, 
some demonstrators felt themselves forced into the use of violence, if 
only for the moment.
(e) Independent political candidates. The nuclear disarmament
93
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movement argued its position on unilateralism without the support
of a major political party. Unsuccessful in incorporating its
views into the program of the Labour Party, it had no hopes of
seeing its views become policy upon the latter's election. It
therefore seemed plausible to argue that one of the most effective
ways to get the message of the movement across to the electorate
was to set up independent political candidates to run on platforms
built around the unilateralist question; if elected, these candidates
could represent the interests of the movement within Parliament.
The dilemma of supporting such candidates was examined in
Capter VIII. In 1962, Pembroke supporters of CND were rebuked by
the CND Executive for their move to promote a parliamentary candidate
96in defiance of a national resolution against such action. While 
critics of the Executive agreed on the need for closer cooperation 
with and action in the Labour Party, they argued that independent 
CND action in the party political sphere, such as the running of 
CND candidates where none of the candidates had a suitable position 
on unilateralism, could present a direct challenge to the right-wing 
of the Labour Party and a clear choice to the electorate. Peace News 
also argued that by operating solely within the Labour Party, the
movement was fighting on grounds favorable to the right-wing of the
_ „ 97Party.
96
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The Labour Advisory Committee of CND, in stating its position
against independent candidates, argued that CND had to win support
from all areas of opinion by not supporting any particular party
or any particular parliamentary candidate; but, it continued, CND
supporters who were politcally active must try to win over their
respective political parties and insure the selection of candidates
98supporting their aims. The 1962 Annual Conference of CND supported
the Labour Advisory Committee’s views, stressing the need to remain
a pressure group which would ascertain candidates' views but which
99would officially support none.
There was a significant element within the Committee of 100 which 
shared the earlier attitude of DACANW towards pronouncing on the suit­
ability of individual parliamentary candidates. But since the 
Committee was preoccupied with other forms of direct action, and, in 
addition, contained a core of anarchits who were against running £7
r
candidates of any political persuasion, the problem of laying down 
one line for all of the Committee to follow was never a serious one.
(f) Direct industrial action. DACANW and later the Committee 
of 100 emphasized in their campaign literature the importance of 
direct industrial action, that is, the downing of tools by the work 
force for political reasons, in the fight for unilateralism. Pat 
Arrowsmith, one of the founders of DACANW and the Committee of 100,
98
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99
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argued:
Short of wholesale resistance by the mass of 
people in this country— that is the industrial 
workers: the people with real power who can
if they wish halt the economy of the country—  
it is unlikely we shall win this campaign, 
however many times we may walk to and from 
Aldermaston and sit down in strategic places 
singing !!We shall not be moved '. 100
But there had been relatively little direct industrial action in
support of the movement during the period 1958-64.^^ In October
1961, the Committee of 100 had sent a circular letter to sympathetic
trade unions, expressing the hope that the latter would not handle
102any nuclear material on the docks or in the factories. But in
July( 1962, the National Council of CND, emphasizing the need to 
use normal and legal means of persuasion and fearing industrial 
anarchy, opposed strike action taken in sympathy with its objectives. 
This action caused Arrowsmith and Scott to resign from CND on the 
grounds that the National Council had paid no regard to Conference 
policy which had supported "token and direct industrial action,
100
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101
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including the blacklisting of work, on the issue of disarmament". 
When Conference met again, the Executive was critized for failing 
to follow up the previous resolution on industrial action.
Aldermaston Marches. Both forms of direct action— civil dis­
obedience and lawful persuasion—  were used during the 1961 Alder­
maston March. In Chapter VIII, the role played by CND and legal 
persuasion on the March discussed. After the March had been concluded 
in Trafalgar Square, a break-away group, not officially organized 
by either CND or the Committee of 100, conducted a sit-down near
the American Embassy, which resulted in the arrest of thirty-one 
106persons.
The fifth Aldermaston March held in 1962 was the largest one 
to date: messages from the many other marches being held simultan­
eously throughout the world emphasized how important a protest ritual 
Aldermaston had become. The line of twenty thousand which marched 
in silence past the American Embassy in protest against the resumption 
of nuclear tests swelled to four times that size as crowds massed 
in and around Trafalgar Square. Collins said:
104
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This is a magnificant response, a terrific 
concourse of people all determined to per­
suade Messrs. MacMillan, Gaitskell, and 
Grimond that they are not leading the 
British people where they ought to go. They 
always think the Aldermaston demonstration 
just a flash in the pan. I hope this year 
they will recognize it as a flash they 
cannot resist. 107
In the aftermath of the Square gathering, 350 persons, of a 
crowd of fifteen hundred bearing letters of protest, were arrested 
in a sit-down outside the American Embassy and fined for wilfully 
disregarding directions of the police by sitting in the roadway.
Some of the demonstrators alleged that the sit-down was a spontaneous 
reply to the action of the police in trying to keep them from the 
Embassy
By the time of the 1963 Aldermaston March, the activities over
the Easter week-end had become not only a British tradition and
a protest ritual but also internationally significant. For Peggy
Duff, organizing secretary of CND, Aldermaston had come to symbolize
I;the revolt of ordinary people against the mad policies of govern- 
109mente." Ten thousand set off from Aldermaston and the peak of
107
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forty thousand, a sharp drop from the 1962 March, was reached
at the Hyde Park rally, where in addition to the usual speeches,
hundreds of tins of dried milk were collected to be shipped to
the starving children of Algeria; this was CND's way of showing
a better use to which the money spent on nuclear armaments 
_ 110could be put.
But the drama of the 1963 March was outside the moving 
colu&ns of marchers. Four thousand copies of a document, DangerI 
Official Secret RSG-6", which gave details of the system of 
government under which the country would operate in the event 
of a nuclear attack, were published by an anonymous Spies for 
Peace group and distributed to the marchers by the Committee of 
100. It gave the location of the "regional seats of government" 
which would coordinate government activities after the nuclear 
attack and invited the Aldermaston marchers to detour the March 
to one such area in south E n g l a n d . F o u r  to five hundred 
of the marchers, heeding the advice of the document, headed for 
one of the "secret headquarters", but no arrests were made by the 
police even though defense officials, admitting that some of the 
material in the document was classified as secret, had announced
110
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that the publication constituted a breach of the Official 
112Secrets Act.
CND officials pleaded ignorance of the leaflets and con­
demned the Spies' outbreak as not being an official part of the 
March. For this criticism of the document, officials were in 
turn criticized by some members of CND who felt that even if
the authors had broken the law, the revelations of the docu-
113ment outweighed in importance the tactics which they used.
Later, at its Annual Conference, CND officially endorsed the
disclosures made by the Spies for Peace out of sympathy with
114the group’s objectives if not its tactics.
Members of the Committee of 100 had warned, even before 
the Spies for Peace episode, that the Committee (to which it was 
believed that the Spies were affiliated) had been making tactical 
mistakes and miscalculations. Nicolas Walter, one of the original 
supporters of the Committee, assessed that the decentralization 
of the Committee in 1962 ’'turned out to be the beginning of a 
ritualized disintegration.”^** As supporters withdrew from the 
Committee, a new kind of organization had grown out of the old;
112
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it was one more firmly committed to anarchist principles.
It was the new group of the Committee of 100 which felt after 
the Spies for Peace episode that:
The nuclear disarmament movement in 
Britain has gone over to the offensive.
The days of protest are over. We are 
beginning to see the basis of a genuine 
revolutionary mass movement, using tactics 
and methods appropriate to our society.
The movement must encompass all those who
are opposed to the present authoritarian
and bureaucratic set-up. 116
On the 1963 March itself, more than seventy people were 
arrested when thousands of marchers on the final stages fought 
with p o l i c e . U n d e r  the leadership of the Federation of 
London Anarchists and the Committee of 100, thousands of young 
people broke through police ranks in order to take another route 
to the Hyde Park rally.
The 1964 Easter March replaced the traditional Aldermaston 
March after the CND leadership assessed that the March had out­
lived its purpose. The movement could still record that fifteen
118to thirty thousand people packed Trafalgar Square; but after 
the traditional four days rallies, the Easter March was something 
of an anti-climax. National and international speakers spoke of
116
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the importance of the movement, the importance of opposing the 
establishment, the need for unilateralism, and the dangers of 
accidental war, but the spirit of the earlier marathons was 
missing.
The Committee of 100, fearing a retrogression in activities 
at Easter when people were expecting the traditional Aldermaston 
protest, held a civil disobedience demonstration at the United 
States Air Force base at Ruislip. After a three-day march to 
Ruislip of one thousand people, three hundred people, undeterred 
by the earlier arrests of four Committee members under the
H<Official Secrets Act, sat-down outside the base and were arrested.
Reaction
Public reaction. During this phase of the nuclear dis­
armament movement, adverse public reaction was directed primarily 
against the tactics of civil disobedience used by the Committee 
of 100; there was a supplementary reaction of disapproval towards 
the broadening of protest activities into fields less directly 
concerned with disarmament. Whether the Committee of 100 achieved 
publicity for its objective of unilateralism is debatable, but 
that it achieved publicity for its activities is certain. Russell’s 
desire to have the press report the activities of the movement 
and to dramatize the urgency of its action was assured when police 
and reporters turned out in record strength to cover the novel,
119
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often star-studded demonstrations. Sit-downs on the pavement 
and grass in front of government buildings, the arrest of the 
eighty-nine year old Russell, and the number of theatrical 
personalities who supplemented the hard core of pacifists, 
anarchists and radicals of the Committee made the press more 
anxious to report the demonstrations.
However, one gets the impression from analyzing the newspaper 
coverage and from personal contact with former activists that the 
public was less concerned with discussing the demands of the 
movement than with discussing its methods. Whereas in the initial 
phase of the movement, the public appeared prepared to debate the 
consequences of the new weapons of warfare, now it was worried by 
the consequences of civil disobedience. Arguments were raised in 
the press against civil disobedience as a tactic: that there was
no place for it in a democracy; that it involved disrespect of 
the elected leaders; that it involved a minority forcing its views 
on a majority; that it relied upon improper channels of agitation; 
that the breaking of laws such as those which pertained to traffic 
had nothing to do with disarmament; and that it would lead to 
anarchy and disorder.
The Committee of 100, as DACANW before it, was angered that 
discussions in the press, the labour movement and the Parliament 
were centered almost exclusively around the procedural issues of 
the demonstrations. At the time of the first DACANW demonstrations, 
supporters attacked the severity and archaic quality of the 1361 
Peace Act and its repugnance to principles of civil liberty and fair
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play; very few critics of the authorities' action in having the six 
DACANW members sent to jail were concerned with the reasons underlying 
the activists' action, and their purposeful breach of the law.
In 1961, when the National Council for Civil Liberties issued its
report, Public Order and the P o lice_, it also entered the debate on
grounds of procedure. Citing thirty-one allegations of police violence
arising from a sit-down in Trafalgar Square, the Council listed six
issues on which the public was entitled to clarification, all involving
120questions of civil liberties. ‘ Even supporters of the government’s 
foreign policy queried the handling of particular cases. In the incid­
ent involving Russell's arrest, supporters questioned the way in which 
Butler tried to evade responsibility for Russell’s imprisonment, the 
naivete of believing that threatened or real imprisonment would deter 
the Committee of 100 and its supporters, and the stupidity of making 
a martyr of Russell and other celebrities and thereby giving sympathetic
120
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of Works of permission to book the Square on September 17. 2. The
invoking of the Public Order Act, 1936, to prohibit all processions 
for 24 hours. 3. The announcement to the public of an extension 
of orders apparently prohibiting processions and assemblies when 
the police had no such powers. 4. The allegations of violence and 
misconduct made by members of the public against the police. 5. The 
remarkable statements by police officers on oath when stating that 
they had advised arrested persons of the Commissioner’s directions 
under the Public Order Act when this appeared to onlookers to be 
almost impossible. 6. The refusal to permit contact with legal 
advisers or family to those under arrest." National Council for 
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publicity to the cause of nuclear disarmament. What the authorities
should have done, one of the government's supporter-turned-critic
said, was nothin?: 'Eventually they (the Committee of 100] would
have become tired of sitting down and gone away. As it is, a bad
law has been used in a silly way to produce the opposite effect to
»,121what was intended.
Some anarchists argued that questions of civil liberties were 
not relevant to the movement as the protests were a matter of con­
science. Judith Hart, MP, put the view in opposition to this. She 
viewed the movement as part of the democratic process, as part of 
the way of promoting change and of enlarging areas of national 
decision-making, and as a method of waking the government responsive 
and sensitive to public opinion. Since the movement had in it people 
who were caught up in most of the other important movements for re­
form, it was important to counter infringements of civil liberties
122in one movement in order to secure the other movements.
As the big names dropped out of the ranks of the activists and 
as the demonstrations became rowdier if still basic non-violent, 
public reaction appeared to become more critical of the militant 
section of the movement. As a case in point, the tactics of the Spies
121
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for Peace and the demonstrations concerned with distributing the 
Spies' document annoyed more people than did the revelations of 
Danger! Official Secret RSG-6". The anarchistic element within 
the movement appeared to frighten more people than the arrangements 
to be made after the nuclear holocaust. The Times spoke of:
those who are resolved to use this urgent 
flood of protest to serve their political 
aims— aims which in many cases would most 
effectively be achieved by a breakdown of 
law and order in Britain....The violent 
clashes with the police in London, attempts 
to encourage contempt for the Official 
Secrets Act; and the appearance of uni­
lateralist emblems at almost any manifest­
ation of civil disobedience on whatever 
pretext, are matters of the most serious 
moment. 123
Even the Tribune had "little interest in the content of the notorious
’Spies for Peace’ pamphlet which had done the nuclear disarmament
124movement a great deal of harm." Anarchy, in support of the docu­
ment and its publication, replied for the Committee of 100:
The reaction of the press ("right", "left”, and
’centre") showed how futile the traditional
channels of protest have become. When the CND
leadership speaks of ‘marching into politics",
is this the kind of politics they mean? With
the publication of the RSG-6 document, a real
challenge suddenly confronted people. Yet from
the Times to Tribune, from the Daily Mail to the
Daily Worker, from the "leaders" in Westminster
to the "leaders" in Carthusian Street, traditional
politics spoke with but a single voice: "The
State is sacred. Down with the Spies". 125
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At the time of the Greek demonstrations, criticism arose over 
the relevance of the protests to the objectives of the nuclear dis­
armament movement. The demonstrations, as well as several others 
which had preceded it, were less disciplined, less concerned with 
strict non-violence, and had objectives which related less specific­
ally to nuclear disarmament than had earlier ones. The Observer 
warned: 'By becoming indiscriminate in their indignation, they
are also becoming less effective— confirming the belief of those
who dismiss protest marches as the symptom of a general social dis-
126content in search of an outlet and a political pretext.
Similarly, in September^1963, when six leaders of CND announced
that they would not stand for election on the National Council, one
of them, Jacquetta Hawkes, expressed her disapproval of too many
127diverse organizations coming under CND’s ’umbrella policy.”
As for reaction to the more traditional mode of protest, the
public appeared uncritical but unmoved. By 1961, the Aldermaston
March had almost become a national institution. The Times called
it ’an annual spring festival which excites enthusiasm and derision 
128in equal measure." But it appears that the March excited the
public less once the tactics of civil disobedience were introduced 
as accompanying methods of agitation. The Marches’ very acceptance 
by the public, in a sense its new-found respectability and conventionality,
126
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detracted for some activists from its earlier importance in the
movement. It was the reaction against this respectability that
had made the Committee of 100 base its activities on a direct
challenge to the government in what it hoped would be "a form
129that cannot be ignored by the authorities”. While the
public, as well as the government, did not ignore the form, they 
both succeeded in ignoring the demands associated with civil dis­
obedience.
Labour Party. In this phase of the movement, the Labour 
Party took a harder line toward the movement, its role as a kind 
of pressure or ginger group and its objectives of an alternative 
foreign policy. With respect to the CND, with which the Party was 
more concerned than with the Committee of 100, the Executive tightened 
Party discipline in an effort to keep members from supporting candi­
dates whom CND supporters put forward; membership or support of an
organization which put forth its own candidates was made incompatible
130with membership of the Labour Party.
Relations t>etween the Party and CND erupted after Gaitskell 
was heckled at a Glasoow May Day rally. To the jeerers, Gaitskell 
shouted the suggestion that nuclear disarmers who felt so strongly 
about their case should conduct demonstrations in the Soviet Union 
or hold their peace and concentrate more on helping the Labour Party
129
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130
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131win support for its platform. Gaitskell further alleged that
the demonstrations against him had been organized by the Communist 
Party with the support of CND; these allegations were supported 
by Len Williams, General Secretary of the Labour Party, who, warn­
ing that some members of CND were bringing nearer the day when 
Labour would have to consider proscribing the movement, argued
that CND obviously had been infiltrated by "anti-democratic 
• 132elements.” In addition, the Labour Party announced plans
to conduct an investigation into Communist influence within CND: 
the results of the investigation, if it was carried out, were 
never reported.
This was the first time that a Labour spokesman had accused the 
Communists of having organized hostility to Labour through the CND. 
Various persons within the nuclear disarmament movement estimated 
the Communists1 activities in the movement differently: some
thought that they were out to wreck the movement for the benefit 
of the Soviet Union; others that they were hard workers who could 
be counted on to put across the unilateralist program; others that
131
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they were a nuisance whose motives were suspect but not a genuine 
threat; still others that they had a right to be in the movement 
so long as they did not attempt either to direct or to control
As for the Communist Party itself, it had welcomed the nuclear 
disarmament movement, for varied reasons and motives, but had 
never been in complete agreement with the movement's objective 
of unilateralism, preferring as it did the objective of multi­
lateralism. Initially cautious towards the CND, it had thrown 
itself belatedly behind the Aldermaston Marches and other activi­
ties again for varied reasons, after the appeal of the movement 
had proved successful.
Following on its tough line the Labour Party waved a threat
of expulsion over the heads of Lords Russell and Chorley and Canon
Collins for their sponsorship of the Moscow World Congress for
General Disarmament and Peace, but the National Executive Committee
135refused to approve a sub-committee’s ultimatum on expulsion.
On policy issues, the Party continued with the Blackpool resol­
utions demanding an energetic Party campaign on the issue of
133
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censuring nuclear weapons testing by any country. By 1964, with 
a change in Party leadership, it offered a program which rejected 
the idea of an independent nuclear deterrent but still supported 
joint nuclear commitments with western bloc countries.
Government, In response to the tactics of civil disobedience, 
the sole area of response by the government to the movement, the 
government tried to prevent demonstrations from occurring in some 
instances as well as taking legal action once the demonstrations 
had taken place. When it found that placing a ban on the Committee's
activities, as it did in the Berlin protests planned for central
«2» *3 ^London, only increased the number of persons prepared to demon­
strate in defence of the right of assembly, it sought to counter 
the demonstrations in other ways. In response to the demonstrations 
planned for the NATO bases in December 1961, the government announced 
the extensive physical precautions it was taking; at Wethersfield 
alone, the demonstrators were to be greeted by five thousand Royal 
Air Force Regiment men, 260 Royal Air Force and Womens Royal Air 
Force police, 850 civil police and special branch officers, seventy- 
five Air Ministry constabulary men, twelve Royal Air Force police
Alsatians, two belvedere helicopters and six and one-half miles of
137barbed wire fencing.
136
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Where arrests were made, they were usually on charges of
138wilful obstruction of police officers in their line of duty, 
trespassing on government property,obstructing traffic, 
refusing to be bound over on a summons accusing them of inciting
14]others to break the law and commit a probable breach of the peace,
142disorderly conduct, wilful disregard of the direction of the
143 144Commissioner of Police, disturbing the peace, and a combina­
tion of the above charges.
One of the series of arrests turned into a major trial, designed 
to cripple the Committee. In December 1961, Special Branch officers
138
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with warrants under the Official Secrets Act raided the London
Office of the Committee of 100 and the homes of six of its members
in search of documents relating to proposed demonstrations at 
145NATO bases. Advance notice of the demonstrations, which
were to be symbolic acts to block and reclaim the bases for
civilian use, had been given already to the police, but under
government regulations the airfields were prohibited places within
the meaning of the Official Secrets Act. Five officials of the
Committee— Terry Chandler, Ian Dixon, Trevor Hatton, Michael
Randle, and Pat Pottle (Helen Allegranza later became the sixth)—
were charged under the Act with having conspired together to incite
others to commit a breach of Section 1 of the Act for a purpose
146prejudicial to the safety or interests of the state.
The six booked came to trial following the demonstration at 
Wethersfield and entered a plea of not guilty. Opening the case 
for the Crown, the Attorney-General stressed that the trial was not 
a political prosecution of people suspected of political offenses, 
but of persons whose conduct led to a criminal offense. The accused, 
as members of the Committee of 100, could legally hold and advocate 
their views on nuclear disarmament, but they must not attract 
attention to those views by criminal activity. Reading from docu­
ments of the Committee on the uses to which civil disobedience could 
be put, the Attorney-General warned of the seriousness of action geared
145
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to interfere with or immobilize part of the country’s defenses.
He argued that the immobilization of an airfield in a state of 
instant readiness was quite serious and clearly prejudicial to 
the safety and interests of the state.
The defence, for its part, argued that it was not in the 
interests of the state to have aircraft armed with nuclear weapons 
on British soil. The defence’s efforts to establish the pertinency 
of the accused’s views on nuclear disarmament (for example, on 
the effect of nuclear explosions, the possibility of an error in 
radar identification the effect of fall-out, and the like) were 
cut short by the judge’s ruling out evidence on the nature of Great 
Britain’s nuclear weapons arrangements. The judge stated that 
Randle's view of the nature of nuclear war was immaterial, as was 
any expert evidence on whether the nuclear deterrent was beneficial 
or prejudicial to the state. The jury was to consider not personal 
views on the weapons question but whether Great Britain’s defences 
would have been weakened if planes were unable to take off should 
the demonstrations have succeeded.
The jury brought in a verdict of guilty, adding a rider recommend­
ing leniency. The six were sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment, 
reduced to twelve for Allegranza, after having refused to give an 
undertaking that they would not commit any further criminal offences. 
Upon appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, the defence argued that
See reports in Daily Telegraphy Feb. 13, 1962, p. 21; Feb. 14,
1962, p. 20; Feb. 15, 1962, p. 18; Feb. 16, 1962, p. 21; Feb. 20, 
1962, p. 19.
147
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the accused, in trying to bring home to the public the danger of
nuclear war, disputed whether entering the airfield was done for
any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the state;
in fact, having acted on certain facts, their purpose was to benefit
the state. The defence objected to the judge's having disallowed
the introduction of evidence called to support their intentions.
The Court of Criminal Appeal held that it was the prerogative of
the Crown tc determine what was prejudicial to the state; evidence
148challenging that power was correctly excluded by the trial judge.
Upon appeal to the House of Lords, the appellants again argued 
that the trial judge had wrongly excluded certain questions in 
cross-examination and had disallowed evidence connected with the 
use of the word purpose They said that evidence relating to the 
danger of accidental explosion, accident due to human error, accident 
due to the failure of the air warning system, the effect of an atom 
bomb explosion, and the fact that the existence of such bases was in 
fact prejudicial because they attracted an immediate hostile attack 
by the enemy should have been admissible. But the Lords dismissed 
the appeal on the grounds that matters relating to prohibited places, 
which in turn were related to the armed forces, were within the 
exclusive discretion of the Crown and not a subject of legal remedy 
through the courts: Anyone was entitled, in or out of Parliament,
to urge that policy regarding the armed forces should be changed;
148
Beginn v. Chandler and Others} C.C.A., 2 All E.R. 314 (1962).
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but until it was changed no one was entitled to challenge it 
149in court.”
When a similar possible breach of the Official Secrets Act 
arose in the case of the Spies for veace document, the government 
confiscated some of the documents, searched houses, warned against 
the reproduction of details of the document, but no official action 
against the anonymous authors, even those who subsequently named 
themselves when reprinting the document, was ever t a k e n . I n  
Parliament, efforts were made to gloss over the entire affair.
As was mentioned in Chapter VIII many of those who came to 
the defense of the activists did so on procedural not substantive 
issues. Anthony Greenwood, M.P., to cite one example, expressing 
his disapproval of both British foreign policy and civil disobedience 
criticized the Minister of Works for prohibiting the use of Trafalgar 
Square and pointed out that many had come to the demonstration 
simply to protest against the infringement of political freedom 
by the Government. Re summed up the principal queries of members 
of the Committee;
149
Quoting Lord Reid, at 146, in Chandler and Others v. Director of 
Public Prosecutions, ti.L., 3 All E.R. 142 (1962).
150
LT, June 1, 1963, p. 8.
SeePD(C), 646; 23-32 (Apr. 23, 1963).
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In arguments with supporters direct action 
and civil disobedience I have consistently urged 
that those who share my views on the bomb should 
seek to win support for those views through (a) 
public meetings, (b) Parliament, and (c) the 
political parties. In reply to my first argument 
they can now adduce Mr. Butler's recent behavior.
In reply to (b) they point out that, in spite of 
the Berlin situation, the resumption of tests, 
the fighting in Katanga, and the crises in the 
United Nations, Parliament has been in recess.
And in reply to (c) they ask me, since the 
Scarborough Conference of the Labour Party, 
what is the use of seeking to get their policy 
accepted by a political party if leaders can 
side-step decisions with which they disagree? 152
Similarly, where members came to the support of the movement in 
Parliament, it was either to criticize the government on procedural 
grounds or to criticize local police for ill-treatment of some of 
the demonstrators.
Evaluation
To return to Smelser's criteria of a successful norm-oriented
movement— one that ' leaves an observable mark— a norm cr an organization 
154in its wake'' —  then the nuclear disarmament movement failed on 
this score. While British defense policy had been altered in the
152
LT3 Sept. 22, 1961, p. 15. Similarly on procedural grounds, five 
Labour MPs demanded a judicial enquiry into the September 17th 
events.
153
See, e.g. PD(C)3 646: 155,162 (Oct. 17, 1961); 646: 736-39 (Oct. 
24, 1961); 652: 1278 (Feb. 1, 1962).
Smelser, op. cit.3 p. 111.
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y e a rs  fo llo w in g  th e  in c e p t io n  o f th e  n u c le a r  disarm am ent movement, 
changes appeared  to  be in  re sp o n se  to  te c h n o lo g ic a l  in n o v a tio n .
The c a n c e l l a t io n  o f B lue S tre a k  and S kybo lt by th e  C o n se rv a tiv e  
governm ent was n o t a r e s u l t  o f th e  m ovem ent's p ropaganda . Even 
th e  s p l i t  over th e  indep en d en t n u c le a r  d e t e r r e n t ,  w ith  Labour under 
W ilson p re p a re d  to  abandon i t ,  cou ld  no t be chalked  up as a w in fo r  
th e  movement• Through th e  tim e o f  th e  1964 G enera l E le c t io n ,  Labour 
p o l ic y  was d e riv e d  from th e  1961 C o n fe re n c e 's  Policy for Peace 
s ta tem en t*  f o r  i f  Labour in  1964 was p re p a re d  to  abandon an independ­
e n t s t r a t e g i c  s t r i k i n g  f o r c e ,  i t  s t i l l  accep ted  th e  b a s ic  t e n e ts  o f 
a p o l ic v  based  on n u c le a r  s t r a t e g y .
U n ila te ra l is m  as an o b je c t iv e  f a i l e d .  A lthough th e  te c h n iq u e s  
o f  th e  movement had been  co p ie  ^ in  more th a n  t h i r t y  c o u n tr ie s  by 
th e  tim e a t  which t h i s  s tu d y  c lo s e s ,  nowhere had u n i l a te r a l i s m  been 
adopted  as a fo re ig n  p o l ic y .  The movement had f a i l e d  to  p ersu ad e  
th e  i n d u s t r i a l  work fo rc e  to  b o y c o tt  work on n u c le a r  w eapons, o r to  
conv ince  a m ajor p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty  to  adop t and keep i t s  program  on 
u n i l a t e r a l i s m ,  o r to  convince th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  th a t  i t s  demands had 
to  be met l e s t  th e re  be mass s o c i a l  d i s lo c a t io n  in  th e  s o c ie ty .
N o n e th e le ss  i t  d id  s c o re  c e r t a in  p o s i t i v e  ach iev em en ts . I t  
r a l l i e d  th e  c o n v e rte d , o rg an ized  lik e -m in d ed  p e rso n s  and l e t  b o th  th e  
B r i t i s h  p u b lic  and th e  B r i t i s h  governm ent know how a m in o r ity  f e l t  on 
th e  q u e s tio n  of n u c le a r  w a r fa re .  I t  took  up an unp o p u la r p o s i t io n  
and threw  u n p o p u la r id e a s  in to  th e  m a rk e tp la c e . I t  b ro u g h t a v i t a l i t y  
to  th e  B r i t i s h  p o l i t i c a l  scene  and th rew  open fo r  d is c u s s io n  th e  
e n t i r e  q u e s tio n  o f w e s te rn  fo r e ig n  p o l i c y .  I t  awakened a s lum bering
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public* or one just beginning to rise from its sleep. It brought 
to life the possibility of ad hoe political action by activists 
operating outside of the party political sphere. Foot gave it 
its fair duet
Aidensaston will be* whatever else It is, a 
sign that the bomb testers» the great deterrent 
theorists» the orthodox spokesmen about defence 
are not to be allowed to be the only voices 
speaking for Britain....It has made argument 
about nuclear weapons a central feature of 
political controversy. Even when it has failed 
to establish any hold on the levers of political 
power, it might at a critical moment in inter­
national affairs help to determine the climate 
of opinion and tip the balance in favour of 
sanity. 155
In addition, the movement touched upon problems which might 
otherwise have gone unnoticed. Ouestions of civil liberties which 
had implications beyond the specific roovementwere broached.
Questions of police brutality, bans on public meetings, ramifications 
of the Official Secret Acts, and other like cases once raised had 
relevance to other political movements as well. It could be argued 
that the framework of politics and economics that shaped policy with 
respect to disarmament, shaped policy also with respect to civil 
liberties, aid to underdeveloped countries, poverty, social welfare, 
and revolutions in Asia. If certain principles coul< be established
155
Foot, Michael, MWhat Next for CND?U, Tribune, Apr. 20, 1962, p. 1.
Italics in the original.
15*
Driver, op. oii., pp. 156-81
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in any one of these fields then one might be establishing principles, 
even if indirectly, in other fields.
The Aldermaston March showed the strength of the nuclear dis­
armament forces, made an appeal to a larger public than the already 
converted, and gave an identity to the movement. But it also 
accustomed people to working and acting together; it gave them the 
confidence to express in public what they had previously held in 
private; it allowed them to find kindred spirits. Peace Views said:
Anything which tends to break down centralized 
power and give more power to individuals and 
groups of ordinary people, anything which works 
against a mass and sterotyped culture and which 
makes people more personally creative, discrim­
inating and critical, anything which destroys 
authoritarianism and creates self-reliance, and 
anything which breaks down fear and helplessness 
and creates a sense of confidence and strength, 
also tends to widen the area of resistance and 
to work against power politics and nuclear 
weapons. Campaigners can thus adopt, attitudes 
and take action relevant to the campaign in almost 
all areas of life. 157
The above achievement was on the personal side. On the political 
side, the movement was handicapped by the nature of its program.
The kind of changes which it sought to promote in the society had 
definite drawbacks. First of all, the movement offered few tangible 
benefits to the British people; this is not meant to imply that the 
changes it sought were any the less important. Secondly, the movement
157
PNj Apr. 20, 1962, p. 4. See also Brian Richardson, "What 
Has It Got to do with the Bomb", Anarchy, No. 26 (April, 1963) 
100-03.
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failed to have a hierarchy of goals from the very beginning, some 
of which might have been obtainable immediately. It had ultimate 
general objectives but too few short range objectives. Unilateralism 
failed to appeal as a political issue to enough people; that is, to 
a sufficient number who were prepared to immobilize the society.
Thirdly, the movement operated in an area, as the Cuban demonstra­
tions showed where the individual often was powerless once the 
crucial stage had been reached. At the point of no return, protest 
movements mattered far less than they did when policy was being 
debated and the environment could be changed. The Cuban crisis,
Greenwood could say upon reflection, showed that nuclear weapons
158provided the British people with no defence at all. For others,
the crisis showed that "the prospect of nuclear war had...a power-
,159ful pacificatory effect on both the Mr. Ks." Arrowsmith's
flight to West Ireland during the crisis to avoid the holocaust of 
the nuclear war should not detract from the positive achievements 
of the movement. But it should illustrate the powerlessness which 
even convinced activist felt when the moment of nuclear obliteration 
appeared to be at hand. By 1962, it is true to say that the "balance 
of terror" seemed a greater preserver of peace to most than did the 
renunciation of British intentions to escalate the arms race.
158
Anthony Greenwood, Why We Go on Marching", Tribune, Mar. 29,
1963, p. 5.
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"Nuclear Disarmers: Second Thoughts" Economist, cCV (Dec. 1, 1962), 
898. See also Bertrand Russell, Unearned Victory (Hammondsworth: 
Penguin, 1963).
CHAPTER X
THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT: POLITICAL STRIKES
The objective of this thesis is to examine a certain kind of 
collective behaviour (the norm-oriented movement) and explain why 
it occurs where it does9 when it does, and in the way that it does«
In this chapter, using Smelser*s six determinants of collective 
behaviour, I shall offer an explanation of Australian political 
strikes, which are essentially a form of non-violent direct action 
whose purpose is to convey certain demands to the authorities: 
structural conduciveness and structural strain could assist in explaining 
why such strikes occur in Australia; the growth of a generalized belief 
and the role of precipitating factors why they occur when they do; and 
the mobilization of the participants for action and the operation of 
social control why they occur in the way that they do«
However, this section of the thesis poses certain difficulties in 
methodology. While the use of political strikes by some Australian trade 
unions has much in common with the methods of non—violent direct action 
used by the civil rights and nuclear disarmament movements, there are 
also some significant differences«
First, with respect to the differences, I am not concerned in this 
section \ith the demands of the trade union movement p&T 86 but with the 
demands of the militant section (to be defined later) of the movement.
While the objectives of civil rights and nuclear disarmament were embraced 
by a whole movement and commanded general agreement throughout the movement 
political strikes and their objectives were not always supported by the
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traue union movement as a whole, but only Dy militant sections of it.
In concrete terms, the Printers* Union did not bear the same relationship 
to the Waterside Workers* Federation (WWF) on the question of banning 
goods to South Africa as the NAACP did to CORE on the question of slum 
clearance in Chicago.
Second, political strikes, unlike direct action for civil rights 
and nuclear disarmament, have been an intermittent phenomenon with wide 
gaps in time between their appearances. Third, activists in political 
strikes had to be members of trade unions. In the other two movements, 
association with the movement was largely a result of choice, although 
convention may have had something to do with that choice.
To counter these differences, I wish to make three points. First,
the prevalence of strikes in the coal and maritime industries, the nature
of the disputes in these industries, and the left-wing composition of the
Miners* Federation, WWF and Seamen’s Union separate these latter unions
out from the rest of the trade union movement. In a sense, with a few
other unions, these became the"militant movement" within the broader trade
union movement. Like movements in general,"^ Arhese militant unions share
a desire to change institutions, a turnover of membership without a loss
of identity, and an awareness of their common interests; in addition, they
2attract, while not formally containing, other organized groups and 
individuals.
1
2
See Chapter I, 
Ibid.I p,io
pp. 10, 11,
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Applying kerr ana S ie g e l ' s  coop era tive  a n a ly s is  o f  the in d u s tr ia l
3 Ap rop en sity  to  s t r ik e  to  A u stra lian  co a l and maritime in d u str ie s»  I
would argue th a t the lo c a t io n  o f workers in  th ese  in d u s tr ie s  (namely th e ir
geograph ica l or s o c ia l  i s o la t io n  from th e  gen era l community) anu the nature
o f  th e ir  job s (namely hazardous and u npleasant working co n d itio n s)  turn
the os in to  a co n esiv e  group o f  m ilita n t»  is o la t e d  workers w ith  n a s s , as
opposed to  in a iv id u a l ,  g r iev a n ces . Kerr and S ie g e l s t a t e :
The s t r i k e  f o r  t h i s  i s o l a t e d  mass i s  a  k in d  o f  
c o lo n ia l  r e v o l t  a g a in s t  fa r-rem oved  a u th o r i ty »  
an o u t l e t  f o r  accum ula ted  te n s io n s»  and a  sub­
s t i t u t e  f o r  o c c u p a tio n a l and s o c i a l  m o b i l i ty .
The i n d u s t r i a l  env ironm ent p la c e s  th e se  w orkers 
in  th e  r o le  o f  members o f  s e p a ra te  c l a s s e s . . . .  
t h e i r  own c la s s  o f  m iners o r  lo n g sh o rem en .• • •
Thus th e  i s o l a t e d  mass i n  a  c l a s s l e s s  s o c ie ty  
may become som eth ing  l i k e  th e  i s o l a t e d  c la s s  
in  a  c l a s s  so c ie ty »  more o r  l e s s  perm anently  
a t  odds w ith  th e  community a t  l a r g e .  3
K err and S ie g e l do n o t deny t h a t  o th e r  th e o r ie s  on th e  p ro p e n s ity  to  s t r i k e  
may ap p ly  to  th e  c o a l and m aritim e  I n d u s t r i e s .  But th e o r ie s  on th e  econo­
mic en v iro n m en t» th e  p o l i t i c a l  environm ent»  human r e la t io n s »  th e  tre n d  o f 
h i s t o r i c a l  developm ent» dom inant p e r s o n a l i t i e s »  ad herence  to  id e o lo g ic a l  
views» th e  s e le c t io n  o f  good b a rg a in in g  te ch n iq u es»  and key b a rg a in s  a re  
b e t t e r  f o r  e x p la n a tio n s  o f In d iv id u a l  s i t u a t i o n s  th a n  f o r  s t r i k e  p ro p e n s ity
3 C la rk  K err and Abraham S ie g e l ,  "The I n te r - i n d u s t r y  P ro p e n s ity  to  S t r ik e  -  
An I n te r n a t io n a l  Comparison"» in  A rth u r K ornhauser s t  a l • e d s . ,  In d u s tr ia l  
C o n flio t  (Hew Y ork: McGraw-Hill Book Company» 1954)» pp . 189-212.
See A u s t r a l ia n  s t r i k e  s t a t i s t i c s  i n  Commonwealth B ureau o f  Census and 
S t a t i s t i c s »  Labour and I n d u s t r i a l  Branch» Labour B u lle tin  (renam ed Labour 
Reports  in  1917)» 1913-64 . See a l s o  Boss and Hartman» op . c i t . ,  p p .143-46
K err and S ie g e l»  op . c i t . ,  p . 193.5
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in  p a r t i c u l a r  i n d u s t r i e s .
W hile th e  h ig h  p ro p e n s ity  to  s t r i k e  in  th e se  i n d u s t r i e s  c u ts  
a c ro s s  u a t io n a l  b o u n d a r ie s ,  i t  i s  im p o rta n t to  n o te  t h a t  in  A u s t r a l ia  
th e  m i l i t a n t  u n io n s in  th e se  i n d u s t r i e s  have been in f lu e n c e d  by M arx is t 
o r  Communist id e o lo g y . W hile th e re  i s  no lo g i c a l l y  n e c e s sa ry  co n n ec tio n  
betw een m ili ta n c y  and a s p e c i f i c  id e o lo g ic a l  o r i e n t a t i o n ,  h i s t o r i c a l l y ,  
A u s t r a l ia n  m i l i t a n t  u n ions (o r  th e  le a d e r s h ip  th e re o f )  have been l e f t -  
w ing a d h e re n ts  to  th e  th e o ry  o f c l a s s  c o n f l i c t  and th e  c la sh  o f  c la s s  
i n t e r e s t s .  W hether i t  was so in  f a c t  o r  n o t ,  i t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  a t  * 
c e r t a i n  p o in ts  in  t im e , p a r l ia m e n ta r ia n s ,  em p lo y ers , and o th e r  t r a d e  
u n io n s  have c o n s id e re d  th e  m i l i t a n t  u n io n s to  be s u b je c t  to  Communist 
c o n t ro l  (when d e c is io n s  w ere made by o f f i c i a l s  o f  th e  Communist P a r ty )  
o r  Communist in f lu e n c e  (when d e c is io n s  w ere m o d if ie d , a f f e c te d  o r  swayed 
by o f f i c i a l s  o f  th e  Communist P a r ty ) .  Even th e n ,  i t  was re c o g n iz e d  th a t  
o n ly  a very  sm a ll p ro p o r tio n  o f  th e  ran k -an d  f i l e  need  be Communist f o r  
th e  un ions to  be th o u g h t o f  in  th e s e  te rm s.
The s ig n i f i c a n c e  o f t h i s  M arx is t o r  Communist in f lu e n c e  ap p ea rs  to  
be a f a c t o r  in  th e  k in d s  o f  s t r i k e s  in  which th e s e  A u s tr a l ia n  u n io n s  were 
p re p a re d  to  engage (o f  which more l a t e r ) .  Thus, th e  com position  o f  th e  
un io n s and th e  n a tu re  o f  t h e i r  d is p u te s  i s  a n o th e r  co h es iv e  f a c t o r  o f 
th e  " m i l i t a n t  movement" in  A u s t r a l i a .
S eco n d ly , by ta k in g  a co n n ec ted  p e r io d  o f  tim e in  w hich th e r e  were 
a  s e r i e s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s ,  namely th e  p e r io d  1937-50 , I  would argue 
th a t  one cou ld  app ly  S m e lse r 's  d e te rm in a n ts  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  b eh av io u r to  
th e  m i l i t a n t  t r a d e  un io n s in  th e  same way a s  th e y  w ere a p p lie d  to  th e  
o th e r  two p o l i t i c a l  movements.
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T h ird ly ,  I  w ould a rgue  th a t  th e se  un ions b e a r  m ajor s i m i l a r i t i e s  
to  v o lu n ta ry  a s s o c ia t io n s  even though a c t i v i s t s  w ere re q u ire d  to  jo in  
them e i t h e r  th ro u g h  law o r  co n v e n tio n , I  su p p o r t th e  c o n te n tio n s  o f 
T urner and G ollan  t h a t  th e  d e c is io n s  o f  th e  le a d e r s  a re  s u b je c t  to  th e  
s c r u t in y  o f  th e  r a n k - a n d - f i l e ,  t h a t  d e c is io n s  o f  th e  le a d e r s  can be 
n e g a te d , and th a t  d e c is io n s  o f  th e  le a d e r s  a re  s u b je c t  to  th e  boundary 
l i n e s  drawn up by th e  r a n k - a n d - f i l e ,^
I t  i s  th e  s i m i l a r i t y  w hich th e  m i l i t a n t  un ions have to  th e  c i v i l  
r i g h t s  and n u c le a r  disarm am ent movements w hich I  f in d  o f  i n t e r e s t  and 
w hich make th e  th r e e  s e c t io n s  com parable w ith in  th e  l i m i t a t i o n s  d is c u s s e d . 
A ll th r e e  e x h ib i t  d i s t i n c t  p a t te r n s  o f  b e h a v io u r w hich a re  based  on 
d e v ia tio n s  from  th e  co n v en tio n s  and law s o f  th e  s o c i e t i e s  in  w hich they  
o p e ra te .  A ll th re e  in c lu d e  groups w hich u se  c o n v e n tio n a l and i l l e g a l  
t a c t i c s  as  a r e g u la r  p a r t  o f  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s .  A ll th r e e  a re  forms o r  
r e l a t e d  p a r t s  o f  n o rm -o rie n te d  movements w hich a re  concerned  to  a l t e r  
r u le s  o r  p o l i c i e s  o f  th e  s o c ie ty  i n  th e  name o f  c e r t a in  g e n e ra liz e d  
b e l i e f s ;  none o f  th e  th r e e  a re  o u t to  r e c o n s t i t u t e  th e  v a lu e s  o f t h e i r  
r e s p e c t iv e  s o c i e t i e s  by t h e i r  s p e c i f i c  use o f  n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n .
In t ro d u c t io n
With some m inor e x c e p tio n s ,  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  A u s t r a l ia n  t r a d e  un ions 
do n o t d i f f e r  from  th o se  o f  most o th e r  p re s s u re  groups o p e ra t in g  in  system s
^ I .A .H . T u rn e r , In d u s tr ia l  Labor and P o l i t i c s :  The Dynamics o f  the 
Labor Movement in  Eastern A u s tra lia , 1900-1921, unpub. Ph.D . t h e s i s ,  
A u s tr a l ia n  N a tio n a l U n iv e r s i ty ,  1962, pp . 2 -3 ; Robin G o lla n , The 
Coalminers o f  New South Wales: A H istory  o f  the Union 1860-1960 
(M elbourne: M elbourne U n iv e rs ity  P re ss  in  A s s o c ia tio n  w ith  th e  
A u s tr a l ia n  N a tio n a l U n iv e r s i ty ,  1963) pp . 220-21 .
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o f d em o cra tic  c a p i ta l i s m .  The u n ions (1 ) t r y  to  o b ta in  t h e i r  o b je c t iv e s  
by in f lu e n c in g  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  o r  governm ental b o d ie s  w ith o u t th em selves 
t r y in g  to  govern ; (2 ) pu rsu e  aim swhich a re  c o n s i s te n t  w ith  th e  e x i s t in g  
framework o f  s o c ie ty  and w hich do n o t c a l l  f o r  a  t o t a l  re a lig n m e n t o f 
econom ic and p o l i t i c a l  p a t t e r n s ;  and (3) a re  p r im a r i ly  concerned  w ith  
th e  w e lfa re  o f  t h e i r  own members, th e  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  some econom ic 
o r  p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t ,  o r  th e  p rom otion  o f  a s p e c i f i c  cause o r  p a r t i c u l a r  
s e t  o f  b e l i e f s .  O ften  t r a d e  un io n s w i l l  t r y  to  change th e  p o l i c i e s  n o t 
o f  th e  governm ent i t s e l f  b u t o f  some l a r g e r  t r a d e  un ion  body o r  some 
im p o rta n t group o f  u n io n s ; b u t  th e  u n ions s t i l l  b e a r  th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
a s s o c ia te d  w ith  o th e r  p re s s u re  g ro u p s .^
W hile m ost t r a d e  un ions do w ant to  b r in g  ab o u t changes in  s o c ie ty ,  
they  a re  c o n te n t to  win m easures o f  re fo rm  w h ile  p la y in g  th e  game o f 
government a c c o rd in g  to  th e  co n v en tio n s  and law s upon w hich d em o cra tic  
c a p i ta l is m  o p e r a te s .  In  A u s t r a l ia n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h i s  r e q u ir e s  th a t  in d u s­
t r i a l  a c t io n  be used  f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  k in d s  o f p u rp o se s , t h a t  th e  u n ions 
r e ly  upon l e g a l  means to  se c u re  t h e i r  dem ands, th a t  th ey  r e s p e c t  th e  
judgm ent o f  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  on m a tte r s  o f  governm ent p o l i c y ,  and t h a t  they
There have been few works devo ted  to  a s tu d y  o f  A u s tr a l ia n  p re s s u re  
g ro u p s. In  t h i s  c o n n e c tio n , see  W illiam  A. B ay ley , H istory o f  the 
Farmers and S e t t l e r s 1 A ssocia tion  o f  N.S.W. (Sydney: Farm ers and 
S e t t le r s *  A s s o c ia t io n , 1957); G o lla n , The Coalminers o f  New South  
Wales: A H istory o f  the Unionß 1860-19603 op, c i t , ;  G erald  Lawrence 
K r is t ia n s o n ,  Pressure Group A c t iv i t ie s  o f  the Returned Servicemen’s 
League9 unpub. Ph. D. t h e s i s ,  A u s tr a l ia n  N a tio n a l U n iv e r s i ty ,  1965;
D.W.Rawson, "The F r o n t ie r s  o f  Trade U nionism ", A u stra lia n  Journal o f  
P o li t ic s  and H isto ry ,1 1  (May, 1 9 5 6 ), 196-209; T .C . Truman, The Pressure 
Groups3 P o lic ie s  and P o li t ic s  o f  the A ustra lian  Labor Movement,  unpub.* 
M.A. t h e s i s ,  Q ueensland U n iv e r s i ty ,  1953; Tom Truman, C atholic Action  
and P o l i t ic s  (M elbourne: G eorgian H ouse, 195 9 ); P .B . W esterw ay, " P re s su re  
G roups", in  John W ilk es , e d . , Forces in  A ustra lian  P o li t ic s  (Sydney:
Angus and R o b ertso n , 1 9 6 3 ), pp . 120-66 .
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g
a b id e  by th e  e s ta b l i s h e d  a r b i t r a t i o n  sy stem . By a c c e p tin g  some k in d
o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  th e  e f f i c i e n t  fu n c tio n in g  o f  th e  c a p i t a l i s t  
9
econom y, t r a d e  un ions o p e ra te  on a  s ta n d a rd  o f  l a v  a b id in g n e s s .  They 
u se  norm al d em o cra tic  m ethods o f  p e rs u a s io n  to  p re s e n t  t h e i r  demands* 
W hile they  do n o t r u le  o u t  th e  use  o f  d i r e c t  a c t io n ,  o n ly  in  a  m in o rity  
o f  in s ta n c e s  do th ey  u s e ,  o r  a c tu a l ly  th r e a te n  to  u s e ,  as  an a rg u in g  
p o in t  t h e i r  prim e so u rce  o f  s t r e n g th  -  th e  w ith d raw a l o f  t h e i r  labour*  
The a r b i t r a t i o n  sy stem  i s  r e s p o n s ib le  f o t  th e  d e c re a se d  u se  o f  
m ethods o f  d i r e c t  a c t io n  and th e  in c re a s e d  s e t t le m e n t  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  
d is p u te s  by c o u r t  aw ards b in d in g  on th e  r e s p e c t iv e  p a r t ie s *  W hile th e  
sy stem  does n o t  demand e i t h e r  th e  com plete  r e n u n c ia t io n  o f  th e  r i g h t  to  
s t r i k e  o r  p e n a l iz a t io n  f o r  a l l  s t r i k e s ,  methods o f  d i r e c t  a c t io n  common 
to  o th e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  such as  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  and G reat B r i t a i n ,  a re  
n o t  a s  im p o rta n t a  p a r t  o f  un ion  a c t i v i t i e s *
A ll s o c i e t i e s  e x h ib i t  a  d isc re p a n c y  betw een th e  v a lu e s  and norms 
o f  th e  s o c ie ty  and a c tu a l  behav iour*  In  A u s t r a l i a ,  th e  r o le  o f  a r b i t r a ­
t i o n  in  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  b e a rs  w itn e s s  to  t h i s  c o n f l ic t*  For w h ile  
th e r e  a re  numerous in s ta n c e s  in  w hich p e n a l t i e s ,  re q u ire d  by l e g i s l a t i o n  
o r  w r i t t e n  i n to  c o u r t  aw ard s , have n o t been e n fo rc e d , th e s e  p e n a l t ie s
On a r b i t r a t i o n  in  A u s t r a l i a ,  s e e  H e rb e rt V* E v a t t ,  "C o n tro l o f  Labour 
R e la tio n s  in  th e  Commonwealth o f  A u s t r a l i a " ,  U n ivers ity  o f  Chicago 
Lad L ev ied , VI ( Ju n e , 1 9 3 9 ), ^  529 -51 ; B rian  F i t z p a t r i c k ,  The
A u stra lian  Commonwealth: A P ic tu re  o f  th e  Community, 1901-19S5 
(M elbourne: F.W* C h e sh ire , 1 9 5 6 ), pp . 6 9 -8 7 ; Henry Bournes H ig g in s ,
A New Province f o r  Law and Order (London: C o n s ta b le , 1922);
Mark P erlm an , Judges in  In d u stry : A Study o f  Labour A rb itra tio n  in  
A u stra lia  (M elbourne: M elbourne U n iv e rs ity  P r e s s ,  1954 ).
T h is  p o in t  i s  developed  in  D.W. Rawson, " P o l i t i c s  and •R e s p o n s ib ili ty *  
in  A u s t r a l ia n  Trade U nions"^ A u stra lian  Journal o f  P o l i t i c s  and 
H is to ry ,  IV (November, 1 9 5 8 ), , 224-43*
9
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still appear on the statute books. While trade union attitudes towards 
arbitration are mixed, with less support from the left-wing of the 
movement, Walker's estimation is correct: the "unions support and operate 
through the arbitration system despite their disappointment with the gains 
it has brought the workers."^
Mast trade unions are prepared to obey and conform to the conventions 
and laws which regulate their activities for various reasons: because they 
regard them as legitimate, rational and obligatory; because they fear the 
legal actions should they do otherwise; or simply out of habit. Most 
trade unions would appear to agree with the sentiments expressed by the 
Australian Worker: "The defiance of a law enacted by Parliament, obnoxious 
though that law may be, would react disastrously upon the working-class 
movement, which aims at the realisation of its great and beneficient 
objectives by^the exercise of parliamentary power.
Not all trade unions place such a high priority on law and order; 
nor are all trade unions content with minor reforms along conventional 
lines. Militant unions deviate from this general pattern of activities 
and are prepared to wage a vigorous, all-out fight for their aims and 
objectives without necessarily stopping at the borderline of propriety.
They are prepared to rely upon direct industrial action particularly the 
strike when compliance with arbitration procedures, legislative enactments,
10 Kenneth F. Walker, "Australia", in Walter Galenson, ed., Comparative 
Labor Movements (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952), p. 216; see also 
Perlman, op. cit, 9 p. 8.
11 Australian Worker. July 5, 1939, p. 17
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or other traditional forms would be more acceptable and more conventional. 
Among trade unionists who regard the right to strike as sacred, there is 
usually felt a responsibility not to strike until other alternatives have 
been thoroughly exhausted. But it seems doubtful if miners, waterside 
workers, or seamen would be as concerned with the following questions 
before resorting to strike action as was a more moderate unionist:
(1) Has every method other than direct action 
been used to establish what he wants to establish?
(2) If so, does a majority of his membership want
to strike?..... (3) Is the issue serious enough 
to warrant a strike? (4) Can more good be gained 
from the strike than can be achieved by other 
methods? (5) Is there a reasonable chance of 
winning? 12
While reaffirming uncompromising opposition to strikes over trivial 
issues and strikes undertaken without proper union endorsement, militants 
who regard strikes as their chief weapon in the class struggle, would
•Iobject to restrictions "calculated to prevent legitimate freedom of action,
to stifle working-class initiative, and to hamstring tht taking of justified
action to defend or improve the conditions of our members and take part in
13activities in the interests of the working-class in general."
While the militant unions will work within the existing capitalist 
framework even though most of them are convinced that the working-class 
cannot achieve any real or permanent improvements under capitalism, they 
are prepared to use direct action as a means of persuasion in a variety
12 J. Ducker of the Federated Ironworkers' Association, in John Wilkes 
and S.E. Benson, eds., Trade Unions in Australia (Sydney: Angus and 
Robertson, 1959), p. 122.
Decision of the National Convention of the Miners' Federation, held 
on Aug. 24, 1948, reprinted in Common Cause, Sept. 28, 1948, p. 8.
13
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of situations in which other trade unions and other sections of the 
community would censure its use. Militant unions are unlikely to 
regard strikes as outright breaches of the law or of awards or as 
instances of contempt of the arbitration courts. Nor do they see 
strikers as criminal offenders. When they reject the arbitral process 
or withhold their labour for any reason whatsoever, they do so in terms 
of rights which they regard to be theirs by virtue of their being 
workers. ^
Militant unions are unusual not only in their attitudes toward 
strikes but also with respect to the kinds of strikes in which they are 
prepared to engage, specifically political strikes - concerted work 
stoppages which are not concerned with the changing or sustaining of 
conditions of employment but with broader objectives."^
For the militant unions, political grievances do not stand in sharp 
contrast to economic grievances. For them, all strikes, political and 
industrial, are trials of strength, demonstrations of a political nature 
illustrating class conflict, and protests against the existing policies 
of the authorities. Stoppages in support of the vital, immediate demands 
of the workers and those that call for some far-reaching political changes 
are considered of equal importance for working-class interests. Militants 
recognize that because of their strategic position in the society, non­
cooperation through the withdrawal of their labour is their most effective
14 These impressions are based on views expressed to me in various 
interviews with leaders and members of the W.W.F., the Seamen’s 
Union, and the Miners* Federation, in Sydney and Melbourne during 
the period 1963-65.
15 See Chapter I, pp. 20, 21.
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method of making demands upon employers and authorities alike. Unlike
most trade unionists who profess preparedness to engage in strikes only
when genuine industrial issues are involvedmilitants regard the
strike as their main fighting weapon to be used whenever the cause of the
working class needs to be advanced.
Trade union strike action was nourished by the tradition of direct
action within the Australian labor movement. For Communist militants,
the belief in the importance of political strikes was derived from the 
17 18writings of Marx“ and Lenin translated to the Australian situation by 
L. Sharkey, one-time general secretary of the Communist Party. In his 
The Trade Unions: Communist Theory and Practice of Trade Unionism,
Sharkey attacked the "Economists", those in the trade union movement who
argued that the tasks of the unions should be confined to the economic
conditions
questions of wages /and hours; similarly, he decried those suffering from 
trade union narrowness, who concentrated almost all of their attention 
on the immediate and practical problems of the unions.
See, e.g., the authorized statement by L. Short (National Secretary, 
Federated Ironworkers’ Association), Strikes - and You: Ironworkers’ 
Policy on Strikes (Sydney: Cumberland Newspapers, n.d.).
See, e.g. Karl Marx and Friedrick Engels, "The Manifesto of the 
Communist Party", in Karl Marx, Selected Works vol. I (London:
Lawrence and Wishart, 1947). pp. 97-142. See also A. Lozovsky,
Marx and the Trade Unions (London: Martin Lawrence, 1935), pp. 120-37.
See, e.g., V.I. Lenin, "What Is to Be Done?", in V.I. Lenin, Collected 
Works, vol. V (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1961), pp. 347-529; see 
also Thomas Taylor Hammond, Lenin on Trade Unions and Revolution, 
1893-1917 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), pp. 15-42.
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Communist th e o ry  demanded th a t  Communists be th e  b e s t  t r a d e  u n io n i s t s ,
a b le  to  le a d  the  f i g h t  f o r  econom ic demands w h ile  ready  to  in tro d u c e
p o l i t i c s  i n to  th e  u n io n s1 p rob lem s. Sharkey argued  t h a t * [ a j l l  s t r i k e s
have p o l i t i c a l  s ig n i f i c a n c e ,  s in c e  e v e ry th in g  th a t  d e a ls  a blow to  th e
19c a p i t a l i s t  d e a ls  a blow to  th e  c a p i t a l i s t  o r d e r . ” S tr ik e s  a g a in s t  th e  
governm ent, an o rgan  o f th e  c a p i t a l i s t ,  o r  a g a in s t  a r b i t r a t i o n ,  a dev ice  
fo r  p re s e rv in g  th e  c a p i t a l i s t i c  s ta tu s  quo,  must be adop ted  by m i l i t a n t s :  
’’p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s  a re  a h ig h e r  form o f  s t r u g g le  th a n  economic s t r i k e s .
Such s t r i k e s  c h a lle n g e  th e  governm ent, th e  S ta t e ,  th e  r u le  o f  th e  c a p i t a l ­
i s t  c l a s s .
I t  may app ea r th a t  p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s  as p r a c t i s e d  by m i l i t a n t  
u n io n i s t s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  by Communists, f a l l  o u ts id e  th e  boundary l i n e s  s e t  
by norm r-orien ted  p o l i t i c a l  movements. I  would a rg u e , how ever, t h a t  th e  
s p e c i f i c  demands o f p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s  in  A u s t r a l ia  w ere a t ta c h e d  to  a 
m i l i t a n t  s e c t io n  o f th e  t r a d e  un ion  movement th a t  was demanding no rm ativ e  
changes and u o t one th a t  was d i r e c t l y  c h a lle n g in g  th e  v a lu e s  o f  d em o cra tic  
c a p i ta l is m . The g r ie v a n c e s  r e l a t e d  to  s p e c i f i c  p o l i c i e s ,  law s and customs 
and d id  n o t demand a l t e r a t i o n s  in  th e  v a lu e s  o f  e i t h e r  democracy o r  
c a p i t a l i s m . ^
In  t h i s  c h a p te r ,  f o r  th e  p e r io d  1937-50 , I  s h a l l  exam ine: th e  
f a c to r s  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  m i l i t a n t s '  d e c is io n s  to  d isobey  l e g a l  re g u la ­
t io n s  o r  c o n v e n tio n a l o b l ig a t io n s ;  th e  s p e c i f i c  t a c t i c s  u sed ; and th e
19 L .L . S harkey , The Trade Unions: Communist Theory and Praotiee o f  
Trade Unionism (Sydney: Communist P a r ty  o f A u s t r a l i a ,  1 9 4 2 ), p . 29.
^  I b id .3 p . 35.
21 Cf. S tn e lse r 's  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een v a lu e - o r ie n te d  and n o rm -o rie n te d  
movements; see  S m else r, op . c i t . 3 pp. 318-19 .
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r e a c t io n  to  th e  t a c t i c s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  th e  h i s t o r i c a l  f a c t o r s ,  bo th
p o l i t i c a l  and econom ic, w hich de te rm in ed  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s '  r e a d in e s s
to  p e n a l iz e  th e  u n la w fu l o r  u n co n v e n tio n a l b eh av io u r o f  m i l i t a n t
t ra d e  un ions e i t h e r  th ro u g h  s p e c i f i c  t r a d e  un ion  l e g i s l a t i o n  o r  by
some o th e r  means. I  s h a l l  th en  o f f e r  an e v a lu a t io n  o f  th e  su c c e s se s
and f a i l u r e s  o f  A u s tr a l ia n  p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s .
W hile I  have l im i te d  my a n a ly s is  to  th e  p e r io d  1937-50 , i t  i s
im p o rta n t to  n o te  th a t  b eh in d  t h i s  p e r io d  la y  th e  e x p e r ie n c e s  o f fo u r
22o th e r  p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s  and a t r a d i t i o n  o f  m ili ta n c y  w ith in  t h i s
23s e c t io n  o f  th e  t r a d e  un ion  movement.
Temporal Phases
P ig -iro n  b a n ,-  In  th e  l a t e  1930*s ,  i n d u s t r i a l  la b o u r  found l i t t l e
su p p o rt from e i t h e r  th e  p a r lia m e n ta ry  wing o f  th e  Labor P a r ty  o r  from
th e  Lyons government f o r  i t s  c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  in a d e q u a c ie s  o f  A u s tr a l ia n
d efen ces  and i t s  f e a r  o f  th e  Ja p a n e se . M i l i ta n t s  w ith in  th e  t r a d e  un ion
movement, i n i t i a l l y  a g i t a t e d  a g a in s t  any invo lvem en t in  " i m p e r i a l i s t i c  
24w ars" ; b u t as th e  Japanese  in c re a s e d  th e  tempo and s e v e r i ty  o f  t h e i r
See Appendix B f o r  p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s  w hich o c c u rre d  in  th e  p e r io d  
1916-64.
For in f lu e n c e s  o f  m ili ta n c y  w ith in  th e  t r a d e  un ion  movement, see  
Vere Gordon C h ild e , How Labour Governs: A Study o f  ' W orkersr 
R ep resen ta tio n  in  A u s tr a lia ,  F .B . Sm ith , e d . , 2nd ed . (M elbourne: 
M elbourne U n iv e rs ity  P r e s s ,  1 9 6 4 ), pp. 131-50; Robin G o llan ,
R adical and Working Class P o l i t i c s :  A Study o f  E astern  A u s tr a lia ,  
1850-1910 (M elbourne: M elbourne U n iv e rs ity  P re s s  in  A sso c ia tio n
w ith  th e  A u s tr a l ia n  N a tio n a l U n iv e r s i ty ,  1 9 6 0 ), pp . 69 -109 , 128-50 ; 
T u rn e r, op, c i t , ,  pp . 5 5 -6 2 , 103a-120 , 213 -39 , 304-06 , 347-403.
R e so lu tio n  o f  th e  Annual C onference o f  th e  A u s t r a l ia n  R ailw ays Union 
(ARU), r e p o r te d  in  W orkers* Weekly,  S ep t. 10 , 1935, p . 3. See a lso  
R ailroad , O ct. 10 , 1935, p . 4 .
a t ta c k s  a g a in s t  China and as h e r  d e s ig n s  in  th e  P a c i f i c  appeared  to  be
in c re a s in g ly  a g g re s s iv e  a n t i-w a r  se n tim e n t was overshadow ed by a g i t a t i o n
25ab o u t e v e n ts  in  th e  P a c i f i c  a r e a .
Jap an , how ever, was too  im p o rta n t a t r a d in g  p a r tn e r ,  e s p e c ia l ly  in
w heat and w ool, f o r  many in  i n f l u e n t i a l  c i r c l e s  to  re g a rd  h e r  as a  t h r e a t
to  n a t io n a l  s e c u r i t y .  When th e  A u s tr a l ia n  C ouncil o f  Trade Unions (ACTU),
a c t in g  under s t ro n g  p re s s u re  from th e  le f t - w in g  o f  th e  New South Wales
Labor C o u n c il, c a l le d  f o r  a n a tio n -w id e  b o y c o tt  o f  Jap an ese  goods and an
26embargo on th e  e x p o r t o f  sc ra p  i r o n  to  J a p a n , su p p o rt came m ainly  from
th e  a lre a d y  c o n v e rted  — th e  m i l i t a n t  s e c t io n s  o f  th e  t r a d e  un ion  movement,
peace b o d ie s ,  some church  o r g a n iz a t io n s ,  some i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  and th e  
27Communist P a r ty .
By 1937, th e  t r a d in g  problem  had c r y s t a l l i z e d  around th,^ s a le  o f 
iro n  o re  and r e la t e d  p ro d u c ts  to  Jap an . C o n s id e ra tio n s  o f t r a d e  were 
d is c u s se d  in  th e  n ew spapers , in  P a r lia m e n t ,  and in  th e  t r a d e  u n io n s . There 
was concern  w ith  th e  f in a n c ia l  rew ards o f  t r a d e  w ith  J a p a n , th e  dom estic
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Some o f th e  o p p o s it io n  to  Japan  came from  s e c t io n s  o f  th e  Labor movement 
w hich had a t r a d i t i o n  o f  r a c ia l i s m  stemming back to  C hinese im m igrants 
in  th e  1 8 7 0 's .  However, th e re  was a l s o  a s t ro n g  a n t i-w a r  e lem en t in  th e  
Labor movement d a t in g  back to  th e  Boer War. See G o llan , R adical and 
Working Class P o l i t i c s :  A Study o f  Rastern A u s tra lia , 1860-1910, o p . c i t %,  
pp. 78, 158, 197. The p re-S econd  World War p e r io d  i s  more complex th a n  
would ap p ea r due to  C a th o lic  s p l i t s  in  Labor movement o v e r th e  q u e s tio n  
of S p a in , th e  Communist P a r ty 's  concern  o v e r  th e  dubious r o le  t h a t  th e  
S o v ie t Union was p la y in g ,  and la b o u r  s e n tim e n t opposed to  rearm ament 
in  any c a s e .
Sydney Morning Herald  ( h e r e a f t e r  SMB], O ct. 30 , 1937, p . 17 ; Workers' 
Weekly,  Nov. 2 , 1937, p . 1 .
Much o f  t h i s  in fo rm a tio n  comes from  th e  f i l e s  o f th e  W aters id e  W orkers' 
F e d e ra t io n , w hich were made a v a i la b le  to  me by th e  f e d e r a l  o f f i c e  in  
Sydney.
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needs f o r  m a te r ia ls  c u r r e n t ly  b e in g  s e n t  a b ro a d , th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
p ro v o c a tio n  sh o u ld  Jap an ese  o f f e r s  to  buy be r e fu s e d ,  and th e  c o n t r i ­
b u tio n  which m ight be made to  Jap an ese  a g g re s s io n  by th e  c o n tin u ed  s a le s
28o f such  m a te r ia l s .  C lass  and p a r ty  l i n e s  w ere f r e q u e n t ly  c ro s se d  
when p ronouncing  on th e  govern m en t's  t r a d e  p o lic y  w ith  th e  Ja p a n e se . 
W estern A u s t r a l ia n s  o f  a l l  p e r s u a s io n s ,  in c lu d in g  John C u r t in ,  le a d e r  
o f  th e  f e d e r a l  Labor P a r ty ,  w anted m in e ra l a re a s  in  th e  s t a t e  developed  
by th e  Jap an ese  who had e x p re sse d  an i n t e r e s t  in  do ing  so ; i r o n  and s t e e l  
em ployees and em ployers w ere concerned  abou t th e  d e p le t io n  o f  sc ra p  i r o n  
s to c k s ;  th e  ACTU demanded th e  s u p p re s s io n  o f  p r o f i t s  from  t r a d e  in  arm s.
The s p e c i f i c  q u e s tio n  o f  s t r a t e g i c  m a te r ia ls  came to  a  head when 
th e  Jap an ese  e n te re d  in to  an agreem ent to  e x t r a c t  i r o n  o re  from  th e  r i c h  
Koolan I s la n d  d e p o s it  on th e  n o rth w e s t c o a s t .  I t  was a g a in s t  t h i s  back­
ground th a t  t a lk  a g a in s t  t r a d e  w ith  Japan  was tu rn e d  in to  a c t io n .  Begin­
n in g  in  O ctober 1937, as a  r e s u l t  o f  a  lu n ch tim e  m e e tin g , members o f  th e  
F rem an tle  Lumpers* U nion, an a f f i l i a t e  o f  th e  WWF, re fu s e d  to  lo a d  a 
Jap an ese  w h a lin g  s h ip ;  in  th e  fo llo w in g  m onths, w a te r s id e  w orkers in
v a r io u s  A u s t r a l ia n  p o r ts  r e fu s e d  to  lo a d  goods, in  p a r t i c u l a r  i r o n  o re
29p ro d u c ts ,  f o r  J a p a n . The i n i t i a l  a c t io n s  p reced ed  th e  ACTU p o lic y  on
2 8
S ee, e . g . , SMH,  Mar. 6 , 1937, p . 17 ; W orkers9 W eekly, Mar. 9 ,  1937,
p . 2.
^  SMH., O ct. 13 , 1937, p . 17 . (F re m a n tle ) ; A rgus, O ct. 25 , 1937, p . 1 ;
O ct. 26 , 1937, p . 13 ; O ct. 29 , 1937, p . 11 (G ee lo n g ) i) SMH, J a n . 1 9 , 
1938, p . 14 (P y rm o n t) .J a n . 26 , 1938, p . 9 (W alsh Bay)^ The Sydney 
b ran ch  o f  th e  WWF h a d * i n i t i a l l y  re fu s e d  to  lo a d  th e  "C anberra  M aiu", 
b u t su b se q u e n tly  d ec id ed  to  c o n tin u e  to  work th e  s h ip  in  view  o f  
th e  New South Wales Labor C o u n c i l 's  sch ed u le d  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  
s u b je c t ;  see  SMH, S e p t. 30 , 1937, p . 11 .
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b o y c o tts  and r e s u l t e d  from In d iv id u a l  p o r t  a c t io n  w ith o u t p r i o r  c o n s u lta ­
t io n  w ith  f e d e r a l  o f f i c i a l s  o f  th e  WWF. A ccord ing  to  Jim  H ea ly , th e n
g e n e ra l s e c r e ta r y  o f  th e  WWF, a  g e n e ra l d i r e c t i v e  had n o t been is s u e d  f o r
30f e a r  t h a t  th e  T ra n sp o rt W orkers ' Act would be invoked  fo r  th o se  p o r ts
to  w hich i t  a p p l ie d ;  i t  was d ec id ed  to  le a v e  th e  d e c is io n  ab o u t lo a d in g
cargoes to  each  u n io n  b ran ch  , w hich co u ld  in  tu r n  d ec id e  w hether th e
31b ranch  was in  a  p o s i t io n  to  defy  th e  A ct. However, by J a n u a ry , 1938, 
th e  cam paign had th e  f u l l  su p p o rt o f  th e  e n t i r e  F e d e ra t io n .
C onferences betw een sh ip p in g  i n t e r e s t s  and th e  WWF f a i l e d  to  end th e
„ 32
c o n tin u in g  w a lk -o f f s ,  w hich by A p r il  ^ 1938| had sp re a d  to  M elbourne. The
The Transport Workers1 Act 1929 was known in  un ion  c i r c l e s  as th e  
"Dog C o lla r  A ct" and view ed by m i l i t a n t s  as  a d e l ib e r a t e  a tte m p t 
to  smash th e  u n io n s . In tro d u c e d  by th e  B ruce-Page Government in  
1928, th e  Act p ro v id ed  f o r  th e  l i c e n s in g  o f  w a te rs id e  w orkers and 
was h e ra ld e d  by th e  governm ent as  a p r o te c t io n  f o r  th e  p rim ary  
p ro d u ce r a g a in s t  ra sh  and I r r e s p o n s ib le  in d iv id u a ls  who d id  n o t  
c a re  i f  p ro d u c ts  r o t t e d  in  th e  sheds o r  on th e  w harves w h ile  th e y  
p re s s e d  f o r  t h e i r  i n d u s t r i a l  demands. I t  p e rm itte d  anyone to  o b ta in  
a l ic e n c e  so lo n g  as  he ev id en ced  good b e h a v io u r and a w il l in g n e s s  to  
obey A r b i t r a t io n  C ourt aw ards; w ith  a  l i c e n c e ,  anyone m ight be p ick ed  
f o r  la b o u r  b u t  th e  s e le c t io n  was e n t i r e l y  a t  th e  d i s c r e t io n  o f th o se  
r e q u ir in g  la b o u r .  One co u ld  have en v isag e d  a  s i t u a t i o n  in  which th e  
more m i l i t a n t  u n io n is t s  m ight be p assed  up . L icen ces  m ight be can­
c e l le d  by th e  l i c e n s in g  o f f i c e r  i f  th e  o f f i c e r  was s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  th e  
w orker had e i t h e r  re fu s e d  to  comply w ith  a d i r e c t io n  g iven  to  him in  
r e l a t i o n  to  h i s  jo b ,  had f a i l e d  to  work in  acco rd an ce  w ith  th e  term s 
o f  th e  r u l in g  aw ard , o r  had in t im id a te d  a n o th e r  w orker in to  do ing  
e i t h e r  o f  th e  above. As o f  Ju ly  1 , 1938, th e  l i c e n s in g  p ro v is io n s  
a p p l ie d  to  most A u s t r a l ia n  p o r ts  e x c e p t Sydney; b u t th e  Act co u ld  
be c lap p ed  o n to  any p o r t  by government en ac tm en t. For t r a d e  un ion  
a t t i t u d e s  on th e  A c t, see  is s u e s  o f  th e  Daily Standard f o r  Septem ber 
and O c to b er, 1928.
3^ Jim  H ealy to  R. W est, s e c r e ta r y  B risb an e  WWF, Feb. 28 , 1938, in  Branch 
C orrespondence, W ate rs id e  W orkers ' F e d e ra tio n  f i l e s ,  Sydney.
32 Sm 3 Apr. 2 1 , 1938, p .  12 .
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men were adamant in  re fu s in g  to load  m unitions and could  not be put o f f
by assurances th at the scrap iron  would not be used in  the manufacturing
o f war m a te r ia ls . Nor i n i t i a l l y  were they put o f f  by th rea ts  o f  the
33government to  apply the Transport Workers' A ct. However, under an
o f f i c i a l  th rea t by the government to  apply th e Act to  the Sydney p o r t ,
34th e WWF agreed to  load  a l l  cargoes o f f e r in g .
In May,1938, the government announced a com plete ban on the export 
35o f  iron  ore in  order to  conserve re so u rce s , but trade in  iron  ore by-
36products was s t i l l  a llow ed .
The union ban on s t r a t e g ic  goods to Japan was l i f t e d  on ly  tem porarily .
In November, 1938, Port Kembla w atersid e  workers refu sed  to  load  p ig  iron
37on the steam er "Dalfram" fo r  Japan. In t h e ir  su p p ort, Sydney maritime
unions sa id  they would not work the sh ip  should  th e  cargo be loaded by 
38non-union labour. A conference o f  seven teen  unions s tr o n g ly  endorsed
Ib id .  s Feb. 1 9 , 1938, p . 11; see  a lso  statem ent o f  H ea ly 's in  
W orkers' W eekly , Apr. 15 , 1938, p . 3 .
^  SMH3 May 26 , 1938, p . 12; Maritime Worker. Ju n e,1938, p . 1 .
35 Commonwealth Parliam entary Debates [h e r e a fte r  CPD]f 155: 1259-76  
(May 19 , 1938 ).
36 The WWF su ggested  th a t th is  in c o n s is te n c y  was to  p la c a te  the Broken Hill 
P roprietary  Company (BHP).
^  Illa w a rra  Mercury9 Nov. 18 , 1938, p . 11.
smt Nov. 3 0 , 1938, p . 15 .
38
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th i s  a c t io n ;  i t  em phasized i t s  d e te rm in a tio n  n o t  to  co o p e ra te  w ith
any non -un ion  la b o u r  t h a t  m ight be employed to  lo a d  th e  s h ip ,  recommended
th a t  th e  m e ta l t r a d e s  un ions r e fu s e  to  r e p a i r  any v e s s e l  lo ad ed  by such
39la b o u r ,  and p led g ed  i t s  " sy m p a th e tic  su p p o r t"  to  th e  WWF. A s t r i k e
in v o lv in g  th e  fo u r  thousand  w orkers a t  th e  P o r t Kembla s te e lw o rk s  was
th re a te n e d ;  and th e  A u s t r a l ia n  R ailw ays Union (ARU) ag reed  n o t to  have
40i t s  members r a i l  p ig  i r o n  to  o th e r  p o r t s .  When th e  WWF c o n tin u ed  to  
re fu s e  to  o rd e r  lo a d in g s ,  th e  governm ent c lap p ed  th e  l i c e n s in g  p ro v is io n s  
o f th e  T ra n sp o rt W orkers' Act on th e  p o rt*
On th e  P o r t Kembla w h arv es , no v o lu n te e r s  o f f e r e d  to  ta k e  o u t l i c e n s e s  
and , s u b se q u e n tly , no v e s s e ls  w ere lo a d e d . Mass m eetings and r a l l i e s  were 
h e ld  to  in c re a s e  su p p o rt f o r  th e  WWF, and p le d g e s  w ere fo rth co m in g  from 
th e  I l l a w a r r a  T rades and Labor C o u n c il, th e  South C oast M iners ' F edera­
t i o n ,  th e  P o rt Kembl^*1?£tel$$&krs' A sso c ia tio n  (FIA) , th e  ARU, and o th e r
b ranches o f  th e  WWF, as w e ll  as  p re v io u s ly  com m itted s e c t io n s  o f  th e  
41community. The d is p u te  sp re a d  to  Sydney, when w a te r s id e  w orkers re fu se d
to  lo ad  consignm ents o f  p ig  i r o n  on th e  s team er " N e llo re "  find th e  l i n e r
" T a ip in g " , on th e  grounds t h a t  th e  a c t io n  a t  P o rt Kembla had tu rn e d  th e  
42cargo  " b la c k ."  M ediation  e f f o r t s  i n i t i a t e d  by th e  ACTU f a i l e d  to  
re s o lv e  th e  d is p u te .  The management o f  th e  P o r t  Kembla works o f  A u s tr a l ia n  
I ro n  and S te e l ,  a s u b s id ia ry  o f  th e  BHP, c lo se d  down i t s  p l a n t ,  more 
l i k e ly  to  fo rc e  p u b lic  o p in io n  a g a in s t  th e  and to  t r y  to  s p l i t  th e
M aritime Worker,  December, 1938, p . 1 .
40 R ailroad ,  Dec. 13 , 1938, p . 1 .
41 SMH, Dec. 1 2 , 1938, p . 13 .
42 I b i d . ,  Dec. 1 4 , 1938, p . 17.
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t r a d e  u n io n s , th a n  b ecau se  o f  a sh o r ta g e  o f  s h ip s  in  w hich to  t r a n s p o r t
th e  companyf s p ro d u c ts .  A f te r  two months o f  s ta n d in g  t h e i r  g round,
b u t under th e  p re s s u re  o f  expenses and h a rd sh ip s  c r e a te d  by th e  ex ten d ed
d is p u te ,  th e  w a te r s id e  w orkers ag reed  to  lo a d  th e  d is p u te d  c a rg o e s , "under
d u re s s " ,  p ro v id ed  th a t  th e  governm ent removed th e  l i c e n s in g  p ro v is io n s
and ag reed  to  h o ld  d is c u s s io n s  on th e  bann ing  o f  f u r th e r  sh ipm en ts  o f 
44war m a te r ia ls .
When two o th e r  sh ipm en ts  had to  be lo a d e d , members o f  th e  WWF were
45too  ex h au ste d  to  c a l l  a n o th e r  s t r i k e  and load ed  "under p r o t e s t " .  The 
o u tb re a k  o f  th e  w ar some months l a t e r  ended th e  c o n tro v e rsy  ab o u t f u r th e r  
sh ip m en ts .
National R e g is te r  b o yco tt . -  In  1939, u nder th e  le a d e r s h ip  o f  th e  ACTU, 
t r a d e  u n io n is t s  w ere ad v ised  n o t to  f i l l  i n  th e  com pulsory N a tio n a l 
R e g is te r  forms l e s t  th e  d e t a i le d  in fo rm a tio n  o f  a v a i la b le  manpower 
re so u rc e s  be used  by th e  Lyons governm ent to  reg im en t la b o u r  f o r  in d u s­
t r i a l  and m i l i t a r y  p u rp o se s . Many key t r a d e  u n io n s (m eta l t r a d e s  u n io n s , 
M iners ' F e d e ra t io n , ARU, WWF, M unition W orkers' U nion, p u b lic  u t i l i t i e s  
u n io n s , e n g in e e r in g  u n io n s , P r in te r s *  U nion, M isce llan eo u s W orkers ' U nion, 
Road T ra n sp o rt U nion, F e d e ra te d  C le rk s ' Union) p led g ed  them selves n o t to  
app ly  f o r  r e g i s t r a t i o n  fo rm s. Some even prom ised  r e t a l i a t o r y  a c t io n  sh o u ld
Maritime Worker,  J a n . 1 4 , 1939, p . 1 ; SMH3 J a n . 1 3 , 1939, p . 10 .
Jim  H ea ly , "G en era l S e c r e t a r y 's  R eport on th e  R ecent P ig  I ro n  
D ispu te  -  P o r t  K em bla", n . d . ,  in  W aters id e  W orkers ' F e d e ra tio n  
f i l e s ,  Sydney.
S m ,  Feb. 16 , 1939, p . 9 ; A pr. 2 8 , 1939, p . 12 .
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th o se  who re fu s e d  to  f i l l  o u t th e  forms be p u n ish e d . I t  was hoped
47th a t  th e  government would revoke th e  N a tio n a l R e g is te r  Act when i t  
f e l t  th e  im pact o f  mass p r o t e s t s  and w itn e sse d  p u b l ic  b u rn in g s  o f  th e  
fo rm s. However, u n d er p re s s u re  from  th e  Labor P a r ty ,  w hich was concerned  
abou t i t s  chances a t  th e  n e x t e l e c t i o n ,  th e  ACTU m o d ified  i t s  s ta n d  to  
w orking tow ard l e g a l  r e p e a l  o r  m o d if ic a t io n  o f  th e  law . A lthough th e  
m i l i t a n t  un io n s h e ld  o u t f o r  a more d e f ia n t  cam paign, most o f  th e  p led g ed  
un ions ag reed  to  l i f t  th e  b o y c o t t .
Ratliff-Thom as• In  1941, H orace R a t l i f f  and Max Thomas, Communist t r a d e
u n io n i s t s ,  w ere in te rn e d  by th e  Commonwealth governm ent under th e  National
Security (Subversive A ssociations) Regulations . T h e ir  a r r e s t s  fo llow ed
upon t h e i r  r e le a s e  from  p r is o n  w here th ey  had se rv e d  a s i x  months* se n te n c e
f o r  p o s se s s in g  i l l e g a l  l i t e r a t u r e .  In  p r o t e s t ,  R a t l i f f  and Thomas went on
a hunger s t r i k e .  S pearheaded  by Com m unist-led t r a d e  u n io n s , p r o te s t s
a ro se  demanding th e  r e le a s e  o f  th e  men; s e c t io n s  o f th e  la b o r  movement
a ls o  demanded a l e s s  r e p r e s s iv e  p o lic y  tow ards th e  A u s tr a l ia n  Communist
P a rty  now th a t  th e  S o v ie t Union was on th e  s id e  o f  th e  A l l i e s .  The p r o t e s t s
cu lm in a ted  in  a one-day  sympathy s to p p ag e  o f  t h i r t e e n  thousand  South C oast
48tra d e  u n io n is t s  and Cessnock m in e rs . More d e m o n stra tio n s  fo llo w ed  when
Prime M in is te r  M enzies announced th a t  th e  War C ab inet had d ec id ed  a g a in s t  
49r e le a s in g  th e  men; b u t th ey  f e l l  f a r  s h o r t  o f  th e  m il i ta n ts *  e x p e c ta t io n s
46 S ee , e . g . , " D ire c t iv e  o f  th e  M eeting o f  T rade Union E x ec u tiv e s  and 
th e  New South W ales Labor C o u n c il" , June 2 2 , 1939, in  W aters id e  
Workers* F e d e ra tio n  f i l e s ,  Sydney.
47 National R egistra tion  Act3 1939.
48 SMH, J u ly  19 , 1941, p . 11 .
49 TbicL j  J u ly  25 , 1941, p . 8 ; J u ly  26 , 1941, p .  11 ; Ju ly  29 , 1941j p .7 .
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and p o in ted  up th e  s p l i t  w ith in  the  lab o u r movement over wartim e tra d e  
union p o lic y . The men were re le a se d  in  O ctober,1941,when changes had 
occurred  in  the dom estic and in te r n a t io n a l  s i tu a t io n s .
Post e/ar P o l i t ic a l  S t r i k e s . -  The p ig - i ro n  d isp u te  was p layed  o u t in  
term s which became a rc h a ic  by 1945; f o r  i t  re s te d  on an assum ption which 
both s id e s  were p rep ared  to  a c c e p t ,50 th a t  the  m i l i t a n t  a c t i v i s t s ,  r i g h t l  
o r  w rongly, had e le v a te d  th e i r  r ig h t  o f conscience above th e  government’s 
power to  s e t  fo re ig n  and tra d e  p o lic y . The p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n  in  
A u s tra lia  a f t e r  th e  Second World War was bound up w ith  th e  e x te n t o f 
Communist c o n tro l o f  the  tra d e  union movement. There had been deep 
concern over Communist in f lu e n c e  in  th e  tra d e  union movement ev er s in ce  
the  form ation  o f th e  Communist P a rty  in  1920, b u t th i s  concern was 
g re a t ly  in te n s i f i e d  as th e  Cold War l e f t  i t s  in d e l ib le  mark on the  
dom estic p o l i t i c a l  s c e n e .51 By 1945, Communists had im p o rtan t p o s it io n s  
o f le ad e rsh ip  in  th e  M iners' F e d e ra tio n , the  ARU, th e  FIA, th e  Amalgamatec 
E ngineering  Union (AEU), th e  WWF, th e  Seamen's Union, th e  Sheet M etal 
Workers* Union, th e  B u ild in g  Workers* I n d u s t r ia l  Union (BWIU)the
Federated  Clerks* Union, th e  New South Wales Teachers* F e d e ra tio n , and 
Actors* E qu ity .
50 _ _
Only once du rin g  the  p ig - i ro n  d isp u te  Menzies doubted th e  s in c e r i ty  
o f the  WWF, im puting to  th e  le a d e rsh ip  more concern w ith  **the u su a l 
Communist Technique th an  they  a re  w ith  in te r n a t io n a l  p o litic s .* *
Ib v d .,  J an . 14, 1939, p . 12. F
See Miriam Dixon, The Labor Movement in  New South Wales 1919-27:
An In te rp r e ta tio n ,  unpub. Ph.D. t h e s i s ,  A u s tra lia n  N ational
U^ i ^ r8 i ty * 19.63* J ,D * P layfo r d * D octrin a l and S tr a te g ic  P rob lem  
o f  the Communist P arty o f  A u s tra lia , 1946-1962,  unpub. Ph. D. th e s is  
A u s tra lia n  N a tio n a l U n iv e rs ity , 1962.
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There was no disputing the domestic agitation by the Co—uniats 
who hoped to exploit the unrest and dislocation that accoapanied the 
transition from a wartime to a peactiee econo«.,-.52 Partially as a 
result of Coemunist take-overs in  Eastern Europe, there was fear of 
domestic Coemunist in filtra tio n  and s o .  sections of the Labo/r and 
Liberal parties were demanding some form of control over Communist 
movements in A ustralia.53
m  no wey should the militancy of the Communist Party, i t .  d is i l lu ­
sionment with trie arbitration system, and i t s  heavy reliance on direct 
action in both economic end p o lit ic a l etruggla. be under-empbasiaed. Hor 
should the rise  iu Communist Party membership in the 1940*.,54 i t .  influent 
rn trade unions and in front organisations during and immediately after  
tie  wur,55 and i t s  attempts to be s  major influence in the labour movement 
be disregarded. But i t  i s  Just ss in sccu r .t. to . .c r ib ,  near-mystical 
powers of organization and in filtr a tio n  to the Co-uniat Party, a . both 
i t s  opponents and i t s  own laadsrahip had done, by —king i t  the single  
cause of worker discontent«
The post-war situation  was characterised by more than the influence of 
ti.e Co—unistu. Industrial and p o lit ic a l stoppages occurred in an at—a- 
phere where hope« for Improved standard, of liv in g  among the working class
52
Ilf*» e : 8V .M *  "Derelopaents on the Industrial Front".
fpI ’ 1946> P- 106‘ Sme « 1 -  *. Dixon,
Abolisn Wage—Pegging, Control Pci cess Report to C.C. PlemaL 
neld l*t-3rd Wovamber 1946-, ib id . ,  December, 1946, pp. 358-60.
53
t e l / ! * 7*0* * * pp* U$~28* B ic e s te r  Webb, Coutnuniom andss ”  **■m i
s‘ Ä S !  • ’• 2101 »•
9 1 - 1 *  M _ A A
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had not materialized to the degree expected. Worker discontent, as a 
result of the slow maturation of hopes for a better life which had been 
nourished by the 1930's depression and the war, characterized the period, 
not only in Australia but in other countries as well. In trying to 
control inflation, the Chifley government also had to continue with 
policies of consumer rationing, high taxation levels, and other measures 
of wartime austerity, housing shortages, petroleum rationing, wage­
pegging, and the like put off the day of improved living conditions for 
many Australian workers, militant as well as moderates.
On the international scene, Australia had to face the growth of 
nationalist and Independent movements in Asia. While Labor had a 
tradition of racism in so far as the country's immigration policy was 
concerned, it also had a tradition of anti-colonialism which helped it 
to look favourably upon events in Indonesia, India and the like.
The first political strike after the Second World War occurred in 
September^1945, when the Federal Executive of the WWF, having been 
approached by Indonesian seamen in port in Sydney and Brisbane, declared 
a "black ban" on all Dutch ships bound for the Netherlands East Indies.
It was argued that any cargo transported would be used to suppress the 
newly established Indonesian government. In addition, the WWF organized 
Indonesians living in Australia into "Committees of Indonesian Independence 
to act as a pressure group on their Dutch employers resident in Australia. 
The Dutch authorities insisted that the ships in question were to carry 
food, medicine, and clothing for the relief of the civilian population 
in the East Indies; these assurances were discounted by the WWF. It 
had been suggested that the ban could be lifted in the case of bona 
fide mercy ships, provided that these were supervised by the United
-  350 -
N ations R e lie f and R e h a b ili ta tio n  A sso c ia tio n  (UNRRA), b u t no agreement 
on th i s  p o in t was reached.**8
S tr ik e  a c tio n  spread  when workmen a t  the  Rose Bay fly in g -b a se
workshops in  Sydney ( a f f i l i a t e d  w ith  th e  A u s tra lia n  S oc ie ty  o f  E n g in ee rs ),
the  AEU, th e  E le c t r ic ia n s 1 Union, and some o th e r  tra d e  union bod ies
re fu sed  to  s e rv ic e  any Dutch a i r c r a f t  a f t e r  two tra d e  u n io n is ts  a t  the
base had been d ism issed  fo r  t h e i r  r e fu s a l  to  r e p a ir  a Dutch p la n e .^ 7
The Sheet M etal Workers* Union, in  sup p o rt o f the  WWF, in s tru c te d  i t s
5Ömembers s im ila r ly  to  re fu se  to  s e rv ic e  Dutch sh ip s  o r  planes«
In  an attem pt to  break  the  deadlock on th e  ban , h earin g s  were h e ld
b e fo re  the C o n c ilia tio n  Commissioner. The Dutch vetoed  p ro p o sa ls  which
c a lle d  fo r  an o b serv er who met th e  approval o f  th e  tra d e  unions to
accompany a t r i a l  r e l i e f  sh ip  fro n  A u s tra lia  in  o rd e r  to  s c r u t in i s e  th e
59d is t r ib u t io n  process« In  any c a se , th e  tra d e  unions them selves could
n o t agree on an o b serv er who s u i te d  bo th  th e  m il i t a n ts  and m oderates
60w ith in  th e  movement.
A ttem pts a t  s e t t le m e n t,  mod: o£ which were undertaken  by th e  ACTU, 
were no t very  su ccess fu l*  The ban remained l a  fo rce  as th e  months dragged 
on and more sh ip s  were re fu sed  s e r v ic e .  The ban was k e p t, even when a 
tem porary tru c e  had been ree€hed in  In d o n esia  l a t e  in  1 .4 6 , a t  th e  re q u e s t
**8 Jim Healy to  R. Pettym an, S e c re ta ry , Permanent and Casual Wharf 
Labourers Union, O ct. 15 , 1945, in  W aterside W orkers1 F ed era tio n
f i l e s ,  Sydney.
57 Sm 9 Nov. 2 , 1945, p . 1 .
58 I b id . ,  Nov. 3 , 1945, p . 5 .
^  I b id . ,  Har. 1 , 1946, p . 3 ; Mar. 21, 1946, p . 4 .
60 I b id . ,  Mar. 13, 1946, p . 3 .
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of the Indonesian government which feared a Dutch blockade of the newly-
recognized republic. With the resumption of the war in July,1947, any
settlement of the ban was postponed. The new flare-up revoked earlier
ACTU policy and a conference of federal unions voted to impose a total
ban on the movement of all Dutch goods in Australia. ^T$legrams were
sent to maritime unions in other countries asking that similar action
6° 63be taken elsewhere. Under pressure from Chifley, the ACTU modified
its stand to cover only ships carrying munitions or service personnel
64which might be used against the Indonesians.
In May^l948, after another truce had been reached in Indonesia, 
federal transport and waterfront unions voted to relax the ban to allow 
normal trade to be resumed between the Australians and the Indonesians.^ 
But the WWF reinstituted the ban in December,1948^when fighting in Indon­
esia was resumed. With the signing of a final agreement between the 
Dutch and the Indonesians at the end of 1949, the ban was finally lifted.*
Ibid., Aug. 6, 19477 p. 1; Maritime Worker > Aug. 9, 1947, p. 1.
62 E. Roach to J. Murray, Aug. 1, 1947, in Waterside Workers* Federationn 
files, Sydney.
^  J.B. Chifley to ACTU officials, Aug. 7, 1947, in ibid• It was also 
feared that a total and complete ban would affect the supply of food 
for Great Britain, the occupation forces in Germany, wheat for India 
and the carrying of wool supplies from Australia and Europe to Asian 
countries.
A  A
A, Monk to Federal Secretaries, Federal Trade Unions, Aug. 12, 1947, 
in ibid.
Circular No. 32, JU/DN, July 4, 1948, in ibid.
"Major Resolutions of Council and Those Affecting Councillor Home 
Ports Following 18th Session November, 1949", ibid.
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At th e  same tim e th a t  th e  Dutch sh ip p in g  ban was in  e f f e c t ,  o th e r  
p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s  w ere o c c u rr in g .
In  1946, Sydney w a te rs id e  w orkers re fu s e d  to  lo a d  f l o u r  which they
b e l ie v e d  was bound f o r  th e  Shanghai b la c k  m ark e t. Upon a s su ra n c e s  from
UNRRA th a t  th e  f lo u r  would be used  to  a l l e v i a t e  fam ine c o n d itio n s  on
m ain land  C hina, th e  men ag reed  to  work th e  s h i p s . ^
In  1947, th e  WWF banned th e  e x p o rt o f  goods to  S pain  u n t i l  th e  Franco
68governm ent sh o u ld  be re p la c e d .  In  th e  same y e a r ,  th e  WWF is s u e d  a ban on
th e  e x p o r t o f  soap u n t i l  th e  dom estic  sup p ly  sh o u ld  r e tu r n  to  a  norm al 
69l e v e l .  Some months l a t e r ,  Sydney w a te r s id e  w orkers re fu se d  to  lo a d  
g a lv a n iz e d  ro o f in g  i ro n  f o r  New Guinea u n t i l  such m a te r ia ls  w ere used  to  
r e p a i r  storm -dam aged R edfem  h o m e s .^  In  a l l  th r e e  in s ta n c e s ,  th e  bans 
w ere s h o r t - l i v e d .
In  1948, Sydney w a te r s id e  w o rk e rs , seam en, and s h i p 's  p a in te r s  and 
d o ck ers  s to p p ed  work f o r  fo u r  h o u rs ,  w h ile  South Coast mines c lo se d  down 
f o r  th e  day , to  march w ith  th e  women o f  th e  fcfew H ousew ives' A ss o c ia tio n  in  
p r o t e s t  ov er n igh  p r ic e s  and b la c k  m ark e tin g  in  food and c l o t h i n g . ^  L a te r  
th a t  y e a r ,  th e  Seam en's Union p la c e d  a  b o y c o tt  on a l l  Greek s h ip s  in  p r o t e s t
SMHj J u ly  18 , 1946, p . 3 ; Tribune 3 Ju ly  23 , 1946, p . 6 .
SMHj J a n . 25 , 1947, p . 1 ; J a n . 28 , 1947, p . 1 ; see  a ls o  
W ate rs id e  W orkers' F e d e ra tio n  C ir c u la r  No. 1 6 , F ebruary  8 , 
1947, in  W aters id e  Workers* F e d e ra tio n  f i l e s ,  Sydney.
M aritime Worker,  Feb. 8 , 1947, p . 3.
SMR9 June 10, 1947, p . 1 ; Tribune ,  June 13 , 1947, p . 6 . 
SMH9 Mar. 6 , 1948, p . 3.
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a g a in s t the  Greek governm ent’s trea tm en t o f Greek tra d e  u n io n is ts ;
72th is  b o y co tt a lso  was s h o r t l iv e d .
In  1949, as a r e s u l t  o f c e r ta in  comments made to  a newspaper
r e p o r te r ,  Sharkey, then g e n e ra l s e c re ta ry  o f the  Communist P a r ty ,
was charged and conv icted  under the  Crimes Act fo r  having u tte re d
73a s e d it io u s  s ta tem e n t. The M iners’ F e d e ra tio n , the  Seamen's
Union, th e  Newcastle Trades H a ll c o u n c il , the  I l la w a r ra  Trades and
Labor C ouncil, the  Sydney Sheet M etal W orkers' Union, the  P o rt
74Kembla WWF, and the  Sydney AEU h e ld  stoppages and dem onstrations 
in  p r o te s t  a g a in s t  the  c o u r t 's  a c t i o n . ^  S im ila r ly , when Jack
M cP h illip s , Communist a s s i s t a n t  s e c re ta ry  o f the  F edera ted  Ironw orkers '
72
Seamen's Jo u rn a l, June 1948, p . 1.
73
Q uestioned on a s ta tem en t o f M aurice Thorez, Sharkey s a id :  " I f  
S o v ie t fo rce s  in  p u rs u i t  o f ag g resso rs  e n te r  A u s tra l ia ,  A u s tra lian  
workers would welcome them. A u s tra lia n  w orkers would welcome 
S ov ie t fo rce s  p u rsu ing  ag g resso rs  as th e  w orkers welcomed them 
throughout Europe when th e  Red troops l ib e r a te d  the  people from 
the power o f th e  N azis. I  support the  s ta tem en t made by the  French 
Communist le a d e r .  In v asio n  o f A u s tra lia  by fo rce s  o f the  S ov ie t 
Union seem very  remote and h y p o th e tic a l  to  me. I  b e lie v e  the 
S ov ie t Union w i l l  go to  war only i f  she i s  a tta c k e d . I  cannot see 
A u s tra l ia  be ing  Invaded by S o v ie t tro o p s . The o b je c t o f Communists 
i s  to  s tru g g le  to  p rev en t war and to  educate  the  masses o f the  
people a g a in s t the  id ea  o f w ar. The Communist P a rty  a lso  wants to  
b r in g  the  working c la s s  to  power and i f  f a s c i s t s  in  A u s tra l ia  use 
fo rce  to  p rev en t the  w orkers ga in ing  th a t  power communists w i l l  
adv ise  the w orkers to  meet fo rce  w ith  fo rc e . "
74
SMH, Mar. 22, 1949, p . 1; Mar. 23, 1949, p . 1; Mar. 24, 1949, p . 1.
75
I b i d . ,  Mar. 29, 1949, p . 1
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A ssociation  was charged and convicted o f contempt o f  the
A rbitration  C o u rt,^  the Sydney and Newcastle branches o f the
FIA, the Miners* Federation, the ARU, the Seamen’s Union, the
Ships Painters and Dockers* Union, the Port Kembla and Sydney WMF, 
oA
the A ustralian Society  o f Engineers, and the Road and Transport 
Workers’ Union held p ro test s to p p a g es .^
The period of these p o l i t i c a l  stoppages was one o f In d u str ia l 
un rest, when m ilita n t trade union lea d ers , Communist and non- 
Coinraunist a lik e , who had to deal d ir e c t ly  and s o le ly  w ith the 
problems o f the working c la s s ,  became contemptuous o f the p o l i t i c a l  
leaders who had to c o n c ilia te  other sec tio n s  o f the community as 
w e ll. The Communists had a d is t in c t iv e  trade union p o lic y , but 
they found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  apply. They had e f f e c t iv e  organizations  
at work in  the unions, but they found the workers d i f f i c u l t  to  
a ttra c t on other than bread-and-butter is su e s ;  the Marxist h eritage  
meant l i t t l e  to men who considered them selves b e tter  o f f  than th e ir  
comrades in  the Soviet Union.
The Coal S tr ik e . In 1948, the Communist Party abandoned i t s  period  
o f accommodation w ith the C h ifley  government. Warning o f right-w ing
76
M cPhillip i s  a lleged  to have to ld  a trade union meeting o f f iv e  
hundred: '*The b a s ic  wage in  ex isten ce  i s  not re la ted  to the stand­
ard o f l iv in g .  This is su e  w i l l  be determined ou tsid e the A rbitration  
Court. We do not tru st the people in  charge o f the Court to  play  
the game. We want an immediate cash Increase o f not le s s  than 3 0 /-  
a week”.
77 I b id , ,  Apr. 7 , 1949, p. 1; Apr. 8 , 1949, p. 1; Apr. 12, 1949, p . 1.
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moves in  the  Labor P a r ty , R. Dixon, then p re s id e n t o f the  Communist
P a r ty , argued a g a in s t moderate p o l ic ie s  which h id  measures designed
78to  s t i f l e  the  w o rk in g -c la ss . He warned o f le g i s la t io n  which 
would c u r t a i l  the  r ig h t  to  s t r i k e  and o f s t a t e  c o n tro l of e le c tio n s  
through the  s e c re t  b a l lo t :
...e x a m in a tio n  o f the  mass o f a n t i - t r a d e  union 
l e g i s la t i o n  enacted  by A u s tra lia n  p a rliam en ts  
during  th e  l a s t  e ig h te en  months i s  s u f f ic ie n t  
to  show th a t  the  b o u rg eo is ie  and t h e i r  Labour 
l ie u te n a n ts  a re  out to  d est r y  t h e i r  cap ac ity  
to  p ro te c t  the  w orkers ... .The tra d e  union move­
ment must be awakened to  the danger co n fro n tin g  
the  working c la s s .  I t  must expose the  re a c tio n a ry  
laws and o rg an ise  the  masses to  oppose and d e fe a t 
them. 79
80When in  Hay 1949, th e  Combined Mining Unions (CMU) f a i le d  
to  secure  claim s lodged w ith  the  J o in t  Coal Board, i t  c a lle d  fo r  
aggregate  stop-w ork m eetings to  d iscu ss  fu tu re  a c tio n . Unless a 
s a t i s f a c to r y  se ttle m e n t of i t s  claim s was reached , the  F ed era tio n
78
See, e . g . ,  R. Dixon, "Labour P a rty  Moves to  R ig h t" , Communist 
Review9 F eb ru a ry f1948, pp. 35-36.
79
R. Dixon, "Trade Unionism under F i r e " ,  i b i d . ,March, 1948, p . 68. 
Compare w ith  h is  re p o r t  to  th e  C en tra l Committee in  Septem ber,1947, 
when he spoke o f the P a r ty ’s need to  develop a u n ite d  f ro n t o f the 
working c la s s ,  m id d le -c la ss  and fa rm ers , and the  need to  support 
the  Labor Government on bank n a t io n a l iz a t io n  and o th e r  p ro g ress iv e  
economic m easures; R. Dixon, "The Economic C r i s i s " ,  ib id . ,
O ctober, 1947, pp. 675-84.
80
C o n sis tin g  o f d ep u ta tio n s  from th e  M iners’ F e d e ra tio n , C o llie ry  
M echanics, AEU, F edera ted  Engine D rivers  and Firem en’s A sso c ia tio n  
(FEDFA), and B lacksm ith s ' S o c ie ty .
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81prop o sed  to  is s u e  a c a l l  f o r  a g e n e ra l s t r i k e .  The Coal Board
re fu s e d  to  be in t im id a te d ,  g ra n te d  th e  c o a l owners an in ju n c t io n
r e s t r a i n in g  th e  m iners from c a l l in g  s t r i k e s ,  s to p p ag es o r  p i t - t o p
m eetings f o r  th r e e  m onths, and a ls o  postponed  p u b l ic a t io n  o f  th e
82agreem ent on two o f  th e  c la im s th a t  had been  g ra n te d . The
F e d e ra tio n  re fu se d  to  a c c e p t r e s t r i c t i o n s  on i t s  r i g h t  to  s t r i k e
and h e ld  a g g re g a te  m eetings w hich v o te d  in  fa v o r  o f  th e  p roposed  
83s t r i k e .  F u r th e r  n e g o t ia t io n s  f a i l e d  and th e  s t r i k e  began on 
June 2 7 th .
84New South W ales, p a r t i c u l a r l y  th e  Sydney a r e a ,  had been 
tra n s fo rm e d  even by th e  t h r e a t  o f  th e  s t r i k e :  m ilk  s u p p lie s  w ere 
c u t by tw o - th i r d s ;  b re a d  s u p p lie s  w ere red u ce d ; th e  most d r a s t i c  
power and gas r e s t r i c t i o n s  e v e r  im posed on in d u s try  in  th e  s t a t e  
w ere g a z e t te d ,  as sh o p s , w areh o u ses , t h r e a t r e s  and p u b lic  h a l l s  
w ere made to  douse t h e i r  l i g h t s ;  h o s p i ta l  s e rv ic e s  w ere a v a i la b le  
f o r  emergency case s  o n ly ; land  and see  t r a n s p o r t  was im m obilized ; 
and th e  w artim e atm osphere was re c a p tu re d  when th e  Emergency 
T ra n sp o r t C o o rd in a to r  a rran g ed  to  r e e s t a b l i s h  th e  Road T ra n sp o rt 
Poo l w hich had  o p e ra te d  in  th e  e a r ly  1940*s .  By June 2 1 s t ,  more
81
Common Cause> June 26 , 1949, p .  1.
82
SMHj June 16, 1949, p . 1.
83
Common Causet  June 26 , 1949, p .  1 .
84
F or re a so n s  o f sp a c e , I  s h a l l  c o n c e n tra te  t h i s  a n a ly s is  on th e  
New South Wales a re a  w hich was th e  h e a v ie s t  h i t  by th e  s t r i k e .
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th an  two hundred  thousand p eo p le  w ere o u t o f  w ork; h a l f  th e  
s t a t e ’ s w orking p o p u la tio n  w ere o u t o f work th e  fo llo w in g  week.
The l i s t  o f  in d u s t r i e s  a f f e c te d  by power c u ts  in c re a s e d  d a i ly ;  
su g a r  p ro d u c tio n  was b ro u g h t to  a s t a n d s t i l l  and th e  b e e r  supp ly  
s t e a d i ly  d im in ish e d . In  V ic to r i a ,  le s s  a f f e c te d  b ecau se  o f  th e  
s t a t e ’ s developm ent o f brown c o a l re so u rc e s  and th e  im p o r ta t io n  
o f c o a l from  o v e rs e a s ,  power and gas r e s t r i c t i o n s  w ere i n t e n s i f i e d ;  
tram s and t r a i n s  w ere c u r t a i l e d  and w orkers were l a id  o f f .  South 
A u s t r a l i a  cou ld  n o t  escap e  th e  s p i r a l l i n g  e f f e c t s  e i t h e r ,  and 
along  w ith  a l l  o f  th e  o th e r  s t a t e s  sh a red  in  th e  im p o s itio n  o f 
t r a n s p o r t  and power r e s t r i c t i o n s  and th e  s id e  e f f e c t s  o f  la b o u r 
d isp la c e m e n t.
Prim e M in is te r  C h if le y  and James M cG irr, Labor P rem ier
o f  New South W ales, w ere adamant in  t h e i r  s ta n d  th a t  th e  only
s o lu t io n  la y  th rough  th e  a r b i t r a t i o n  p ro c e s s  and th a t  no amount
o f  i n d u s t r i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  p re s s u re  co u ld  fo rc e  e i t h e r  f e d e r a l
85o r  s t a t e  governm ents to  o p e ra te  o u ts id e  t h a t  p ro c e s s .  W hile th e  
m iners re c e iv e d  su p p o rt from some f e d e r a l  un ions (ARU, FIA, AEU,
WWF, Seamen’ s U nion, F e d e ra te d  C le r k 's ,  BWIU, B la c k sm ith s ’ S o c ie ty ,  
Ships P a in te r s  and D ockers’ U nion , S heet M etal W orkers ' U n io n ), th e  
ACTU c a s t  i t s e l f  in  th e  ro le  o f  m e d ia to r . When a tte m p ts  a t  p e a c e fu l 
s e t t le m e n t  f a i l e d ,  th e  Commonwealth governm ent assumed powers p r o x i­
mate to  th o se  needed to  meet a w artim e em ergency: i t  f ro z e  th e
86funds o f p a r t i c i p a t i n g  u n io n s ; i t  j a i l e d  th e  le a d e r s  o f  p a r t i c ip a t in g
85
SMH3 June 21 , 1949, p . 1 .
86
N ational Emergency (Coal S tr ik e )  A ct,  1949.
-  358 -
unions who refused to disclose details about union funds; it
ordered other unions to move coal produced before the strike and
now "at grass"; it imported coal from abroad; it used troops to
87extract coal from open cut mines. These moves, as well as lessen­
ing trade union support, forced the miners to capitulate. Terms 
proposed by the ACTIJ, which had been rejected earlier because of 
a provision that the unions resubmit their claims to arbitration, 
now became acceptable. These called for: (1) a return to work 
within a week of resumption of negotiations with the Arbitration 
Court; (2) application to be made for the release of jailed union 
leaders; (3) application to be made for a decision by the Coal 
Industry Tribunal on long-service leave, with broad discussions 
on terms before it could be finally determined; (4) resumption of 
conferences of all parties concerned on a shorter working week and 
other matters; and (5) decisions of conferences to be ratified by 
the Tribunal, or failing agreement, the question to be determined 
by the Tribunal. The rank-and-file of the CMU rejected any
continuation of the strike and seven weeks after it had begun the
87
SMH3 July 12, 1949, p. 3; July 14, 1949, p. 1; July 17, 1949, 
p. 1. The coal lifts occurred without incident, although not 
without agitational opposition from miners; only the FEDFA, the 
Boilermakers* Union, and the BWIU refused to work in plants where 
the "black" coal was to be used. Barrier Miner3 July 15, 1949, 
p. 1; SMH3 July 17, 1949, p. 3.
88
S m 3 July 28, 1949, p. 1
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s t r i k e  c o l la p s e d ,
1950. In  p r o t e s t  a g a in s t  th e  High C o u r t 's  upho ld ing  o f th e  j a i l i n g
o f S harkey , New South Wales m iners and Sydney w a te r s id e  w orkers
90and seamen s to p p ed  work f o r  one day . M iners a t  th e  South B u l l i
c o l l i e r y  t i e d  in  t h e i r  p r o t e s t  w ith  one on th e  High C o u r t 's  in v a l id -
91a t io n  o f th e  P h a rm a c e u tic a l B e n e f i ts  A c t. In  th e  same y e a r ,
when th e  M enzies governm ent in tro d u c e d  l e g i s l a t i o n  to  ou tlaw  th e
Communist P a r ty ,  some Communist u n ions h e ld  s to p -w o rk s and p r o te s t  
92s to p p a g e s . L a te r  t h a t  y e a r ,  th e  e x e c u tiv e  o f  th e  Seam en's Union
93is s u e d  an o rd e r  a g a in s t  th e  t r a n s p o r t in g  o f  w ar m a te r ia ls  to  K orea,
b u t th e  u n io n 's  r a n k - a n d - f i l e  v o te d  to  d i s s o c ia te  i t s e l f  from th e
94ban and th e  e x e c u tiv e  was fo rc e d  to  re s c in d  th e  e a r l i e r  o rd e r .
Aims and M otives
Most o f  th e  demands made by th e  m i l i t a n t  un ions w ere f o r  an 
a l t e r a t i o n  in  some a s p e c t o f  governm ent p o l i c y ,  W ith r e s p e c t  to
89
89
I b i d , ,  J u ly  28 , 1949, p . 1; J u ly  31 , 1949, p . 1; Aug. 1 , 1949, 
p .  1 ; Aug. 4 ,  1949, p . 1; Aug. 8 , 1949, p .  1; Aug. 10, 1949, 
p .  1; Aug. 11, 1949, p . 1 .
90
I b i d . ,  O c t. 19, 1949, p .  3; O ct. 20 , 1949, p . 4 .
91
I b i d . ,  O c t. 12, 1949, p . 3 .
92
I b i d . ,  May 4 , 1950, p . 1.
93
I b i d . ,  J u ly  8 , 1950, p . 1.
94
Seamen's Journa l, J u ly ,  1950, pp . 1 , 4 .
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fo re ig n  and t r a d e  p o l i c y ,  th e  un ions demanded: (1) a ban on
s t r a t e g i c  e x p o r ts  to  Ja p a n ; (2) a ban on e x p o r ts  to  Dutch fo rc e s
in  th e  n e th e r la n d s  E a s t I n d ie s ;  (3) a ban on f lo u r  e x p o r ts  to
C hinese b la c k m a rk e ts ; (4) a ban on e x p o r ts  to  S pain  u n t i l  th e  Franco
governm ent was re p la c e d ; (5) a ban on th e  e x p o r t o f  soap and g a lv a n -
95iz e d  ro o f in g  i r o n  u n t i l  th e  le v e l  o f  dom estic  s u p p lie s  had r i s e n .
With r e s p e c t  to  dom estic  p o l i c y ,  th e  m i l i t a n t  un ions demanded:
(1) th e  r e p e a l  o f  th e  National R eg is tra tio n  Act;  (2) th e  r e le a s e  
o f  R a t l i f f  and Thomas, S harkey , and M c P h ill ip s ;  and (3) th e  c o n tro l  
o f h ig h  p r ic e s  and b la c k  m ark e tin g  in  food and c l o t h i n g . ^
The 1949 c o a l s t r i k e  i s  l e s s  r e a d i ly  c l a s s i f i e d  as a p o l i t i c a l  
s t r i k e  th a n  a re  th e  o th e r  s t r i k e s  w hich have been d is c u s se d  in  t h i s  
s e c t io n .  The CMU se rv e d  a log  o f c la im s upon th e  c o l l i e r y  em ployers 
and th e  J o in t  Coal Board f o r  a  t h i r t y - f i v e  h o u r w eek, t h r i t y  s h i l l i n g s  
a week in c r e a s e ,  lo n g - s e rv ic e  le a v e ,  and Improved p i t  and town 
a m e n it ie s .  But a c lo se  ex am in a tio n  o f  th e  ch rono logy  o f  n e g o t ia t io n s  
betw een th e  un ions and th e  c o a l a u t h o r i t i e s  in d ic a te s  t h a t  th e  de­
mands b eh in d  th e  s t r i k e  w ere n o t i n d u s t r i a l .  W hile th e  p o l i t i c a l
95
S im ila r  is s u e s  w ere in v o lv ed  in  th e  fo llo w in g : Korean War ban ; 
th e  Indo -C h ina  b an ; th e  Vietnam  b a rb e d -w ire  ban ; and th e  South 
A fr ic a n  b a n . See Appendix B.
96
S im ila r  i s s u e s  w ere in v o lv ed  in  th e  fo llo w in g : a n t i - c o n s c r ip t io n  
s to p p a g e s ; P au l Freeman c a s e ;  F a th e r  J e r g e r  c a s e ; Walsh and 
Johnson c a s e ; P h a rm a c e u tic a l B e n e f i ts  A ct p r o t e s t ;  Communist 
P a r ty  D is s o lu t io n  B i l l  p r o t e s t s ;  and Crimes A ct p r o t e s t s .  See 
Appendix B.
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demands of the miners' leadership were never stated explicitly, 
it seems apparent that the Miners' Federation wanted to show the 
futility of arbitration and the fertility of direct action and to 
suggest that orthodox trade union policies held no hope for the 
workers' future betterment.
The political quality of the coal strike becomes more apparent
when it is contrasted with the 1917 general strike. First, the
1917 strike was precipitated by an industrial dispute in the
Government Tramway Workshop in Sydney; the 1949 strike was engineered
by the Communist Party operating through the leadership of Miners'
Federation whose genuine industrial grievances made its membership
receptive to the call for a strike. Secondly, Turner writes that
although the government regarded the 1917 strike as political and
without any industrial grievances, the strike could have been solved
97in industrial terms; the coal strike, however, could not have been 
solved by meeting the industrial demands of the CMU. For even when 
it appeared that the various government authorities operating in the 
coal industry were prepared to grant the CMU what it asked for in its 
log of claims, the Miners' Federation still pressed ahead with the 
strike. The coal strike involved political demands; it could only 
have been settled by the Commonwealth government overriding the 
agents of the arbitration system.
Occasionally, there was a demand on a foreign government. This
Turner, op. oit.9 pp. 240-76.
97
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was the case of the boycott on Greek ships until the Greek govern­
ment would alter its repressive policies toward certain Greek trade 
98unionists.'
Tactics
Withdrawal of labor took the form of either strike action 
(the direct downing of tools) or of a boycott (the refusal to 
handle or produce certain goods or to operate certain services). 
Either usually was accompanied by various forms of legal demonstra­
tions (such as mass meetings, marches, rallies and picketing) and 
other forms of constitutional pressure (such as deputations). Both 
forms were designed to have repercussions on both the public and 
the authorities. Both forms of direct action were regarded as being 
either a very likely way of winning demands or as the only way in 
which the working-class could make known its position. In most in­
stances, the militant unions had little influence with either the 
government or the party in opposition; denied access to the author­
ities, the unions abandoned methods of negotiation.
The activists appealed not only to individual consciences and 
the authorities but also, by relying on direct economic action, 
actively prevented the smooth running of the wheels of government 
and industry in whatever way they could. They hoped to set an
A similar Issue was the stoppage and boycott in retaliation for 
the executions of Sacco and Vanzetti by the United States. See 
Appendix B.
98
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example, to call upon kindred spirits to support their demands, 
and to initiate a pattern df response to government policy which 
others could follow. They hoped that their refusal, made at the 
price of turning down some employment oppostudties or at the price of 
disciplinary action, would give a lead to other sections of the 
community. By engaging in political strikes, they hoped to make 
some useful contribution to the field of political ideas end 
political activity. They hoped that what on the surface might 
appear to be a useless protest, doomed to impotence and ineffect­
iveness, might, over a period of time, be e factor in social change*
Their strike action was justified by the activists on various 
grounds. First, in many instances, the militants argued that their 
action had been taken in the nave of something higher than their 
individual welfare, such as international working class solidarity 
or humanitarian considerations, and that It was taken in the public 
intereat and for the general welfare. They often attacked the 
authorities for not having acted in the "real** public lntareet and 
for being active group partisans whose decisions were determined by 
their own interests whether those were the same as those of the 
industrialists or reformist and right-wing elements in the Labor Party.
At the time of the pig iron ban. Healy put the case that the 
men could not be expected to surrender "the right of the Individual 
to refuse to participate in any action towards which he may have 
conscientious objection**. Their refusal to participate in the
99 Quoted in Workers9 Weekly, Apr. IS, 1938, p. 3.
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business of munitions manufacturing,was similar to their later 
refusal to assist the Dutch to reassert control in the East Indies, 
They claimed that they "retain(ed) their personal rights and 
perogatives one of which was to aid persons engaged in a struggle 
for freedom", Secondly, militants recognized that other sections 
of the community, such as commercial interests, were not standing 
idly by while the government set policy.
Spokesmen for the activists often implied that they were re-
presentative of the majority of Australian, while the authorities
!r
were not. In 1938, the Maritime Worker said that:
A small section of the community [BHP] is 
definitely dictating the policy of the 
Government in relation to the export of 
these materials, and that section of the 
community is much smalled [sic] numerically 
than the W.W.F.; and the small sections of 
commercial interests are apparently powerful 
enough to determine the policy of the Govern­
ment, in defiance of the voice of the majority 
of the Australian people, which has definitely 
expressed itself in favor of the action taken 
by our members, 102
Healy expressed the resentment of many militants towards Menzies* 
attack on their right to assert pressure on governmental policy 
while at the same time being prepared himself to accept "dictation
100
SMH, Jan. 19, 1938, p. 14; Jan. 25, 1938, p. 11; Feb. 19, 1938,
p. 11.
101
Quoting Roach in ibid., Mar. 13, 1946, p. 1.
Maritime W o r k e r June^1938, p. 4.
102
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103from big commercial interests”.
Thirdly, militant trade unions regarded themselves as the
vanguard of the labor movement. As such, they considered that they
had to give a lead to other sections of the movement, be it with
regard to humane causes, matters of conscience, or political
struggles. As far as Communist theory was concerned: 'The struggle
of the workers arouses the rest of the toiling masses. An energetic
struggle on the part of the workers wins them as allies of the
workers, and establishes the leadership of the labour movement over 
104these masses.
Fourthly, by resorting to direct action as a political tactic, 
militant unions were serving notice publicly that they could no 
longer rely upon remedies of peaceful persuasion; the time had come 
when they had to act with the force available to them in order to 
impress upon the government how urgent their demands were. They 
considered that it would have been far worse to abide by policies 
which they considered immoral or incorrect than suffer the conse­
quences of their direct action.
Decisions to strike, be they for political or industrial de­
mands, were tempered with considerations of success and support.
103
Quoted in SMH, Dec. 8, 1938, p. 11. See also Maurice Blackburn’s 
attack on the government for attacking the WWF for its act of 
conscience while not rebuking the doctors who threatened to 
sabotage the national health Insurance scheme; CPDS 158: 2295 
(Dec. 8, 1938).
104
Sharkey, op. cit.3 p. 34.
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M il i t a n t s ,  no le s s  than  o th e r  k in d s  o f  t r a d e  u n io n i s t s ,  were n o t 
p rep a red  to  ta k e  w ild  gambles and throw  c a u t io n  to  th e  w ind; th e y , 
to o ,  i n i t i a t e d  a s t r i k e  hop ing  fo r  some m easure o f su c c e s s . Com­
m unist th e o ry  em phasized th e  need f o r  g e n e ra ls h ip  in  s t r i k e s :
Those who a re  le a d in g  th e  s t r i k e  must re g a rd  
i t  as a b a t t l e ,  in  w hich th e y , th e  le a d e rs  
must c a r e f u l ly  e s t im a te  th e  s t r e n g th  o f  the  
enemy a t  any g iven  moment, must r e a l i s e  th e  
need to  m anoeuvre, th e  need fo r  good t a c t i c a l  
le a d e r s h ip ,  to  be a b le  to  u n d e rs ta n d  when th e  
s t r i k e  has been  d e f i n i t e l y  l o s t ;  to  be ab le  
to  r e t r e a t  w h ile  th e  s t r i k e r s  a re  s t i l l  n o t 
d iv id e d  and d e m o ra lis e d , to  be ab le  to  p re v e n t 
th e  ex posu re  o f  th e  w orkers to  undue p u n ish ­
m ent, in  th e  ev en t o f  th e  lo s s  o f  th e  s t r i k e ,  
and so  on . 105
M il i ta n t s  had to  a s s e s s  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s 1 re s p o n s e s , p r im a r i ly  
to  d e term ine  how com m itted th e  l a t t e r  would be to  b re a k in g  th e  
s t r i k e .  In  a s s e s s in g ,  th e  re p e rc u s s io n s  o f  t h e i r  a c t io n ,  th ey  
assumed th a t  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  had a d i s t a s t e  f o r  p ro lo n g e d , w ide­
sp read  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t io n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  on is s u e s  w hich ch a llen g e d  
government p o l ic y  in  th e  p o l i t i c a l  sp h e re . But they  a ls o  assumed 
th a t  th e re  w ere l im i t s  beyond w hich th e  a u th o r i te s  p ro b ab ly  would 
n o t go in  r e p re s s in g  p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s .
liea ly  had had g rave  doubts about c ro s s in g  swords w ith  th e  BHP
in  1938 b ecause  he fe a re d  ’’th i s  would g iv e  Lyons and Company an
«106o p p o r tu n ity  to  ru sh  in  w ith  some k in d  o f  in t im id a t in g  a c t io n .
105
I b i d ,3 p . 36.
106
Jim  H ealy to  J .  L onergan , Tasm anian S ta te  R e p re s e n ta t iv e ,  WWF, 
Feb. 16, 1938, in  W aters id e  W orkers’ F e d e ra tio n  f i l e s ,  Sydney.
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Similarly Communist trade union leaders abandoned any proposed 
support for a rocket range ban when the government Instantaneously 
Introduced strike-breaking leg isla tion .1^ 7
In the post-war period, m ilitants had to contend with those in 
the trade union movement who disapproved of the ir r ita tio n  stoppages, 
both industrial and p o litic a l, which were being called. The moder­
ates within the movement feared not so much that the m ilitants were 
out to capture control of the movement, although some moderates 
thought that they were, as that these tactics made the employers 
and the government less receptive to «diet they considered to be the 
more legitimate and pressing demands* Militants had to examine the 
kind of support they could expect from those in the labour movement 
who agreed In principle with the ir demands but not with the means 
used.
In 1949, for exanple, even i f  I t  could be argued that the 
Miners* Federation had some ju stifica tion  for i t s  claims that 
arbitration had failed the workers, th is was a question that came 
to seem less and less Important; the tactics offended many in the 
trade union movement who fe lt  a strike would sp lit the movement and
107
The government had signed the Long-Fang« Weapons Project agree­
ment with Great Britain to set aside areas In the in te rio r of 
South and Central Australia for use as testing grounds for 
guided projectiles* In itia l  protests of concern for Aborigines 
in the area had subsided [see CPD, 190: 435-40 (Mar. 6, 1947)] 
when the problem was raised afresh a f t e r  some Communist trade 
union leaders reconmended that a r,black ban1 be placed on the 
range so that monies could be used for peaceful, domestic pur­
poses [see e.g*, SMH, May 10, 1947, p. 11]* The proposal was 
dropped afte r i t  met strong opposition in the trade union move­
ment [see, e .g .,  ib id ,s May 13, 1947, p. 1].
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cause unnecessary discomfort to the overwhelming majority of 
workers. The miners1 failure to embarrass the Labor government 
and become the key voice in the trade union movement was based on 
a miscalculation. The leaders of the strike recognized that the 
established leadership in the labor movement had been conditioned 
by years of participating in an atmosphere of parliamentarianism 
and arbitration which had blunted the edge of the militant sword 
and shaped inclinations and habits in the direction of legal rather 
than direct action. But the miners failed to recognize that the 
workers had been subjected to the same milieu. By seriously mis­
judging responses, militants faced the possibility of producing 
wide divisions within their ranks and isolating themselves from 
large numbers of workers.
Reaction
Public. Host of the political strikes were too short for public
responses to have been noted. However, on three of the longer 
strikes reaction can be gauged.
(1) Pig iron ban. Within the community there appeared to
be little concrete response to the various boycott proposals that
had been put forward by the ACTU and the militant unions. While
some groups and individuals sympathetic to the WWF's stand passed
108resolutions in support of the union's action, trade figures did 
108
Based on material in the Waterside Workers' Federation files, 
Sydney.
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n o t I n d ic a te  any sh a rp  drop in  Jap an ese  im p o rts  o r  e x p o r ts .
A dverse r e a c t io n  to  th e  ban d id  come from e x p o r te r s  who were 
s u f f e r in g  t r a d e  d i s lo c a t io n ;  th ey  accused  th e  w a te rs id e  w orkers 
o f  b e in g  " l i t t l e  C z a r s " d i c t a t i n g  t r a d e  p o l ic y  to  th e  govern­
m ent, and asked th e  governm ent to  ta k e  a c t io n  a p p ro p r ia te  to  hav ing  
th e  ban l i f t e d .
(2) Dutch sh ip p in g  b an . The governm ent i t s e l f  reco g n ized
th a t  many groups and in d iv id u a ls  in  A u s t r a l ia  w anted to  see  Dutch
r u le  ended in  th e  N e th e rla n d s  E a s t I n d ie s .  C h if le y  spoke o f an a n t i
c o lo n ia lis m  th a t  " ru n s  v e ry  deep ly  th rough  th e  w hole t r a d e  union
movement in  t h i s  c o u n try , and does n o t e x i s t  m ere ly  among a few
Communists. I t  runs much w id e r th a n  th e  t r a d e  un ion  movement".
Community a c t i v i t y  in  su p p o rt o f  th e  In d o n es ian s  was r e f l e c t e d  in
th e  In d o n es ian  M edica l Aid Appeal s e t  up by some A u s tra l ia n  church
and b u s in e s s  le a d e r s  and a s u c c e s s f u l ,  w e l l -a t te n d e d  p r o t e s t  march
112by Sydney U n iv e rs i ty  s tu d e n ts  o u ts id e  th e  Dutch c o n s u la te ;  in
109
On tr a d e  developm ents d u rin g  t h i s  p e r io d ,  see  Graeme M o ffa t, 
" A u s tra lia n -J a p a n e se  T rad e , 1930-1959: An H i s to r i c a l  S u rv ey " , 
Economic S o c ie ty  o f  A u s tra lia  and New Zealand, Economic Mono­
graph, XX (A ugust, 1960); Jack  Shepherd , A u s tra lia 's  I n te r e s ts  
and P oli& ies in  th e  Far E ast (New York: I n s t i t u t e  o f  P a c i f i c  
R e la t io n s , 1940).
110
SMH, A pr. 23 , 1938, p . 12.
111
CPE, 186:U*(Mar. 6 , 1946).
112
K’T ut T a n t r i ,  R evo lt in  Paradise  (London: Helnem ann, 1960), 
pp . 290-96 ; see  a ls o  d e m o n stra tio n  a t  Woolloomooloo w harves, 
SMR, Nov. 8 , 1945, p . 5 .
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addition enthusiastic audiences flocked to see Joris Iven's
documentary^Indonesia Calling.
However, it was argued that delayed cargoes would destroy
trade opportunities that could be developed to the benefit of the
Australian economy. This was countered by arguments that Australia
would have greater opportunities for trade with a free Indonesia,
in which the standard of living of the people had been raised,
113than with one still under Dutch rule. As with the pig iron ban,
exporters and other comnercial Interests accused the unions of 
dictating policy to the government and demanded that these efforts 
be countered.
(3) Coal strike. More than in any other strike, the militants 
were anxious to take their case to the public. But in so doing the 
activists had official and unofficial obstacles to clear before they 
could get a hearing: limited funds a hostile press unsympathetic
113
See, e.g., Maritime Worker, Feb. 23, 1946, p. 1.
114
Which in comparison to the monies available to the other side 
seemed even more limited; to cite but one example - the Federation 
had f32,500 in financial backing for strike benefits when the 
strike began, while the Commonwealth Government spent nearly 
f25,000 on advertising alone between June and August. For some 
Commonwealth expenses, see CPD> 204:313 (Sept. 15, 1949).
115
Which according to Edgar Ross, editor of Common Cause, ignored 
or mutilated public statements and reported favourable informa­
tion in obscure parts of the paper; see Edgar Ross, The Coal 
Front: An Aocount of the 1949 Coal Strike and the Issues It 
Raised (Sydney: Conpress Printing, n.d.), p. 65.
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r a d io  n e t w o r k s a n  o f f i c i a l  b u re a c ra c y  ready  to  impose h u rd les* * ^  
o r  ready  to  p ro s e c u te  sh o u ld  th e  l i n e  betw een Communist p ropaganda 
and s e d i t io u s  u t te r a n c e s  be c ro s s e d .
I t  was u n l ik e ly  t h a t  th e  p u b l i c ,  in c o n v en ien ced  as i t  w as, would 
su p p o rt th e  s t r i k e r s .  The d a i ly  p ap e rs  announced each  day in  b o ld  
ty p e  th a t  th e  m iners had "s to p p ed  you from h av ing  a h o t b a th  o r  
from  w ashing y o u r c lo th e s  in  h o t w a te r ,  s to p p ed  you cooking more 
th an  2 m eals a day , c u t y ou r t r a n s p o r t  s e r v i c e s . . . .  c u t you r b read
and meat s u p p l ie s . . . . "  w h ile  c o n t r ib u t in g  to  se v e re  lo s s e s  in  goods
. 118 and w ages.
Labor movement• M i l i t a n t  t r a d e  un ions have r e l i e d  upon them selves
and seco n d ly  upon r e la t e d  w o rk in g -c la s s  o rg a n iz a t io n s  to  p re s e n t  
t h e i r  demands to  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s .  M i l i t a n t s  have had a v a ry in g  r e ­
la t io n s h ip  w ith  th e  Labor P a r ty ,  w hich has depended upon b o th  
h i s t o r i c a l  c irc u m stan c es  and L a b o r 's  b e in g  in  power o r  in  o p p o s it io n . 
In  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s  w hich have been d is c u s s e d ,  th e re  w ere a 
few in s ta n c e s  in  w hich th e  m i l i t a n t s  w ere su p p o rte d  in  t h e i r  demands 
by th e  Labor P a r ty  and o th e r  s e c t io n s  o f  th e  Labor movement.
The WWF re c e iv e d  su p p o rt f o r  th e  p ig  i r o n  ban from th e  M in ers ' 
F e d e ra t io n ,  th e  AEU, th e  Seam en's U nion, th e  ARU, th e  B u ild in g  Trades
116
The ABC had re fu s e d  e q u a l tim e to  th e  M in e rs ' F e d e ra tio n  to  
answ er a b ro a d c a s t  by th e  Chairman o f  th e  Coal B oard , i b i d .
117
For exam ple, no a m p li f ic a t io n  fo r  Domain m ee tin g s  and a ban on 
a March th ro u g h  th e  C ity  from  th e  C e n tra l  Railw ay S ta t io n  to  
Town H a ll .  I b i d ,9 pp . 6 7 -68 .
118
"What th e  Coal S t r ik e  Means to  Y ou", SMH,  June 27 , 1949, p . 1.
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F e d e ra t io n , s e v e r a l  T rades and Labor C o u n c ils , th e  ACTU, and 
s e v e ra l  b ran ch es o f  th e  Labor P a r ty .  I t  d id  n o t r e c e iv e  o f f i c i a l  
su p p o rt from  P a r lia m e n ta ry  L abor. At th e  tim e o f th e  Dutch sh ip p ­
in g  b a n , th e  WWF re c e iv e d  su p p o rt from  th e  FIA, th e  B o ile rm ak e rs ' 
U nion, th e  Sh ips P a in te r s  and D ockers ' U nion, th e  Road T ra n sp o rt 
W orkers' U nion, th e  T a l ly  C le rk s ' U nion, th e  Seam en's U nion, and some 
T rades and Labor C o u n c ils . The WWF ap p ea led  to  th e  ACTU to  su p p o rt 
a c t io n  c a lc u la te d  to  d e f e a t  Dutch p o l ic y  in  th e  N e th e rlan d s  E ast 
I n d ie s ,  b u t  th e  C ouncil d id  n o t make any p o l ic y  recom m endations 
a long  th a t  l i n e .  R iv a l f a c t io n s  w ith in  th e  t r a d e  union  movement 
on th e  q u e s tio n  o f  th e  ban began to  champion t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  
p o s i t i o n s ;  from 1946 on , th e re  were th e  WWF su p p o r te rs  who w anted to  
keep th e  ban u n t i l  such tim e as th e  In d o n e s ia n  governm ent shou ld  r e ­
q u e s t i t s  rem oval and ACTU s u p p o r te rs  who w anted to  m oderate th e  ban
119as th e  m i l i t a r y  s i t u a t i o n  in  th e  N e th e rlan d s  E as t In d ie s  im proved.
T rade un ion  a g i t a t i o n  in  th e  p o s t-w a r  p e r io d  fo s te r e d  th e  grow th
o f an ti-C om m unist a g i t a t i o n  in  th e  la b o r  movement and le d  to  th e
120fo rm atio n  o f th e  i n d u s t r i a l  g ro u p s . S p l i t s  w ith in  th e  t r a d e  union
119
S ee , e . g . ,  i b id . ,  Mar. 16, 1946, p . 3 . The ACTU had been charged  
i t s e l f  by th e  p a r lia m e n ta ry  o p p o s it io n  f o r  h av in g  p u b l ic ly  adopted  
Communist te c h n iq u e s  o f  in t im id a t io n  when i t  c a l le d  fo r  a s e r i e s  
o f  p u b lic  d em o n stra tio n s  a g a in s t  th e  A r b i t r a t io n  C ourt f o r  th e  
fo r ty -h o u r  week. I b id . , Feb. 26 , 1946, p . 4 . Not w an ting  to  
endanger i t s  i n d u s t r i a l  ch an c es , th e  ACTU E x ec u tiv e  th o u g h t i t  
b e s t  to  d i s a s s o c ia te  i t s e l f  from th e  WWF's p o l ic y .  See Monk's 
s ta te m e n t ,  i b id . ,  M ar. 13, 1946, p . 1.
120
See James Ju p p , A ustralian Party P o l i t ie s  (M elbourne: M elbourne 
U n iv e rs i ty  P r e s s ,  1964 ), pp . 80-82 .
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movement had been  f o r e c a s t  by th e  p r o te s t s  a g a in s t  th e  Sharkey
121and M c P h illip s  s to p p a g e s . These w ere made e x p l i c i t  a t  th e
tim e o f  th e  c o a l s t r i k e .  The New South Wales T rades and Labor
C ouncil w ent on re c o rd  w ith  a condem nation o f  th e  s t r i k e  as a
menace to  th e  la b o r  movement by en d an g erin g  r e l a t i o n s  betw een
122m iners and o th e r  t r a d e  u n io n i s t s ,  w h ile  th e  M elbourne T rades
H a ll C ouncil re fu s e d  to  cen su re  th e  C h if le y  governm ent fo r  i t s
123in t r o d u c t io n  o f  th e  em ergency s t r i k e  l e g i s l a t i o n  . Both
b o d ie s ,  as w e ll  as th e  ACTU and some key un ions (B u ild e rs  L a b o re rs ’
F e d e ra t io n ,  A u s t r a l ia n  W orkers’ U nion, Road T ra n sp o rt W orkers’
Union) o f f e r e d  su p p o r t f o r  th e  Prim e M in is te r ’ s a c t io n  and urged
th e  m in e rs ’ le a d e rs  to  re su b m it t h e i r  case  to  th e  Coal In d u s try  
124T r ib u n a l.  O f f i c i a l s  o f  th e  New South Wales and F e d e ra l Labor
P a r ty  launched  an in te n s iv e  propaganda campaign on th e  c o a l f i e l d s :  
d i s t r i b u t i n g  f i f t y  thousand  l e a f l e t s ;  sp eak in g  o v er c o a l f i e l d  ra d io  
s t a t i o n s ;  a d d re s s in g  p u b lic  m e e tin g s ; and g e n e ra l ly  d ec ry in g  th e  
s t r i k e  w hich they  argued  had been  b ro u g h t abou t to  in s u re  th e  de­
f e a t  o f Labor a t  th e  fo rthcom ing  g e n e ra l e l e c t i o n .  The s t r i k e  
c o l la p s e  was a s s i s t e d  by th e  f a i l u r e  o f  a l l - o u t  su p p o r t f o r  th e
121
SMH, Mar. 24 , 1949, p . 1 ; Mar. 25 , 1949, p . 1 ; Apr. 12, 1949, p
122
I b i d .3 J u ly  2 , 1949, p p . 1 ,3 .
123
Age,  J u ly  1 , 1949, p .  1 .
124
SMR3 June 30, 1949, p . 1 ; Age3 J u ly  1 , 1949, p . 1 .
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miners from other trade u n io n is ts . The A ustralasian Society  o f
Engineers endorsed the government's e f fo r ts  to  bring coal "at
grass" in to  u se , w hile the land transport unions, including
the New South Wales branch o f the ARV (in  defiance of a federal
executive d ir e c t iv e ) , agreed th at union labor should remove a l l
126such coal "at grass" and in  trucks. The la t t e r  unions a lso
agreed to  work with troops i f  operations were carried  out under
127governmental d ir e c t iv e s .
P o l i t ic a l  s tr ik e s  were supported at a l l  times by the Communist
Party. 128
Government. The reaction  by the a u th o r itie s  to p o l i t i c a l  s tr ik e s  
was conditioned by the p rev a ilin g  h is to r ic a l  circum stances, but 
there were no in stan ces in  which the a u th o r itie s  welcomed action  
that exceeded c o n stitu tio n a l forms or which challenged i t s  author­
i t y .  The a u th o r itie s  were confronted d a lly  w ith attempts by groups 
and in d iv id u a ls to Influence le g is la t io n ,  but they were n eith er  used 
to nor prepared to accepted attempts to in flu en ce le g is la t io n  by 
intim idation* The a u th o r itie s ' punishment o f unions for  engaging 
in  p o l i t i c a l  s tr ik e s  which challenged s p e c if ic  p o lic ie s  o f the
125
SMS, July 12, 1949, p . 3.
126
I b id , ,  July 14, 1949, p . 1.
127
I b id , ,  July 23, 1949, p . 1; July 25, 1949, p. 1.
128
Based on relevant is su es  o f W orkers' Weekly and Tribune.
government depended upon weighing the consequences of taking 
disciplinary action against the consequences of allowing the 
success of the strike to lead to further attempts to demand other 
changes in the political or industrial sphere.
In deciding upon a course of action, the authorities were 
only being advised and pressured by different groups with differ­
ent axes to grind, not all of whom carried equal weight and pres­
tige with the decision-makers, but they were also concerned with 
notions of the "general welfare" or the "public interest". In 
dealing with political strikes, the authorities explained their 
action in terms of a public interest to be found over and above 
that of any one sectional interest, and implied that this interest 
was over and above the sura of all sectional interests. It also 
appeared that when the authorities settled a controversy in the 
public interest, they assumed that, in the long run, all sectional 
interests would be better off as a result of the harmony and order 
which their decision made possible.
In Australia, there appeared to be a parliamentary ethos 
which considered certain organized activities to be outside the 
bounds of permissible and legitimate action. This ethos respected 
the distinction between persuasion and coercion and considered all 
attempts to force concessions from the government as being contrary 
to the rules and requirements of parliamentary democracy. As 
applied to trade unions, the ethos required disputes to be about 
real issues which involved concessions from employers; then, within 
the limits set down by the arbitration system, trade unions could
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back up th e se  demands by th e  u se  o f d i r e c t  a c t io n .  But d is p u te s  
cou ld  n o t be t in g e d  o r  t a in t e d  w ith  p o l i t i c a l  demands made upon 
th e  governm ent. T rade unions co u ld  p la y  upon p u b lic  f e e l in g s  o r  
upon governm ent s e n s i b i l i t i e s  w ith  as many l e g a l ,  p e r s u a s io n a l  
d ev ice s  as they  saw f i t  to  u s e ,  such as m e e tin g s , sp e e c h e s , pam­
p h l e t s ,  p a rad e s  and m arches. They cou ld  argue a g a in s t  p o l ic y  in  
an a tte m p t to  have i t  a l t e r e d  o r  r e d i r e c te d .  Byt"arguing, p e r ­
su ad in g  and t r y in g  to  conv ince  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  a f fo rd e d  no l e g i ­
t im a te  grounds on w hich th ey  cou ld  back up t h e i r  demands w ith  
d i r e c t  s t r i k e  a c t io n .
At a tim e when some m i l i t a n t  t r a d e  un ions w ere co n tem p la tin g
p la c in g  a " b la c k  ban” on th e  c o n s tru c t io n  o f  th e  Mount Eba ro c k e t
range in  c e n t r a l  A u s t r a l i a ,  th e  C h if le y  governm ent in tro d u c e d  p e n a l
l e g i s l a t i o n  to  d e a l w ith  p e rso n s  who d e c la re d  o r  a ttem p ted  to  d e -
129c la r e  "b la c k "  any f i n a l l y  approved d e fen se  p r o j e c t .  In  su p p o r t­
ing  th e  g o v e rn m e n ts  a c t io n ,  A tto rn e y -G e n e ra l E v a t t  e la b o ra te d  
upon th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een p o l i t i c a l  o p in io n  and p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n ;  
" J u s t  as th e  endeavor to  change d e c is io n s  by open e x p re s s io n  o f 
o p in io n  i s  o f  th e  e sse n c e  o f  dem ocracy, so  a tte m p te d  b o y c o tt to  
p re v e n t th e  governm ent c a r ry in g  th rough  a d e fen se  p r o je c t  approved 
by P a rlia m e n t would be th e  a n t i t h e s i s  o f  dem ocracy, and no governm ent 
cou ld  t o l e r a t e  i t " .  In  o th e r  w ords, th e  ethos  a llow ed  p e rso n s  to
129
Approved Defence P ro jects  P rotection  A ct, 1947.
130
H.V. E v a t t ,  "The A tto rn ey  G en era l W rites  on D efence P r o je c t s  
and B oycott Propaganda*, Australian Observer,  I  (May 31, 1947 ), 37.
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y
h o ld  to  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t  view s on m a tte rs  o f governm ent p o lic y  so 
long  as th ey  d id  n o t t r y  to  g ive  e f f e c t  to  th o se  views by fo rc e  
o r  in t im id a t io n .  W hile th e re  cou ld  be f u l l  and open d is c u s s io n  o f  
p o lic y  under c o n s id e r a t io n ,  th e  d i s s id e n t  p a r t i e s  had to  ab id e  by 
a f i n a l l y  d ec id ed  p o l ic y .
When tr a d e  un ions w ere a t ta c k e d  fo r  u s in g  i n d u s t r i a l  weapons
fo r  p o l i t i c a l  p u rp o ses  and on p o l i t i c a l  is s u e s  and f o r  r e j e c t i n g
th e  "o ld  and le g i t im a te  co n c e p tio n  o f i n d u s t r i a l  a c t io n  fo r
131i n d u s t r i a l  p u rp o s e s " , they  w ere accused  o f  v io l a t i n g  t h e i r  r e ­
la t io n s h ip  w ith  th e  governm ent. Under th e  term s o f  th a t  r e l a t i o n ­
s h ip ,  they  w ere " e n t i t l e d  to  form t h e i r  own o p in io n  on any i s s u e s ,
w hether p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c ia l  o r  econom ic, b u t they  have no r ig h t  to
132a tte m p t en fo rcem en t by r e s o r t  to  s t r i k e  a c t io n ' . I f  d i s s a t i s f i e d
w ith  th e  s t a t e  o f a f f a i r s ,  they  had re c o u rse  to  th e  p o l l s :  "The
essen ce  o f  dem ocracy i s  th a t  o b ed ien ce  sh o u ld  be ren d e red  to
133Government founded upon a p o p u la r  v o te " .
There w ere v a r io u s  grounds on w hich th e  governm ent re fu s e d  to  
t o l e r a t e  p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s .  F i r s t ,  i t  was argued  th a t  dangerous 
p re c e d e n ts  w ere e s ta b l i s h e d  i f  a s in g le  s e c t io n  o f th e  community
131
Q uoting M enzies on w age-pegging s t r i k e s ,  CPV3 190:21 (Feb . 20, 
1947).
132
Q uoting Mr. J u s t i c e  G a lla g h e r  on th e  South A fr ic a n  b o y c o t t ,  
Canberra Times,  S e p t. 11, 1964, p . 3.
133
M enzies on p ig  i r o n  b a n , SMHß Dec. 22 , 1938, p . 11; see  a ls o  
C u r t in ,  ib id .  3 Feb. 10, 1938, p . 11.
was p e rm itte d  to  a c t  a lo n e : no governm ent cou ld  "p e rm it any
s e c t io n  o f  th e  community to  u su rp  th e  fu n c tio n s  o f th e  G overnm en t..., 
[ t h i s  would b e] in  c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e  rec o g n iz e d  p r in c ip le s  o f
134
o rd e r ly  governm ent and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d in g " .  I t  was con­
s id e re d  th a t  th e  s e c t io n  was b o th  u su rp in g  th e  g o vernm en t's  
fu n c tio n  by se e k in g  to  impose i t s  own p o l ic y  on th e  community and 
a ls o  d e fy in g  th e  m a jo r i ty  w i l l  v e s te d  in  th e  governm ent. When 
m in o r i t ie s  s e t  them selves a g a in s t  a p o l ic y  o r  p ie c e  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  
th ey  w ere re fu s in g  to  su b o rd in a te  p r iv a te  f e e l in g s  to  p u b l ic  r e ­
q u ire m e n ts . The governm ent argued  t h a t  once th e  w i l l  o f  th e  peop le  
was ex p re ssed  in  a l e g i t im a te  a c t ,  a t r a d e  un ion  le a d e r  had a 
g r e a te r  du ty  to  th e  mass o f  p eo p le  than  to  h i s  own s e c t io n a l  g roup ; 
f o r  w h ile  he had to  p r o te c t  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  h is  im m ediate group he
had to  be c a r e f u l  n o t to  d e s tro y  h i s  o b l ig a t io n  to  th e  community and
„ 135th e  s t a t e .
S econd ly , i t  was argued  th a t  th e  governm ent framed p o l ic y  w ith  
th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  a l l ,  th e  " p u b lic  i n t e r e s t " ,  in  m ind, w h ile  a t r a d e
134
SMHs No v . 18, 1938, p .  11. T h is  was th e  p o s i t io n  o f  Lyons 
governm ent in  th e  p ig  i r o n  d is p u te ;  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  
p a r lia m e n ta ry  o p p o s it io n  in  th e  D utch sh ip p in g  b an ; and th e  
p o s i t io n  o f  th e  A r b i t r a t io n  C ourt in  th e  c o a l s t r i k e .
See Taylor v • Australasian Coal and Shale Employees Federation  
and Others,  64 C.A.R. 741 (1 9 4 9 ), a t  745; see  a ls o  Mr. Judge 
F o s te r  in  se n te n c in g  J .  K ing, M in e rs ' F e d e ra t io n  o f f i c i a l ,  
r e p o r te d  in  SMH, J u ly ,  14 , 1949, p . 1.
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union  was concerned  w ith  a p u re ly  s e c t io n  i n t e r e s t .  Even
though th e re  w ere o cca s io n s  when a s e c t io n a l  i n t e r e s t  c o in c id e d
w ith  th e  p u b lic  i n t e r e s t  ( th e  governm ent d e c id in g  what th e  p u b lic
i n t e r e s t  w a s ) , th e re  w ere a ls o  o c c a s io n s  when th e  two c o n f l i c te d ;
s in c e  th e  p u b lic  i n t e r e s t  had to  be d e c is iv e  a t  a l l  t im e s , i t  was
a dangerous p re c e d e n t to  a llo w  a s e c t io n a l  i n t e r e s t  to  s e t  p o lic y
even o nce . The governm ent s t r e s s e d  tim e and tim e ag a in  th a t  a
harmony o f  i n t e r e s t s  was p o s s ib le  on ly  when a l l  s e c t io n s  o f  th e
137community obeyed laws e n a c te d  f o r  th e  b e n e f i t  o f  a l l .  F u r th e r ­
m ore, by im posing i t s  w i l l  on th e  community th e  t r a d e  un ion  was 
n o t on ly  v o ic in g  i t s  in d iv id u a l  co n sc ien ce  b u t was p re v e n tin g  
o th e rs  from v o ic in g  t h e i r s ;  f o r  exam ple, when th e  w a te rs id e  w orker« 
p la c e d  a ban on c e r t a in  c a rg o e s , th ey  w ere p re v e n tin g  th o se  who 
g en u in e ly  b e l ie v e d  th a t  th o se  ca rg o es  sho u ld  be lo a d e d , from doing 
so .
T h ird ly ,  p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s  d e s tro y e d  th e  s t a tu s  quo under 
which th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  w ere accustom ed to  o p e ra t in g .  I f  th e  govern ­
ment allow ed  th i s  k in d  o f  a c t io n  to  su ccee d , th e n  i n d u s t r i a l  
p re s s u re s  would be used  to  e f f e c t  changes In  a l l  sp h e re s .
Both p a r t i e s  to  a d is p u te  tem pered t h e i r  d e c is io n s  w ith  con­
s id e r a t io n s  o f  s t r a t e g y ,  su c c e ss  and s u p p o r t .  The p r e c is e  r e a c t io n
136
The p o s i t io n  o f  th e  Lyons governm ent d u rin g  th e  p ig  iro n
d is p u te .
137
The p o s i t io n  o f  th e  A r b i t r a t io n  C ourt d u rin g  th e  c o a l 
s t r i k e .
of the government varied as other phases of national and inter­
national life changed. There was the constant factor of prestige,
for the government resented having to tolerate the acts of the
138usurper of its functions; nor did it welcome the taunts of the
parliamentary opposition that it was a flabby, shadow government
which accepted orders from Communist trade unions and continuously
139submitted to industrial blackmail. But there were also the
variables. First, the government had to consider the reaction of 
sections of the community other than the strikers. During the 
pig iron dispute, the government had to show a firm hand in order 
not to antagonize one of its best customers for primary products 
or the domestic manufacturers of those products. It also had to 
placate sections of the community who were complaining of any 
other section’s applying pressure on the government. During the 
coal strike, the problem was more complex than merely victory at 
any price. There was an outraged public whose mundane comforts 
had to be attended to; there was a mounting list of unemployed; 
there was a parliamentary opposition demanding war on the belli­
gerent miners; there was a labour tradition which questioned the 
use of repressive measures against fellow workers.
138
See, e.g., Menzies on the pig iron dispute, CPD, 158:1999 
(Dec. 8, 1938).
See, e.g., parliamentary opposition on the Dutch shipping 
ban, CPD, 185:5818 (Sept. 25, 1945); 186:135 (Mar. 8, 1946); 
186:1467 (Apr. 11, 1946).
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Secondly, the government had to consider how much community 
support the strikers had. The humane objectives of a wide range 
of participants tempered its action in the Freeman case; and wide­
spread community support led it with caution through the anti­
conscription stoppages, the pig iron dispute (particularly the 
early stages), the Dutch shipping ban, and the South African boy­
cott. But where political strikes appeared to be lacking in out­
side support, for example, in the Korean War stoppages or the 
Indo-China ban, the government could act with greater severity.
In 1938, before the Lyons government decided to invoke penal
measures on the offending members of the WWF, it had to consider
that the men had acted on humanitarian and conscientious grounds
that would appeal to the public, that the action had been in line
with ACTU policy, that, while localized in Sydney, the action was
not causing any serious disturbances. But it also considered that
the militants could find little support from parliamentary labor.
In emphasizing that "the foreign policy of Australia is the respons-
140ibility of the government and not of groups of individuals”,
Lyons found support from Curtin, who similarly condemned the sectional 
outbursts of those who took the initiative in matters of foreign 
trade.
During the Dutch shipping ban, Chifley judged that pro-Indonesian
140
Quoting Lyons, SMH, Jan. 29, 1938, p. 11.
141
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feeling was not confined to a few Communist trade unions. He
argued that many people in Australia wanted to see a changed
142situation in Indonesia. The Labor government itself had
143spoken of the "legitimate aspirations" of the movements for
independence in Southeast Asia; Evatt had argued: "We must work
for a harmonious association of democratic states in the South-
East Asia area, and see in the development of their political
maturity opportunity for greatly increased political, cultural
144and commercial cooperation". Given this predisposition to­
wards the Indonesians, Chifley was not prepared actively to re­
press the WWF1s activities; nor was he willing to justify them 
because of the industrial and political consequences which might 
accrue.
The shipping ban, like other political strikes of the post­
war period, was a part of the delicate problems which confronted 
a Labor government in its relationship to the trade union move­
ment: hoxtf to intensify its campaign against the Communist Party 
while taking care not to make inroads upon the freedom of the 
labor movement in the process; how to alleviate genuine worker
142
CPU, 186:16 (Mar. 6, 1946).
143
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144
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discontent without strengthening the hands of the Communists 
who would claim victory for benefits won by direct action; how 
to counter the parliamentary oppositions cries of being flabby, 
inactive, and Communist sympathizers; and the working class’s 
cries of being traitors, heartless, and unsympathetic bureaucrats;
and how to show concern for the interests of the whole country
145while being fair to the interests of particular sections.
For Chifley, the Dutch shipping ban was not simply a 
Communist plot, as the parliamentary opposition alleged. Within 
the Labor Party, some argued that the ban was an action undertaken 
for the highest motives, as in the pig iron dispute when the water­
side workers "placed the nation first, and penalized their de-
146pendents by refusing to work'1; others, that it was part of a
tradition on the waterfront which "has always taken a positive
147attitude on questions of international importance". The
pragmatic approach advised by Chifley was for the government to 
weigh the consequences of using discipline in a dispute the motives 
of which were at least partially a reflection of the sentiments of 
the community.
Thirdly, in cases involving trade, the government considered
145
On Labor*s activities to counter the Communist Party, see 
SMH, May 28, 1945, p, 4; Ibid.3 June 8, 1946, p, 3; Ibid., 
June 17, 1946, p. 1; I b i d July 5, 1946, p. 1.
146
Quoting Ward, CPD3 185:5829 (Sept. 25, 1945).
147
Quoting Beazley, CPD, 189s169 (Nov, 13, 1946).
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th e  amount o f  t r a d e  in v o lv e d . At th e  tim e o f  th e  p ig  i ro n  d is p u te ,  
Japan was too  v a lu a b le  a t r a d in g  p a r tn e r  to  an ta g o n iz e  on any s c o re .  
But w here th e  t r a d e  in v o lv ed  was n e g l ig ib l e  o r  the  tr a d in g  p a r tn e r  
n o t th a t  im p o r ta n t , as in  th e  case  o f  th e  Dutch in  1945, f in a n c ia l  
c o n s id e ra t io n s  f ig u re d  la rg e ly  in  a re v e rs e  s e n se ; th e  government 
d id  n o t f e e l  th e  same k in d  o f  p re s s u re  to  re d re s s  th e  e x p o r te r s 1 
g r ie v a n c e s .  C h if le y  asked d u rin g  th e  Dutch sh ip p in g  ban : ’’Does
th e  h o n o rab le  member su g g e s t th a t  in  o rd e r  to  have a l im ite d  q u a n t i ty  
o f  s u p p lie s  [w orth c a . f A 3,000,000] load ed  fo r  some p a r t i c u l a r  p a r t  
o f th e  g lobe we sho u ld  have a llow ed  an i n d u s t r i a l  d is p u te  to  f l a r e
up on th e  w a te r f ro n t  t h a t  w ould have in v o lv ed  th e  w hole i n d u s t r i a l
148movement and th e  whole o f  th e  sh ip p in g  t r a d e  o f th e  co u n try ?"
He a ls o  argued  th a t  th e  c a n c e l l a t io n  o f Dutch o rd e rs  fo r  goods in
A u s t r a l i a  was due more to  l im i te d  Dutch f in a n c e s  th an  to  th e  w a te r -
149s id e  w o rk e rs ’ b an . R. P o l la r d ,  th en  M in is te r  f o r  Commerce, sub­
se q u e n tly  m a in ta in ed  th a t  much o f  th e  lo s s  was due to  c o m p e titiv e  
p r ic in g  more th a n  to  th e  la c k  o f  t r a n s p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s .
F o u r th ly , th e  governm ent took  advan tage o f  s p l i t s  in  th e  t r a d e  
union and la b o r  movement b e fo re  d e c id in g  upon a p p ro p r ia te  a c t io n .
In  1937, th e  la b o r  movement was s p l i t  on th e  t r a d e  q u e s t io n .  ACTU
148
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policy on Japanese boycotts and embargoes, if a victory for those 
on the left advocating a united front program, was not official 
Labor policy. Parliamentary labor held out against enmeshing 
Australia in the problems of the disordered old world. By 1945, 
the labor movement showed signs of being more disunited. The Labor 
government took advantage of trade union splits during the coal 
strike by arguing that it was not acting against its own members 
but the deceivers of its members. Chifley contended that the strike 
was not a pure industrial dispute called to bring about a just settle­
ment of grievances, but an attack on arbitration calculated to under­
mine the government and its instrumentalities; as such it had to be 
treated in an extraordinary manner. While the government weighed 
the possibility of industrial repercussions should it punish the 
strikers, it decided to chance the possible industrial retaliation.
There were special problems involved if strikes occurred while 
a Labor government was in office. For a Labor leader, there was the 
added problem of the possible electoral liabilities of prosecuting 
industrial leaders. Since the Labor Party depended upon the organized 
support of the trade unions, this became a factor in the way in which 
it handled political s t r i k e s . L a b o r ' s  responses to the post-war 
period were colored by Chifley's affirmation: "I do not agree with
the strikers, but... I shall not at any time Join a crusade to crucify
But the Labor Party leader is also influenced by allies who fall 
outside the working-class— nationalists, small farmers, petty 
bourgeoisie, Catholics, intellectuals. See Childe on this point; 
Childe, op, eit,y pp. 79-80.
151
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152th e  w orkers o f  t h i s  c o u n try , to  whom I  b e lo n g . . .«  D uring th e
c o a l s t r i k e ,  C h if le y  re fu s e d  to  invoke th e  Crimes A ct; f o r  in
a d d i t io n  to  th e  la b o r  movement’ s t r a d i t i o n a l  o p p o s itio n  to  th e  A c t,
C h if le y  b e l ie v e d  th a t  th e  ’’g e n e ra l p u b lic  does n o t re g a rd  men who
153have been  engaged in  i n d u s t r i a l  t ro u b le s  as c r im in a ls  . N onethe­
l e s s ,  he r e a l iz e d  th a t  th e  c o a l s t r i k e  was no o rd in a ry  i n d u s t r i a l  
d is p u te  le d  by r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  o f  th e  w orkers b u t a p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e
15/
c a l le d  by men and "u s in g  th e  m iners f o r  t h e i r  own tre a c h e ro u s  p u rp o se s" .
I t  was made e x p l i c i t  by th e  Labor governm ent a t  th e  o u ts e t  o f
th e  c o a l s t r i k e  t h a t  th e  on ly  a u th o r i ty  empowered to  a d ju d ic a te  th e
m in e rs ’ c la im s was th e  Coal In d u s try  T rib u n a l and t h a t  th e re  cou ld
be no f u r th e r  p ro cee d in g s  b e fo re  t h a t  body u n t i l  th e  m iners ag reed
155to  c a l l  o f f  th e  s t r i k e .  A lthough i t  seems c l e a r  t h a t  th e  govern­
ment had th e  power to  launch  p ro s e c u tio n s  a g a in s t  th e  m iners  e i t h e r  
under th e  Crimes A c t o r  by in v o k in g  S e c tio n  54 o f  th e  Coal In du stry
152
Quoted in  L .F . C r is p ,  Ben C h ifley : A Biography (London: Longmans, 
1961 ), p . 351.
153
CPD,  203:1561 (June 28 , 1949).
154
Q uoting an a d v e rtise m e n t a u th o r iz e d  by C h if le y ,  SMR3 J u ly  20 , 
1949, p . 4 .
155 A s t r i c t  re a d in g  o f  th e  CommonwealthW Coal In du stry  Act 1946, 
C lause 18 ( 2 ) ,  in d ic a te d  th a t  w h ile  th e re  was d i r e c t i o n a l  power 
on th e  Prim e M in is te r  o v er th e  Coal B oard , C h if le y ’s d e c is io n  
n o t to  in te rv e n e  was a p o l i t i c a l  n o t a l e g a l  d e c is io n .
Crimes Aot9 1914.
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Ae1?‘~>^ , i t  was d i s in c l in e d  to  do so i f  th e re  was a p o s s i b i l i t y  o f
s e t t le m e n t  by o th e r  m eans. When s e t t le m e n t  seemed Im p o ss ib le , th e
15 8governm ent in tro d u c e d  s p e c i f i c  l e g i s l a t i o n  to  meet th e  c r i s i s .
The cou rts• The on ly  p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e  in  which th e  c o u r ts  p la y ed  
a s ig n i f i c a n t  p a r t  was th e  c o a l s t r i k e .  The A r b i t r a t io n  C o u rt, a c t ­
in g  under th e  powers o f  th e  em ergency l e g i s l a t i o n  p assed  by th e  
Commonwealth, is s u e d  r e s t r a i n in g  o rd e rs  to  fo u r  un ions ( th e  M in e rs ’ 
F e d e ra t io n ,  WWF, AEU, and FIA) and th e  Communist P a r ty  p r o h ib i t in g  
them from d i r e c t in g  t h e i r  funds tow ards a s s i s t i n g  th e  c o a l s t r i k e .
When on th e  fo llo w in g  day th e  High C ourt upheld  th e  emergency l e g i s -
l a t i o n ,  th e  A r b i t r a t io n  C ourt handed down p e n a l t i e s  fo r  th e  u n io n s ’
160f a i l u r e  to  com ply. These d e c is io n s  w ere in  due co u rse  upheld  by
th e  High C o u rt.
Both th e  Coal In d u s try  T rib u n a l and th e  A r b i t r a t io n  C ourt p la c e d  
s tro n g  em phasis on th e  need o f  th e  c i v i l i z e d  community to  o p e ra te  on 
th e  b a s is  o f  th e  r u le  o f  law ; b o th  argued  t h a t  a harmony o f  a l l  s e c t io n a l
157
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Employees Federation Southern D is tr ic t  and Others,  64 C.A.R. 758 
(1 9 4 9 ); Taylor v . Australasian Coal and Shale Employees Federation  
Western D is tr ic t  and Others,  64 C.A.R. 762 (1 9 4 9 ); Taylor v. 
Australian Communist Party and Otherss 64 C.A.R. 803 (194 9 ); Taylor 
v. Waterside Workersf Federation o f  A u stra lia  and Others, 64 C.A.R. 
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I n te r e s ts  was p o s s ib le  only when a l l  s e c tio n s  obeyed the  g en era l 
law s. R ather than  disobey th e  law , groups and in d iv id u a ls  must 
appeal to  dem ocratic in s t i t u t i o n s  to  re so lv e  competing lo y a l t i e s ,  
fo r  such in s t i t u t i o n s  had the  good o f the  community a t  h e a r t .  Minor­
i t i e s  could n o t s e t  them selves above th e  law: "Once the  w i l l  o f the
people i s  expressed  in  the  a c t . . . [ o n e  h as] a g re a te r  duty to  the  
mass o f th e  peop le” than to  o n e 's  own s e c t io n a l  group.
E valua tion
P o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s ,  l ik e  a l l  th e  forms o f n o n -v io le n t d i r e c t  
a c tio n  which have been examined in  th i s  t h e s i s ,  a re  n o t t a c t i c a l  
weapons In  a b a t t l e  between e q u a ls . To i l l u s t r a t e :  (1) In  the  p ig  
iro n  d is p u te , a t  the  end o f n ine  w eeks, the  s t r ik in g  w orkers had
lo s t  #100,000 in  wages w hile  the  sh ip  owners had l o s t  #3,000 in
162goods. (2) In  the  co a l s t r i k e ,  th e  government had both  le g a l  de­
v ices  to  b rin g  th e  m iners to  t h e i r  knees and means o f  eas in g  th e  coal 
c r i s i s ;  i t  a lso  had th e  upper hand in  th e  propaganda b a t t l e .  The 
M iners ' F ed era tio n  had #32,500 a v a ila b le  fo r  s t r ik e  b e n e f i ts  when
the  s t r ik e  began. The Commonwealth government spen t n e a r ly  #25,000
163fo r  a d v e r tis in g  on the  s t r ik e  alone between June and A ugust, 1949.
The s t r i k e s ,  even where they  d id  n o t achieve t h e i r  demands, 
dem onstrated to  the  government th a t  o f f i c i a l  p o lic y  o r  p a r t i c u la r
161
The King v . Taylor3 op. eit•
162
SMH,  J an . 23 , 1939, p . 11.
CPV, 203:313 (S ep t. 15, 1949); see a lso  Ross op . cit., pp. 65-68.
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pieces of legislation were unpalatable to a section of the community.
In the pig iron dispute, the WWF had made sure that Japan’s original
contract for twenty-two thousand tons of pig iron would not be filled
and that exporters and the government would question the wisdom of
164any future shipments. However, the action of the WWF had not bound 
the government to any change in trading policy.
Concretely, the Dutch shipping ban had held up forty thousand 
tons of cargo. The ban also struck a blow at colonfelism, as far as 
the WWF was concerned, and brought the Indonesian case before the 
Australian p u b l i c . O t h e r  political strikes discussed had less 
notable effects.
♦
The coal strike cost #100,000 in lost production, #30,000 in
166lost pay, and 2,149,900 tons in lost coal. In political terms, 
it issued in the following warnings to the workers: from one side,
to be ever watchful of any attempt in the future to embroil them in
164
See statement of Ted Roach, Secretary of the Port Kembla branch 
of the WWF, in Ironworker, September, 1941, p. 1; see also Jim 
Healy to Ted Roach, Jan. 25, 1939, in Personal Files of Jim Healy, 
Waterside Workers' Federation files, Sydney; Healy, "General 
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op. oit.
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industrial disputes which were designed for purely political motives; 
from another; that "in the great test of battle between the workers 
and the capitalists the Labor government and the Right wing leaders 
of the Australian Labor Party join forces with the capitalist to 
make war upon the worker”. The parliamentary opposition, not
content with the action taken during the strike, demanded that the 
government bring in legislation to ban the Communist Party and to 
introduce secret ballots into trade union elections; when the Liberals 
came to power at the end of 1949 the strike acted as a stimulus for 
proposals which culminated in the Communist Party Dissolution Bill 
of 1951.
167
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CHAPTER XI
C O N C L U S I O N
In this concluding chapter, I plan to reassess the three political 
movements in terms of Smelser's six determinants of collective behaviour. 
In his own work, Smelser does not attempt to apply the determinants 
consistently to any single historical instance, but generally and compara­
tively to various historical instances of the major forms of collective 
behaviour. In this thesis, I applied each of the six determinants to 
three examples of norm-oriented movements which (a) occurred in stable 
societies of democratic capitalism, and (b) had in common the use of 
unconventional or illegal tactics as a regular part of their activities. 
However, I have found that while Smelser's classifications were valuable 
for setting up a model by which to trace the sequence of events which 
made up the life period of the movements, they were less helpful in 
assessing the successes and failures of different kinds of movements. 
Therefore, in this chapter, I shall supplement Smelser's work with an 
evaluation of my analytical findings.
The civil rights movement, the nuclear disarmament movement, and 
the selected aspects of the trade union movement were examples of norm- 
oriented movements which attempted to Induce governmental authorities 
to modify or create norms in the name of a generalized belief. Their 
objective was to institute new or modify old laws or policies of the 
existing system; that is, to affect the norms or regulatory principles 
by which democratic capitalism operates. While these movements contained 
some groups or some individuals who challenged the values of democratic
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capitalism, the movements as a whole were limited to demands £or 
normative change.
Two other factors are important about these movements. First, they 
were minority movements which challenged norms accepted by the majority. 
Their membership was a minority of the population, their views were 
minority views, and their protest was a minority's protest. The majority 
either confidently or apathetically supported the norms which the minority 
wanted to change; the latter, thus, had immediate disadvantages. The 
Negroes, the Alderoaston marchers, and the militant trade unionists, 
unlike the followers of Gandhi who were in a majority in India, the women 
suffragettes who represented a large percentage of the population, or the 
American trade unionists in the 1930's who had friends in the national 
government, were minorities with few financial resources and few friends 
in a position to set policy.
Secondly, while the nature of the changes sought were basically 
normative, they had at all times valuatlve consequences and implications. 
But even though normative, they were changes of great magnitude. They 
were changes to alter well-established domestic or foreign policies.
These policies often had deep historical roots; in all cases, they were 
policies that were supported by sizeable and significant vested interests.
I wish now to turn to Smelser's six determinants of collective 
behaviour, bearing in mind two points. First, that these determinants 
are useful guide-posts for examining the movements' sequence of events. 
Secondly, no single determinant can explain why and how the movements 
developed as they did; but all six determinants are, in effect, the 
necessary conditions which constituted the sufficient condition for the
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movements to have occurred.
1. Structural conduciveness. Certain structural characteristics 
permitted or encouraged these political movements by providing channels 
through which demands for normative change could be made upon the 
authorities. In addition to the availability of existing media to 
communicate beliefs, a common language, and such pre-established Insti­
tutionalized structures as pressure groups, political parties, and ethnic 
and religious groups, the political movements had access to certain 
devices: "petitions, elections, initiatives, referenda, letters to
congressmen, letters to the press, demonstrations, public opinion polls,
2requests for court injunctions, etc.”
This parallels the first of Dahl's conditions for insuring the
peaceful adjustment of conflict:
The likelihood of peaceful adjustment to a conflict 
is increased if there exist institutional arrange­
ments that encourage consultation, negotiation, the 
exploration of alternatives, and the search for 
mutually beneficial solutions. Conversely, the 
prospects of deadlock and coercion are increased 
if institutional arrangements severely inhibit such 
activities. 3
The choice of channels depended upon the movements' composition, 
historical circumstances, and tactical considerations. For example, some 
in the nuclear disarmament movement believed that the radio and press were 
boycotting their activities and sought to use tactics which the media
^ Smelser, op, oit,, p. 382.
2 Ibid,, p. 282.
3 Robert A. Dahl, Modem Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- 
Hall, 1963), p. 77.
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o f  com m unication cou ld  Ig n o re  l e s s  e a s i l y ;  th e  c i v i l  r i g h t s  movement 
had l o s t  f a i t h  in  bo th  th e  p a r t i e s  o f  E isenhow er (R ep u b lican ) and 
E a s t la n d  (D em ocrat); A u s tr a l ia n  w a te r s id e  w orkers and Negro sh a re c ro p p e rs  
d id  n o t have th e  fo rm al s k i l l s  f o r  engag ing  in  p e t i t i o n in g  and l e t t e r  
w r i t i n g ;  N egroes in  New York C ity  b o y c o tte d  sch o o ls  b ecau se  o th e r  ch an n e ls  
( r e s e a r c h ,  p o lic y  s ta te m e n ts ,  new spaper a r t i c l e s ,  sp e e c h e s , p u b l ic  d e b a te )  
had been t r i e d  and found w a n tin g ,
S m elser a rg u es  th a t  th e  s t r u c t u r a l  s e t t i n g  n o t o n ly  must make some
avenues o f  p r o te s t  a v a i la b le  b u t a ls o  m ust c lo se  some ch an n e ls  o f
4
e x p re s s io n .  But he ap p ea rs  to  con fuse  th e  movements' g e n e ra liz e d  b e l i e f s  
and t h e i r  means o f  e x p re s s io n .  Movements a re  c l a s s i f i e d  as n o rm -o rie n te d  
b ecau se  o f  th e  n a tu re  o f  t h e i r  demands and n o t b ecause  th e y  f in d  o b s ta c le s  
to  en g ag in g  in  o u tb re a k s  o f  h o s t i l i t y ,  mob v io le n c e  and coups d 'e ta t • I t  
would be s i g n i f i c a n t  i f  CORE o rg a n iz e d  h o s t i l e  mobs in  H arlem ; b u t i t  
co u ld  do so i n  th e  name o f  slum  c le a ra n c e  p r o j e c t s .  In  c o u n tr ie s  where 
th e r e  i s  a t r a d i t i o n a l  method which m ost n o rm -o rie n te d  movements fo llo w , 
t h i s  method a c t s  to  c o n fin e  th e  b o u n d a rie s  o f any n o rm -o rie n te d  movement. 
T h is i s  so  even in  movements in  w hich th e  use  o f  n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n  
i s  u n c o n v e n tio n a l; th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  methods s t i l l  o p e ra te  as a  r e f e r e n t  to  
d i r e c t  a c t io n .
2 . S t r a i n . The movements in d ic a te d  d iv e rs e  k in d s  o f  s t r a i n :  (a )  new 
in fo rm a tio n  on th e  d e s t r u c t iv e  p o t e n t i a l  o f  n u c le a r  weapons c o n t r ib u te d  to  
th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  CND; (b) d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w ith  th e  post-W orld  War I I  
s i t u a t i o n  c o n t r ib u te d  to  th e  c a l l i n g  o f  p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s ;  (c )  th e
4 S m else r, op. c i t .  t pp . 285-86
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disharmony between the social and economic conditions of the white 
middle class and the "black bourgeoisie" contributed to the discontent 
of the Negro middle class; (d) the attempts of the American government 
to bid for Asian and African support, in the context of the Cold War, 
by citing the equality ideology embodied in the American Creed contri­
buted to the discontent of the domestic Negro population.
These strains exerted pressure for change in the social system by 
creating demands for altering some aspect of that system - in the case 
of the three movements studied, normative aspects of the system. The 
strains by themselves did not make for change in the system; but they 
did represent a possible source of change.
3. Growth of generalized beliefs. In the presence of appropriate 
conditions of conduciveness and strain, generalized beliefs were 
activated. The beliefs, more complex than mere causes, explained or 
identified the dissatisfactions or inadequacies within the society, made 
the situation meaningful to the potential activists, and suggested methods 
of correcting the dissatisfactions or inadequacies. In the movements 
studied, federal civil rights legislation was envisaged as bringing equal 
rights to American Negroes; an Australian ban on pig iron sales to Japan 
was regarded as decreasing the latter's chances of aggression; and a pro­
gramme of unilateralism was considered to represent a chance to remove 
Great Britain from the moral and military destructiveness of nuclear 
weapons.
In the movements, certain results were promised, hoped for or expec­
ted if certain normative changes were made which would alter what the 
movements regarded as the situation of strain. Smelser points out that
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in  th e  se a rc h  f o r  s o lu t io n s  to  c o n d it io n s  o f  s t r a i n ,  p eo p le  develop  a 
b e l i e f  which " ’ s h o r t - c i r c u i t s *  from  a v e ry  g e n e ra liz e d  component d ire c tly  
to  th e  fo cu s o f  s tra in ." " *  He c o n tin u e s :  " C o l le c t iv e  b e h a v io r ,  th e n ,  i s  
th e  a c t io n  o f  th e  i m p a t i e n t . . . .  This i s  one reaso n  f o r  d e f in in g  c o l l e c t iv e  
b e h a v io r  a s  u n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d ;  i t  o ccu rs  when s t r u c t u r a l  s o c ia l  a c t io n  
i s  under s t r a i n  and when i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  means o f  overcom ing s t r a i n  a re  
inadequate ,"**
4 . Role o f  p r e c i p i t a t i n g  f a c t o r s . A s p e c i f i c  ev en t w hich came to  
sym bolize th e  c o n d it io n s  o f  con d u c iv en ess  and s t r a i n  s e t  th e  movements in  
m o tion . The b e l i e f ,  in  o th e r  w ords, was g iven  an immediacy and u rgency .
The Labour governm ent’ s to ughen ing  a t t i t u d e  tow ard th e  A u s t r a l ia n  Communist 
P a r ty ,  m a n ife s te d , in  so f a r  as th e  l a t t e r  was co n ce rn ed , in  th e  c o u r t  
c o n v ic tio n s  o f  Sharkey and M c P h ill ip s , was a f a c t o r  p r e c i p i t a t i n g  th e  c o a l 
s t r i k e .  The changed a t t i t u d e  o f  Bevan on u n i l a t e r a l i s m ,  o r  r a th e r  th e  
hopes o f  th e  u n i l a t e r a l i s t s  in  th e  Labour P a r ty  t h a t  Bevan would champion 
t h e i r  p o s i t i o n ,  p r e c i p i t a t e d  a c t io n  o u ts id e  th e  Labour P a r ty  f o r  th e  
d e fen ce  p o l ic y  o b je c t iv e s .  The a r r e s t  o f  Rosa P ark es  p r e c i p i t a t e d  th e  
Montgomery bus b o y c o t t ;  th e  su c c e s s  o f  th e  b o y c o tt  s t im u la te d  l a t e r  d i r e c t  
a c t io n  m easures f o r  c i v i l  r i g h t s .  In  some in s ta n c e s ,  th e  c o n d i t io n  o f  
s t r a i n  and th e  p r e c i p i t a t i n g  f a c to r s  w ere th e  sam e, f o r  exam ple, th e  
r e v e la t io n s  o f  th e  1957 Defence W hite P aper in  G reat B r i t a in .
Ib id , ,  p . 71. I t a l i c s  in  th e  o r i g i n a l .
6 Ibid . 3 pp . 72-73
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5. Mobilization of the participants for action. In the body of this 
thesis, I have discussed the class composition of the movements, the role 
of the leadership, the diverse strategies and tactics which the movements 
adopted, and the manner of action of the affected groups. At this point,
I would like to offer a more general explanation of the unconventional!ty 
of these three political movements.
Two main problems faced the movements: first, to command the attention 
of the nation; and second, to make the authorities more responsive to the 
urgency of their situation and, hence, to their demands. The question 
was how best to approach these problems: how to draw attention to their 
case: how to present arguments for their position; and how best to apply 
pressure on the national authorities to enact the kind of legislation 
which they saw as curing their ills.
The general answer was non-violent direct action, of which there 
were two kinds. First, "immediate" direct action posed a direct threat 
to the institutions being attacked. The outcome of sit-ins at lunch 
counters, sit-ins at weapon plants’ roadways, shop-ins at food stores, 
rent strikes and political strikes was partially dependent upon the 
economic dislocation which they caused. The loss of trade as a result 
of direct action demonstrations was a factor in integrating public 
accommodation; while the fact that weapons production continued unimpeded 
allowed the authorities to ignore the nuclear disarmament activists. 
Considering their strategic location in the society, militant trade unions 
won surprisingly few of their strikes; the idea of their being able to 
force the society to a standstill, like Sorel’s myth of the general
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strike,^ sustained their enthusiasm and maintained their willingness 
to engage in many strikes, but it brought few concrete results«
Secondly, it was hard for most activists to take immediate direct 
action; they had to be content with symbolic direct action - parades, 
marches, vigils, sit-downs in public thoroughfares, stall-ins« In these 
cases, the extent of the social rather than the economic (financial) 
dislocation was a factor in the demonstrations* outcome. Two thousand 
people peacefully sitting down in Parliament Square could be ignored 
by the authorities; for there was no indication that if they were ignored 
they would be more numerous or less peaceful at later demonstrations«
But three hundred Negroes conducting a sit-down at a hospital site in 
New York City could not be Ignored, since the authorities feared that 
the next time they might be a hostile, violent group of one thousand 
led by the Black Muslims.
The reasons for using both immediate and symbolic direct action 
varied. Some people regarded it as a personal statement of where they 
stood on the issues raised by the movements and as an end in itself«
But most people regarded it as a political act. Non-violent direct 
action was considered to be supplementary to political action and to 
conventional politics; it was an act to "force” the authorities to yield 
what they would not give of their own. Except in the case of the trade 
union movement for whom direct action, as a form of action, was an 
integral part of their traditional activities, the civil rights and 
nuclear disarmament movements regarded it much more so as a "last resort"
7 Sorel, op, e i t pp. 41-46
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to  be used  e i t h e r  when o th e r  methods seemed in a p p ro p r ia te  o r  when 
o rd in a ry  means o f  p e rs u a s io n  had f a i l e d ,  o r  o u t  o f im p a tien ce  w ith  th e  
speed  o f  c o n v e n tio n a l means o f  demanding change.
What s t r i k e s  th e  o b s e rv e r  i s  how a p p ro p r ia te  n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  
a c t io n  was to  a mass s o c ie ty .  I t  was a dynamic m ethod. I t  was s u i t a b le  
f o r  lo n g , d raw n-ou t s t r u g g le s .  I t  cou ld  be used  by p eo p le  whose prim e 
re so u rc e  was t h e i r  b o d ily  s t r e n g th ;  i t  r e q u ire d  l i t t l e  money, few s k i l l s  
and s im p le  te c h n iq u e s  o f  o r g a n iz a t io n .  I t  co u ld  be u sed  by b o th  th o se  to  
whom i t  was a  p a r t  o f  a  p h ilo so p h y  o f  l i f e  and th o se  to  whom i t  was a 
p o l i t i c a l l y  e x p e d ie n t t a c t i c .
The i n t e l l e c t u a l s  in  th e  c i v i l  r i g h t s  and n u c le a r  disarm am ent move­
m ents spoke o f  th e  a l i e n a t io n  o f  modern man -  th e  problem s connec ted  w ith  
do ing  m ean ing fu l work and p la y in g  a  m e an in g fu l r o le  in  th e  mass s o c ie ty .
In  th e  h igh l)ob rgan ized  econom ic and s o c ia l  s t r u c t u r e ,  w ith  i t s  l e g a l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  i n t r i c a c i e s  and c o m p le x i t ie s ,  what Fromm c a l l s  " e x p re s s io n s  o f 
a c o n s te l l a t io n  in  w hich th e  in d iv id u a l  i s  c o n fro n te d  by u n c o n t ro l la b le  
d im ensions in  com parison w ith  which he i s  a  sm a ll p a r t i c l e "  , n o n -v io le n t  
d i r e c t  a c t io n  gave p eo p le  f a r  from  th e  c o r r id o r s  o f  power a chance to  
a f f e c t  th e  p o l i t i c a l  p ro c e s s .  I t  a llow ed  them to  become p o s s ib le  v e h ic le s  
o f  s o c i a l  change in  a manner a p p ro p r ia te  to  t h e i r  s i t u a t i o n .  A s it-d o w n ,
a mass m arch, a b o y c o t t ,  and a  b la c k  b an , s im p le  as they  w ere , s to o d  in
9
sh a rp  r e l i e f  to  th e  c o m p le x it ie s  o f mass s o c ie ty  d e s c r ib e d  by L e d e re r ,
g
E rich  Fromm, The Fear o f  Freedom (London: R outledge & Kegan P a u l,
1 9 6 0 ), p .  114.
Emil L e d e re r ,  S ta te  o f  the Masses: The Threat o f  the C la ss le ss  S o c ie ty  
(New Y ork: W.W. N orton , 1940 ).
9
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M annheim 10 A re n d t,11 H u x ley ,12 O rw e ll, 13 K o rn h au se r ,14 and M i l l e .15
N o n -v io len t d i r e c t  a c t io n  th rew  up i t s  own p rob lem s. These w ere 
d is c u s s e d  in  d e t a i l  in  th e  t h e s i s .  B u t, in  b r i e f ;  f i r s t l y ,  o c c a s io n a lly  
m i l i t a n t  forms o f  d i r e c t  a c t io n  overshadowed th e  movements' dem ands. Few 
ca re d  what B rooklyn CORE demanded as  tt .e  p r ic e  f o r  c a l l i n g  o f f  th e  s t a l l -  
i n s ;  th e  d an g ers  o f  r a d io a c t i v i t y  took  second  p la c e  to  th e  consequences
Of th e  Committee o f  100 'a  a c t s  o f  c i v i l  d is o b e d ie n c e ; th e  sh o rtco m in g s o f 
th e  a r b i t r a t i o n  system  m a tte re d  l i t t l e  to  th e  in co n v en ien ced  p o p u la tio n  
o f  Sydney; th e  r e v e la t io n s  o f  th e  S p ie s  f o r  Peace document m a tte re d  l e s s  
than  th e  S p ie s ' b reach  o f  th e  O f f i c i a l  S e c re ts  A ct.
S eco n d ly , a l l  th r e e  movement se a rc h e d  f o r  a l l i e s ,  fo r  th ey  fe a re d  
t h a t  a lo n e  they  co u ld  n o t  b r in g  enough w eig h t to  b e a r  on th e  a u t h o r i t i e s .
But th e  need to  have a l l i e s  e n t a i l e d  th e  need  to  c o n s id e r  t a c t i c s  and 
s t r a t e g y  in  term s o f  th e  fo n a e r 'e  p o s s ib le  support*
T h ird ly ,  once n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n  was u se d , th e  movements found 
i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  rech a n n e l e n e rg ie s  in to  th e  o rd in a ry  p o l i t i c a l  p ro c e s s e s .
10
^  ”a5nh‘f1®« and S o c i e t y in  an Age o f  R econ stru ction : S tu d ies  in  
o c .m  s o c ia l  o tru c tu re  (hondon: R outledge & Kegan P a u l,  1951 ).
i T o ! 1' 1 9 5 1 ) 11'  Tke O rigins ° f  T o ta lita r ia n ism  (New York: H a rc o u r t ,  B race
12
Aldous H uxley , Brave New World R e v is i te d  (London: C ha tto  A H indus, 1960). 
13 „ „
(.eorge O rw e ll, 1984 (London: S eeker & W arburg, 1951 ).
C l i t i c s  o f  Mass S o c ie ty  (London: R outledge
H ^ C“ , £e t r C r  M i U c s
°T ° '  (New Y o rk :* B a llan tin «
15
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This problem was particularly acute in the civi& rights movement. After 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it was difficult for activists 
to move from dynamic measures of direct action to the necessarily slower 
and often frustrating business of exerting energy by means of the vote and 
other forms of political action.
Fourthly, as some sections within the movement began to argue that 
other changes (often, but not always, valuative changes) had to take place 
in the society before the movements' demands could become meaningful 
(paradoxically, this argument was advanced least often in the militant, 
usually Communist-led, trade unions), it became less simple to pinpoint 
objects to attack. Automation, to cite example, was less easy to 
protest against with the aid of non-violent direct action than was a 
segregated lunch counter.
6 .Social control. The agencies of social control existed before the 
formation of the movements, but I was concerned in this thesis with measures 
which were activated after an episode of collective benaviour had material­
ized. Trie specific measures of social control were discussed in the main 
body of this thesis. The following remarks are of a more general nature.
In general, the authorities could encourage the movements, hold out 
the promise that demands could be obtained, use dilatory or vacillating 
tactics, ignore the movements, or repress them by inhibition o;r prohibition. 
The authorities could open up or close off some of the avenues of protest; 
they could remove or minimize the conditions of strain or make the strains 
appear tolerable; they could make normative changes which were less than 
those sought by the movements, but which the authorities regarded as a 
necessary palliative.
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The a u t h o r i t i e s  n ev e r welcomed n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n ;  i t  bew ild ered  
them , annoyed them , and c re a te d  c o n fu s io n . The te c h n iq u e s  o f  th e  p r o t e s t  
movements were c o n s id e re d  to  be dangerous p re c e d e n ts ,  ones t h a t  encouraged  
d is r e s p e c t  o f  th e  co n v en tio n s  and law s o f  th e  s o c ie ty ,  ones th a t  b o rd e red  
on in fr in g e m e n ts  o f  m a jo r i ty  r u l e ,  ones t h a t  b o rd e red  on d i s r u p t in g  th e  
d em o cra tic  p ro c e s s e s ,  and ones t h a t  u p s e t th e  s t a t u s  quo. The a u t h o r i t i e s  
fe a re d  th a t  i f  n o n -v io le n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n  was s u c c e s s f u l ,  i t  m ight be
adop ted  by o th e r  groups in  th e  s o c ie ty  to  p re s s  f o r  more f a r - r e a c h in g  
demands.
A lthough th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  d id  n o t welcome th e  p r o t e s t  movements, th e  
l a t t e r * s  a c t i v i t i e s  w ere c a r r i e d  on w ith  th e  co n sen t o f  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  
w here th ey  w ere h e ld  to  be more v a lu a b le  a s  a s a f e ty  v a lv e  th a n  a s  a 
m easure o f  s o c ia l  a c t io n  ( c i v i l  r ig h t s  m ovem ent); w here pun ishm ents were 
h e ld  to  be c o s t ly  and c a p a b le o f  p r e c i p i t a t i n g  d is o r d e r  ( t r a d e  u n ion  
movem ent); where th ey  d id  n o t th r e a te n  w id esp read  d is o rd e r  ( a l l  th r e e  
m ovem ents); w h ere , i f  l e f t  a lo n e ,  i t  was th o u g h t th a t  they  m ight c o l la p s e  
on t h e i r  own i n i t i a t i v e  (n u c le a r  disarm am ent movement). A ction  was taken  
a g a in s t  t a c t i c s  which th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  found p a r t i c u l a r l y  o d io u s , such  as th e  
s t a l l - i n ,  th e  b reac h  o f  th e  O f f i c i a l  S e c re ts  Act a t  th e  W e th e rs f ie ld  a i r  
b a s e , and th e  c o a l s t r i k e .
I  ag ree  w ith  Sm elser t h a t  because  b e l i e f s  a re  g e n e ra l iz e d ,  su ccess  
cannot be m easured s o le ly  in  te rm s o f th e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  th e  b e l i e f s .  
Movements w hich ach iev ed  some m easure o f  su c c e s s  co n tin u ed  to  a g i t a t e  a long  
th e  same o r  s im i la r  l i n e s  -  w itn e s s  the  c i v i l  r i g h t s  movement; th o se  w hich 
were u n s u c c e s s fu l d e c l in e d  -  w itn e s s  th e  n u c le a r  disarm am ent movement and 
th e  d ec re a se d  u se  o f  p o l i t i c a l  s t r i k e s  by th e  m i l i t a n t  t r a d e  u n io n s . But
-  403 -
even where the movements did not establish a normative innovation, they 
brought some measures of change to the society.
When the obaerver takes an over-all look at the movements, the most 
obvious question is why the civil rights movement achieved success (it 
left, in fact, "an observable mark - a norm or an organisation in its 
wake") to a far greater extent than did the other two movements, I 
should like to offer an explanation of the reasons for its success; I
suggest that the explanation reveala something important about protests 
luovements In general.
Tue situation in the United States differed from that in the other 
two countries because of the degree to which the ideal of equality (from 
wnich the generalised beliefs drew sustenance) was inculcated into the 
values of American society. The movement drew its inspiration from 
American ideology, but there was no anti-war ideology similarly entrenched 
in british society and no comparable, deeply-felt ideology in Australia 
which the trade unions could call upon to bolster their case. In fact,
1" tllooe ca»«« in Australia where there was an historical tradition, 
such as anti-Japanese and anti-colonialist feeling in the labour movement, 
the political strikes received greater community support.
Certain aspects of the civil rights movement may have been novel, 
especially the unprecedented scale on which the action took place, but 
tue issues had been with the country for nearly one hundred years. There 
were years of struggle by Negro groups, steady pressure from radicals and 
liberals, growing encouragement from the courts, and the gradual trans­
formation of the South into an industrial society in which some of the 
discrlainatory practices were costly,
16 Szuelser, op. o i t p. ill.
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The s t r a i n s  which th e  c i v i l  l ig h ts  movement spoke abou t were s tro n g ly  
f e l t  by more groups and in d iv id u a ls  o u ts id e  th e  movement, in c lu d in g  some 
o f th e  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  th an  was th e  case  in  th e  o th e r  two movements. The 
c i v i l  r i Sh t s  a c t i v i s t s ,  u n lik e  th o se  in  th e  o th e r  two movements, d id  n o t 
have to  engage in  an e d u c a tiv e  cam paign, b e fo re  th e  purpose o f  t h e i r  non­
v io l e n t  d i r e c t  a c t io n  cou ld  make s e n s e . Nor d id  they  have to  d iv id e  t h e i r  
e n e rg ie s  in to  b o th  e d u c a tin g  th e  p o p u la tio n  on th e  re a so n s  f o r  t h e i r  
p o s i t io n  and ta k in g  a s ta n d  on th a t  p o s i t io n  i t s e l f .  What th e  c i v i l
movement was t a lk in g  ab o u t was w id e ly  re c o g n iz e d  in  th e  community; 
b u t r a d io a c t iv e  f a l l - o u t ,  Jap an ese  a g g re s s io n ,  and th e  f a i l u r e s  o f  
« . n i t r a t i o n  w ere not m a tte rs  w ith  w hich th e  p u b l ic  had much know ledge.
i t  would ap p e a r  th a t  one f a c t o r  in  a movement’ s  b e in g  s u c c e s s f u l ,  th e n , 
i s  th e  d eg ree  to  w hich th e  v iew s a re  w id e sp re a d , th e  d eg ree  to  w hich view s 
become w idesp read  when c a l le d  to  p eo p le  ’s  a t t e n t i o n ,  and th e  d eg ree  to  
w hich view s a re  n o t h e ld  a t  a l l .  The rem oteness w ith  which most p eo p le  
re g a rd  m a tte r s  o f  fo re ig n  p o lic y  and th e  co m p lex ity  w ith  w hich th ey  regarded 
m a tte rs  o f defence  p o lic y  made i t  more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  movements to  succeed  
ii* th e se  f i e l d s .  I t  was e a s i e r  f o r  p eo p le  to  see  th e  im p lic a t io n s  o f  
c i v i l  r i g h t s  and f o r  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  to  i n s t i t u t e  change in  t h i s  f i e l d ,  
w h ile  i t  was h a rd e r  to  se e  th e  immediacy o f  th e  n u c le a r  disarm am ent and 
t r a d e  un ion  movement’ s demands and more complex f o r  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  to  
a l t e r  p o l i c i e s  in  th e s e  f i e l d s .
This i s  n o t meant to  im ply th a t  movements f o r  n u c le a r  disarm am ent o r  
fo r  changes in  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  a re  doomed to  im potence a t  th e  s t a r t .  I t  
means th a t  they  have to  wage a  h a rd e r  an d lo n g er cam paign to  g e t t h e i r  
demands th ro u g h . I t  means th a t  th e y  have to  ed u c a te  ( a ls o  an e lem ent 
in  s o c ia l  change) u n t i l  th e  tim e h as  become r ip e  f o r  a  change.
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APPENDIX "A"
METHODS OF NON-VIOLENT DIRECT ACTION
Cons titutional
Action
Petitions 
Deputations 
Lobbies 
Negotiations 
Fact Investi­
gation Propaganda
Letters to press
Leaflets
Pamphlets
Canvassing
Public Meetings^,
Exhibitions
Conferences _ Symbolic
Parades
Marches
Vigils
Rallies
Economic
Strikes (industrial or 
political)Boycott
Picket
Civil Disobedience
Open contravention 
of unjust laws througt 
acts of omission or 
commission 
Trespass 
Obstruction 
Revenue Refusal
In certain circumstances 
may become Act of Civil 
Disobedience
1916
1919
1920 
1927
1937
1939
1941
1945
1946
1947
1947
1947
APPENDIX "B"
AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL STRIKES*
Anti-conscription stoppages: various unions involved 
in refusals to file compulsory war census questionnaires; 
stop-works in protest over conscription referendum
Paul Freeman case: WWF refused to work ship until 
Freeman, alleged undesirable alien, was released
Father Jerger case: WWF refusal to work ship until 
Jerger; alleged undesirable alien, was tried
Sacco Vanzettl case: various unions hold stop-works 
in protest over executions of Sacco and Vanzetti in 
the United States; ACTU passes consumer boycott on 
American goods
•39 Pig-iron ban: WWF refusal to load various strategic 
goods for Japan
National Register boycott: various unions refuse to 
fill in National Register forms
Ratliff-Thomas case: various Communist unions hold 
stop-works demanding release of interned Communist 
trade union leaders Ratliff and Thomas
49 Dutch shipping ban: various unions, WWF in particular, 
refuse to load goods for the Netherlands East Indies
Flour ban to China: WWF refusal to load flour bound 
for Shanghai black market
Boycott on goods to Spain: WWF refusal to load goods 
for Spain
Soap ban: WWF refusal to load soap for export
Galvanized roofing ban: WWF refusal to load galvanised 
roofing iron for New Guinea
* This list does not purport to be complete.
1948
1948
1949
1949
1950
1950
1950
1951
1954
1960
1962
APPENDIX "B" [Ctd]
Prices protest: various unions hold stop-works in 
protest over high prices and black marketing in food 
and clothing
Greek ships ban: Seamen's Union refusal to work Greek 
ships
Sharkey and McPhillips case: various unions hold stop- 
vorke in protest over jailings of Sharkey and HcPhllllpa 
for contempt of court
Coal strike: Combined Mining Unions' protest over arbitra­
tion system and related causes
Sharkey case: various unions hold stop-works over jailing 
of Sharkey
Communist Party Dissolution Bill stoppages: various unions 
hold stop-works over the introduction of bill to ban the 
Communist Party
Korean War stoppages: Seamen's Union refusal to transport
war materials to Korea
Roach and Healy case: WWF refusal to load ships in protest 
of jailings of Roach and Healy
Indo-Chlna ban: WWF declaration of freighter "black*1 for 
carrying arms to Indo-Chlna
Crimes Act stoppages: WWF holds stop-works in protest 
against proposed amendments to Crimes Act
South Vietnam ban: WWF refusal to load barbed wire for 
South Vietnam
South Africa ban: WWF refusal to load or unload cargo 
Involved in trade with South Africa
